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ABSTRACT
Over a century before the Cherokees’ infamous “Trail o f Tears,” uprooted refugees 
already made up a majority among Indians in many regions o f the American backcountry. 
Using the Tuscarora Indians as a case study, I take a new look at the role o f refugee 
Indian groups in the construction of colonial frontiers and examine the ways that Indians 
thrown together from varying regional and cultural backgrounds wrestled with questions 
o f collective identity. Although the Tuscaroras had once been eastern North Carolina’s 
most influential Indian nation, after devastating military defeat, in the words o f one 
contemporary, they “scattered as the wind scatters smoke.” Some remained in North 
Carolina where they resided uneasily on the periphery o f a plantation society and saw 
their lives restructured as “tributaries” o f that colony. A few moved to South Carolina 
where they found employment as mercenaries, working to buy back enslaved kin.
Nearly two thousand trekked to Pennsylvania and New York where they settled with the 
Iroquois, a powerful five-nation confederacy that adopted the newcomers as their “sixth 
nation.” The result o f such dispersals was an eighteenth-century backcountry tied 
together by new bonds o f trade, war, diplomacy, and kinship: Indian travelers, often 
members o f displaced nations, constantly visited each other on worn valley paths hidden 
behind Appalachian ridge lines. At the same time, massive refugee movements that 
crossed colonial boundaries forced previously insular colonial governments to square off 
in either cooperation or competition in implementing frontier policies.
This study is the first detailed examination o f the Tuscaroras and a provocative case study 
in the interrelations between migration, culture, and politics.
IX
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INTRODUCTION
In mid-winter o f 1767, a sudden blizzard struck the Pennsylvania frontier, 
forcing a group of Indians to abandon their camp along the Susquehanna River and 
beg for refuge at the Moravian mission station o f Friedenshutten. The Indians’ 
distress may be partially explained by the unexpected strength o f the wintry blast, the 
unsuitability o f their temporary shelters, or their lack of supplies, but the Moravian 
diarist who recorded the incident suspected that the main reason was that the natives 
were entirely unused to the heavy, several-foot deep snowfalls o f the Pennsylvania 
hill country. The seventy-five Indians— among them women and children— were 
Tuscaroras, originally from the more temperate coastal plains o f North Carolina. 
Several months earlier they had begun a grueling journey north to rejoin many of their 
kin already living among the Iroquois in New York and northern Pennsylvania.1
1 Frank H. Severance, "Our Tuscarora Neighbors," Publications o f  the Buffalo 
Historical Society XXII (1918): 326; J. N. B. Hewitt, "Tuscarora," in Handbook o f  
American Indians North o f  Mexico, ed. Frederick W. Hodge, Bulletin, U.S. Bureau o f  
American Ethnology, 30, Part 2 (Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institution, 1910), 
847; Fioberger and Schmick, Diary, Friedenshutten, 1/26/1767 in Moravian Mission 
Records Among the North American Indians from  the Archives o f  the Moravian 
Church, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (microfilm, 40 reels) (New Haven, Conn.:
Research Publications, 1978) (hereafter Moravian Mission Records)', Carl John 
Fliegel, Index to the Records o f  the Moravian Mission Among the Indians o f  North 
America (New Haven: Research Publications, 1970), 3: 1052.
2
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3How does this image of a band of rag-tag Tuscarora Indians shivering on a 
Pennsylvania hillside fit into our broader understanding of colonial history? Bernard 
Bailyn once invited historians to imagine ourselves aboard a satellite looking down 
from spaced From that perspective, the view of the colonial period was a sea 
crisscrossed by the wakes o f ships traveling in every direction, carrying 
unprecedented populations o f Europeans and Africans.2 Another historian, 
introducing a work on the Great Puritan Migration of the 1630s, wrote that 
“geographic mobility is a major factor— some would say the major factor— in the 
deep changes that have affected people in the Western World over the last three or 
four centuries.” Such statements held equally true for non-Europeans, especially 
when we consider that perhaps three times as many enslaved Africans came to British 
America as Europeans.4 Anyway we look at it, the colonial period was a world in 
motion.5
2 Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling o f  British North America: An Introduction (New 
York: Knopf, 1986).
3 Roger Thompson, Mobility and Migration: East Anglian Founders o f  New England, 
1629-1640 (Amherst: University o f Masssachusetts Press, 1994), 4.
4 Philip D. Morgan, "British Encounters with Africans and African-Americans, Circa 
1600-1780," in Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins o f  the First British 
Empire, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan (Chapel Hill: University o f North 
Carolina Press, 1991), 161.
5 For a useful survey of the major secondary sources on migration during the colonial 
period, see Ned Landsman, "Migration and Settlement," in A Companion to Colonial 
America, ed. Daniel Vickers (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003), 76-98.
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4But what about Native Americans? At the same time as Europeans and 
enslaved Africans were establishing outposts along the Atlantic rim, the North 
American backcountry was a veritable sea o f displaced and migrating Indians, one 
whose currents and courses are little understood. Archeology reveals that Indian 
groups had shifted location time to time over history, but during the colonial period 
these movements accelerated from a glacial crawl into frenetic torrents.6 Over a 
century before the Cherokees’ infamous “Trail of Tears,” uprooted refugees made up 
a majority among Indians in many regions o f the American backcountry— some 
fleeing encroachment, war, or disease; some consolidating for strength; a few actually 
moving closer to Europeans to take better advantage of trade routes and the economic 
firepower they represented. Yamasees fled south to Florida; Delawares crossed into 
the Ohio Valley; Shawnees followed but not before a long detour through the 
Southeast; Abenakis departed north to New France. During their travels, Tuscaroras 
fixed their mark upon the place-names of sites such as Tuscarora Mountain, Path
6 For examples o f a debate about the migration among the Iroquois before European 
contact, see Dean R. Snow, "Migration in Prehistory: The Northern Iroquoian Case," 
American Antiquity 60, no. 1 (1995): 59-79; Dean R. Snow, "More on Migration in 
Prehistory: Accommodating New Evidence in the Northern Iroquoian Case," 
American Antiquity 61, no. 4 (1996): 791-96; Gary W. Crawford, and David G. 
Smith, "Migration in Prehistory: Princess Point and the Northern Iroquoian Case," 
American Antiquity 61, no. 4 (1996): 782-89. For a brief survey of Indian migrations 
and their effects during the colonial period, see Colin G. Calloway, New Worlds fo r  
All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking o f  Early America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), esp. chapter 7, “New Nomads and True Nomads.”
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5Valley, at least three Tuscarora Creeks, and numerous hills and ridges in present-day 
North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York.7
For a long time, most historical portrayals o f such migrations and movements 
fell into two camps, both flawed. One, borrowing heavily from the early rhetoric of 
European invaders, portrayed Indians as constantly on the move, with few ties or 
claims to any one location, almost like animals effortlessly roaming the landscape. 
Another, more sympathetic, portrayal depicted Indians stolidly rooted to and 
defending “traditional homelands,” until defeated. By this story line, movement 
becomes synonymous with defeat, and once defeated a particular Indian group would 
retreat into the sunset and out o f scholarly view.
Thankfully, some of the best recent scholarship on Indians has brought new 
sophistication to understanding disrupted and uprooted Indian groups. The opening 
chapter o f Richard White’s The Middle Ground entitled, “Refugees: A World Made 
of Fragments” describes how the Indians o f the Great Lakes region “were becoming 
cocreators o f a world in the making. The world that had existed before . . . was no
7 F. Roy Johnson, The Tuscaroras: Mythology, Medicine, Culture, 2 vols. 
(Murfreesboro, N.C.,: Johnson Publishing Co., 1967), 2: 205; Douglas Wesley Boyce, 
“Tuscarora Political Organization, Ethnic Identity, and Sociohistorical Demography,
1711-1825” (Ph.D. diss., Dept, o f Anthropology, U. o f North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
1973), 30; Hewitt, "Tuscarora," 848; Severance, "Our Tuscarora Neighbors," 326; 
Paul A. W. Wallace, Indian Paths o f  Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania 
Historical and Museum Commission, 1965), 168-70; Hamill Kenny, The Place 
Names o f  Maryland: Their Origin and Meaning (Baltimore: Museum and Library of 
Maryland Historical Society, 1984), 273.
8 For an analysis o f such literature, see Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian: 
Images o f  the American Indian from  Columbus to the Present, (New York: Knopf, 
1978).
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6more. It had shattered” like glass. The rest of the book is about how these Indians 
“pieced together a new world from shattered pieces.”9 Other historians have picked 
up the same thread, outlining a process sometimes called “ethnogenesis.” Fragments 
of Indian groups shattered by smallpox, land theft, and warfare joined together to 
create new peoples and new cultures that differed from the mere sum of their parts.10 
In other words, the real melting pots o f colonial American were not Boston, New 
York, or Philadelphia—they were Oquaga, Log town, and countless other 
communities where disrupted Indians came together and formed new cultures.
This project builds upon and, in some ways, challenges such models. 
Examining the Tuscarora Indians offers a new look at the role o f refugee Indian 
groups in the construction of colonial frontiers and reveals the ways that Indians 
thrown together from varying regional and cultural backgrounds wrestled with 
questions o f collective identity. As Tuscaroras were uprooted, they did assimilate 
aspects o f other Indian cultures. Nonetheless, they never forgot or abandoned old
9 Richard White, The Middle G round: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great 
Lakes Region, 1650-1815, Cambridge Studies in North American Indian History 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1.
10 See, for example, James H. Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their 
Neighbors from  European Contact through the Era o f  Removal (New York: Norton, 
1989); Patricia Kay Galloway, Choctaw Genesis, 1500-1700, Indians o f  the Southeast 
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1995); J. Leitch Wright, Creeks & Seminoles: 
The Destruction and Regeneration o f  the Muscogulge People, Indians o f  the 
Southeast (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1986); Michael N. McConnell, A 
Country Between : The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: 
University o f Nebraska Press, 1992).
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7identities. Their old sense o f self never shattered. Therefore, the story of the 
Tuscaroras is both one of cultural creation, and one of cultural preservation.
These questions extend beyond the Indians themselves. Although the 
Tuscaroras are the main focus o f this study, the events they experienced did not occur 
in a vacuum. Instead, decisions made by colonists helped shape the Tuscaroras’ 
course on every step of their journey. The early eighteenth century saw British 
colonies for the first time coming together into a nearly unbroken line o f settlement. 
Before, colonial governments had fashioned frontier policies largely in isolation from 
one another. But as old gaps between colonies disappeared, governments discovered 
that they would need to coordinate and cooperate to heretofore-unprecedented levels. 
Contradictions in policies from one government to another could no longer be easily 
allowed to persist.
The Tuscaroras played a special role in this process. At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, the Tuscaroras were the most influential Indian nation in eastern 
North Carolina, one of the last regions on the eastern seaboard to experience sustained 
European settlement. For several decades, Tuscaroras took advantage o f uncertain 
lines o f colonial authority there. When large numbers of Tuscaroras rose up in the 
Tuscarora War in 1711, they faced retribution from three governments, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, who to varying degrees cooperated or 
competed with one another. The Tuscaroras’ ties to other Indian groups, most notably 
the Iroquois, prompted the attention of other colonies as far away as Pennsylvania and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8New York. In the war’s aftermath, the expulsion and northward migration o f many 
Tuscaroras accelerated these inter-colonial processes.
The Tuscaroras stand out, but they were not unique in their movements. By 
the eighteenth century, many of the Indians encountered by European settlers had 
themselves recently moved, and were every bit as much “settlers” in their own right. 
What might be called an early “refugee crises” altered the ways that officials from 
individual colonies interacted with each other and conceptualized their role in an 
increasingly interconnected backcountry. Colonial governments came to see new 
opportunities among disrupted Indian groups like the Tuscaroras, viewing them as 
easily movable pawns that could be controlled in the great game for empire— an 
assumption that proved false. The story of the Tuscaroras is one of “identity politics” 
in the truest sense o f the term— that is, colonial and Indian leaders attempted to shape 
the culture and identity of the Tuscaroras for political purposes.
For these reasons, attention in this study is given not only to the choices of 
Tuscaroras, but also to understanding the actions of colonial leaders, traders, and 
missionaries who attempted to shape those choices. Most o f the documents consulted 
in this study were created by and for colonists who found themselves intertwined with 
the Tuscaroras. These writers saw themselves as playing a crucial role in shaping 
Tuscarora history— and they were correct. Conversely, the choices of Tuscaroras 
influenced colonists.
Chapter One describes the arrival o f European settlers and traders into the 
Tuscaroras’ world at the end o f the seventeenth century. Rather than being a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9politically cohesive confederacy, the Tuscaroras instead consisted of a loose alliance 
o f about fifteen ethnically related towns. Living near the fall-lines o f several rivers, 
Tuscaroras had acted as middlemen between coastal and interior tribes even before 
Europeans arrived, their language acting as a regional lingua franca in trade and 
diplomacy. After European contact, Tuscaroras had briefly thrived, securing a place 
in the trans-Atlantic deerskin and rum trades, and commanding respect from North 
Carolina’s weak government. But Chapter Two shows tensions mounted not only 
from the abuses o f slavers, traders, and settlers, but as the colonial governments of 
North Carolina and Virginia tried to impose contradictory models of control upon the 
regions’ Indians. The result was chaos and mounting frustration.
In reaction, a coalition of Lower Town Tuscaroras and other nearby Indians 
launched a series o f bloody attacks, known as the Tuscarora War (1711-1713). This 
assault, described in Chapter Three, rather than attempting to destroy colonial society, 
was meant to be a limited strike to force colonists to stop their abuses and enact a new 
era of orderly relations. Moreover, Tuscaroras hoped that divisions in North Carolina 
would prevent large-scale retaliation. The war, however, quickly escalated from a 
bloody but isolated conflict in the swamps of North Carolina into a conflagration that 
threatened to engulf the region. North Carolina’s government, already weak, nearly 
collapsed from the blow. Chapters Four and Five discuss how the governments of 
Virginia and South Carolina leapt into the vacuum. Each attempted to use the 
disorder o f the war to try to reconstruct their frontiers: South Carolina through the 
violence and economics of the slave trade, Virginia through the extension of tributary
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
relations with the region’s Indians, especially the large numbers o f Tuscaroras who 
tried to remain neutral. Despite initial success, the Tuscaroras who had rose up met 
defeat in 1713.
Chapter Six describes the choices confronted by Tuscaroras in the aftermath. 
The survivors scattered in a ordeal echoing Richard White’s shattered glass, or in the 
evocative words o f a contemporary, as the “wind scatters smoke.” Some remained in 
North Carolina, where they were restricted to a shrinking reservation and saw their 
lives restructured as “tributaries” of that colony. Their leader, “King” Tom Blount, 
nevertheless managed to carve out a degree of autonomy for his people and new 
authority for himself. A few Tuscaroras moved to South Carolina, where they found 
employment as mercenaries, hoping to buy back enslaved kin. Others, uncomfortable 
with Blount’s seizure of control, briefly considered creating separate communities in 
Virginia.
Between fifteen hundred and two thousand Tuscaroras fled the region 
altogether, trekking to Pennsylvania and New York where they settled among the 
Iroquois, a powerful five-nation confederacy. Following the lead o f current 
scholarship, it might be expected that this would have been a moment ripe for another 
instance o f ethnogenesis, whereby Tuscarora survivors would come together with 
other groups, leaving their culture to dissolve as a distinct entity. Indeed, predicting 
that the Tuscaroras’ identity as a cohesive body would soon be erased, an Iroquois
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sachem told an English negotiator that the Tuscaroras, defeated in war, “are no longer 
a Nation with a name, being once dispersed.”11
Despite dispersal, the Tuscaroras did not disappear; they remained a nation. 
Indeed, rather than departing the historical stage, they are best known for what 
happened next. Before 1722, the Iroquois, centered in modern-day New York, had 
consisted of a confederacy of five distinct, and yet allied nations— the Mohawks, 
Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas. Together the Iroquois held a unique 
political and military position among Europeans and Indians in eastern North 
American during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. After the flight o f the 
Tuscaroras to the region, the Iroquois took the unprecedented step o f expanding their 
confederacy, and granted the Tuscaroras status as a “sixth nation.”
Chapter Seven examines the context o f this transformation. Although the 
Tuscaroras shared distant cultural ties with the other five Iroquois nations, these 
bonds alone do not explain the Tuscaroras’ adoption. Indeed, until 1710, relations 
between the Tuscaroras and Iroquois were characterized less by amity than by 
bloodshed, as Iroquois warriors targeted Tuscarora communities in “mourning war” 
raids. Instead, the recognition o f the Tuscaroras as the sixth Iroquois nation owed in 
large part to the political circumstance o f the 1710s. The crisis created by the 
Tuscarora War and, more importantly, the subsequent flight o f angry refugees forced 
Virginia, New York, and Iroquois leaders into a debate over the proper nature of 
relations between Indian groups and colonies along the frontier. It was in the context
11 NYCD, 5: 376.
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of these arguments that Tuscaroras first acquired the status o f the Sixth Nation at a 
large multi-party treaty at Albany in 1722.
This was a singular transformation. An Indian group that was all but 
destroyed in North Carolina at the beginning of the eighteenth century reemerged 
hundreds of miles away in New York as a separate yet integrated part o f the Iroquois 
Confederacy—the most influential Indian polity o f the period. Their status was 
unique. The Tuscaroras were only one of fifteen or more groups who moved into the 
shadow of the Iroquois in the eighteenth century. Although this motley crew entered 
into a dizzying array of political and cultural arrangements with the Iroquois, only the 
Tuscaroras achieved lasting status as a sixth nation.
Chapter Eight examines what it meant to be Tuscarora living in Iroquoia in the 
eighteenth century. Not only does the chapter consider the status o f the Tuscaroras as 
a “nation” within the cultural and political structures o f the Six Nations and in 
diplomacy with colonial governments, it also describes integration by communities 
and individuals at the local level. Whether in towns along the Ambassadors’ Path 
between the Oneidas and Onondagas or along the upper reaches o f the Susquehanna 
River, Tuscaroras lived in communities that were closely integrated and intermixed 
with other refugees and migrants, other Iroquois, and especially Oneidas. As has 
often been the case for migrants, the Tuscaroras carefully straddled the line between 
acculturation among new neighbors and the maintenance o f a separate identity that 
preserved their own language, leaders, and customs.
i
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Even while many Tuscaroras acclimated to new northern homes, others 
remained in North Carolina. The persistence o f a broad Tuscarora identity partially 
owed to contacts that continued between the two bands of Tuscaroras that 
demonstrated and in turn strengthened their common bonds. Chapter Nine describes 
two separate types o f exchanges. The first consisted of war parties that traveled south 
to strike traditional Catawba enemies in the Carolinas, often stopping en route among 
Tuscaroras in North Carolina. The second consisted of sporadic bands of migrants 
who subsequently chose to depart North Carolina to rejoin their northern kin— a 
native example of the “chain migrations” more often used to described European 
population flows. Unable to prevent such travels, colonial officials did their best to 
harness these movements and migrations to create dependencies and reshape the 
cultural geography of the frontier. For Tuscaroras, both types o f exchanges 
. contributed to the continuity of a distinct culture, but both could also generate tension 
as Tuscaroras, long separated, could assess differences among the others and wonder 
were the “real” Tuscaroras.
The Tuscaroras in the eighteenth century underwent a long odyssey. Defeated 
in war, dispersed, reincarnated as part of the Iroquois, all the while maintaining a 
particular identity via distant travels and migrations— none o f these changes would 
have been easy to predict in the late 1600s. Indeed, the first few Englishmen to arrive 
in their North Carolina homeland had hardly looked like agents o f change at all. They 
merely looked afraid.
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CHAPTER I 
RESTLESS NEIGHBORS:
CONTACT BETWEEN TUSCARORAS AND EUROPEANS, 1670-1711
Until late in the seventeenth century, the Tuscaroras lived virtually isolated 
from direct European contact. The sparse encounters that did occur had been tense 
and curt— sharp staccatos that punctuated longer silences. The first Englishman to 
seek contact with the Tuscaroras was Ralph Lane, who in 1586 paddled with an 
expedition several days upriver from the ill-fated Roanoke Colony. His efforts were 
rewarded with an ambush of arrows from the brush that caused an unseemly retreat. 
In 1650, after the establishment of Virginia, the would-be trader and land-speculator 
Edward Bland bungled his way south towards the Tuscaroras. But after becoming 
increasingly paranoid that almost every Indian he met was conspiring to cut him off, 
he too led his party in a panicked scramble back to safety. Two decades later, a young 
German scientist, John Lederer, left behind his haughty Virginian traveling 
companions and, accompanied only by a Susquehannock guide, walked a long loop 
visiting Indian communities through southwestern Virginia and North Carolina. 
Despite his adventurous spirit, he dared to stay at Katearas, a Tuscarora town, only
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one night. In the morning, fearing “some sudden mischief towards me,” he fled, 
content to abandon his gun and escape with his life.1
Apprehension and mistrust had marked encounters between the Europeans and 
Tuscaroras, but towards the end of the century barriers began to erode. Thirty years 
after Lederer staggered back to Virginia telling tales so unbelievable that he was 
subsequently laughed out of the colony, John Lawson, an adventure-seeking, well- 
heeled young Englishman versed in cartography and the natural sciences, ventured 
into nearly the same territory.2 Unlike Lederer’s misguided meanderings, the route 
Lawson took is reasonably clear. Accompanied by a small band of Indian guides and 
English traveling companions, Lawson set out by canoe from Charleston into the 
Carolina interior. Then, on foot, the group turned north on a series o f paths across the 
piedmont. They forded the Wateree, Peedee, and Haw Rivers above their falls and 
waded numerous small creeks that cut east toward the coastal sounds. As Lawson’s 
party passed through the piedmont landscape o f rolling hills interspersed with
1 Edward Bland, “The Discovery o f  New Brittaine, 165 O f in The First Explorations 
o f  the Trans-Allegheny Region by the Virginians 1650-1674, ed. Clarence Walworth 
Alvord and Lee Bidgood (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark and Co., 1912), 105-130; John 
Lederer, “Discoveries John Lederer,” in First Explorations o f  the Trans-Allegheny 
Region by the Virginians, 1650-1674, ed. Clarence Walworth Alvord and Lee 
Bidgood (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1912), 131-172. Nathaniel Batts, an agent for 
the trader Francis Yardley had better luck. In the early 1650s he established a trading 
house near the mouth o f the Roanoke River where he met with several Tuscarora 
leaders. Francis Yeardley, "Narrative of Excursions into Carolina, 1654," in 
Narratives o f  Early Carolina: 1650-1708, ed. Alexander S. Salley (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911), 25-29.
2 John Lawson, A New Voyage to Carolina (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina 
Press, 1967), 3-67, especially 63-67.
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meadows and hardwood forests, far from entering an uninhabited countryside, they 
traveled among a dazzling array of peoples. They met Catawbas, Enoes, Saponies, 
Cheraws, Santees, Waxsaws, Occaneechees, and others— all loosely categorized by 
modern ethnographers as “Siouan groups” but varied in their local practices and 
languages.3 Nearly every evening they reached a town or village where they traded, 
ate, shared news, and spent the night.
After several hundred miles Lawson turned east, following the Neuse River 
downstream from the piedmont into the coastal plains. The land became more level, 
sandy, and only slightly rolling; rapid rivers turned sluggish and brown; swamps 
became more common; hardwoods gave way to open pine mixed with scrub oak. 
“Good Range for Cattel,” noted Lawson who always had an eye towards speculation, 
but only “indifferent for swine.”4 More notable were the people. “The Country here,” 
he recorded as his party crossed northeast, passing Contentnea Creek and emerging
3 For descriptions o f the Siouan peoples, particularly the Catawbas, see James H. 
Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors From European 
Contact Through the Era o f  Removal (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1989), in particular pages 1-7 for Lawson’s journey. Much o f this chapter is informed 
by that work’s examination of the Catawbas, the Tuscaroras’ neighbors and 
competitors to the south. Merrell also uses Lawson as one o f his principle sources—a 
tactic that is somewhat problematic considering that Lawson’s own contacts were 
primarily with the Tuscaroras. Although there were similarities between the early 
contact experiences o f the Catawbas and the Tuscaroras, the Catawbas ultimately 
were able to accommodate themselves to the expanding English presence. Many of 
the Tuscaroras, on the other hand, rose up in war and were ultimately driven from the 
Carolinas. See also John Reed Swanton, The Indians o f  the Southeastern United 
States, United States Bureau o f American Ethnology. Bulletin 137 (Washington, DC: 
Smithsonian Institution, 1946).
4 Lawson, New Voyage, 65.
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onto the Pamlico River, “is very thick of Indian Towns and Plantations.”5 They had 
entered the heartland of the Tuscaroras. About fifteen villages, not to mention 
sprawling neighborhoods of scattered farms, clustered along the major waterways of 
the coastal plain and the piedmont’s eastern edge. A population of approximately 
four thousand made its Iroquoian-speaking people one of the largest Indian groups in 
the Carolinas, indeed, of the whole eastern seaboard.6
Unlike his predecessors who were apprehensive about hazarding into a heart 
o f darkness, Lawson did not feel endangered. If anything, his pace among the 
Tuscaroras slowed, mimicking the sluggish waterways he marched along. For several 
days his party leisurely ambled through the region’s hunting camps and towns. At one 
man’s invitation they “resolved to tarry for his Company” for two nights. Food was
5 Lawson, New Voyage, 66.
6 Douglas W. Boyce, “Iroquoian Tribes o f the Virginia-North Carolina Coastal Plain,” 
in Northeast, ed. B. G. Trigger, Handbook o f  North American Indians, Vol. 15 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 282-289; Douglas W. Boyce, 
“Notes on Tuscarora Political Organization, 1650-1713” (Master's Thesis, Dept, of 
Anthropology, University o f Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1971); John E. Byrd and 
Charles L. Heath, “The Rediscovery of the Tuscarora Homeland: A Final Report of 
the Archaeological Survey of the Contentnea Creek Drainage, 1995-1997” (East 
Carolina University, David S. Phelps Archaeology Laboratory, 1997); J. N. B. Hewitt, 
“Tuscarora,” in Handbook o f  American Indians North o f  Mexico, ed. Frederick W. 
Hodge, Bulletin, U.S. Bureau o f  American Ethnology, 30, Part 2 (Washington, D.C: 
Smithsonian Institution, 1910), 842-853; Thomas C. Parramore, “The Tuscarora 
Ascendancy,” NCHR 59, no. 4 (1982): 307-326; Herbert Richard Paschal, “The 
Tuscarora Indians in North Carolina” (Master's Thesis, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, 1953); F. Roy Johnson, The Tuscaroras: Mythology, Medicine, Culture,
2 vols. (Murfreesboro, N.C.,: Johnson Pub. Co., 1967). One observer wrote in 1712 
“Tho’ this be called a town, it is only a plantation here and there scattered about the 
Country, no where 5 houses together, and then lA a mile such another and so on for 
several miles” (Boyce, “Iroquoian Tribes,” 283).
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scarce—the season was late winter and hunting was poor—yet one Tuscarora host 
offered to share the last of his corn; another proffered beaver tail, a delicacy. During 
their stay they witnessed a healing ceremony and a funeral; they partook of the feast 
that followed. Setting out east again, some of his party accepted an invitation to go 
out o f the way to another town.7 Finally, after reaching the coast and finishing his 
journey through the Carolina backcountry, Lawson felt comfortable enough among 
the Tuscaroras to settle at the edge of their territory. He constructed “a House about 
Half a mile from an Indian town at the fork of Neus-River, where I dwelt by myself, 
excepting a young Indian Fellow, and a Bull-Dog, that I had along with me.” He 
became North Carolina’s Surveyor General, a post whose travels over the next several 
years would bring him into further contact with the region’s Indians.
The contrasts between Lawson’s experiences and Lederer’s, Bland’s, or 
Lane’s reflect a shift that had been underway for several decades. Those few early 
explorers had been frightening outsiders, whose entry elicited fear and apprehension 
for everyone involved. However, from about the 1670s onwards, trade and 
settlement exploded, making contacts between the two peoples more common.8 The 
paths Lawson followed had been made by Indians, but were increasingly familiar to 
traders going north from Charleston or south from Virginia. For part of his journey he 
had traveled with John Stewart, homeward-bound to Virginia after months among the 
Indians selling seven horseloads of goods. Settlers also lived nearby. Lawson’s cabin
7 Lawson, New Voyage, 65-61.
8 Merrell, Indians ’ New World, 32.
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on the Neuse joined those of a growing number o f settlers within one or two day’s 
reach of the Tuscaroras. Among the Tuscaroras, Lawson was entertained and treated 
politely, but he did not elicit exceptional attention. People like him— other Europeans 
trading trinkets, flirting with women, accepting food, and sharing sleeping quarters—  
had become common. Lawson’s Tuscarora host regularly traded with the English and 
had probably quartered numerous traders. In return, the host probably hoped to be 
received similarly when he next ventured among the Europeans.
Lawson not only benefited from this increasing familiarity, he furthered it by 
recording and publishing his observations and experiences in a work entitled A New 
Voyage to Carolina. It contained both his journal and an extensive account o f the 
Indians of North Carolina. Part scientific catalogue, it also acted as a virtual how-to 
guide for life among the Indians.9 He recognized that traders and settlers (both of 
whom he hoped to attract to the region with the work) would need to take the 
Tuscaroras and other Indians into account in nearly every aspect of their endeavors.
At the same time, the Tuscaroras were also observing Europeans, becoming 
familiar with their ways and adapting to their presence. By almost any standard, the 
Tuscaroras remained the most powerful and influential group in the region. But in the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries they found themselves facing new 
challenges: an intruding culture, a competing political presence, and sudden inclusion 
into Atlantic markets. The issue was no longer rare confrontations between
9 Hugh T. Lefler, “Promotional Literature of the Southern Colonies,” Journal o f  
Southern History 33: 1 (Feb. 1967): 19-20.
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unfamiliar peoples. It was how the two would cope when they became thoroughly 
intertwined.10
* * * *
Doors Opened
For decades the Tuscaroras had been feeling the indirect aftershocks of 
Europeans jostling with native groups just beyond their borderlands. These 
reverberations reached a new magnitude in 1676 with Bacon’s Rebellion. That war is 
best known as an internecine struggle among Virginia settlers that saw the sacking 
and burning of the capital at Jamestown at the hands of a boisterous band of ex­
servants, middling farmers, slaves, and discontented planters, all headed by the 
ambitious Nathaniel Bacon. They erected their own revolutionary junta before being 
ultimately defeated by Governor William Berkeley with his own band of supporters 
reinforced by royal marines. Although the rebellion exposed long-brewing tensions 
over taxation and representation o f new counties, sparking the conflict and giving it 
its terrible momentum was a bloody series o f raids and counter-raids between settlers 
and neighboring Indians. The result was an orgy of bloodletting in which Bacon’s 
men, unable to track down enemy raiders, and impelled by fear, frustration, and deep- 
seated racism, indiscriminately struck at any Indians at hand. The conflict had begun
10 Merrell, Indians’ New World; Richard White, The Middle G round: Indians, 
Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991); Colin G. Calloway, New Worlds fo r  A l l : Indians, 
Europeans, and the Remaking o f  Early America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997); James Axtell, The Indians' New South : Cultural Change in 
the Colonial Southeast (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997).
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in the north against the Susquehannocks who lived near the Maryland border; soon 
much of the action shifted to Virginia’s southside, the region closest to the 
Tuscaroras.11
The Tuscaroras were not drawn into the war, but many o f their closest 
Iroquoian neighbors immediately to the north were. At one point Bacon’s men 
induced two dozen Nottoways and the Meherrins (cousins and often allies o f the 
Tuscaroras) to join an attack upon the Occaneechees (a Siouan group northwest o f the 
Tuscaroras that controlled much of the area’s trade).12 “What we reckon most 
materiall,” recounted one of Bacon’s followers, “is that wee have left all nations of 
Indians, where wee have been engaged in a civill warr amongst themselves, soe that 
With great ease wee hope to mannage this advantage, to their utter ruine and
( n
destruction.” Soon the Meherrins and Nottoways themselves joined the long list of 
tribes who felt the wrath of Bacon’s men. In 1677 Ununtequero, “king of the 
Meherrin,” Harehannah, “the Meherrin’s 2nd chief,” and the “king of the Nottowayes” 
signed their marks to a treaty meant to restore peace to Indians whom the rebels had 
assailed.14 Also appearing on the treaty were the marks of the leaders of the
11 Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Governor and the Rebel: A History o f  Bacon's 
Rebellion in Virginia (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture at 
Williamsburg by the University of North Carolina Press, 1957).
12 “Bacon’s Rebellion,” WMQ 1st series, 9, no. 1 (July 1900): 1.
13 “Bacon’s Rebellion,” WMQ 1st series, 9, no. 1 (July 1900): 4.
14 “Treaty Between Virginia and the Indians, 1677” VMHB 14, no.3 (January 1907): 
295-96; Shannon Lee Dawdy, “The Meherrin's Secret History of the Dividing Line,” 
NCHR 72, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 394.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2
Pamunkeys, Appomattox, Weyanokes, Nansemonds, Nansiaticoes, Monacans, and 
Saponis—members o f nearly every tribe that shared the swath o f territory between 
Virginia and the northern reaches of the Tuscaroras.
Besides offering Tuscaroras a vicarious lesson in English military wrath, the 
long-term effect o f the war was to eliminate many o f the barriers that had previously 
shielded the Tuscaroras from nearly all direct contact with the English. Before the 
war, several Indian groups had wielded influence out of proportion with their disease- 
depleted numbers by jealously guarding roles as middlemen between Virginia and 
larger, more distant Indian groups like the Tuscaroras. The Occaneechees had held a 
stranglehold over southern trade from their nearly unassailable rocky island in the 
Roanoke River, but the war killed many and drove the rest to resettle far to the south 
along the Eno River out of range of future retaliations.15 The Weyanokes had cagily 
warned off interlopers by spreading rumors (by no means entirely false) that “the 
English would kill them, or detaine them, and would not let them goe without a great 
heape o f Roanoke [wampum] middle high.”16 The Meherrins also employed scare
1 7tactics to prevent direct contacts between the Tuscaroras and the English. Defeated 
in war, weakened in numbers, and subject to treaty agreements, after Bacon’s
15 Daniel Simpkins, “Aboriginal Intersite Settlement System Change in the 
Northeastern North Carolina Piedmont During the Contact Period” (Ph.D. diss. Dept, 
of Archeology, U. o f North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1992), 219-21.
16 Edward Bland, “The Discovery of New Brittaine, 1650,” in Narratives o f  Early 
Carolina, 1650-1708, ed. Alexander S. Salley (New York, 1911), 12.
17 Dawdy, "Meherrins’ Secret History," 396.
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rebellion these groups were less of an imposing obstacle to traders seeking to pass
through and seek customers among the Tuscaroras.
Another casualty o f war was the network of border forts that Virginia’s
Council had designated as official trade rendezvous since 1644. These had helped
hem in English expansion and had regulated contact with outside groups o f Indians.
Long unpopular for the government cronyism they sustained, their military
ineffectiveness during the war made them a chief target of the rebels. Bacon’s
ultimate defeat did little to resuscitate this gasping institution. The structures still
remained, but increasingly places like Fort Henry became mere departure points, last
stops for Englishmen at the heads o f ever-larger pack trains loaded with trade goods
1 &headed south into Indian country. As gentlemen traders established their own 
plantation headquarters complete with storehouses near the falls o f the James and 
Appomattox Rivers and later along the Blackwater River, these forts were eventually 
by-passed entirely. In the 1650s, the trader Francis Yardley briefly established a trade 
house under the direction of Nathanial Batts at the mouth of the Roanoke River.19 In 
1671, a year after Lederer had been shocked at the scarcity o f trade goods among the 
“remoter Indians,” a young William Byrd inherited over five thousand acres at the
18 Earlier in the century several traders and explorers had departed from these 
outposts, as the examples of Bland, Lederer, Batts, and Fallam attest. But Alan 
Briceland in Westward from  Virginia believes these early adventurers and the failures 
they met with were the exception that proved the rule that travel beyond the fall line 
by Europeans was rare before the last quarter of the century. Alan Vance Briceland, 
Westward From Virginia: The Exploration o f  the Virginia-Carolina Frontier, 1650- 
1710 (Charlottesville, University Press o f Virginia, 1987).
19 Yeardley, "Narrative."
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falls o f the James River, complete with “Several Slaves, Houses Cattle Households 
Stuff Goods [and] Merchandizes.”20 Within a few years he was outfitting frequent 
trading expeditions from his warehouse and constantly seeking out ships to transport 
the hides and furs to England.
Eliminating the bottlenecks that had slowed the passage o f traders into the 
Carolina piedmont and inner coastal plain helped make the next four decades the 
golden age of Virginia’s southwestern trade. By the end of the century between fifty 
and sixty Virginia traders embarked annually on the “trading voyage” to the Indian 
nations in the Carolinas and beyond. By 1708 their numbers had perhaps reached as 
many as one hundred.21 Before 1711 many of these expeditions made the Tuscaroras 
their final destination or a temporary stopping point as they wound their way south, 
ferrying across the Pamlico, Neuse, and Tar rivers, pausing to trade for hides at the 
numerous towns, villages, and scattered plantations o f the Tuscarora heartland before
'youltimately turning west towards the piedmont tribes. Other traders called “coasters”
came by water, meeting Indians along the shores o f the Pamlico or Albemarle Sound, 
or traveling further inland by river.23 The result o f these transformations was that in 
their own territory Tuscaroras were encountering English traders in greater numbers 
and for longer periods than ever before.
20 Quotation in Mary Miley Theobald, “The Indian Trade in Colonial Virginia” (M.A. 
thesis, Dept, o f History, The College of William and Mary, 1980), 58.
21 Merrell, Indians' New World, 29.
22 Merrell, Indians ’ New World, 28-29.
23 NCCR, 22: 732-35; Yeardley, "Narrative."
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* * * *
Traders in a Tuscarora World
For the English traders beginning to venture south out of the settled tobacco 
plantations o f Virginia, the territory they were entering was unfamiliar. “The Land 
between James River and Roanoke River is for the most parts low sunken swampy 
land not well passable but with great difficulty,” the legend on a 1673 map grimly 
reported; even worse, “therein harbours Tygers Bears and other Devouringe 
creatures.”24 But what seemed foreboding and new to early English traders was 
familiar ground for Indians who had been trekking and trucking between various 
tribes in the region long before Europeans got involved in the trade. Even before the 
English showed up on at their doorways with loads o f cargo, the Tuscarora town of 
Katearas was reported to be a place of “great trade and commerce.” Copper, 
deerskins, flint, shellfish (tiny black marginella shells), pearls, and buffalo hides had 
passed through Tuscarora towns on their way back and forth in a busy commerce as
Oftribes exchanged their local abundance and surplus for distant delicacies. Later, 
European goods entered the mix and reached the Tuscaroras through a long filter o f
24 Herrman, “Map of Virginia and Maryland,” (1967 facsimile of 1673 original from 
the John Carter Brown Library, Providence, Rhode Island at the Barrett Branch of the 
Alexandria Public Library, Alexandria, Virginia).
25 Lederer, "Discoveries," 162.
Oft Helen C. Rountree, ed., Powhatan Foreign relations, 1500-1722 (Charlottesville: 
University Press o f Virginia, 1993), 44-49.
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Indian middlemen. As early as 1622 an Englishman exploring the area reported 
seeing a “China box” that had probably passed through a long line o f Indian traders’ 
hands northward from Spanish settlements on the Gulf Coast.27 Virginia had 
inherited for its traders a cluster of well-trod routes that connected the old Powhatan 
empire at the fall line with other peoples to the south and southwest where war parties 
and traders had alternately passed through for diplomacy, war, and trade.28 Locals 
knew one of these routes, not far from a “great swamp” on the Roanoke River where a 
group of Weyanokes fled in the mid-seventeenth century, as the “tuscaroora path.”29 
An archeological assortment o f potshards of Tuscarora and Powhatan manufacture
on
reveal that the region experienced a constant flow of goods, people, and technology.
RVCL, III: 641-642. The king who possessed it “declared, that it was sent him from 
the West, by a King that dwels ouer the great hils, whose Countrey is neare the Sea, 
he hauing that box from a People, as he said, that come thither in Ships, and weare 
clothes, and dwell in houses, and are called Acanackchina.”
A high mixture o f Gaston (generally Powhatan) and Cashie (Tuscarora) pottery 
reveals that the southern border o f the Powhatan empire experienced a great deal of 
trade with the Tuscaroras. (Rountree, Powhatan Foreign Relations, 91.) A Tuscarora 
route known as the Wecacanna Path linked the Occaneechee Path to the Chowan 
River (Parramore, “Tuscarora Ascendancy,” 311). See Dawdy, “Meherrins’ Secret 
History,” 397 for a map on which several o f these routes can be seen. The same map 
is also in William Byrd, William Byrds's Histories o f  the Dividing Line Betwixt 
Virginia and North Carolina, William K. Boyd, ed. (Raleigh: North Carolina 
Historical Commission, 1929).
29 William G. Stanard, “The Indians of Southern Virginia, 1650-1711: Depositions in 
the Virginia and North Carolina Boundary Case,” VMHB 7, no. 4 (April 1900): 349- 
50.
TO Rountree, Powhatan Foreign Relations, 91.
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Rather than plunging into this stream of commerce alone, Englishmen waded
•j |
in accompanied by Indian guides and translators. These were the men and women 
who led the traders past swamps and down rivers, who hunted daily meals, and when 
paths split in the woods, chose the one best traveled. In old age Richard Booth could 
look back upon his first forays as a young trader paddling down the Blackwater River 
toward Carolina guided by a Weyanoke Indian named Tom Frusman. “Being a 
Stranger in those parts” he recalled, he had brimmed with questions: “what river that 
was they first mett with on their Right Hand?” Who planted that field over there? 
“How far . . .  to Maherine River?”32
Besides leading traders across the landscape, these Indian companions showed 
traders heading into Tuscarora country the ins and outs o f unfamiliar cultural 
territory. There were numerous pitfalls and missteps to avoid. Approaching 
strangers needed to announce themselves to a village with a gunshot, a halloo, or an 
unthreatening child sent running home, or else they risked being suspected as spies, or 
what was worse, Iroquois raiders. Traders needed to be taught when to shake hands 
and when to scratch and stroke the shoulders of their hosts and potential customers.34
31 Merrell, Indians’ New World, 30.
32 NCCR, 7:661-662.
33 Merrell, Indians ’ New World, 29-31. For a less optimistic appraisal, in which 
Indians and European contested for authority on the trail, see Philip Levy, “Fellow 
Travelers: Indians and Europeans Together on the Early American Trail” (Ph.D. diss., 
Department o f History, College of William and Mary, 2001).
34 Rountree, Powhatan Foreign Relations, 39-44.
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Even where to sleep, whether in the house of the town leader, in a separate structure 
built for visiting traders, or in the “mercenary” embrace of a “trade girl” next to her 
seemingly indifferent parents, had to be carefully thought out and considered.35 
Mistakes could do more than hinder trade among Indians who considered commerce 
on a single continuum with diplomacy, kinship, friendship, and war; they could be 
dangerous. These were the sort o f blunders that Bland’s boisterous band and Lederer 
after him had made, turning every town they visited into a hotbed of suspicious 
whispers.
To be successful, traders had to learn more than geography and cultural 
niceties; they needed to be able to communicate verbally with their customers.36 
Often they depended upon their guides to serve double duty as interpreters. But such 
dependence had its weaknesses. On his first trip into Tuscarora territory, Lawson 
wasted half a day ineffectually shouting and waving across a flooded stream at a pair 
of Tuscaroras on the other side. Only when his native guide, Enoe Will (bringing up 
the rear with a stubborn pack horse), finally arrived could sense be made of what was 
being said. Such linguistic roadblocks were liable to occur constantly. The numerous 
tribes each had their own language so that “it often, appears, that every dozen miles, 
you meet with an Indian Town, that is quite different from the others you last parted 
withal.” Easing the confusion, however, was the convention that, despite this babble
35 For “mercenary” trade girls, Lawson, New Voyage, 189.
36 James Axtell, "Babel o f Tongues: Communicating with the Indians," in Natives and 
Newcomers: The Cultural Origins o f  North America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 46-78.
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of tongues, “the most powerful Nation of these Savages scorns to treat or trade with 
any others (of fewer Numbers and less Power) in any other Tongue but their own, 
which serves for the Lingua o f the Country.” As for North Carolina, “we see that the 
Tuskeruro’s are most numerous . . . therefore their Tongue is understood by some in
07
every Town of all the Indians near us.”
Lawson’s early linguistic helplessness shows that any sensible trader or 
traveler needed to pick up at least a few crucial Tuscarora words and phrases.
Lawson himself later recorded over a hundred and fifty words and an assortment of 
phrases in the Tuscarora language (far outnumbering the few words in Woccon and 
Pampticough he also put down). His choice o f words gives a glimpse of the 
stuttering exchanges he and other traders attempted in Tuscarora towns. The wordlist 
begins with translations o f numbers. They are followed by names for an assortment 
o f trade goods including Rum (“oonaquod”), Blankets (“Oorewa”), Gunpowder and 
shot (“ou-kn” and “cauna”), kettle (“oowaiana”), and gun (“Auk-noc”). If the trader 
knew the wares he carried, he also knew how to name his price. He sought raw skins 
undressed (“ootahawa”), dressed-skin, (“cotcoo”), buckskin (“ocques”), fawn-skin 
(“ottea”), bear-skin (“oochehara”), fox-skin (“che-chou”), and others. Traders were 
also armed with such handy phrases as “I will sell you Goods very cheap,” 
“Englishman is thirsty,” “How many?” “Give it to me,” and “I am sick.”39
37 Lawson, New Voyage, 233.
38 Lawson, New Voyage, 233-39.
39 Lawson, New Voyage, 233-39.
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Knowing a few awkward words and becoming fluent were two different 
things. , To make themselves understood, Tuscaroras spoke simply and slowly to 
non-natives. This practice contributed to the wrong impression that “their Languages 
or Tongues are so deficient, that you cannot suppose the Indians ever could express 
themselves in such a Flight o f Stile, as Authors would have you believe.”40 Practice 
could be had by patient exchanges over a campfire with a guide who might know an 
equivalent smattering o f English. A method more pleasurable to many traders was 
having “an Indian Female for his Bed-fellow” according to the belief that “this 
correspondence makes them learn the Indian Tongue much the sooner, they being of 
the . .  . opinion, . . .  [that a] Wife teaches her Husband more . .  .in one Night, than a 
School-master can in a Week.”41
Opportunities for such companionship abounded, with native guides and 
middlemen frequently introducing traders to “trading Girls.” Distinguishable by 
specific haircuts, these young women often met native and English traders and 
“design’d to get Money by their Natural Parts.” A price was set, with either the 
parents, local leader, or occasionally the girl herself naming the sum, and the couple 
retired either to a cabin of their own or to a less-than-private corner of the family 
dwelling 42 Sometimes these women would turn down the traders, seeing that they 
had nothing they wanted. Other times they would take as payment more than the
40 Lawson, New Voyage, 239.
41 Lawson, New Voyage, 35-36.
42 Lawson, New Voyage, 190.
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trader had bargained for: one of Lawson’s companions had his pockets picked and his 
shoes stolen and had to hop along the next day barefooted.43
Long-term relationships also resulted between traders and Tuscarora women, 
with the man being “constant to their Indian Wife, and her Relations, so long as they 
liv’d.”44 In such cases the woman became an invaluable assistant and guide who not 
only fixed food and dressed hides, but also worked “instructing ‘em in the Affairs and 
Customs of the Country.”45 Their kinship ties, language skills, and practical 
knowledge could smooth over a host o f difficulties for a trader among the Tuscaroras. 
On occasion relationships ended in bitter tears and abandonment.46 But a trader had 
every incentive not to let this happen because, as Lawson noted, when a trader “is 
reserv’d from the Conversation o f their Women, ‘tis impossible for him ever to 
accomplish his Designs amongst that People.”47 Such relationships were especially 
valuable when one considers how many o f the trader’s wares, whether metal hoes or 
draw-knives to replace curved digging sticks and oyster shell scrapers, were bound for 
female hands 48
43 For a trade girl’s refusal of trader’s advances, Lawson, New Voyage, 36. For the 
theft o f shoes, Lawson, New Voyage, 47.
44 Lawson, New Voyage, 192.
45 Lawson, New Voyage, 192.
46 Lawson, New Voyage, 195.
47 Lawson, New Voyage, 192.
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Whatever the goods, traders among the Tuscaroras and other southeastern 
Indians had to learn to provide products that met the exacting standards o f their 
clientele. William Byrd’s letters to his suppliers fumed with the frustration of trying 
to get goods that pleased his fickle customers: “Beads you sent mee large white 
instead of sm all. . . send mee none but small white this year, all others a drug.”49 
Indians turned up their noses at “kettles which they say had holes in them.”50 They 
preferred blue above all other colors, but a shade that was “sad” and dark, prompting 
Byrd to protest that “Your duffields much complaind of both ye goodnesse & color a 
darker blew pleases the Indians best.”51 An Indian buying a gun might blast away a 
hundred or more valuable rounds before being satisfied that it fired true.52 Byrd 
begged his supplier to “Pray Speake to the Gun Smith that the Dogs of all the Gun 
Locks have good Hold otherwise the Indians will not buy them.” An Indian trader’s 
account books occasionally listed “Guns returned.”54 Whatever the trader thought of 
his choosy buyers, he had to learn to hold his tongue and put forward a proper 
attitude. Indians looking for goods “never frequent a Christian’s House that is given 
to Passion,” reported Lawson, “nor will they ever buy or sell with him, if they can get
49 Quotation in Theobald, “Indian Trade,” 60.
50 Quotation in Theobald, “Indian Trade,” 60.
51 Quotation in Theobald, “Indian Trade,” 60.
52 Lawson, New Voyage, 33.
53 Quotation in Theobald, “Indian Trade,” 60.
54 CRNC, 4:420.
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the same Commodities o f any other Person; for they say, such Men are mad Wolves, 
and not more Men.”55
This choosiness on the part of the Tuscaroras and other southeastern Indians 
shows that new goods being brought by traders were being weighed against traditional 
native products and used in familiar ways. Even with native precedents, however, 
European goods represented a technological revolution. Brass kettles were less liable 
to shatter when placed directly over an open fire than pebble-tempered, pattern- 
stamped clay pots the Tuscaroras had been shaping for several centuries. Gradually 
these were replaced in the archeological record.56 When trade kettles finally wore 
out, the Tuscaroras could cut them up and recycle the brass into decorative bracelets, 
gorgets, and amulets, in addition to utilitarian knives and arrow points.57 Traders 
carried small metal knives and scissors by the dozens because Tuscaroras recognized 
that they held an edge longer and could be re-sharpened more easily than 
painstakingly knapped stones.
When Lawson visited the backcountry, the Indians were in the midst of a 
fashion revolution as English trade cloth (which was lighter, warmer, more pliable,
55 Lawson, New Voyage, 210.
56 Brass kettles of various sizes in CRNC 4\ 419-420. For Tuscarora “Cashie ware,” 
see introductory chapter of Byrd, "Rediscovery;" David Sutton Phelps, "Archaeology 
of the North Carolina Coast and Coastal Plain: Problems and Hypotheses," in The 
Prehistory o f  North Carolina: An Archaeological Symposium, ed. Mark A. Mathis 
and Jeffrey J. Crow (Raleigh: North Carolina Division of Archives and History,
1983), 1-51; Coe, Joffre L., The Formative Cultures o f  the Carolina Piedmont 
(Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 1964).
57 Merrell, Indians ’ New World', Lawson, A New Voyage, 203.
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and easier to cut, sew, and wash than leather) was worked into distinctively native
CO
styles. Tuscarora women often still wore aprons o f “Deer-Skin dress’d white, and 
pointed or slit at the bottom, like Fringe.” But in place o f white skins some women 
began to wear the dark reds and blues o f English trade bays and plains, tucked at the 
corners and cinched around the waist with a belt.59 Men sported ornate cloaks of 
rabbit, raccoon, or beaver skins. The fanciest of these “match-coats” were 
painstakingly sewn entirely o f the shimmering green feathers o f a mallard’s head and 
were worked with ornate designs and figures. But some dandies traded in their skins 
for English-made military coats that they pulled out on festival days. Their bottom 
halves remained wholly native, however, for they continued to prefer moccasins, bare 
legs, and breech clouts for unrestricted ease of movement.60 Even when they went to 
war, Tuscaroras daubed themselves with European dyes, painting their faces red with 
English-bought vermilion and adding black circles of lead around their eyes.61 To 
arm themselves for war or the hunt, Tuscaroras eagerly sought guns, whose large-bore 
stopping power, ability to shoot in heavy underbrush without being tangled up, and 
fearsome noise made them more desirable than quicker, quieter, and often more
58 Axtell, Indians ’ New South, 62.
59 Lawson, A New Voyage, 197.
60 Some of the Tuscaroras closest to the settlements may have dressed like members 
of small groups near Virginia and the Albemarle region who being “more civilized 
than the rest, . . . wear Hats, Shooes, Stockings, and Breeches, with very tolerable 
Linnen Shirts.” The loose, open-breasted cotton hunting frock, ever-present among 
southeastern Indians in the mid-eighteenth century, apparently had not yet achieved 
much popularity among the Tuscaroras. Lawson, A New Voyage, 200.
61 Lawson, A New Voyage, 201.
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accurate bows. Opposite the ever-present pouch of shot and powder on his waist was 
usually strung a tobacco pouch and pipe. Indians had long used a bitter native variety 
of tobacco for ceremonial purposes, but as Chesapeake plantations rolled out 
hogsheads o f sweeter-tasting varieties by the tun, Tuscaroras joined Europeans in the 
early eighteenth century in picking up a daily tobacco habit.
Other products that the traders brought to the Tuscaroras were entirely new 
with no native analogue. Chief among these was rum, whose portability, high value 
for its weight, and tendency to loosen up contumacious customers made it a favorite 
among traders. One trader’s accounts showed nearly five hundred gallons being 
dispensed in a single year.64 But Indian drinking took on a distinctly native cast. 
Rather than mixing rum into punch as the Virginia planters habitually did, the 
Tuscaroras took theirs straight and were “never contented with a little but when once 
begun, they must make themselves quite drunk.”65 These all-night “frolicks” gave 
normally stoic tribesmen and women an opportunity to unleash and vent frustrations 
and dislikes that were otherwise frowned upon, for “they never call any Man to 
account for what he did, when he was drunk; but say it was the Drink that caused his
tV) Lawson, A New Voyage, 175-76;
fVXPeter C. Mancall, Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America (Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 1995).
64 CRNC, 4: 419-420.
65 Lawson, A New Voyage, 211; They called rum and medicine by the same word; the 
implication was that rum falls onto a gradation of spiritual power that can either heal 
or hurt (Lawson, A New Voyage, 240.)
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Misbehaviour, therefore he ought to be forgiven.”66 The social costs were painfully 
high, however. Drink occasioned fights, accidents, and sickness. It contributed to the 
dark depression of one ch iefs son, who upon being chastised by his mother “at his 
drinking too much rum” replied “that he would do the like no more,” and shot
• 67himself. Tuscarora women normally held veto power over a suitor’s advances; but 
upon being rebuffed, frustrated men armed with alcohol might “strive to make her 
drunk,” and then rape her, shear her hair in grim parody of a trade girl’s coiffure, and 
sell the clippings to the English.68
Besides being used for local consumption, rum joined an assortment o f other 
goods that the Tuscaroras resold to “Westward Indians, who never knew what it was, 
till within very few Years.”69 Lawson reported that by the Indians in close contact 
with Europeans, “but the Tuskeruro’s chiefly,” carried rum “in Rundlets several 
hundred Miles, amongst other Indians.” Often these “merchants” would cut into their 
stock enroute, have a raucous trailside drinking session, and afterwards add water or 
urine to make up the remainder. When they staggered into town, an even more 
boisterous scene followed. A buyer picked out the man with the biggest mouth 
among his compatriots and the drink was measured out by the mouthful, with the
66 Lawson, A New Voyage, 210; Axtell, Indians ’ New South, 65.
67 Lawson, A New Voyage, 211.
68 Lawson,/! New Voyage, 212.
69 Lawson, A New Voyage, 232.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 7
seller looking on ready to clobber the man if he tried to sneak a swallow.70 The last
days o f Lawson’s journey were spent being guided by one such Tuscarora rum seller
w h o w a s g o in g  to  the E n g lish  to resto ck .71
Besides selling rum, Tuscaroras sold guns, pots, pans, and cloth to Indians
further removed from Europeans. European traders might have initially provided the
merchandise, but their practice o f entrusting large stores o f goods to Tuscaroras, who
often took it upon themselves to trade, sell, or gamble away part, shifted influence 
• • 10into native hands. Acting as a middleman, however, was nothing new to the 
Tuscaroras, who merely added these goods to established patterns o f exchange. 
Making the same rounds were peddlers o f small black shellfish that the coastal 
Indians east of the Tuscaroras harvested on long knotted strings baited with bits of 
oyster meat. The Tuscaroras were well positioned to carry these cockles “a great way 
into the main Land, to trade with the remote Indians, where they are of great Value.”73 
Another occasion for selling European and native goods was at various feasts, in the 
spring for the com planting, or fall for harvest when they “gave thanks to the good 
Spirit” and asked for the “same Blessings for the succeeding Year.” These 
celebrations, which brought people together from fifty to sixty miles away, were
70 Lawson, A New Voyage, 232-33.
71 Lawson, .T New Voyage, 66.
72 CVSP, 1: 65; EJCCV, 2: 402.
73 Lawson, A New Voyage, 218.
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occasion for dancing, gambling, and a fair-like market where everything from carved 
bowls to guns might be exchanged.74
The quest for deerskins that would be shipped ultimately from the Indian 
towns probably affected Tuscarora society almost as much the guns, pots, and cloth 
that European traders brought to them. European demand for leather for book 
bindings, gloves, belts, workman’s aprons, trunks, coach seats, buckets, hats, and 
horse tackle (to name only a few items) made the hides o f the whitetail deer the staple
nc
export of Tuscarora towns. Initially, Indians had been content to sell leftover hides 
from deer hunted for food and skins that would otherwise be worked into native 
clothing, moccasins, bags, or blankets. But increasingly Tuscarora society geared 
itself towards producing ever-larger numbers o f skins that could be traded for 
essential and desirable European goods.
Providing the thousands of skins entailed more than merely shooting deer in 
the woods. The task was a community-wide effort that affected life throughout the 
year. In the winter almost an entire community, numbering five hundred or more, 
would relocate from sprawling neighborhoods and scattered riverside farms to more 
compact hunting quarters, consisting of neat rows of ridge-topped pine-bark houses. 
On his first visit to Tuscarora territory in midwinter, Lawson made the mistake of 
visiting summer residences which he found to be a virtual ghost town, abandoned
74 Lawson, A New Voyage, 178.
75 Axtell, Indians ’ New South, 48; Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins & Duffels: 
The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1993).
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except for “an Old Woman or two; the rest being gone to their Hunting-Quarters.”76 
Shorter, less community-wide versions o f these yearly hunting retreats predated 
European contact, but the added impetus o f cross-Atlantic demand began to put an 
added strain on the local deer population.77 Lawson attributed the shortage to 
overpopulation among the Tuscaroras, writing that “tho’ they are expert Hunters, yet 
they are too populous for one Range; which makes Venison very scarce to what it is
7 0
amongst other Indians, that are fewer.” Since the Tuscaroras’ population had been 
declining from disease in recent years, the culprit was more likely the Tuscaroras’ 
greater exposure to the market, not overeating or hunting for local use.79 In response, 
Tuscaroras began to hunt farther afield and for longer periods, in the process 
encroaching on native and English neighbors. In 1702 the Nottoways complained to
7 f t Lawson, A New Voyage, 65.
77 John E. Byrd, Tuscarora Subsistence Practices in the Late Woodland Period: The 
Zooarchaeology o f  the Jordan's Landing Site (Raleigh: North Carolina 
Archaeological Council, 1997), 67 and throughout. Examining the zooarcheological 
record, Byrd suggests that prior to a widespread deer trade, hunters left town on 
temporary forays, but remained close enough to bring back nearly whole deer 
carcasses that could be divided and added to simmering pots o f family members who 
remained at home. Later, further- ranging hunters only brought back cuts o f meat.
70
Lawson, New Voyage, 65.
79 Timothy Silver, A New Face on the Countryside : Indians, Colonists, and Slaves in 
South Atlantic forests, 1500-1800, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
76-92.
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Virginia officials that the Tuscaroras “come in great bodies into this country to hunt 
whereby the game which is their chief support is destroyed.”80
Another enterprising solution was for Tuscaroras to trade with westward 
Indians who “perhaps have greater plenty o f Deer and other Game.”81 By this avenue, 
even women and men who were unskilled at hunting could tap into the deer trade by 
spending their winter months weaving baskets and mats and carving bowls, dishes, 
and spoons to be exchanged for “raw” hides (with the hair still on) from westward 
Indians. Thus, even beyond the direct reach of European traders, exchanges o f goods 
made, sold, and used by Indians reflected the growing influence of Atlantic markets.
Spring thaw and the return to summer settlements did not end attention to the 
deer trade. Summers were spent dressing raw and half-dressed hides either purchased 
from westward Indians or shot by Tuscarora hunters. Women, slaves, and old men 
soaked the skins in water, loosening the hair, and then scraped them clean with a 
polished deer-hoof or an iron draw-knife. Next they smeared on a mixture o f ashes 
and deer brains. When dried, the skins were worked and scraped soft with an oyster 
shell. Finally, they were either cured in a cabin over a sooty fire or tanned in a 
mixture of tannic water steeped in bark.
80 EJCCV, 2: 275; The English settlers o f Henrico County (in the same region) made 
similar complaints against the Tuscaroras encroaching during their hunts in 1693; see 
JH B V 1659/60-1693,454-55. See also Hening, Statutes, 2: 202-203; JH BV 1659/60- 
93, 23; EJCCV, 1: 333; CVSP, 1: 65.
81 Lawson, New Voyage, 217.
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Working deer hides, which had previously been only a small part o f the 
schedule o f the busy townspeople, took up larger amounts o f time. Although women 
continued to spend much of their days making their own pots, fabrics, and tools, they 
spent increasing hours finishing deer hides that could be exchanged for the European 
equivalent. Why painstakingly make a clay pot when for a few hides a more durable 
copper one could easily be purchased? Besides the social implications o f this shift, the 
outward character and appearance o f communities took on a different cast as more 
space and time were devoted to working the skins. The smells o f town life, never 
subtle, could become overwhelming with the reek of hundreds o f half-dried hides in 
the sun. Vermin and parasites attracted by hair and gristle became a problem, 
prompting Lawson to complain that “they are often troubled with a multitude of 
Fleas, especially near the Places where they dress their Deer-Skins.”82 Tuscaroras 
already relocated their towns every several years to escape pests and bring themselves 
closer to fresh fields and abundant firewood; greater infestations likely prompted 
them to accelerate this cycle.
If the influx o f European traders affected Tuscaroras’ tools, work habits, and 
schedules, it is harder to determine what changes trade caused in conceptions towards 
wealth and status. Products, previously valued according to their immediate 
usefulness, increasingly took on fixed values, especially in terms of deerskins. A 
good set of gambling sticks (used in a counting game) cost one doe-skin. Roanoke
82 Lawson, New Voyage, 180.
83 Lawson, New Voyage, 180.
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and wampum, which had been used in trade and in ceremonial uses, acquired a more 
monetary function: five cubits were worth a dressed doe-skin, seven or eight cubits, a 
buckskin.84 A captive, valuable as a trophy o f prowess, a target o f torture, or a 
candidate for adoption into a grieving family, could be sold into the growing slave 
market.85
The greatest sources o f respect remained skill on the hunt and at war. That 
these activities were rewarded by skins and slaves could blur the distinction between 
market and non-market sources o f prestige. Typically, at a man’s funeral, an orator 
enumerated the deceased’s “Guns, Slaves, and almost every thing he possess’d of, 
when living.”86 But this was only part of a longer speech that described the 
deceased’s “Valour, Conduct, Strength, Riches, and Good Humour.” The speaker 
would go into detail on “who the dead Person was, and how stout a Man he approv’d 
himself; how many Enemies and Captives he had kill’d and taken; how strong, tall, 
and nimble he was; that he was a great Hunter, a Lover of his Country, and possess’d 
of a great many beautiful Wives and Children.”87 Products were important largely as 
outward displays o f prowess and skill; if they were earned some other way, they 
might provoke scorn as easily as admiration. “Several of the Indians are possess’d of 
a great many Skins, Wampum, Ammunition, and what other things are esteem’d
84 Lawson, New Voyage, 203.
85 The slave trade will be treated in detail in a later chapter.
86 Lawson, New Voyage, 187.
87 Lawson, New Voyage, 187.
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Riches amongst them; yet such an Indian is no more esteem’d amongst them than any 
other ordinary Fellow, provided he has no personal Endowments, which are the 
Ornaments that must gain him an Esteem among them; for a great Dealer, amongst 
the Indians, is no otherwise respected and esteemed, than as a Man that strains his 
Wits, and fatigues himself, to furnish others with Necessaries o f Life, that live much 
easier and enjoy more of the World, than he himself does with all his Pelf.”88
Even if many Tuscaroras looked askance at the coveting o f European goods, 
increasingly these wares became invaluable in ways inconceivable generations earlier. 
In Lawson’s time, Tuscaroras still knew how to spark a fire using two flints or by 
rubbing sticks together, but they only used these methods in case of some sort of
RQaccident, instead preferring European flint and steel. Bows were still carved and 
used, but mostly by children learning the arts of forestry by stalking birds and 
squirrels, almost never by grown men who felt naked and unarmed without a firearm. 
Tuscaroras learned to carve a new stock, bend the barrel straight, and make simple 
field repairs, but the gun itself and the powder and shot still needed to come from 
European traders. Rum became such an integral part o f daily life that when a group 
o f Tuscarora leaders sought to stem the flow, “the young Indians were so disgusted . .
. that they threatened to kill” those who made the agreement.90 Visiting Senecas may 
have struck a nerve when they taunted the Tuscaroras and “told them that the Whites
88 Lawson, New Voyage, 206-207.
89 Lawson, New Voyage, 212-13.
90 Lawson, New Voyage, 211-12.
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had imposed upon them . . . [and] that they were fools to slave and hunt to furnish 
themselves” for trade with Europeans; “it was but killing o f them and possessed of 
their substance.”91
Trade with Europeans quickly became an inseparable part o f Tuscarora 
culture. By the time of Lawson’s visit in 1700, a steady stream o f packtrains had been 
winding southward from Virginia for nearly thirty years. More appeared from the 
south with the establishment o f trading routes from Charleston, the same paths
• • Q9 •Lawson had taken on his own journey. Traders crisscrossed Carolina on trails that
centered along the fall line where they could easily turn east towards the Tuscaroras
or west to the inner piedmont tribes. The near-nonchalance with which Lawson was
received, compared to Lederer’s frightening foray, reveals how commonplace such
contacts had become. Nowhere on Lawson’s journey was he out o f  easy hale o f a
trader, guide, or townsman who was intimately familiar with the ins and outs o f the
trade. Increasingly, Tuscaroras were becoming accustomed to traders staying two,
three, or more years, learning the language, taking wives, fathering children, and
bringing new goods. Whatever barriers had once existed between Tuscaroras and
Europeans were quickly being dismantled.
* * * *
91 Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise o f  the English Empire in the 
American South, 1670-1717 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 265.
Q9 It appears that traders from Charleston preferred to trade with the Tuscaroras’
Siouan neighbors on the piedmont, resulting increasingly over time in competition 
between two trade axes. This will be described in greater length below.
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Settlers in a Tuscarora World 
Arriving at nearly the same time were settlers pushing at the borders and 
crossing into the Tuscarora homeland. A few Virginians began coming to the 
Albemarle region, with its narrow sounds, sandy banks, and shallow passages 
dividing low lands, in the late 1650s, but large numbers did not come until the late 
1670s. Some came looking for fresh pasture for their cattle, others for cheap land, 
still others for land not exhausted by the rigors o f tobacco agriculture. A Virginia 
official wrote that “many families o f old Inhabitants whose former plantations are 
worn out as well as great numbers of young people & servants just free . . .  seek for 
settlements in the province in North Carolina where Land is to be had on much easier 
Termes than here.”93
In 1663 Charles II awarded North Carolina to eight proprietors— a reward for 
loyalty to the royal family during the Interregnum; two years later the region was 
incorporated into the county of Albemarle. Soon the proprietors published grand 
plans for their colony, complete with a set o f “Fundamental Constitutions” written by 
philosopher John Locke. But the visions these documents contained of semi-feudal 
lords, leet-men, and near-fiefdoms were far removed from the hardscrabble 
improvisation that was the reality o f life in the young settlements. The settlers 
numbered only a few hundred, most of whom were clustered upon small tracts on the 
far northeastern edge of the region, pressed against the underbelly o f Virginia around
93 NCCR, 1: 690.
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Currituck Sound.94 The population slowly increased, reaching between three and four 
thousand by 1694, but the region kept its rough-and-tumble frontier atmosphere. Few 
ships were willing to brave the barriers o f shifting shoals and dangerous banks, so 
products shipped in and out of Albemarle usually had to cross the short but uncertain 
land route from Virginia.95 Except for a few wealthy slave owners, reported a 
missionary unhappy with his station, “men are generally of all trades and women the 
like within their spheres.” The men needed to be “Carpenters, Joiners, Wheelwrights, 
Coopers, Butchers, Tanners, Shoemakers, Tallow Chandlers, Watermen and what 
not” while the women were “Soap makers, Starch makers, Dyes etc.”96 Hard-pressed 
newcomers found little help among their callous neighbors, who “love to see new 
comers put to their shifts as they themselves have been.”97 Among Virginians the 
region gained a reputation for “harbouring our debtors, and servants and receiving
• QO
such as are fledd from hence for theire treason and Rebellion.”
94 Lefler and Powell estimate around five hundred settlers by 1663,1 suspect that the 
number was slightly lower; Hugh Talmage Lefler and William Stevens Powell, 
Colonial North Carolina: A History (New York: Scribner, 1973), 32. The average 
size o f a land grant for the entire proprietary period was approximately 492 acres, 
with half being less than 375 acres; Christine A. Styrna, “The Winds o f War and 
Change: The Impact of the Tuscarora War on Proprietary North Carolina, 1690-1729” 
(Ph.D. diss., Dept, o f History, College of William and Mary, 1990), 308.
95 For complaints o f the cost o f having to ship through Virginia see NCCR, 1: 247.
96 NRRC 1, 764.
97 NRRC  7,764.
9SJH B V 1659-1693, 75.
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Despite rough beginnings, settlement in North Carolina continued to expand, 
making beachheads near the mouths o f the major rivers. In the late 1690s, French 
Huguenots, who had previously attempted to settle at Monacan Town along the James 
River in Virginia, began to take out patents to the south around the Pamlico R iver."
In 1705 Lawson, acting as surveyor general, laid out the town o f Bath, in truth little 
more than a village, near the mouth of the Pamlico not far from the sparse settlements 
to which he had emerged at the end of his “five hundred mile” journey.100 By 1708 it 
could count a population o f fifty or sixty inhabitants.101 In 1710 Lawson plotted the 
bounds of another town farther south, where the Neuse and Trent rivers intersected.
In this case the settlers were Palatines: German and Swiss Protestant refugees fleeing 
from poverty and religious wars along the upper Rhine, who, remembering their 
homeland, named their settlement New Bern. These added about 400 people to the 
sprinkling of English settlers who had set up scattered plantations in the area a few 
years earlier.102 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, contemporaries estimated 
the colony’s white population at around five thousand, plus an unknown number of
103black slaves.
99 Before 1701 there were only five patents for lands south o f Albemarle Sound. 
Between 1702 and 1707, 155 land grants were signed. Styrna, “Winds,” 316.
100 Herbert R. Paschal, A History o f  Colonial Bath (Raleigh, N.C.: Edwards & 
Broughton, 1955).
101 CRNC4: xvii.
102 Alonzo T. Dill, “Eighteenth-Century New Bern,” NCHR 22, no. 1 and 2 (Jan. and 
July, 1945): 1-21,292-319.
103 Styrna, “Winds,” 86.
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At every step of the settlement process, the Tuscaroras made their presence 
felt.104 Even before settlement in the area began, contemplating the prospect, the 
Virginia Assembly had declared that any plantations near the Roanoke River or south 
of the Chowan River needed to be located “advantageously for security, and be 
sufficiently furnished with ammunition and strength” to repel a possible attack.105 
These grim predictions were not unfounded. When settlers from the Currituck region 
moved across the Chowan River, the Tuscaroras struck back and “killed some English 
dwelling on the So. shore in Carolina.”106 The colonial government responded by 
pressing nearby settlers from Knott’s Plane and Back Bay into the militia for several 
short campaigns. Hostilities simmered on until 1672, when a visitor to the region 
recorded that they expected the arrival of the “emperor” of the Tuscaroras and “thirty 
kings under him” to arrange a peace.107 The provisions o f this treaty have not
104 Styrna, “Winds,” 314 and Parramore, “Tuscarora Ascendancy,” 307-326 for 
Tuscarora impediment of settlement.
l05NCCR, 1:17.
106 Stanard, “Indians o f Southern Virginia,” 347-48. Unfortunately, few documents 
relating to these hostilities survive.
107 From George Fox, Selections From the Epistles o f  George Fox (Cambridge: 
Trustees o f Badiah Brown’s Benevolent Fund, and the Managers o f the Mosher Fund 
of the New England Yearly Meeting of Friends, 1879), 154, and Paschal, “Tuscarora 
Indians,” 28.
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survived, but it seems that fear of further repercussions contributed to the scarcity of 
patents west o f the Chowan River for the next thirty-five years.108
In some cases, the Tuscaroras acted as a magnet for settlement.109 The first 
permanent European settler to North Carolina was Nathaniel Batts, who in 1654 built 
a house on the neck between Salmon Creek and Roanoke River as a trading station 
for the Tuscaroras. 110 Numerous other settlers in the Tuscarora borderlands, 
particularly those with sufficient money or credit to purchase goods for trade, blurred 
the line between planter and trader. William Duckenfield, who in 1710 owned a “fine 
plantation” with several slaves on Solomon Creek near the Chowan River, frequently 
traded with Tuscaroras.111 Seth Sothel, governor between 1682 and 1689, had on his
1 OS Paschal, Parramore, and Boyce all suggest that the undated “Sun and Moon 
Treaty” might come from this conference. However, George Stevenson of the North 
Carolina State Archives points out that the language (its anachronistic mention of 
“North” Carolina) and handwriting (probably Pollock’s) probably date it to the early 
18th century. For an example of Virginia settler expansion causing friction between 
the Tuscaroras and settlers in the Blackwater River area in 1693, see JH B V 1659/60- 
1693, 455.
109 Styrna, “Winds,” 314-316.
110 Appears as “Batts House” on the neck between Flatts (Salmon) Creek and 
Moraticco (Roanoke) River on the Nicholas Comberford 1657 Map. See also, 
Elizabeth McPherson “Nathaniel Batts,” NCHR 43 (1966): 66-81. Batts is the same 
“young man” mentioned as helping to establish trade the Tuscaroras in a 1654 letter 
from Yeardley to Farrer.
111 For Duckenfield meeting with (and probably trading with Tuscaroras) see EJCCV, 
1: 147. For his ownership of slaves, including several “mustees,” see NCCR, 2: 331 - 
333. For the location of his plantation, see Christoph Von Graffenried, Christoph 
Von Graffenried's Account o f  the Founding o f  New Bern, ed. Vincent H. Todd 
(Raleigh: North Carolina Historical Commission, 1920), 229 [hereafter cited as 
Graffenried, Account].
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plantation an “Indian Store-House . . . made of Logs” filled with “Blankets, Powder, 
Shot and Rum.”112
Entire communities that had no intention of becoming permanently entwined 
in the Indian trade nonetheless often knew that early success would depend upon 
fruitful commerce with the Tuscaroras. Despite misapprehensions, such settlers 
sought to establish themselves as close to the Tuscaroras as they could reasonably 
risk. William Hancock made claims near the Tuscarora community o f Heeruta, while 
a settler with the unlikely name of Farfmold Green acquired title to a plot near another 
community called Nonawharitsa.113 Sometimes this proximity resulted because the 
Tuscaroras, as an agricultural people, had already occupied and cleared the most 
fruitful territories; in other cases settlers valued the opportunity for commerce. This 
pattern was true o f Bath to an extent, but was more evident in the case o f New Bern. 
An early map of the town depicts the tensions inherent in this cheek-by-jowl pattern: 
several “Indian cabins” are depicted on the edge of town, but farther afield was a 
“Millfort: redoubt erected thus at first for protecting against the Indians.”114 Several 
o f these cabins probably predated the European settlement. The site was none other 
than the Coree town of Chattooka, near which Lawson had lived for several years. 
Christopher Von Graffenried, the eager youngest son of a Swiss nobleman who 
headed the New Bern adventure, only considered the site when Lawson (whom he
112 Lawson, New Voyage, 224.
113 Paschal, “Tuscarora Indians,” 39.
114 Map translated and reprinted in Lawson, New Voyage, xxvii.
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met in London where he was overseeing the publication of his Journal) assured him 
that there was little danger and that he would purchase the location from its native 
owners.115
Lawson probably envisioned making the site into a major entrepot by using 
canoes to ply the rivers and creeks that reached into the nearby Tuscarora heartland to 
divert trade from Virginia. Graffenried leaned towards the eventual establishment of 
well-ordered farms radiating from a neat town of able craftsmen of “all kinds of 
avocations and handicrafts.” 116 Planting would be eased by using previously cleared 
Indian fields. But in the short run he agreed that trade would sustain the Palatines in 
their first years. A Palatine settler writing to his family in Europe assured any who 
might follow in his footsteps that “the so-called wild and naked Indians” are “not 
wild, for they come to us often and like to get clothes of us.” In return they traded 
deerskins, and perhaps most valuable to the struggling settlement, “bacon, beans and 
corn.” 117 Another settler recommended that anyone coming bring “one hundred iron 
tobacco pipes, knives, iron pots, and copper kettles.” 118 After arriving, Graffenried 
noted that,“tanners o f furs are much needed for the skins o f the wild and tame 
animals.”119
115 Graffenried, Account, 42.
116 NCCR, 1: 908; Graffenried, Account, 285.
117 Graffenried, Account, 316-17.
118 Graffenried, Account, 313.
119 NCCR, 1: 908; Graffenried, Account, 285.
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As settlers established themselves along the seaboard, natives paddled or 
walked the short distances to these new communities. There the two peoples traded, 
supped, argued, and puzzled over each other. The engine for much of this interaction 
was economic; as had been the case with the traders, deerskins were a staple of 
exchange, with many Tuscaroras bringing hides to the settlements to trade. In the 
cash-strapped colonial economy, hides often took the place o f currency (in a situation 
similar to the case decades later in South Carolina and Georgia where inhabitants 
measured their worth in “bucks”)-120 Numerous other native wares made their way 
into settlers’ homes. Native women near the coast busied themselves weaving 
baskets of bulrush and silkgrass into which they worked “figures o f Beasts, Birds,
191Fishes, etc.” for sale in the settlements. They also made rush mats, which settlers 
found to be “commodious to lay under our Beds, or to sleep on in the Summer Season 
in the Day-time, and for our Slaves in the Night.”122 Other mats, “which the 
Tuskeroro Indians make, and sell to the Inhabitants” were fashioned from old strips of 
European cloth, an example of European materials literally being interwoven with 
Tuscarora know-how.123
Services as well as goods were sold. North Carolina and Virginia settlers 
often employed Tuscarora men as expert hunters to provide fresh game for the table
120 For an example of a minister being paid in “barrels o f skins” see NCCR, 1: 766.
121 Lawson, New Voyage, 195-96.
122 Lawson, New Voyage, 195.
123 Lawson, New Voyage, 195.
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or as escorts to “guide the Christians through the forests and show new ways.”124 
Along the southwestern borders of Virginia, Tuscaroras even came into the 
settlements for part o f the year to work during the tobacco harvest. This seasonal 
fieldwork became so common that neighboring counties complained of the practice, 
saying that it was unfair because the Tuscaroras, who were neither servants, family
i  -y  c
members, nor slaves, were not taxed. Along the labor-poor frontier where slaves 
and servants were scarce, Tuscarora labor probably helped planters compete with 
more established regions, thereby fueling expansion into these frontier zones. Indians 
also may have found temporary employ within households under the supervision of 
the plantation mistress.126
The frequency and fluidity of these meetings made trade into more of a free- 
for-all than when lone English traders unloaded their goods and established brief 
miniature monopolies at Ucouhnerunt, Torhunta, or some other Tuscarora town. 
Indians of the Carolina coastal plains became bargain hunters, shrewdly calculating 
whether to stay home awaiting the arrival of traders or to bring their furs, hides,
124 Graffenried, Account, 317.
1 'yc
These same reasons probably explain why the practice does not appear on any 
other records except for the petition to have taxes applied, a request that was 
ultimately denied. JHBV-1702, 156.
This practice would explain why William Byrd occasionally recorded giving his 
wife Indian goods, presumably to pay such native workers. See, for example, 
September 29, 1709 where Byrd recorded that “I presented my wife with some Indian 
goods to the value o f 4 pounds 10 shillings;” William Byrd, The Secret Diary o f  
William Byrd ofWestover, 1709-1712, ed. Louis B. Wright and Marion Tinling 
(Richmond, Va.: The Dietz Press, 1941), 237.
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slaves, baskets, and mats to the settlements themselves. When they arrived, the 
Tuscaroras had the option of going house to house until they encountered a settler 
who not only would offer acceptable goods at a fair price, but also would be 
accommodating and evenhanded (as often as not, this search proved as fruitless as 
Diogenes’s search for one honest man.).127
The economic advantages of contact with the settlements was not one that the 
Tuscaroras were eager to share with other Indians. Tuscaroras took advantage o f their 
geographic position that shielded many North Carolina settlements from direct trade 
with more interior Indians. As Lawson’s motley party headed through Tuscarora 
country towards the English settlements, a pair of Tuscaroras he met, “Hating that any 
of these Westward Indians should have any Commerce with the English, which would 
prove a Hinderance to their Gains,” told stories o f how the English “were very wicked 
people” until several of Lawson’s native companions were deterred from traveling 
any farther.128
Besides boosting prices, a multiplicity o f trade connections among the
settlements gave the Tuscaroras other channels in case one source dried up— an
unwelcome discovery for irate Virginia officials who found it all but impossible to 
1
impose embargoes. Empathizing at times may have been Tuscarora chiefs, elders, 
and “big men” who lost some of their clout when they too learned that if  they tried to
127 Lawson, New Voyage, 210.
Lawson, New Voyage, 64.
129 See below Chapter Two. EJCCVlll, 182, 185, 191, 199, 207, 211.
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control trade between the two peoples, young men bucking authority could bypass 
them and go directly to the “Englishmen’s houses.”130
Like English traders who had to learn new sets o f behavior when they came 
among the Tuscaroras, Indians near English and Palatine settlements got a crash 
course in European manners. Many Tuscaroras learned to speak their neighbors’ 
languages. Salty directness partially compensated for any lack o f fluency, since they 
“learn[ed] to swear the first thing they talk of.”131 Other Tuscaroras, especially 
among the generation that grew up among the settlers, learned to speak with confident 
glibness. At the very least, most in the Pamlico region could distinguish the “ja  ja” of
1 T9the Palatine settlers from the “aye aye” of the English.
But familiarity also meant exploring differences. One of the most acerbic of 
these splits arose from their contrasting approaches to the environment. The 
European newcomers and the Indians of the Carolina coastal plain both hailed from 
long agricultural traditions. John White’s early illustrations o f native towns depict 
nearby communities as surrounded and nearly overwhelmed by fields and gardens. 
Analysis of the Tuscarora diet reveals that most o f their calories came from corn and
I T Tbeans, supplemented by protein from hunting and fishing. Encouraged by their
130 Lawson, New Voyage, 212.
1 t i Lawson, New Voyage, 240.
132 Graffenried, Account, 273.
I T T John E. Byrd, Tuscarora Subsistence Practices in the Late Woodland Period: The 
Zooarchaeology o f  the Jordan's Landing Site (Raleigh: North Carolina 
Archaeological Council, 1997).
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elders, young Tuscarora men cleared fields by girdling trees o f their bark and planted 
beans and com around the leafless stumps. A carved wooden idol representing the 
ghost o f an honored warrior gave additional spiritual oversight to the work. This 
revered figure would supposedly intercede with the spirits reward hard labor by 
making the youths into stout hunters and warriors.134 The initial clearing completed, 
women tended the maize, harvested it, and in heavy mortars beat it into a coarse meal. 
Non-native crops also entered their diet. Peaches so thoroughly infiltrated Tuscarora 
cuisine that observers had to be reminded that the fruit was an exotic introduced by 
Europeans. Archeological excavation of a Tuscarora fort revealed storage chambers 
containing thousands of peach pits -  antecedent seeds o f peach farms that cover much
1 1C
of the region.
Also altering the landscape was the intentional use o f fires to drive deer on the 
hunt, to clear underbrush, and to promote edge habitats where game and useful berries 
and shrubs would be abundant. The result was areas of “tall timber trees without any 
underwood” which would appear as “a bright horizon . . . through the woods, which
1 3 f\travelers take as a mark o f some plantation.” Recent archeology of the Contentnea 
Creek Basin backs up visitors’ descriptions of the region as consisting o f long 
waterside neighborhoods of scattered fields, homes, and occasional village squares.
As soil in a particular spot wore out and firewood within a short haul grew scarce,
134 Lawson, New Voyage, 111.
1 1C
Byrd, Tuscarora Subsistence.
U6NCCR, 1: 215.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 7
Tuscaroras would relocate close by. But rather than being permanently abandoned, 
the richest bottomlands at the intersections o f rivers and smaller streams were 
revisited generation after generation.137 The result was a patchwork of farms, “old 
fields,” orchards, and open forests created over centuries o f use.
These native practices created a landscape that was attractive and desirable to 
European settlers, but the underlying customs were not compatible with the settlers’ 
own style o f cultivation and land use. Settlers tended to view “old fields” as 
abandoned forever and ripe for the taking. Settlers purchased, seized, surveyed, or 
squatted upon tracts that would be cultivated not for several years before moving on, 
but possessed on a continuous basis under strict laws of ownership. European 
concepts that favored the ownership of land, even if unfarmed or fallow, expanded 
their footprint beyond fields actually cut by the hoe or plow. A headright system, 
whereby settlers received additional acreage for bringing slaves, servants, or family 
members with them, attempted to ensure that land would be linked to a labor force 
suitable for intensive agriculture.138 Many settlers, originally from Virginia, hoped 
eventually to emulate that colony’s sprawling tobacco plantation culture. Graffenried 
imagined finely laid-out lands, with each family receiving space for “house, barn, 
garden, orchard, hemp field, poultry yard and other purposes.” Either way, Indians 
expecting the settlers to move on after several years would have been sorely 
disappointed.
137 Simpkins, "Aboriginal Intersite," 360.
13&NCCR, 1: 333.
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The biggest “crop” for the new settlers, however, was livestock, in particular 
cattle and hogs. Graffenried described cattle farmers coming to the region “like a 
wave” because of the ready forage available to farmers who turned their cattle out to 
the woods. Running semi-feral, the hogs and cattle would compete with deer for 
forage, root out and trample less resistant native plants, and invade unfenced and 
lightly tended Indian fields. Exacerbated by European livestock, Indians in turn 
frequently killed cattle and hogs to drive them off and as an easy source of food that 
partially compensated for declining deer populations being over hunted for the hide 
trade. In addition to adding pork to their own diets, some Indians even traded pork 
and beef back to the settlers.139 Some of this might have been stock raised by 
Tuscaroras mimicking the Nottoways north of them, who even registered distinctive 
earmarks for their stocks.140 More likely it was poached.
Hog poaching and cattle rustling added to settlers’ generalized distrust of 
Indians on the hunt. Tuscarora males considered hunting second only to warfare as an 
honorable pursuit. Moreover, the concept o f exclusive land ownership that precluded 
trespass or even following a roaming deer across property lines seemed foreign to 
Tuscarora conceptions. Settlers, on the other hand, hailed from a European tradition
139 Graffenried, Account, 317; Lawson, New Voyage, 182.
140 EJCCV  2,316. For similar tensions in New England, see Virginia DeJohn 
Anderson, “King Philip's Herds: Indians, Colonists, and the Problem of Livestock in 
Early New England,” WMQ, 3rd Series. 51, no. 4 (Oct., 1994): 601-624; David J. 
Silverman, ‘“ We Chuse to Be Bounded’: Native American Animal Husbandry in 
Colonial New England," WMQ, 60, no. 3 (2003): 511-48; also Shepard Krech, The 
Ecological Indian: Myth and History, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); 
Silver, New Face, 196.
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that viewed hunting either as the rightful pastime o f an elite leisured upper class or as 
the shady misbehavior o f scruffy ruffians. Armed Indians “skulking” near other 
people’s property, in their minds, came closer to the latter.141 That the Tuscaroras 
were probably as willing to kill a hog as a deer or, if  hungry and unsuccessful at 
either, to take food from an unwatched field, added to settler misgivings.
Moreover, the Tuscaroras, like most Indians of the region, set large fires 
during their hunts to drive game.142 For Europeans, who feared fire as the destroyer 
of cities and homes, such blazes were dangerous carelessness at best and deliberate 
arson at worse. Tuscaroras along the Pamlico eventually sought to ease tensions by 
seeking an agreement that allowed “Indians to hunt where they wish without any 
hindrance, except in case they come so close to our plantation that the cattle would be 
driven away or injured or danger o f fire might be feared.” 143 More typical were ad 
hoc administrations of rough justice less favorable to the Indians. When William 
Byrd’s men caught six Indians hunting on patented land, he “threatened them and sent 
them away after they had victuals given them.”144 Graffenried reported rougher 
treatment in which settlers catching hunting Indians “under this excuse took away
141 For “skulking,” see Hening, Statutes, 2: 202-203. The word is actually used by 
Nottoways complaining of Tuscarora encroachments, but probably echoed back 
English usage and attitudes. William Duckenfield complained in a January 25,1696 
letter that Indians “have almost killed all my hoggs” (Indians: Treaties, Petitions, 
Agreements and Court Cases (1698-1736), Colonial Court Records, Box 192,
NCSA).
142 Krech, Ecological Indian, 101-23; Silver, New Face, 59-64.
143 Graffenried, Account, 281.
144 Byrd, Secret Diary, 405.
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from them their arms, munitions, pelts or hides, yes even beat an Indian to death.”145 
Two Tuscaroras complained to Lawson that the English were cruel and “threatened 
the Indians for Hunting near their plantations.” His guide retorted that the two were 
nothing but “a couple of Hog-stealers.” Both parties probably spoke the truth.146
Less common but potentially more troublesome were faux pas over belief and 
religion. Neither group undertook much in the way of proselytizing the other. 
Tuscaroras lacked the inclination, Europeans the resources. The Albemarle region 
had to make do with two bickering Anglican ministers whose contempt for each other 
was matched only by their disdain for their poor, ill-educated congregants.147 A 
minister in the Pamlico area admitted that there were a number o f Indians close by 
who “understand English tolerably well, but our own distractions have hitherto 
prevented my thoughts o f doing any great matters among them.”148 These distractions 
included settlers who cared little for religion and Quakers who challenged Anglicans 
for the hearts of the rest. George Fox, founder o f the Society o f Friends, made as 
much effort as anyone to evangelize the Indians when he came to the region. But his 
outreach consisted o f brief discussions about the Flood with some Chowans, and
145 Graffenried, Account, 234.
146 Lawson, New Voyage, 64.
147 See, for example, NCCR, 2: 121-23, 125-28, 227-29.
148 NCCR, 1: 734. See also NCCR, 1:601-603 in which Blair reports that the Pamlico 
“a great nation of Indians that live that government, computed to no less than 
100,000, many of which live amongst the English, and all, as I can understand, a very 
civilized people. I have often conversed with them, and have been frequently in their 
towns: those that can speak English among them seem to be very willing and fond of 
being Christians.”
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leaving behind a written sermon to be read aloud to a delegation of Tuscarora chiefs 
coming in to negotiate a treaty.149 Whether anyone listened is not recorded.
Perhaps in part because of this dearth o f crusading fervor, settlers found 
themselves observers o f Tuscarora practices that they could not easily understand or 
explain. Governor Seth Sothel (who served from 1682 to 1689) played host to a 
healing ceremony when a Tuscarora chief who had come to sell slaves fell sick at his 
plantation. An ancient, white-haired shaman, so shrunken he had to stand on a wood 
pile to reach the patient’s bed, spurted water and waved beads over the sick man. 
When the beads danced as if  alive in the shaman’s hand, he told the disbelieving 
“company that he would recover and that his Distemper would remove into his Leg, 
all which happen’d to be exactly as the Indian Doctor had told.” 150 Europeans heard 
stories o f monstrous canoe-eating snakes lurking in the Neuse River and conjurers 
who captured lightening and tamed it like a pet.151 In awe Graffenried personally 
watched inexplicable lights leaping from a Tuscarora grave and flitting above the 
dead man’s hut.152
Europeans could not easily explain such events, but they did not readily 
embrace their veracity either. Misunderstanding could creep into profound insults.
149 NCCR, 1: 216-218; Paschal, “Tuscarora Indians,” 28.
150 Lawson, New Voyage, 225-26.
151 Lawson, New Voyage, 222 for an account of keeping Lightning “in the Likeness of 
a Partridge;” Graffenried, Account, 280 for catching a mysterious light that becomes 
“a small wood spider.”
152 Graffenried, Account, 279.
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Lawson recorded many of these happenings, but the same scientific curiosity that 
impelled him to describe them, made him stubborn in his disbelief. Convinced that a 
shaman was a scoundrel and a liar, Lawson cornered an English-speaking Indian who 
had lived among the English since childhood. “What a Parcel o f Lyes,” insisted 
Lawson, who was convinced the youth “thought so, as well as I.” He was wrong. No, 
replied the boy. The boy’s reply shocked Lawson—the ancient priest “did never tell 
Lyes,” asserted the Indian; he believed everything the old man said. Disgusted, 
Lawson turned his back on the “Fellow’s Ignorance,” in a silence that spoke words. 
The Tuscarora probably considered Lawson equally ignorant. At that moment a gulf 
opened between him and an erstwhile ally.
The greater the misunderstanding, the greater the potential for affront. Near 
New Bern, Indians had constructed a miniature hut made out of woven twigs, that 
served as an alter in which they put two carved wooden figures. One was half-white, 
half-red; across from it sat another colored black and red “with an ugly face.”
Through small holes in the side of the hut the Indians hung offerings o f coral and 
wampum before the two statuettes at sunrise. A Swiss settler, seeing that the second 
idol was “the very colors of the Canton of Bern” from which he had been driven, 
attacked the image in a buffoonish gesture o f mock rage with an ax, cutting it in two. 
Afterwards the fat settler strutted about and bragged “as though he had split the devil 
in two at one blow” to the laughter of his fellows. When the Indian chief stormed into 
the settlement “very angry, taking this for a sacrilege and a great affront, and 
complaining bitterly,” Graffenried ineptly tried to smooth over the outrage. He
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laughed that it was “only a bad idol [that] was injured and destroyed, that it was o f no 
great harm, but if it had been the good one, I would inflict severe punishment.” In 
Indian cosmology, however, the “ugly face” idol probably represented a figure similar 
to Okeus, a capricious and arbitrary deity worshipped among nearby Algonquian 
groups who had to be continuously appeased to prevent chance disaster such as 
storms, fires, snakebites, floods, and illness. Rather than being a devil that had to be 
battled and overcome as Europeans often imagined, it was better to pacify and soothe 
the forces he represented. And the settlers had hacked him to bits! Not surprisingly, 
when the “Indian king saw that I made a joke of the matter,” Graffenried recorded, “it 
did not please him, but he became serious.” Finally Graffenried promised not to 
allow such things to happen again and half-heartedly assured the chief that he would 
look into punishing the offender. The meeting ended with Graffenried trying to 
lubricate tensions among the chief and his companions by offering rum all around. 
Graffenried thought they departed “well contented and satisfied.” The Indians 
probably disagreed.153
* * * *
In the space of one or two generations, Tuscaroras and Europeans settlers had 
gone from being timid strangers, cautiously teasing out the borders of each others’ 
societies, to being closely, almost suffocatingly, intimate. No longer a rarity,
European traders were a daily feature of Tuscarora life. Still awkward, they had 
nonetheless overcome their greenness to learn the essentials of Tuscarora language
153 Graffenried, Account, 278.
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and culture. Their very presence and the goods that jangled from their horses’ bags 
altered the habits o f their customers. On the surface, some o f these changes were 
insignificant matters of convenience: guns stood in for bows, kettles for pottery, and 
woolen strouds for skins. Rum joined but did not supplant cockleshells in the list of 
goods that Tuscarora middlemen toted west to trade with the interior tribes. Harder to 
quantify are the deeper, underlying changes in mindset and values that occurred as 
towns reshaped their schedules, as men redoubled efforts to hunt deer, and women 
emphasized dressing hides to accommodate new roles as consumers and producers in 
Atlantic-wide markets. Still, native crafts and skills did not disappear. They even 
found a new outlet through the Tuscarora traders — counterparts o f the European 
traders— who frequented settlements along the southwestern swamps of Virginia and 
North Carolina’s Albemarle and Pamlico sounds. Palatines and English alike 
depended upon Tuscaroras for what they ate, what they slept upon, and for guidance 
amid the unfamiliar marshes and pine stands of the coastal plains they hoped to make 
home.
Far from being the inevitable victims of these encounters, through the first 
decade of the eighteenth century, Tuscaroras wielded great influence. Even if 
Tuscaroras wanted, in some cases clamored for, European goods, they still carried 
great weight in their interactions. Ultimately, Tuscaroras and their European 
neighbors were only teased by the unreachable prospect o f true cultural 
understanding, but hate was slow to surface from beneath shared interests. Still, 
encounters were hardly a happy middle-ground of cheerful compromise. The closer
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the peoples came, the more points of contact that were established, the more abrasive 
interactions became. Specks o f contention refused to be worn smooth, and instead 
rubbed into maddening irritations. Differences in belief, contrasting uses o f the land, 
alternative systems of values— all revealed that while the two societies had become 
interlocked, all o f their components did not easily mesh. Given their numbers, 
military strength, and economic sway, it seemed clear that the Tuscaroras would 
continue to wield great influence in the region—too much in the minds of some 
colonial officials.
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CHAPTER TWO 
“NEIGHBOURS TO A GOVMT JEALOUS OF INDIANS” : 
TUSCARORAS AND PLANS FOR COLONIAL FRONTIERS
Guns, kettles, and cloth from overseas had brought the Tuscaroras under the 
indirect economic influence of their new neighbors, but a generation of commerce had 
brought the Tuscaroras no closer to being under the direct control of any colonial 
government. As contacts between Europeans and Tuscaroras became daily 
occurrences, the colonial governments surrounding the Tuscarora borderlands looked 
on with increasing concern. Initially, North Carolina’s newcomers had settled on the 
eastern periphery o f the Tuscaroras— in the coastal regions o f Currituck, Albemarle, 
Chowan, later Bath, and finally New Bern— more often squeezing or pushing aside 
weaker coastal tribes than directly displacing the Tuscaroras. Future expansion would 
necessitate taking into account the presence o f the powerful Indian group to the west.
Virginia’s Executive Council, also deliberating expansion southwest into the 
Roanoke basin, likewise warily scrutinized its relations with the Tuscaroras. But that 
colony’s officials also fretted that any misstep with the Tuscaroras might topple the 
precarious network of tributary Indians (themselves neighbors and close cultural 
cousins o f the Tuscaroras) who inhabited, patrolled, and protected Virginia’s 
borderlands and served as its closest customers in trade. If North Carolina and Virginia
66
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shared similar concerns, in practice they often disagreed over the best course to take 
towards the Tuscaroras and Indian relations in general. As a result, Tuscarora 
communities found themselves engaged in diplomatic wrangling on two fronts with 
colonies who were themselves split over issues o f trade, borders, settlement, and 
Indian policy. Even as they embraced the technological revolution occurring within 
their midst, the Tuscaroras tried to limit the reach of colonial authority. At times they 
found space for themselves between the two competing governments. But the range 
of interactions created by these differences also helped provoke diverging views 
among the inhabitants of the many Tuscarora towns regarding the best course to 
protect their autonomy.
Tributaries. Strangers, and Tuscaroras on Virginia’s Frontier
Of the two colonies, Virginia had the more organized and comprehensive 
Indian policy. At its core was a system that divided Indians into two groups: those 
farther afield with whom few except for traders had direct relations— “strange
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Indians”— and those with which it had close, daily contacts— “tributary Indians.”1 This 
latter category included numerous small tribes within one or two day’s journey of the 
plantations. North of the York River were the Rappahannocks, Mattaponis, 
Portobaccos, and Nanzatico. Nearly directly west o f the tobacco-rich Lower 
Peninsula, near the falls of the James River, were the Monacans and Appomattox. The 
Nottoways, Meherrin, Weyanokes, and Nansemonds made their towns, planted their 
fields, and dug tuckahoo root in a broad crescent, sweeping from south o f the 
Appomattox River through rolling pine-land to the Roanoke River and east through 
swamps and poccosins past the Blackwater and Chowan rivers— a swath cramped 
between the Virginians, North Carolinians, and Tuscaroras. Nearly all o f these tribes 
numbered fewer than 250 members. The largest, the Nottoways, counted about 90 
bowmen in the 1670s. The smallest numbered only a few souls. The Weyanokes 
could field 15 warriors around 1670. Within thirty years, members of that tribe were 
nearly entirely absorbed among their native neighbors, with only a few old women able
1 For the experience of the Catawbas who were tributary Indians to both South 
Carolina and Virginia, see James H. Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and 
Their Neighbors from  European Contact through the Era o f  Removal (New York: W. 
W. Norton and Company, 1989). Discussions o f tributary Indians in Virginia can be 
found in put in J. Leitch Wright, The Only Land They Knew: American Indians in the 
Old South (New York: The Free Press, 1981), 92-95; Helen C. Rountree, 
Pocahontas's People: The Powhatan Indians o f  Virginia through Four Centuries, The 
Civilization o f  the American Indian Series; [V. 196] (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1996); Michael J Puglisi, ""Whether They Be Friends or Foes": The 
Roles and Reactions of Tributary Native Groups Caught in Colonial Conflicts.," 
International Social Science Review 70, no. 3-4 (1995): 76-86; W. Stitt Robinson, 
"The Tributary Indians in Colonial Virginia," VMHB 67, no. 1 (Jan., 1959): 49-64. 
Alan Vance Briceland, Westward from Virginia: The Exploration o f  the Virginia- 
Carolina Frontier, 1650-1710 (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 
1987), 1-4 makes a distinction between tributary and “strange” Indians.
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to recall their days as a separate people.2 A South Carolina official, critical of 
Virginia, was fairly on the mark with a jab that Virginia’s tributary tribes 
“compounded of at least eighteen or twenty different nations and the largest o f them 
not above eighty men and some but ten men.”3
All o f these groups were shadows of their former selves, having either been 
defeated in war or brought low by disease. For their preservation they had made 
treaties with Virginia regulating their movement, trade, and contact with outsiders in 
return for easy access to goods, the support of the colonial militia, and an avenue of 
complaint against misbehaving settlers. They were the colony’s first line of defense, 
acting as eyes and ears on the frontier responsible for reporting rumors of activities by 
the Spanish, French, or potentially hostile “strange” Indians to the west.
Typical was the treaty of 1677, which made peace among Indian groups at the 
end of Bacon’s Rebellion. Although Virginia’s government half-heartedly attempted to 
revive the old Powhatan Empire under the authority of the Pamunkey Queen, many 
tribes— some of them Iroquoian groups who were never under Powhatan rule— signed
2 Numbers of bowmen from Briceland, Westward, 1-4; I multiplied the number of 
bowmen by a factor of 5 for a generous total population estimate. For the absorption 
of the Weyanokes, see Harrison, “Deposition,” 47-50 and Stanard, “Indians of 
Southern Virginia,” 337-58, and below.
3 NCCR, 2: 251-52. For a listing of Indians in the early eighteenth century, see Robert 
Beverley, The History o f  Virginia, in Four Parts (1720; reprint, Richmond: J.W. 
Randolph, 1855), 184.
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separately.4 Therefore, Virginia found itself working with numerous small tribes, each 
of which consisted of no more than several towns. The leadership o f most o f these 
consisted o f one or two headmen called “teethas” or “werowances”— depending on if 
they were Iroquoian or Algonquian, respectively—who served as spokespersons and 
nominal leaders o f their communities. These individuals, called “kings” by Europeans 
(or “queen” in the case of the Pamunkeys who were led by a woman), on occasion 
might appear to wield power single-handedly and gain influence over several towns 
through force of personality, control of trade, or military prowess. More typically, 
however, they relied on the consent of their people and the advice o f a community 
council. “Tho’ the chief person of the Indian Nations is distinguished amongst 
themselves by the Title o f King,” wrote Governor Alexander Spotswood of Virginia, “ 
. . . everyone knows that those Kings are o f no great consideration among the English, 
nor o f much authority among their own people.” “As to the Nottoway Nation,” 
continued Spotswood, “I will maintain that there is no great distinction between their 
kings and their people as there is between a corporal and their privatefs]” in the 
English military.5 Nonetheless, in the Treaty of 1677 and elsewhere, Virginia’s 
government found itself working with and bolstering the authority of these leaders in
4 “Treaty at Middle Plantation . . .” in W. Stitt Robinson , ed., Virginia Treaties, 
1607-1722, vol. A, Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789 
(Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1983), 82-87; also “Articles 
o f Peace,” VMHB, 14 (1907): 289-96.
5 R. A. Brock, ed., The Official Letters o f  Alexander Spotswood, 2 vols. (Richmond: 
Virginia Historical Society, 1857), 2: 200.
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an effort to formalize relations with neighboring Indian groups who would become the 
backbone of a policy for controlling the frontier.
In that treaty, the Indian “kings” and one “queen” acknowledged their 
dependence and submission to the king of England and governor of Virginia and 
promised a symbolic annual tribute o f twenty beaver skins. In return the Indians were 
guaranteed their fields and settlements upon reservations laid out for them. Outside 
these reservations they were allowed to go “oystering, fishing, and gathering 
Tuccahoe, Curtenemmons, wild oats, rushes, Puckoone, or any thing else for their 
natural Support not usefull to the English,” but only unpainted and unarmed, and after 
getting permission from the local magistrate. (No provision was made for deer 
hunting.) They were to be “defended in theire persons goods and properties against all 
hurts and injuries o f the English,” with any breach being brought to the governor. The 
tributaries were enjoined to report “any march of strange Indians near the English 
quarters or plantacons” and, if they were needed, to “strengthen and joyne” the militia 
in defense of the colony. Trade with the tributary Indians was to be “continued, 
limited, restrained, or laid open” according to the wishes of the governor and his 
council. Finally, in order to deter dangerous sympathies and alliances, the tributaries 
were themselves protected from enslavement and were encouraged to act as slave-
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catchers, policing the fringe of the region’s increasingly African chattel-based tobacco 
plantation system.6
Under Virginia’s policy, its tributary Indians saw innumerable aspects o f their 
lives scrutinized. Official interpreters, militia captains, prominent council members, 
and deputized traders had their hands constantly full overseeing, visiting, spying upon 
and writing reports on the affairs of the tributary Indians. Few parts o f native life went 
untouched. When word of the Pamunkey Queen’s death reached Williamsburg, 
Virginia’s councilors asserted their authority by sending the interpreter George Smith 
to inform the tribe’s great men that they needed to come to the capital to have the 
successor confirmed.7 If the Nottoways wanted to plant fields outside their original 
grants, or travel between their main town and a religious site at their “Quiocosin 
House,” they needed to pass on a petition through Nathaniel Harrison, a council 
member who lived nearby.8 William Byrd rushed to the western borders numerous 
times to investigate rumors of marauding Senecas and other “strange” Indians.9 Along
6 For example, in the 1677 treaty, the Indians were enjoined to restore “al such 
children, servants, and horses . . . which they can make a discovery of.” The treaty 
promised that Indian servants would not “serve for any longer time then English of the 
like Ages should serve” and that they “shall not be sold as Slaves.” "Articles o f Peace," 
289-297.
1EJCCV, 1:79
8 EJCCV, 3: 98. For another example in which the Nottoways cleared and planted 
outside their reservation and sought permission to hold onto the fields, see EJCCV, 3: 
45. For a description of their Quiocossin House, see Beverley, History o f  Virginia, 
152.
9 EJCCV, 1: 53, 333.
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with the rangers and the militia, he had the option of commandeering “some Indians 
joyned with the English, being more Expert in the woods.”10
Officials struggled to untangle, understand, and oversee the convoluted webs 
of native treaties, alliances, and agreements among the confusing array o f villages and 
bands. The Nottoways, Meherrins, Pamunkeys, Rappahannocks, and Nanzaticos were 
forced to face the governor’s council to answer charges that they “had prepared a 
Peake [wampum] belt (being the token that usually passes between them when they 
desire a treaty o f peace)” for a secret alliance with the Tawittawayes. They got a 
tongue lashing and agreed to hand over the belt.11 Differences between different 
tributary groups, such as when the Nansemonds complained that two of their men 
were kidnapped by the Pamunkeys, got settled according to European, not native, 
courts and codes o f conduct.12 The government could decide that for the defense of 
the colony two separate groups, such as the Rappahannocks and Nanzaticos, each 
with their own language and customs, would have to merge.13
But if the tributaries saw their options circumscribed by a paternalistic 
government, they partially offset the costs by learning to take advantage of the system. 
Indian leaders whose titles were confirmed by the colonial government, perhaps 
festooned in one o f the coronets and silver badges sent by the king of England, saw
10 EJCCV, 1: 333.
11 E JC C V , 2: 41.
n EJC C V, 2: 148.
13 EJC C V, 1: 54.
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their status become much more unassailable by competitors within the tribe.14 When 
Indian leaders received such gifts and were “accommodated with provisions and house 
roome at the publique charge” when visiting Williamsburg, some colonists feared that 
the message o f who exactly was in charge and who paid tribute was unclear.15 If an 
interpreter like Thomas Blunt seemed to be overly interested in acquiring native lands, 
the Nottoways and Meherrins could “express. . .  a dissatisfaction” and refuse to 
cooperate until another spokesperson was appointed.16
Tributary groups were often able to use Virginia’s concern for the defense of 
its frontiers to push their own agenda. In times of danger from attacking Indians, 
tributaries could go on the defensive and temporarily take cover among Virginia 
settlements, or go on the offensive backed by promises o f English assistance. During 
one crisis, the Weyanokes built cabins in Benjamin Harrison’s apple orchard; during 
another, after a midnight ambush by the Tutelos, the Nottoways struck back with guns 
and ammunition provided by their English allies.17 Nottoways successfully pressed the 
government to curb the rum trade (temporarily) at their town by arguing that it “may 
prove o f very dangerous consequence, by reason that many of their men getting drunk 
therewith may at such times be made an easie prey to any strange Indians who shall
14 EJCCV, 1: 4.
15 EJC C V , 1: 4; "1677 Indian Treaty," 294. For an attempt by the government to 
limit visits by Indians at the “countries charges,” see E JC C V , 1: 40.
16 E JC C V , 2: 315.
17 EJCCV, 3: 202; Benjamin Harrison, "Deposition of Benjamin Harrison in Regard to 
Indian Affairs, 1707," VMHB 5, no. 1 (1897): 48.
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invade them.”18 In one case, using their diligence in patrolling the frontier as an 
excuse, the Meherrins literally got away with murder. After ambushing and killing five 
English traders in their bark canoe, the Meherrins absolved themselves by claiming to 
mistake the victims for “spyes come from the Senequa Indians” 19 If the Indians were 
prevented from making their own private treaties with troublesome SuSquehannocks 
and other distant Indian groups, they could appeal to the Virginia government to use 
its connections with the Maryland officials to help broker a truce.20
Moreover, they learned to maneuver within a justice system that was 
frequently sympathetic. When William Brown petitioned to evict Indians that had 
moved onto his land, cut the trees, disturbed his servants, and could be heard shouting 
late into the night, the council decided that the Indians should be allowed to use the 
fields for the next two years. They had to restrain from burning Brown’s fencing, but 
could burn trees that they had already “barked.”21 Sent to investigate a different series 
o f disturbances, Colonel Harrison, council member and liaison for Indians south o f the 
James River, reported, “I have taken all the care I can to remedy all Complaints 
between the English and Indians; and truly, I think our people are as much or more to 
blame than the Indians.”22
18 EJCCV, 2:316.
19 EJCCV, 2: 322-23.
20 EJCCV, 3: 45.
21 EJCCV, 3: 172.
22CVSP, 1: 131-132.
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Such concessions adhered to the spirit o f the treaty o f 1677, which laid much 
of the groundwork for the tributary system. That seminal document had explicitly set 
out to prevent “the mutual discontents, Complaints, jealousies, and feare of English 
and Indians occasioned by the violent intrusions o f divers English into their Lands, 
forcing the Indians by way of Revenge, to kill the Cattle and hoggs of the English, 
whereby offence, and injuries being given, and done on both sides, the peace of this his 
Majesties Colony hath bin much disturbed.”23 This had been written in the wake of 
Bacon’s Rebellion, which had begun when a bloody series o f unauthorized vigilante 
raids and counter-raids between settlers and Indians slipped out o f the governor’s 
control. That conflict had opened the government’s eyes to the dangers o f an 
unregulated backcountry. Treaties like this were meant to keep the governor informed 
and allow him to put a brake to any conflict before it overheated. Moreover, lining the 
frontier with tributary reservations protected by three-mile-radius buffers would check 
uncontrolled expansion by settlers and squatters, keeping them within easy reach of 
the sheriffs, courts, and tax collectors and impose a denser, more easily governed and 
defended, and more economically advantageous settlement pattern. Continued 
concern for these issues were seen in 1690 when Virginia officials complained that 
uncontrolled settlement near the Blackwater River was irritating Indians, putting 
settlers in a position where they could get themselves killed, and risked dragging the 
whole colony into conflict.24
23 "1677 Indian Treaty," 291.
24 EJCCV, 1: 136.
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Compared to settlers apparently bent upon throwing off authority and to 
whom, according to Harrison, “proclamations sent out by the Government signifies 
not a rush,” tributary Indians assumed a meek position in the eye of the paternal- 
minded government.25 After all, the Indians had for the most part entered into treaties 
because they had been militarily defeated. Despite (and to some extent, because of) 
regulations creating reservations, the Indians could be moved about and placed 
according to the whims of the government. If for now they took up valuable land, in 
time these “vanishing Indians” would disappear and make room for the march of 
progress.26 The people who were in charge of “caring” for the Indians in many cases 
were the wealthy landowners and government officials who were in the best position 
to use such oversight in their own long-term speculation schemes. Meanwhile, the 
government could demand children from Indian leaders to be taught the Queen’s 
English, “reduced” to civility at the College o f William and Mary, and serve in times 
o f emergency as hostages.27
By the late seventeenth century, Virginia’s officials had committed themselves 
to a policy of regulating and controlling the frontier that depended heavily upon
25 CVSP, 1: 131-32.
26 For disappearing Indian, see William Byrd, The Prose Works o f  William Byrd o f  
Westover: Narratives o f  a Colonial Virginian, ed. Louis B. Wright (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), 160-61; Beverley, History 
o f Virginia, 185, EJCCV, 1: 194-95.
27 James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest o f  Cultures in Colonial North 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 190-196; W. Stitt Robinson, 
"Indian Education and Missions in Colonial Virginia," Journal o f  Southern History 18, 
no. 2 (May, 1952): 152-68.
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supervision of its tributary Indians.28 O f the colony’s tributaries, William Byrd had 
supposedly bragged of “how great order they keep them.”29 His boasts were not in 
vain. By giving the government a say among nearby Indians in matters o f trade, 
military affairs, settlement, and movement, Virginia’s tributary policy gave the highest 
officials a useful back channel of authority in the region. The tributaries were 
important symbols o f the governor’s authority and reach in a region where churches, 
courts, prisons, and other emblems of control were few and far between. At the 
policy’s heart was the idea that all the Indians along the frontier with whom traders 
and especially planters came into regular contact would be officially bound to the 
colonial government through treaties and a complex web of paternal obligations.
The glaring exception to Virginia’s blueprint o f control were the Tuscaroras, 
who were tributary to no one. The anomaly was intensified by their status as the 
largest tribe on Virginia’s southwest border, the region into which Virginia was most 
rapidly expanding. Beyond easy reach during most o f the seventeenth century, the 
Tuscaroras had steered clear o f the colonial wars that had defeated and brought into 
subjugation many of its smaller northerly neighbors. They had suffered the ravages of 
newly-introduced European diseases, but their dozen or so towns still made them far
28 For a discussion of focusing on the efforts o f the Virginia government to shape its 
frontier in relation to its slave-owning interior see Warren R. Hoftstra, '"The Extextion 
o f His Majesties Dominions': The Virginia Backcountry and the Reconfiguration of 
Imperial Frontiers," Journal o f  American History 84, no. 4 (Mar. 1998): 1281-312. 
Hofstra, however, focuses upon the utility o f Protestant European yeoman farmers, 
rather than earlier efforts to achieve many of the same ends using the Indian tributary 
system.
29 NCCR, 2: 251-52.
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more populous than the typical Virginia tributary group.30 No Tuscarora signatures 
appear among the lists of native names that conclude numerous documents recording 
the recruitment and subjugation of new tributaries in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. In 1712, Spotswood listed nine tribes o f Indians who were 
tributaries to Virginia. He continued,
These are all in an Entire Subjection to this Government and live 
quietly on our Frontiers trafficking with the Inhabitants their skins and 
furrs for cloathing. The next nation of Indians with whom we have had 
frequent correspondence and who are most like to annoy us is the 
Tuscaruro, said to be about 2,000 fighting men.31
Nor could the Tuscaroras easily be pegged as the opposite o f a “tributary” in 
Virginia’s dualistic conception of the frontier. Virginia’s model for Indian affairs was 
essentially binary: by default an Indian who was not a tributary was the opposite— 
“strange” or “foreign.” These Indians were exactly what their name implied: strange, 
unknown, and unfamiliar.32 When such Indians appeared around Virginia, the colonial 
government usually felt compelled to investigate. In 1691 “strange Indians” were 
rumored to be prowling the northwest border near Maryland and had briefly captured
30 In 1712, Spotswood estimated the total population of the tributary Indians at 700 
men, women, and children. Spotswood, Letters, 1: 167.
31 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 167. By the time of this statement, fighting had already 
broken out in the early stages of the Tuscarora War.
32 Often— but not always— such “strange Indians” turned out to be Iroquois. The 
Tuscaroras’ relations with the Iroquois Confederacy will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters.
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an Indian slave belonging to a Virginia planter. When six were caught, Virginia’s 
council sent investigators to grill the prisoners: Who were they and where were they 
from? What were they doing in Virginia? Did they trade with Maryland? What sort 
of relations did they have with Virginia’ s tributary Indians?33 Even the most basic 
information was a mystery. Such uncertainties, breeding suspicion and fear, led 
Virginia to try to keep foreign Indians away from its borders. When they appeared, 
colonists sounded the alarm, beefed up their militias, and marched out to meet the 
threat—usually to discover that the intruders had already disappeared.34 By contrast, 
the Tuscaroras, who by the end of the eighteenth century were a constant presence 
among the settlements—trading skins, hunting game for settlers’ tables, working as 
hands picking tobacco, stopping for rum, supplies, or merely to shelter for the night— 
hardly counted in anyone’s minds as strange or foreign. They “had a constant trade 
with our Inhabitants for the like commodities as our own Indians,” wrote 
Spotswood.35 Indeed, for Virginia officials, relations between Tuscaroras and settlers, 
or Tuscaroras and tributary Indians, were too constant, too familiar, and far too 
unregulated.
The Tuscaroras threatened to undermine the basic underpinnings o f Virginia’s 
tributary system. From Virginia’s official point of view, one o f the principal duties of 
the tributary Indians was to serve as a buffer between the settlements and outside
33 EJCCV, 1: 205-7.
34 EJCCV, 1: 312, 332; 2: 9-10.
35 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 167.
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Indians. Officials recognized that tributary Indians were likely to interact with tribes 
like the Tuscaroras, a practice that Virginia’s officials hoped to exploit. Through such 
dealings, Virginia hoped to gather news and information through their tributaries. 
These Indians could also potentially act as mediators, semi-neutral messengers who 
could carry messages and make arrangements in situations were a Virginia official or 
deputized trader would be either unwelcome or unsafe. During one crisis two 
Nansemond Indians and two Meherrins “were sent by the Tuscaroras” to pass a 
message.36 During another, the Nottoways hosted a summit between Tuscarora 
leaders and Governor Spotswood (accompanied by most of his executive council) at 
their town.37
But Virginia officials were apprehensive that there were too many interactions 
between the Tuscaroras and their tributaries. The very fact that the tributaries were 
able to serve as such apt go-betweens made Virginia officials suspect them as well. 
Where did the tributaries’ true loyalties lie? Would they become turncoats or harbor 
the enemy in moments of crises? There was always the suspicion that around council 
fires or crowded in a smoky hut away from European eyes, Tuscaroras were making 
their own alliances with the very Indians Virginia depended upon for the defense and 
order o f its frontiers. After all, many of the groups were linguistically and culturally 
almost identical. In 1694 a Tuscarora “queen” visited the Weanoaks and “brought a
36 William Byrd, The Secret Diary o f  William Byrd ofWestover, 1709-1712, ed. Louis 
B. Wright and Marion Tinling (Richmond, Va.: The Dietz Press, 1941), 7. This 
occurred during the Pate Murder Case, described in detail below.
37 This meeting occurred at the outbreak of the Tuscarora War.
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present of Deerskins . . .  to the Wyanoke Queen” and tried to persuade her to remove 
her people from the edge of the English settlements along the Blackwater River closer 
to the Tuscaroras.38 This Queen Ervetsahekeh was familiar not only to the 
Weyanokes. A Meherrin testified that he knew her and two Tuscarora kings named 
“Nicotaw Warr” and “Corrowhaughcoheh” “very well.” 39 In 1704, members of six 
tributary tribes applied for a passport from the Virginia governor to journey north to 
New York with two Tuscarora leaders to try to negotiate a peace with Senecas who 
had captured some local tributaries. The Virginia council ordered that the envoys go 
no further than the Virginia border and that they be chaperoned by three English 
interpreters meant to spy upon any budding alliances.40
The issue went beyond creating alliances with tributaries. The Tuscaroras 
often stirred up a cauldron by provoking and taking part in wars between and among 
the tributary Indians. The Nottoways, in particular, gained a reputation for 
cooperating with Tuscaroras to disrupt the peace that Virginia was trying to sow on its 
frontiers. Frequently, members o f the two nations ganged up to attack other Virginia 
tributaries.41 Virginia officials found themselves stuck with the unwholesome,
38 William G. Stanard, "The Indians of Southern Virginia, 1650-1711: Depositions in 
the Virginia and North Carolina Boundary Case," VMHB 7 and 8, no. 4 and 1 (April 
and July 1900): 337-58 and 1-11, esp. 350.
39 Stanard, “Indians of Southern Virginia,” 9-10.
40EJCCV, 2: 331, 369, 380; 3:45.
41 EJCCV, 2: 269, 275; 3: 220, 222-24; CVSP, 1: 89, 131-32; Harrison, “Deposition,” 
49.
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confusing task of trying to moderate truces to prevent the tributary network from 
disintegrating into a morass of revenge killings. Even worse, in 1705 rumor reached 
Benjamin Harrison of the “secret practices o f the Tuscaruro and Nottoway Indians and 
that there was two hundred Tuscaoruro Indians at the Nottoway town with an 
intention to fall on the English.” It came as a relief when, after rushing to the 
Nottoway town, “he found the Reports that had been spread, to be groundless, there 
being only ten Tuscaruro Indians there and that they had no design on the English.”42 
Nearly as unsettling, in officials’ eyes, were the unruly and unchecked contacts 
between colonists and Tuscaroras. As part o f its tributary program, Virginia officials 
had long been wary of colonists interacting freely with natives, in the parlance of the 
day, “keeping” or “entertaining” Indians.43 In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century, these worries increasingly focused explicitly upon the Tuscaroras. Already 
mentioned, for example, was a proposal either to enforce a tax upon employers of 
Tuscaroras that “come amongst the English” to grow tobacco, or “that they be 
restrained from coming amongst the English.”44 In 1693 citizens o f Henrico county 
proposed that Tuscaroras specifically be prohibited from hunting too close to English
42 EJCCV, 3: 453.
43 EJCCV, 1: 202; 2: 14, 28.
44 CSP, item 354, vol. 17 (1699): 197-99. See also JH B V 1695-1702, 156.
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settlements.45 A 1705 law made it illegal to “entertain or employ any Tuscarora, or 
other Indian, not being a servant or slave, to hunt or kill deer.”46
Despite officials’ fears of collusion, often word of these surreptitious contacts 
came from tributary Indians who had their own reasons to resent unrestrained 
meetings between the two peoples. In 1663 several tributary groups complained to 
the Virginia government that the Tuscaroras “lie skulking about our English plantation 
“ and “there covertly have underhand dealings with the English,” often to “sinister 
ends.”47 For Indian groups like the Nottoways or Weyanokes who found themselves 
under the thumb of Virginia officials, one o f the chief compensations for their loss of 
autonomy was privileged access to English trade and the opportunity to establish 
themselves as middlemen. But the Tuscaroras often circumvented both the tributaries 
and officials to directly visit and trade with settlers. Attempting to overturn the 
economic motivations that motivated settlers to welcome rather than apprehend 
trespassing Tuscaroras, officials altered the law to levy a fine against Englishmen 
found in Tuscarora company, half of which would reward the informer.48 Moreover, 
the tributaries, who lived closer to English settlements recognized that they were likely
45 JH B V 1659-1693, 454-55. This law and the proposal to tax Tuscarora tobacco 
workers were rejected on grounds that existing laws governing Indian relations were 
sufficient— thus demonstrating the ongoing debate regarding whether or not the 
Tuscaroras constituted a separate category in Virginia’s system.
46 Hening, Statutes, 3: 343-44.
47 Hening, Statutes, 2: 202-203.
48 Hening, Statute, 2: 202-203.
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to suffer the fallout for any squabble that might arise between the English and the 
Tuscaroras. In their 1663 complaint, the tributaries worried that they were being 
wrongly blamed for thefts perpetrated by Tuscaroras occurring “dayly” on the 
southside. These included poaching hogs, “robbing of hedges,” and stealing tobacco 
and corn from the fields.49 In a 1699 address to the governor, the Nottoways, were 
even more specific in their complaints:
[The] Tuskaruroe Indians (being incouraged thereto) do often come 
into the upper partes of the Countrey, about Appamattox, amongst the 
English, who furnish them with Gunns and Powder & shott, which 
enbles them to hunt upon and burn up all their grounds, whereby their 
game is Destroyed and their hunting spoyled. That the English trust the 
Tuskaruroes in trade with Rum and other goods which they bring out 
amongst the Nottoways, and sometimes set into Play, and lose all or 
great parte of those goods, and not being able to make satisfaccon to 
the English, they tell them the Nottoways take their goods from them, 
which occasions Differences and dissatisfaccons between the English 
and the Nottoways.50 
Tuscaroras clandestinely visiting settlers to buy guns and ammunition; gaming, 
gambling and forming who knows what ties with tributary Indians; upsetting the
49 Hening, Statutes, 2: 202-203. Presumably, some of this tobacco may have been 
resold to other European settlers.
50 CVSP, 1: 65. I suspect they were gambling, using the gambling sticks described as a 
common and addictive game by Lawson.
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deerskin trade; taking a lead role in the rum trade; squabbling with tributaries; leaving 
a wake of ill-will between tributaries and settlers— here was a swirling frontier that fell 
far from the order to which Virginia’s government aspired.
It often seemed only a matter of time before widespread violence broke out 
owing to contacts between colonists and Tuscaroras.51 When isolated incidents did 
occur, the Tuscaroras gave officials a lesson on the limits o f authority in Virginia’s 
hinterland. In June 1689 William Byrd dashed off a worried letter to Lord Effingham. 
Earlier, several Indian slaves who had run away from Virginia masters encountered 
two Tuscaroras and killed one of them. The runaways had been recaptured, but the 
murder created a diplomatic crisis for Byrd, to whom “the Taskeroodas have sent to 
demand Satisfactione.” The victim’s relatives and the “great men” of his town were 
expected any day. Byrd had written to the president o f the Virginia council for advice, 
but word had not yet returned. Besides, Byrd could see no alternative but “to make 
satisfaction by paying for the Slain man.” Doing otherwise, or even to merely delay, 
could “sett the whole Country in a flame.”52 In April 1707 when Simon Kilcrease, a 
King William County planter, killed a Tuscarora named Parridge, the demands were 
more explicit.53 Unwilling “to have any other Sattisfaction than what is Usual amongst
51 See, for example, the case of Fontaine, a free black Indian trader accused by North 
Carolina o f stirring the Tuscaroras and other Indians against North Carolina. A 
“Fontaine Creek” near the border of North Carolina and Virginia may bear his name. 
EJCCV, 2: 390, 381-82, 402, 405; 3: 199-200. For other tension, see EJCCV, 1: 147.
52 William Byrd, “Letters of William Byrd, First,” VMHB XXVI, no. 1 (Jan., 1918):
28.
53 Thomas C. Parramore, "The Tuscarora Ascendancy," NCHR 59, no. 4 (1982): 320; 
EJCCV, 3: 156.
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themselves,” the Tuscaroras demanded “to have Six hundred Cubitts o f Roanoke and 
one hundered and twenty Cubitts of Peake, two Gunns, Six White Stript Blanketts, 
tenn bottles of Powder, Six thousand Shott, Six Cloth Coats, & twenty four yards of 
plaines.”54
These demands of “satisfaction” were an integral part o f Tuscarora culture— a 
reconciliation ceremony whose basic outlines would have been familiar to Indians 
across the eastern woodlands. The acceptance of goods by the bereaved “to cover the 
dead” (to borrow the Iroquois phrase) stilled restless spirits, checked the need for 
revenge killings, and preserved the peace. Lawson, was essentially accurate when he 
derisively wrote o f the process among the Tuscaroras, “With this they buy off 
Murders; and whatsoever a Man can do that is ill, this Wampum will quit him of, and 
make him, in their Opinion, good and virtuous, though ever so black before.”55 The 
Tuscaroras’ extension of this practice to include Virginia settlers shows how much 
they wanted to prevent violence from severing trade relationships. It also showed the 
Tuscaroras’ confidence that their own principles and notions o f peace and diplomacy 
prevailed in contacts with Virginia. But for Virginia, being forced to pay under the 
threat o f violence felt too much like extortion or even tribute— a reversal o f the 
relations that Virginia’s council was attempting to foster. Therefore rejecting the
54 CVSP, 1: 113. Roanoke consisted of shells attached to an animal hide; peake was 
hollowed shells strung upon cords (referred to as “wampum” in the north.) According 
to “the Indian measure,” a cubit of roanoke “contains as much in Length, as will reach 
from the Elbow to the End of the little Finger” (Lawson, New Voyage, 203). “Plaines” 
refers to coarse blue woolen cloth.
55 Lawson, New Voyage, 204.
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Tuscaroras’ claims, the King William county court concluded that Parridge had been 
the “first aggressor” and acquitted Kilcrease, a move that would come back to haunt 
them.56
Instead of letting the Tuscaroras take the lead in disputes, officials thought 
they should follow the example o f better-disciplined tributaries and abide by Virginia’s 
legal decisions. One of the chief successes o f Virginia’s policies had been to extend 
Virginia’s legal system so that it prevailed among their native neighbors. When, in an 
internal quarrel two Chickahominies burnt the cabin o f one o f their tribesmen along 
“with all his corn and goods,” Virginia’s executive council stepped in to settle the 
case. The bereaved Indian even knew to sharpen his accusations by also charging that 
the two arsonists “spake diverse words agst his Excellcy and the Government.”57
Virginia’s council was even more eager to exert its notions o f justice in cases 
between Indians and Virginia settlers, particularly in cases o f murder. Mid-morning on 
September 11, 1704, ten Nanzaticos speaking English “in a friendly manner,” 
approached the home of John Rowley. When the settler’s guard was lowered, they 
attacked, killing the planter, his wife, son, and mother-in-law, leaving only a young
56 Parramore, “Tuscarora Ascendancy,” 320, EJCCV, 3 : 156.
57 EJCCV , 2: 359, 364, 368-69, 380. This incident was part o f a larger, confusing 
dispute that also included accusations of land fraud and plans to assist Seneca raiders. 
Earlier, the Chickahominy chief had also charged that Tom Perry (the man whose 
cabin had been burned) had “Broke down [the Chicohomany Chiefs] cabin, beaten 
his woman and threatened his Life.” Initially, the Indians through interpreters had told 
Virginia officials that “they had this morning accommodated all differences between 
them,” but the government had already been notified and continued to stay involved.
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daughter to escape.58 Virginia officials attempted to turn the ensuing investigations and 
trials into a showcase for the efficacy and efficiency of European-style justice and the 
tributary system in general. The council immediately sent interpreters to the other 
tributary tribes to notify them of the affair and to admonish them not to harbor 
suspects. They also cautioned the Pamunkeys, Chickahominies, Nottoways, and 
Meherrins to remain in their towns, probably to protect them from suspicion by local 
vigilantes and prevent them from coordinating a general uprising.59 Later, when the 
trial was underway, the council tipped off its didactic tactics by inviting two “great 
men” from each of the tributary tribes to watch and learn from the proceedings, even 
authorizing expenditures to pay for horses to rush the leaders to the trial.60
Every effort was made to present an orderly and righteous front. Taking care 
to spare the innocent, the council released women and children snatched in the sweep 
and provided them food and clothing while their husbands and fathers remained in 
custody.61 After discovering that posses had also stuffed their pockets with loot, the 
council inventoried the stolen goods, and ordered “any skins, wampum, or other goods 
or chattels o f what nature or quality soever” to be returned.62 The remaining suspects 
were kept separated to prevent them from colluding on an alibi, but were allowed an
EJCCV, 2:383-86.
59 EJCCV, 2:383-86.
60EJCCV, 2: 388.
61 EJCCV, 2: 388.
62 EJCCV, 2: 398.
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ample allowance o f food and clothing against the deepening autumn chill o f their 
cells.63 Doubtless the carefully shepherded native observers were told o f these 
arrangements and paraded before these accommodations, but lest the wrong lesson get 
across, they were prohibited from meeting privately with the inmates.64 The inner 
workings of the trial were not recorded, but after its conclusion the Virginia council 
tried to demonstrate its compassion by recommending that the sentences o f two o f the 
Nanzaticos be commuted. Instead of hanging, these two “objects o f mercy” were sold 
into seven years o f slavery in Antigua— an effective death sentence, likely to fool no 
one, except perhaps, the native observers.65
The trials of the Nanzaticos exemplified the extension of Virginia’s authority 
over its neighboring Indians, but when suspects were Tuscaroras, not tributaries, 
success proved more elusive.66 In the October 1707 several Tuscaroras killed 
Jeremiah Pate, an inhabitant of New Kent County.67 The timing o f the murder, only 
months after courts rebuffed Tuscarora demands and acquitted Kilcrease, suggests that 
it may have been an act o f retaliation for the death o f Parridge (at the very least the 
earlier incident may have made Tuscaroras more credulous o f Virginia claims that it
63 EJCCV .i 2: 400.
64 EJCCV, 2: 388.
65 EJCCV, 2: 396-97; EJCCV, 3: 98.
66 The timing of this murder suggests that perhaps it was retaliation for the death of 
Parridge, several months earlier. EJCCV, 3: 158, 159, 161, 162-74, 182, 185, 191, 
200 ,167 ,165 ,185 ,191 ,211 .
67 CVSP, 1: 123.
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sought justice). As it had in the trial of the Nanzaticos, Virginia’s council attempted to 
make the prosecution into a showcase for the orderliness and authority o f the Old 
Dominion’s justice system. Instead it became a dark comedy of errors.
Virginia’s government launched an immediate manhunt. Although the 
Tuscaroras in question were not tributary Indians, and one report referred to them as 
“vagrant Indians,” they were no strangers; the suspects sported anglicized names, were 
“well acquainted” with locals, and “used to hunt for the inhabitants o f the frontier 
Plantations.”68 Later evidence suggested that they were also involved in the rum and 
deerskin trade.69 Major Joshua Wynne soon arrested one Tuscarora named Tom 
Robin, based upon the scanty evidence that he often frequented the locale o f the crime 
and that “we find him to be in Several Stories, wch makes it the more suspicious.”70 
Another suspect, Jack Mason, was probably caught further north, cut off from escape 
south to Tuscarora territory by fast moving Virginians.71 Threats o f violence and 
offers o f reward induced the Tuscaroras from one town to hand over another suspect 
named George.72 But disappointments in the pursuit foreshadowed difficulties to 
come. Nathaniel Harrison reported in frustration that his men would have captured 
another five suspects, “if the Notoway Indians had not befriended them and Deceived
68 CVSP, 1: 123; EJCCV, 3:133
69 EJCCV, 3: 159
70 CVSP, 1: 117. Tom Robin may have been the same person as Tom Jumper who later 
poisoned himself, EJCCV, 3: 173.
71 CVSP, 1: 117.
12 EJCCV, 3: 173;
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us.” Only after a frantic all-night search did Harrison give up, having learned that the 
remaining suspects, warned by the Nottoways, had “Run quit[e] to the Tuscororo 
Towne without making any stop, so as for us to overtake them.”73 Attempts to 
capture these remaining suspects would rattle and shake Virginia’s entire Indian policy 
for the next several months.
Virginia’s officials initially proceeded according to much the same formula that 
they had previously followed to such success—straightforward prosecution o f 
everyone involved. They did not intend to be paid off with bundles o f wampum, nor 
were they going to allow simple eye-for-eye justice to prevail. They sent two or three 
experienced traders to the Tuscaroras to give them a quick lesson in European 
justice— “by our Laws whenever any murder is committed, every person concerned 
therein are to be tryed and suffer death for the same.” The traders promised that all 
suspects handed over would receive a “fair tryal” and, if found innocent, would be 
released unharmed. Four witnesses whom officials desired to question would even be 
paid for their time.74 All of these offers, the Tuscaroras ignored. Virginia’s 
messengers also invited the Tuscaroras to send several representatives to attend in 
order to satisfy themselves of the proceedings’ fairness— an offer that a few headmen 
accepted, only to be treated with suspicion after arriving.75 Local tributaries had less
73 CVSP, 1: 117.
74 EJCCV, 3: 173.
75 Some Tuscarora witnesses eventually attended. EJCCV, 3: 159-60, 166
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choice. The Nottoways, Nansemonds, Meherrins, Pamunkeys, and Chickahominies 
each dutifully sent two observers to Williamsburg to attend the upcoming trial.76
Whatever lessons Virginia hoped to get across became horribly garbled as 
complications mounted. The same messengers charged with explaining the virtues of 
Virginia justice carried the uncomfortable news that two of the Tuscarora suspects 
already in custody had committed suicide with poison before the trial even began.
Jack Mason, the sole surviving suspect in custody, was quickly convicted o f “wilfull 
murder.”77 But the courts had moved too fast. Soon afterwards, an Englishman 
named Colonel Hill came forward with an alibi: the night o f the murder Mason had 
been at Hill’s plantation, the “place where he used to sleep.”78 Suddenly, rather than 
showing off the efficiency of their system, Virginia officials found themselves tangled 
up in its legalisms. Law required that any acquittal for murder necessitated a pardon 
from the queen. Already proven innocent, Mason was required to sit in a 
Williamsburg cell for months waiting first for the request to work its way to London 
and through the corridors of royal power and then for the reprieve to cross the 
Atlantic.79
76 Parramore, “Tuscarora Ascendancy,” 320-21.
11 CVSP, 1: 123.
n  EJCCV, 3: 167, 173.
79 CSP, item 295, vol.24 (1709): 198-99; CSP, item 1573, vol. 23 (1707-1708): 763- 
67.
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Such foul-ups wounded the efforts of Virginia’s officials to convince the 
various Tuscarora towns to surrender the remaining suspects. One town had quickly 
handed over George (who shortly afterwards poisoned himself), but the remainder “of 
the said Towns . . . had declared they would rather hazard their Lives than to 
surrender” the others.80 Messengers to the Tuscaroras were instructed to threaten that 
Virginia would “fetch them” with force if necessary. Towards this martial end, the 
messengers kept secret notebooks to record the strength and numbers o f the towns 
they visited. Virginia’s leaders must have been intimidated by the figures they 
brought back. Pulling back from talk o f war, Virginia set aside the sword and settled 
on a more subtle tool— trade. Messengers announced a twenty-day ultimatum for the 
return o f the suspects. Afterwards, sheriffs of the frontier counties would instruct 
traders not to “furnish or se ll. . . Armes powder and shott” to the Tuscaroras.81 The 
embargo, Virginia officials thought, would force the Tuscaroras to hand over the 
suspects, teach them where true authority lay, and in the meanwhile, “disable them 
from doing mischief.”82
Instead, the embargo illuminated the fragility o f Virginia’s attempts to govern 
the frontier via neighboring Indians. Rather than isolating the Tuscaroras behind iron­
clad edicts, the embargo was shot through with loopholes. Traders were reluctant to 
let pursuit o f three renegade murder suspects hamper their bottom line. The sheriff of
80 EJCCV, 3: 171.
81 EJCCV, 3: 182.
82EJCCV, 3: 185.
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Prince George county hauled in George Fontain, a “free negro” trader who frequented 
the no-man’s land between North Carolina and Virginia, for selling contraband.83 
Other traders, better connected, unhindered by the mark of race and less likely to be 
targeted by the law, doubtlessly got through. Equally irksome was the “clandestine 
practice of diverse persons who under the pretense o f trading with the Nottoway and 
Meherrin Tributary Indians” secretly sold goods to the Tuscaroras.84 Some o f these 
tributaries themselves surely took part in their own illicit trade with the Tuscaroras. 
The attempted cure, extending the embargo to include all the Indians south o f the 
James River, threatened to critically injure Virginia’s carefully nurtured relations with 
its tributaries. Within months, war captains and sachems of the tributary tribes were 
pleading that because they were cut off from powder and shot, they were unable to 
hunt, close to starving, and at risk of losing the deerskin trade. Was this any way to 
treat loyal subjects?85 Besides, trade goods continued to flood into Tuscarora territory 
from other directions. Virginia’s council could only plead ineffectually that merchants 
should no longer “sell any goods to the inhabitants of Carolina who by the supplys 
they have hitherto given the Tuscaruro Indians have frustrated the effect of the late 
proclamation and made them less forward” to hand over Pate’s murderers.86
83 EJCCV, 3: 199.
84 EJCCV, 3: 199.
85 EJCCV, 3: 204-5
86 EJCCV, 3: 207.
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Virginia’s requests and threats to North Carolina exacerbated disputes over a 
contested boundary between the colonies, but did not curb smuggling.
Finally, after almost a year-long standoff, at a meeting of the Virginia Council, 
William Byrd learned that the Tuscaroras still “would not deliver up the men we 
demanded and Colonel Harrison now wrote that now it was his opinion the trade 
should be open, contrary to what he thought before.”87 Many of the councilors, 
themselves intimately involved in the Indian trade, agreed, fearing that their “goods are 
like to perish on their hands.”88 In effect, they conceded defeat. The Tuscaroras 
brought from the Pate case the opposite o f the lesson that Virginia’s council had 
intended. Rather than being brought to heel by Virginia’s trading strength and its 
authority over the buffer Indians, settlers, and traders, the Tuscaroras had instead 
proved the vitality of their niche on the edge of Virginia’s tributary system. In ways, 
Virginia’ tributaries shielded not only the colony but the Tuscaroras. Tuscaroras did 
not encounter crushing settlement pressure from the direction of Virginia. Direct 
economic pressure was also partially deflected by the tributaries because they were 
likely to suffer indirectly in any effort to limit trade with the Tuscaroras. Still, the 
Tuscaroras were close enough to frequently come and go, interacting with Virginia’s 
colonists and enjoying the benefits of trade. Despite Virginia’s undoubted influence in 
Tuscarora society, the embargo proved that traders, settlers, and tributaries were as 
much influenced by the profits that the Tuscaroras offered and could not be counted
87 Byrd, Secret Diary, 25.
88 EJCCV, 3: 214.
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on to blindly side with Virginia’s government in any dispute. Virginia was hesitant to 
take on the Tuscaroras by force, but a trade war was just as likely to impinge upon 
their tributary allies. Traders unwilling to risk nurtured networks, tributaries hesitant to 
alienate their powerful native neighbors, officials fearful of sparking an unpredictable 
border war— all worked to limit the abilities of Virginia’s council to enforce its will 
upon the Tuscaroras. This is not to say that the Tuscaroras were entirely satisfied with 
this stalemate, but it was one in which they wielded immense influence.
The final coda to the Pate case transpired only weeks after the Council decided 
to reopen trade. Rather than reestablishing order, Benjamin Harrison found himself 
hosting a confounding conference between leaders from two tributary groups, 
Nottoways and Saponies, who hurled accusations o f murder and threats o f revenge at 
one another. Decades earlier, as signatories of the treaty o f 1677, the Saponies had 
become tributaries of the colony, but they had removed westward, out o f Virginia’s 
reach. But during the midst o f the Pate affair, as the tributary system seemed to be 
crumbling all around, the Saponies “return’d and prayed to be received again into 
protection, and to have land assign’d them for a settlement.”89 They were reapplying 
to be tributaries, voluntarily— models of the dependent behavior that seemed to be 
evaporating from among other groups. Better yet, they were inveterate enemies of the 
Tuscaroras. So the council welcomed them as prodigal sons and assigned them a plot 
on the Meherrin River, squarely in the path o f incoming Tuscaroras. Colonel Jennings, 
writing on behalf o f the Council, could barely contain his excitement that “the
89 CSP, item 137, vol.24 (Addendum 1708-1709): 95-98.
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character they have of being stout fellows, and withall very friendly to our inhabitants, 
makes me hope their Settlement. . . will be some kind of barrier against the 
Tuscoruros.” But the infusion of new allies did little to bolster the ailing system.
Now, months later, as Harrison found himself trying to sort out mixed stories 
regarding who killed who and watched as supposed allies squared off against each 
other, it became apparent that the Tuscaroras were still at the heart o f the colony’s 
Indian troubles: “By the best accot I can gett, it was a Tuscarodo that fierd the first 
gun, and the same Indian went to Ben Harrisons Quarter over night to discover what 
Indians was there.”90 After a year o f battling it out with Tuscaroras, Harrison was 
reluctant to interfere in matters among the tributary Indians at the risk o f re-igniting 
disputes with the Tuscaroras. “What is best to be done in that case, I shall leave to 
better judgements, but I am very sure if the Government delivers a Tuscarodo Indian 
to the Sapponeys, and they Kill him, twill cost the life of an Englishman, if not 
more.”91
Uncertain Authority in North Carolina
Despite the troubles that plagued Virginia, proprietors of North Carolina also 
hoped— at least initially—to subject their neighboring Indians to paternal, controlling 
relationships and that those dominated would include the region’s largest group, the
90 CVSP, 1: 131-32.
91 CVSP, 1: 131-32.
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Tuscaroras. After all, early skirmishes between the region’s first settlers and the 
Tuscaroras had resulted in the Tuscarora “Emperor” and the “thirty kings under him” 
(probably a Tuscarora “teetha” and his councilors) traveling to the North Carolina 
settlements in the winter o f 1672 to negotiate a peace.92 Shortly afterwards, 
proprietors looking from afar in England may have expected that the carnage of 
Bacon’s Rebellion that had exacted tributary treaties from Indian groups along the 
Tuscaroras’ northern periphery would be echoed to the south by similar victories over 
the Indians in North Carolina. In 1676, proprietors of Carolina asked the governor 
and council of “that parte of our province called Albemarle”— soon to be North 
Carolina—to “send us by the next opportunity a true account o f what tribute or 
payment are rendered by any of our people or officers from any of the Indians.”93
But these hopes never came to fruition. Even though no records o f the 1672 
meeting survive, subsequent events indicate that what was negotiated was a peace 
between two peoples weary with war and wary of one another, but not anything close 
to a wholesale capitulation by the Tuscaroras. During Bacon’s Rebellion, the 
Tuscaroras steered clear of conflict in North Carolina. Therefore, despite the wishes
92 It does not appear that the Tuscaroras had a single leader akin to Powhatan during 
the 17th century, but sources for this period are scarce. Reference to an “emperor” 
and his “kings” either refers to a town leader (“Teetha”) and his councilors, or perhaps 
a powerful spokesperson able to speak for several towns, akin to King Hancock and 
King Blount. Quoted in Herbert Richard Paschal, "The Tuscarora Indians in North 
Carolina" (M. A. Thesis, Dept, of History, U. o f North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1953), 28. 
See also George Fox, Selections From the Epistles o f  George Fox (Cambridge: 
Trustees of Obadiah Brown's Benevolent Fund, and the Managers of the Mosher Fund 
of the New England Yearly Meeting of Friends, 1879).
93 NCCR, I: 230.
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of its proprietors, instead of North Carolina’s colonial government imposing a host of 
rules and restrictions upon the Tuscaroras, what emerged over the next several 
decades was a series of constantly re-negotiated and hotly contested improvisations.
Part o f this flexibility reflected the strength and influence that the Tuscaroras wielded 
in the region, but it was also a reflection of a more general trend in North Carolina.
As opposed to Virginia, which steadfastly attempted to order relations with its Indians 
according to a uniform program to shape its frontiers, North Carolina never held fast 
to a plan to erect an orderly method for dealing with its Indian neighbors.
If one looks at the courts, it may seem that North Carolina experienced success 
where Virginia did not. But closer examination reveals that getting Tuscaroras into 
the courtroom did not equate to capitulation. In the Pate case, Virginia had espoused 
an inflexible approach in attempting to use murder trials to incorporate the Tuscaroras 
according to the patterns established under their tributary system. This failed. North 
Carolina, with its weak, thinly-strung settlements, and a barely-organized government 
in which many officials—including the governor— often personally traded and 
negotiated with the Tuscaroras, could not even seriously attempt to make itself the 
exclusive arbiter o f justice. The result was a melange of overlapping notions o f justice 
along the Tuscarora-North Carolina borderlands. But rather than being an example of 
blissful accommodations between two peoples, such grudging compromises 
increasingly satisfied no one.
Sometime in the 1680s, threatening to “take a course . . . that would not be 
very agreeable to them,” Governor Sothel bullied the inhabitants of a Tuscarora town
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in the Albemarle region to turn over a man accused of breaking into his storehouse and 
stealing rum, gunpowder, and dozens o f deerskins and blankets. But Sothel never 
turned the moment into an instructive opportunity to demonstrate the clear superiority 
o f colonial courts over Tuscarora notions o f justice. Indeed, Tuscarora beliefs 
continued to exert a clear influence. Although a trail of dropped goods and footprints 
had led Sothel’s men to the village, crucial in their determination o f the particular 
suspect—the town shaman—was the governor’s belief that Indian magic had been a 
necessary component of the break-in: the intruder had somehow divined the only small 
spot where it would be possible to dig under the storehouse walls without being 
blocked by huge casks. Such evidence, and probable assurances that no death-penalty 
would be sought, probably played a role in the Tuscaroras submitting to Sothel’s 
threats.94
Shortly after the arrest, another theft occurred: this time a quantity o f peak 
disappeared from the Tuscarora village. In the ensuing manhunt Sothel found himself 
witnessing and indirectly participating in Tuscarora justice. The townspeople 
approached Sothel and told him that “no one could find out the Thief, unless he would 
let the Prisoner conjure for it, who was the only Man they had at making such 
Discoveries.” Finally Sothel agreed to let the shaman in his custody root out the thief, 
but only upon the condition that the prisoner remain in shackles, a compromise that 
the Tuscaroras “very well approved of.” The governor, his family, and “several others 
o f the Neighbourhood,” came to watch the “experiment” in which the shaman, still in
94 Lawson, New Voyage, 224-25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
shackles, lit three fires and donned a leather hood. Blindfolded, he divined the 
perpetrator’s name and even scraped with a stick in the dirt a sketch of the cross­
shaped welts that would be found on the thief s back.95 In his description, the shaman 
may have been trying to expose the actual storeroom thief, or even hoping to revenge 
himself indirectly upon Sothel. The Tuscarora he indicted was a part-time resident at 
the governor’s house who had “no Apprehension of being discover’d.”96 The 
townspeople’s choice of punishments further reflects the mixing of views. After 
catching the perpetrator, they “proffer’d to sell him as a Slave to the Governor, but he 
refused to buy him; so they took him bound away,” perhaps for torture among their 
people or sale to another trader.
Another case in the early 1700s seems to indicate a more straightforward 
assertion of English authority. Officials succeeded in forcing the Tuscaroras to hand 
over for hanging a man suspected of burning an English house and killing a black 
slave. But closer examination of the incident reveals a more complicated story. When 
the English demanded the suspect, the Tuscaroras had “shew’d . . .  a Reluctancy to 
deliver him up” but “would have given another in his Room.”97 Perhaps the 
Tuscaroras felt that English courts were mistaken and were trying to hand over the 
actual perpetrator. Perhaps, according to native notions that favored reciprocity 
towards the bereaved over the European preference for revenge upon the perpetrator,
95 Lawson, New Voyage, 224-25.
96 Lawson, New Voyage, 225.
97 Lawson, New Voyage, 220.
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the Tuscaroras tried to hand over a man who for some unknown reason was already 
anathema among them. Either way, far from willingly agreeing with the colonial 
court’s verdict, they had only handed over the suspect when threats convinced them 
that “the Safety o f all the People lies at stake,” a situation in which they would have 
grudgingly “deliver[ed] up the most innocent Person living.” 98
During the actual execution, the three Tuscarora “kings” who were invited to 
be passive witnesses of the solemn administration of colonial justice unexpectedly 
seized active roles. They rushed the hanged man and, as he gasped and slowly twisted 
in the noose, they gathered around, tugging and punching him, taunting and 
tormenting him with jeers and insults. European executions often contained an element 
of grim mirth, but shocked colonial witnesses felt that all sense o f dignity and decorum 
had broken down. Lawson, normally sympathetic to the Tuscaroras, thought the 
incident “shews these Savages to be what they really are.”99 The Tuscaroras, however, 
were behaving as they would have during a native execution in which “all the whole 
nation, and all the Indians within a hundred Mile” would gather to take part in the 
grotesque tortures, tormenting the victim with “a great deal o f Mirth and 
Satisfaction.”100 By making the execution more akin to a native torture ceremony, the 
kings superseded European protocol and taught their own grisly lessons to the crowd.
98 Lawson, New Voyage, 220. Anger and disappointment at being forced to hand over 
a man widely considered innocent to colonial courts may have fueled the resistance 
that manifested afterwards during the Pate case.
99 Lawson, New Voyage, 220.
100 Lawson, New Voyage, 205.
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Despite a few partial successes in the courts, North Carolina officials failed to 
establish a sustainable tributary system largely because of their reluctance to fulfill their 
own obligations to the Indians. The set of policies enacted by Virginia and in part 
mimicked by North Carolina, implied a deal of sorts, however biased, that promised a 
measure of paternal protection for the Indians. In practical terms this meant warding 
off and controlling settlers, a service North Carolina’s government proved unwilling or 
unable to provide. Officials did make some early efforts. In 1694 the Chowan Indians, 
a group near the Great Dismal Swamps to the northwest o f the Albemarle Sound 
(which had signed several treaties with North Carolina), complained that they were 
“much injured” by encroaching settlers. In response, the colonial government limited 
new claims and declared void unsettled ones that were above the “old towne creek.”101 
Similarly upon “Complaint of the Yawpin Indians” (another small group in the coastal 
swamps), North Carolina’s council ordered a sixteen square mile reservation to be laid 
out according to a treaty that had been negotiated several years earlier.102 But such 
protections were incompatible with rapid settlement favored by officials. Settlers
101NCCR, 1, 432. The lands remained unsurveyed for nearly a decade, however, 
provoking continued disputes. Settlers claimed that in the absence of a formal survey, 
the Chowans claimed and defended a greater area than allocated and were “threatening 
yor Honrs petrs by destroying their Stocks burning their houses and other hostilities 
under pretence they are under yor Honrs protection and no Englishman ought to Seate 
within four miles of their Towne.” In this unusual example, the settlers offered to 
immediately vacate any land to be found justly controlled by the Indians after the 
survey. (NCHGR ,3: 242).
102 NCHGR, 3: 73. Record of Council Held at the House of John Hecklefield, April 
12, 1704, Indians: Treaties, Petitions, Agreements, and Court Cases (1698-1736), 
Colonial Court Records, Box 192, NCSA.
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complained that under excuse of protection, the Chowans had engaged in “destroying 
. . .[settlers’] Stocks burning their houses and other hostilities under pretense they are 
under yor Honrs protection and no Englishman ought to Seate within four miles of 
their Towne.”103 More often, it was Europeans who did the pillaging, a situation in 
which the government typically either openly sided with the intruders or chose to look 
away.
This departure owed to the desire by the leaders of the young, sparsely-settled 
colony to attract European settlers. As early as the late 1670s, the colony’s 
proprietors were angrily demanding to know why the colony was not “welplanted.”
Why had the settlements not spread further inland and south into the region around the 
Pamlico and Neuse rivers?104 They also urged the establishment o f towns that could 
double as military outposts.105 For the next several decades similar instructions 
accompanied new governors crossing the Atlantic.106 Although steps were made in 
1691 by Governor John Archdale to allow more land speculation, most settlement in
103 NCHGR, 3: 242. March 28, 1702 Petition in Indians: Treaties, Petitions, 
Agreements, and Court Cases (1698-1736), Colonial Court Records, Box 192, NCSA.
104 Herbert R. Paschal, A History o f  Colonial Bath (Raleigh, N.C.: Edwards & 
Broughton, 1955), 3.
105 NCCR, I, 228.
106 Christine A. Styrna, "The Winds of War and Change: The Impact of the Tuscarora 
War on Proprietary North Carolina, 1690-1729" (Ph.D. diss., Dept, of History,
College of William and Mary, 1990), 40.
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North Carolina was undertaken by small yeomen farmers who quickly sought small 
plots often within easy reach of (or in the case o f New Bern, upon) Indian towns.107
The willingness of North Carolina’s officials to favor settlers over Indians 
emerged amid a larger pattern o f setting aside laws and regulations to encourage 
growth.108 The explicit goal of such policies was “the more speedy peopling” of the 
colony so that the “Inhabitants o f this Government by reason of their fewness” would 
no longer be “subject to the dayly insults of the Heathen” and owe “their Lives and 
safety’s to the courtesy of the Heathen rather than their own strength.”109 Toward 
such aims, the proprietors and the colonial assembly periodically passed laws, as early 
as 1669, making new settlers immune from past debts for five years, a temporary grace 
that in the increasingly lawless colony often meant permanent immunity.110 Similarly, 
guarantees of religious freedom and lax enforcement of vestry acts beckoned a minor 
flood of Quakers and other dissenters fleeing from England, Ireland, and more 
restrictive colonies.111 The result was a general reputation for lawlessness. “This is a
107 Styrna, “Winds of War,” 22, 40, 309-11.
108 NCCR, I, 674-75.
109 NCCR, I, 674-75.
110 Arwin D. Smallwood, "A History of Three Cultures: Indian Woods, North 
Carolina, 1585 to 1995" (Ph.D. diss., Dept, of History, Ohio State University, 1997), 
152.
111 Styrna, “Winds o f War,” 47; Although these freedoms were first proposed as part 
of John Locke’s idealistic vision of new world settlement contained in his Fundamental 
Constitutions, their effect in spurring settlement was a clear motivation. Two 
contemporary estimates in 1708 and 1709 put the percentage of Quakers at between 
one seventh and one tenth of the total population (CRNC, 4: XV; NCCR, 1: 600-603, 
686-87, 708-15). Many of the Quakers in the colony were also converts, rather than 
immigrants.
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nest o f the most notorious profligates upon earth,” bemoaned an Anglican preacher 
who felt that his neighbors consisted chiefly o f crooks, adulterers, and bigamists who 
“for fear of punishment have fled hither”112 Ironically, these same “undue methods . .
. for seducing . . . inhabitants,” which had given the region a reputation for not 
looking too deeply into one’s affairs and had attracted peace-loving Quakers, also 
made the colony a haven for “Pyrates or Sea robbers” who plied the shoals o f the 
treacherous coast.113 Edward Teach, better known as Blackbeard, once famously 
bragged that he would be welcome in any home in North Carolina.114 He made his 
own home in the town of Bath, once the edge of Tuscarora territory. This same 
riotous reputation— in part intentionally fostered to attract settlers— also freed settlers 
from fear of reprisals for any crimes they might commit upon Indians as they carved 
out homes. First for the Indians along the leading edge of settlement and soon for the 
Tuscaroras, this would spell disaster.
Settlers and Indians could personally experience the contrast between North 
Carolina’s policies, which generally favored settlers over Indians, and those of 
Virginia, which often protected tributary Indians as a way of controlling growth and 
extending authority, in the hotly contested border region between the two colonies.
112 NCCR, 1: 767.
113 NCCR, 1: 475. This 1697 Letter of the Council of Trade explicitly links the “undue 
methods practiced in some of his Colonies for seducing the Inhabitants from others” to 
the rise of piracy in North Carolina and the harboring of “such Fugitives as leave any 
o f his Plantations contrary to the Laws provided for that purpose.”
114 This assessment was shared by a 1697 report that concluded “pirates are kindly 
entertained in Carolina” (NCCR, I, 475).
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The land dispute owed its origins to the fact that North Carolina had two founding 
charters, each containing different language.115 The first, issued in 1663, set the 
northern boundary of the colony at 36 degrees north. The second charter, issued two 
years later, declared that the border reached “from the north end of Currituck River or 
inlet upon a strait westerly line to Weyanoke creek which lies within or about the 
degrees o f 36 and thirty minutes northern latitude; and as far west, in the direct line as 
far as the south seas.”116 In strict geographic terms, this difference o f thirty minutes 
latitude translated into about a 40-mile ribbon that included the northern section of the 
Albemarle Sound, the region’s first area of heavy settlement. In practical terms this 
ambiguity, two different lines, neither of them properly surveyed, turned the entire 
border region into a confusing no-man’s land whose ownership was claimed by both 
but could be proven by neither. A Virginia politician complained that the area had no 
discernible border, “noe River betwixt it and us, and is but one broad Road.”117
Governing in such a place was nearly impossible. The trackless pine barrens, 
shallow ravines, disorienting swamps, and confusingly meandering rivers meant that at 
any time the average settler (or even skilled surveyor, as succeeding generations of 
surveyors including lohn Lawson and William Byrd discovered) would be hard 
pressed to offer more than a guess as to which colony he was in. When tax collectors
115 See William B yrd’s Histories, xvi-xxiv, for a good basic account of the dividing- 
line dispute, upon which much of this paragraph is based.
116 William B yrd’s Histories, xvii.
117 JH B V 1659-93, 98.
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came, settlers were quick to take advantage of the ambiguity. In 1680, settlers in the 
isolated Currituck and Blackwater region, who had received their titles from the 
Virginia land office, refused to pay Virginia quit-rents by claiming that their holdings 
were within North Carolina jurisdiction.118 Eight years later, settlers from the same 
area complained that North Carolina unjustly taxed their Virginia properties.119 
Although settlement was initially slow, the rich, well-watered soil o f the region made 
both colonies fearful of losing potential tobacco export duties.120
A closer look at the second charter shows that any attempt to fix the vacillating 
loyalties o f the settlers would involve Indians. In addition to specifying a longitude of 
approximately 36’ 30”, the 1665 charter described a straight line running westerly to 
Weyanoke Creek. But nobody could agree on what river or stream among 
innumerable backcountry waterways was the forgotten landmark; the two leading 
candidates were the Nottoway River and Wicocon Creek. Presumably the missing 
creek had been named for the Weyanoke Indians who at some point inhabited its 
banks; but this group, knocked about by rival tribes (notably the Tuscaroras) and the 
English in the uprisings of 1622, 1644, and Bacon’s Rebellion, had perambulated from 
site to site across the region for over half a century before finally dispersing into
118 William B yrd’s Histories, xvii.
119 William B yrd’s Histories, xvii; NCCR, 1: 357-358.
120 NCCR, 1: 358.
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surrounding tribes.121 To solve the puzzle, beginning around 1707 North Carolina and 
Virginia took the remarkable step of sending out interpreters to track down and take 
depositions from surviving Weanocks and other Indians and settlers in the region old 
enough to remember back to the early days o f the charter. Each colony hoped to have 
its version of the border “fully corroborated by the concurrent testimony of the 
Tributary Indians.”122 For a brief moment, high politics left the council chambers and 
both colonies hung on the words of “Wyanoke women that live at the Nottoway 
Towne” like Jenny, “aged as we suppose about sixty,” and Betty, “older,” who 
recalled corn planting, gathering tuckahoe roots, and nearly yearly removes in a 
bewildering landscape of native place names that proved impossible to trace on any 
European map.123 Neither colony was above bribing, begging, and threatening.
Indian deponents got a practical lesson in just how divided the two colonies were. 
More than a few also probably took advantage o f their gullible listeners for trade 
goods, alcohol, or a chance to get their own claims to the land set onto paper.
121 For accounts o f the Weyanokes’ movements, see Stanard, "Indians of Southern 
Virginia," 337-58, and 1-11; Harrison, “Deposition,” 47-50. See also Lewis R. 
Binford, Cultural Diversity Among Aboriginal Cultures o f  Coastal Virginia and 
North Carolina (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991), 162-76; Wright, Only Land 
They Knew, 91-92; Daniel L. Simpkins, Aboriginal Intersite Settlement System 
Change in the Northeastern North Carolina Piedmont During the Contact Period 
(Ph. D. diss., Dept, of Archeology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1992), 
257-83.
122 NCCR, 1: 748.
123 Stanard, "Indians of Southern Virginia," 4-10.
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Even while the two colonies sorted through and put their spin on contradictory 
evidence over where the line would eventually be placed, for the time being they both 
tried to exert practical control over the landscape. Virginia’s government tried to 
bolster claims and extend authority by having the area declared off limits to white 
settlement until the conclusion of the dispute. In the meanwhile, the colony affirmed 
tributary relationships with the Indians there, especially the Meherrins who had filled 
the vacuum left by Weyanokes fleeing from combined Nottoway and Tuscarora 
attacks.124 In the contested border region, this policy had the added benefit for Virginia 
o f obstructing the flow of North Carolina settlers. Occasionally North Carolina 
argued that the Meherrins ought to be subject to their government as tributaries, but 
more often that colony took an opposite tack.125 North Carolina tried to swing the 
loyalty of the region by flooding it with settlers who would be drawn by promises of 
debt relief, low taxes, and cheap land.
Predictably, the two policies clashed. At the beginning o f the eighteenth 
century, North Carolina complained that the Meherrin Indians “do daily commit great 
injuries to the inhabitants o f . . . [North Carolina] by destroying their stocks and 
burning their timber and houses and refusing to . . . render obedience . . . under the 
pretense that they are tributary” to Virginia.126 A troop of sixty settlers from North
124 NCCR, 1: 853-54. On the movement of the Meherrin into the area, see Shannon Lee 
Dawdy, "The Meherrins1 Secret History of the Dividing Line," NCHR 72, no. 4 (Oct. 
1995): 394.
125 Dawdy, "Meherrins Secret History," 402.
126 NCCR, 1: 570.
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Carolina, led by Colonel Thomas Pollock (an influential council member who later 
served as governor during the Tuscarora War), struck back by attacking and capturing 
many of the Meherrins, locking them up in the summer heat without water, pulling 
down several cabins, and threatening to destroy the rest.127 Virginia was outraged. 
Remarkably, the Virginia Council wrote to North Carolina that “We might with as 
much justice treat those who possess the adjoining Lands (and pretend to belong to 
Carolina) with the same severity as you have used those poor Indians since we have at 
least as much Reason to believe them within the bounds of Virginia as you have to 
imagine the Meherrin Indians to be within yours . . ”128 At about the same time 
Virginia sent another messenger to the Meherrin Indians promising support and telling 
them not to cave in to North Carolina’s threats.129
But the depredations continued and their repercussions reverberated among 
other nearby tribes. Tuscaroras passed frequently through the nearby Meherrin 
settlements during their winter hunts or on their way to trade with Virginia, and surely 
learned of the quarrels. Nick Major, chief of the Meherrin, would later figure among 
the councils of the southern Tuscarora towns as they debated going to war.130 Unless 
North Carolina imposed order upon its settlers and prevented “unwarrentable 
intrusions,” warned Governor Spotswood of Virginia, the Indian relations o f both
121 NCCR, 1: 670.
USNCCR, 1:671.
129 NCCR, 1:668.
130 NCCR, 2: 644.
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colonies would suffer irreparable harm. If North Carolina did not “now restrain” the 
settlers, the results would be “attended with a train o f ill consequences by involving 
both governments in a war with the Indians ” for “tho: they may perhaps surprise that 
one nation [the Meherrins], they ought to consider there are a great many other tribes 
that will take the alarm when they find the English have broke their faith with them and 
there is no dependence on our Treaties.”131
Farther south, more Indians were coming to this exact conclusion. In 1701 
five Machapunga Indians rescued several stranded Englishmen whose vessel had run 
aground in the sandbanks, and offered to convey them in a canoe north to an English 
settlement. What happened next is unclear. Thomas Amy, one o f the Englishmen, 
claimed that the Indians pulled the canoe to a remote shore and turned upon them.
One drew a bow and arrow, the other “cocking a gun and setting it to Mr. Amey’s 
breast,” threatened the passengers. Only Amy’s quick reflexes saved him. As he drew 
his sword and wrestled with one Indian, the other natives fled, stealing several 
firearms. The Indians told a different story. They claimed to have fed venison and fish 
to the stranded Englishmen who in turn got them drunk with pots of rum. When the 
inebriated Indians overheard that their passengers were from Charleston, the dark 
center o f the Indian slave trade, the Indians feared a trap and panicked. True, they “let 
fall 3 guns of the English into the water in this escape,” but these they later recovered 
and returned to another Englishman. Besides, the English had gotten away with “4
131 Virginia, Governor Spotswood to the Ministry of Queen Anne, Feb, 1710/11 as 
quoted in Douglas W. Boyce, "Notes on Tuscarora Political Organization, 1650-1713" 
(M.A, thesis, Dept, of Anthropology, U. o f Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1971), 7.
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raw Dear skins, one Otter [skin], one hairy match coat” and a quantity of corn. When 
John Lawson arrived in the Machapunga village to inquire into the affair and arrest the 
suspects, their leader told the Indians’ side o f the story and waved a paper in his 
face— a copy of a treaty concluded two years earlier between their people and the 
North Carolina government. Among its provisions was the requirement that the 
Machapungas assist shipwrecked Englishmen. Lawson reported that the chief “would 
make me no positive answer as to delivering up the Indians but always (told me) they 
might not . . .[suffer?] any breach of their articles from the English.”132
This treaty had been agreed upon at the eve of extensive settlement in the 
Pamlico and Neuse basins. But as English, French, and Swiss newcomers poured into 
the area any illusion of ordered relations broke down. In this remote corner o f the 
colony, the government could not even prevent its own settlers from sacking stranded 
ships, much less dictate relations with the Indians.133 The vacuum was filled by 
confused confrontations that left both sides baffled. These were not just the hog- 
killings, thefts, beatings, and complaints of trespassing that too often characterized 
meetings between the two cultures. Mixed in were bewildered attempts to understand 
the contradictions between official promises o f peace and antagonistic actions by 
settlers. An Indian named Wehuna approached Samuel Slockum to “ask him whether
132 Thomas Amy’s account, Lawson’s relation of his meeting with the Matchupunga 
Indians, and a copy of the 1699 Treaty are contained in NCHGR, 1: 597-99. A copy 
of the original can also be found in Indians: Treaties, Petitions, Agreements, and Court 
Cases (1698-1736), Colonial Court Records, Box 192, NCSA.
133 North Carolina settlers had fired upon and plundered a beached vessel (NCCR, 1:
527).
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the English did intend to make war or no.” No, insisted Slockum; but Wehuna pressed 
him, saying that the Indians believed otherwise.134 In another incident, acting upon 
the mistaken rumor that William Powell had delivered a note from Lawson urging 
attacks on the Indians, sixteen warriors seized the settler, robbed his gunpowder, and 
threatened to burn his house at the next full moon.135 The raiders had no respect for 
the governor’s ability to intervene: when Powell threatened to tell the governor, King 
Lowther unleashed a string of insults and struck Powell across the face with his 
bow.136 In this confused environment, even when the Machapungas relocated their 
town away from recent settlements, the settlers suspected the motive was so that they 
could “easily repair without being pursued” and revealed more of “a desire to a War 
with us than a peace.”137 When an Indian leader visited settlements to assess English 
attitudes, witnesses wondered whether it was “out of Real Kindness” or part o f a 
plot.138
Troubles with the smallish coastal tribes were bad enough. Worse was talk 
that “the neighboring towns of the Tuscarorah Indians are o f late dissatisfied with the 
Inhabitants of this place and severall actions and discourses o f the bare-river Indians 
[the Machapungas] and more than ordinary familiarity of late that is between them
134 NCHGR, 2: 194.
135 NCHGR, 1: 437.
m ,NCHGR, 1:437.
137 NCHGR, 2:193.
138 NCHGR, 2: 193.
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persuade them and the Tuscarora Indians is to believe that they are Indeavouring to 
persuade them that the English here desires a war against them.”139 This “familiarity” 
was doubly important because it showed the Tuscaroras forming friendships with a 
group towards whom they had recently been hostile. The threat o f Tuscarora 
involvement drawing the colony into open war spurred a call from the Pamlico region 
for the governor to end this policy o f purposeful neglect. Ten prominent settlers 
(including William Powell, perhaps still nursing a sore jaw and wounded ego) wrote a 
letter begging the governor to “speedily take sum Care in the matter.” Maybe, just 
maybe, order could be restored. Many of the Indian leaders were disposed to some 
sort o f reconciliation. If only the governor would “speedily please to send a good 
Interpreter here with orders what to doe” and a commission, then “sum of the Cheifs 
o f the Indians would come in” to hear the government’s pledges o f peace.140
This tension simmering in an arc from the Meherrins in the north, south 
through the Machapungas, touching upon Tuscaroras at every point, finally pushed 
Governor Robert Daniels, according to Lawson, to call “all the Indian Kings and 
Rulers to meet, and in a full Meeting of the Government and Council, with those 
Indians, they agreed upon a firm peace.” 141 An undated rough draft of a treaty 
mandating peace “so long as Sun and Moon endure” may be the only surviving record
139 NCHGR, 2: 194.
140 NCHGR, 2: 194.
141 Lawson, New Voyage, 211-12.
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of the agreement.142 Not surprisingly, its provisions favored its North Carolina author 
and repeated articles typical in Virginia’s tributary treaties. The Tuscaroras had to 
return runaway servants and slaves, cease burning around English homes, and limit 
their settlements to west of the Roanoke river or half a day from English plantations. 
Highlighting the importance of trade (and Tuscarora habits that took advantage of it), 
Tuscaroras could no longer avoid repaying debts indefinitely without losing “pauns” 
left as collateral. Concerns that the Tuscaroras were colluding with other Indians 
appear in an agreement that during wars the English and Tuscaroras remain neutral 
and “not assist that other natione with men, powder or shot.” On occasion the English 
might even call upon the Tuscaroras as independent mercenaries entitled to 
“reasonable Satisfaction for their tyme.” But the provisions do not merely show the 
colonists seeking to assert authority upon the natives, they also reflected eagerness by 
the Tuscaroras for the colonial government to rein in uncontrolled settlers. In return 
for agreeing to hand over men accused of serious crimes committed upon the English, 
the Tuscaroras received promises by North Carolina officials to prosecute Englishmen 
who “who shall injure or wrong any of the Tuscarore Indians.” Moreover, Lawson 
recorded that Indian leaders used the negotiations to curb the flow of English rum into 
their towns.
However, for all of its ideas, the treaty only survives as a rough draft. It was 
not dated; it was not signed. No evidence indicates that its terms were ever applied.
142 “Sun and Moon Treaty,” in Appendix A of Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians," 160-62; 
NCHGR, 2: 218-19.
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Failure may have owed, in part, to protests by Tuscaroras (particularly young men) 
against new restrictions on the rum trade, which not only provided a valuable source 
o f wealth and influence for Tuscaroras who traded the commodity further west, but 
was also highly sought in their own towns.143 Failure may also have come from the 
internal stresses of handing over suspects to North Carolina’s courts. (It was around 
this time that the Tuscaroras had “shew’d [such] a Reluctancy to deliver” up a 
suspect— a decision that was probably far from unanimous.)144 Restrictions on 
hunting and settlement could not have been popular. But most o f all, failure owed to 
the collapse of North Carolina’s government.
At nearly the exact moment that settlers, Tuscaroras, and the government were 
attempting to order their relations and put aside doubts, fears, and confusion, the 
colony’s government slipped into a period of division, often called Cary’s Rebellion.
North Carolina’s politics had long been beset by “perpetual broils.” 145 For a long 
time, complained Virginia’s governor, Alexander Spotswood, “it has been the common 
practice there to resist and imprison their Governors.”146 The proprietors, in far-off 
England, faired almost as badly; the people regarded them as having no more authority 
than “a ballad singer.”147
143 Lawson, New Voyage, 212.
144 Lawson, New Voyage, 225.
145 NCCR, 1: 686-86.
146 NCCR, 1: 798.
141 NCCR, 2: xii-xix
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Discontent to varying degrees had ebbed and flowed since the 1670s but 
moved towards a new peak with the actions o f Robert Daniel, the same deputy 
governor who had negotiated with the Tuscaroras. He required an oath o f allegiance 
to Queen Anne and the Protestant succession as a tool to break the growing influence 
o f Quakers (who refused to swear out o f religious principle) and their allies in the 
fractious colonial assembly. The resulting power struggle quickly spiraled into almost 
impenetrable turmoil in which many participants switched sides numerous times. 
Broadly speaking, however, it pitted an ensconced Albemarle Anglican elite (with 
strong ties to Virginia) against a fragile coalition of Quakers, disenchanted Albemarle 
politicians, and inhabitants of the newer Neuse and Pamlico settlements who sought 
greater voice in government.148 Events culminated when the proprietors, favoring the 
former group, appointed as governor Edward Hyde, cousin o f Queen Anne, whose 
credentials and blood-ties were meant to inspire quick obedience. His superiors urged 
him to “take great care” in the chaos “that the Indians be not abused and Justice be 
duly administered to them in our Courts.”149 But due to a series o f accidents, he 
arrived in North Carolina without his commission. His opponents coalesced around 
Thomas Cary, a former Charleston merchant, and grew even more open in rebellion.
The Tuscaroras felt the disorder of the Cary revolt most directly in the 
southern Pamlico and Neuse regions where the chaos of the mutinies combined with 
exponential growth. That region, nearest to the core of Tuscarora towns along the
148 Styrna, "Winds," 57.
149 NCCR, 1: 845.
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Neuse, Contentnea, and Tar basins, was cut offby forty miles o f swamp overland from 
the administrative heart o f the colony. Except for a few Albemarle Quaker enclaves, 
this southern part o f the colony harbored the greatest percentage o f Caryites, mostly 
among ambitious planters and traders who sought greater voice for themselves and 
their region in government. Cary himself lived nearby. But despite this concentration 
o f supporters of one side, the colonists there were far from united. That region, where 
the people, according to one disgusted traveler, “for want o f sense and reason” were 
of “such a factious temper, that they are ready to follow any one that will head them,” 
suffered from the greatest swings in allegiance to competing administrations.150 The 
Tuscaroras were sure to have heard word of the armed pinnaces patrolling the mouth 
o f the Neuse; perhaps they spied upon the posses of the governor’s men tramping 
inland up the swamps in blundering efforts to arrest Cary in his fortified home.151 
Numerous settlers were willing to bend a Tuscarora’s ear and put their spin on the 
latest tales of turmoil.
The cresting tide of newcomers, already a source of tensions with Indians in 
the region, accelerated during the revolt, amplifying the disorder. Claiming authority,
Cary liberalized land policy to encourage immigration and rewarded his supporters in 
Bath County by lowering the quit-rent rate there.152 But not all newcomers were so 
appreciative. Graffenried, at the head of over four hundred Swiss and German
150 NCCR, 1: 804.
151 NCCR, 1: 804.
152 CNRC, 4: XXX.
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Palatines coming to settle New Bern, initially claimed neutrality, savoring the sense 
that he “could give the balance of power to whichever party . . .[he] fell to.” 153 Soon 
he decided to side with the royally connected Governor Hyde, and over glasses of 
madeira wine, he rejected Cary’s sweet-tongued offers o f alliance.
The split added to the region’s tensions. Afterwards Cary and his allies saw to 
it that Graffenried’s credit and banknotes were rejected, making it hard to obtain 
supplies and pushing his people to the verge of a starving time.154 Cultural animosities 
added to the mutual contempt. Baron Graffenried disdainfully looked down upon 
slovenly scattered English farms (a reaction to cheap land and scarce labor) and 
contrasted them to the tidy Swiss burgh he envisioned, complete with craftsmen and 
the region’s first water mill. Graffenried’s own camp, however, was far from 
harmonious. Some of the Palatines were middle-class burghers seeking new economic 
opportunities and religious liberties, but others were of the lower sort, whom 
Graffenried considered the “excrement of the whole Canton of Bern.”155 Returning 
the sentiment, the latter group took advantage of colony-wide divisions to resist
153 Graffenried, Account, 229.
154 Jonathan Urmstone, a missionary wrote that by July of 1711 only about a third of 
the Palatine settlers survived, “and those ready to starve” because of the credit crises 
caused by Cary’s supporters (NCCR, 1: 775).
155 Christoph Von Graffenried, Christoph Von Graffenried's Account o f  the Founding 
o f New Bern, ed. Vincent H. Todd (Raleigh: North Carolina Historical Commission, 
1920), 256. There may have also been problems between the Swiss and the German 
inhabitants. Dill notes that on Graffenried’s map only the names o f Swiss, not German 
families, appear as landowners along the tributaries o f the Trent and Neuse rivers. 
Alonzo T. Dill, "Eighteenth-Century New Bern," NCHR 22, no. 1-4 (Jan., April, July, 
and Oct 1945): 170.
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authority and cast their lot with Cary’s supporters (whom Graffenried similarly 
considered little more than “rowdies” besotted with rum and brandy).156 The Palatines 
and the English established separate courts and negotiated guidelines establishing 
jurisdiction in various disputes, but these prescriptions quickly broke down.157 When 
Graffenried tried to apprehend a Swiss blacksmith accused of theft, the man fled to 
William Brice, a prominent slaver, Indian trader, and Cary supporter whom the Swiss 
baron loathed.158 By “instigating some of the English or Carolinian inhabitants and 
people on the nearest plantations,” Graffenried complained o f Cary, “he so frightened 
my people that no one dared venture to go out of his house.” 159
Indians near the Pamlico and Neuse Rivers trying to decode settlers’ intentions 
came to the unsettling realization that negotiations with colonial leaders unable to 
govern their fractious people could have only narrow and short-lived significance.
When Graffenried arrived in North Carolina, he found Chatouka, the future site of his 
colony, still inhabited. Despite having already paid Lawson (who recommended that 
he merely “drive off” the natives) and the Lord Proprietors, Graffenried decided to pay 
the Indians for the land. The meeting between Graffenried and his Indian counterpart 
became a display of the two men’s relative authority. The head o f Chatouka “dressed
156 Graffenried, Account, 236.
157 Graffenried, Account, 363.
158 Graffenried, Account, 235. For Brice’s participation in the Indian slave trade, see 
Dill, "Eighteenth-Century New Bern," 303-304; NCHGR, 3: 270 and NCCR, 2: 298.
159 Graffenried, Account, 230.
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himself in his best” and arrived at the head of seventeen councilors. Not to be 
outdone, Graffenried decked himself out in “whatever would glitter most” and had a 
fine chair brought out for him to the clearing where native leaders sat on the ground 
arranged in a circle. All began well, with Graffenried handing out gifts and offering 
rum, but the display of authority quickly broke down. Franz Michel, one of 
Graffenried’s business partners who had been drinking with the English neighbors, 
stormed into the circle, knocked off the Indian leader’s head-dress and began beating 
one o f the councilors. After his servants seized and dragged off the man, Graffenried 
apologized profusely, promising to have him punished. But the spell had been broken. 
The native king complained that “if the Christians made peace and their alliances after 
that fashion he did not want to have anything to do with them.”160 As if to prove 
Grafenried’s impotence, the next night Michel hit the bottle again, then sneaked into 
the Indian camp, found the poor orator, and repeated the drubbing.
Even this sad caricature of orderliness was more than the typical unregulated, 
muddled encounters. Most survive only as dim rumors, lacking in specificity but 
ringing in frustration: “they had been badly treated and detained by the inhabitants of 
the Pamtigo [Pamlico], Neuse, and Trent Rivers;” 161 “these poor Indians [were] 
insulted in many ways by a few rough Carolinians more barbarous and unkind than the
160 Graffenried, Account, 374-75.
161 Statement that “they had been badly treated and detained by the inhabitants of the 
Pamtigo [Pamlico], Neuse, and Trent Rivers, a thing which was not to be longer 
endured,” in Graffenried, Account, 307.
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savages themselves, [and] could not stand such treatment much longer;”162 women 
were abused and men mistreated “until the Indians grew weary and tired.”163 Amid the 
haze are a few tantalizing glimpses of specific incidents. Settlers robbed and beat to 
death one Tuscarora for hunting too close to their farm.164 Discontent spread among 
the Tuscaroras about another “that the White men had punished for a small fault 
committed in his drink”— a reproof uncalled for according to Tuscarora protocol, 
which held alcohol, not the individual, accountable for acts committed while drunk.165 
A few complaints even named names. One settler, Mr. Hancock had “taken a gun;” 
William Brice in his trade, “dealt too hard.”166
What made these relations so confusing, o f course, was that not all contact 
between the Tuscaroras and the colonists was hostile. Trade, negotiations, perhaps 
even a few friendships endured; they had to-—the Tuscaroras were too entrenched in 
their new lifestyles to entirely turn away from the consumer revolution in their midst. 
Settlers too depended upon interactions for trade to pay creditors and food to feed 
families. Moreover, in the context of the Cary revolt, various groups attempted to 
strike deals and secure firmer alliances with the Tuscaroras in order to strengthen their
162 Hugh Talmage Lefler and William Stevens Powell, Colonial North Carolina: A 
History, (New York: Scribner, 1973), 67.
163 Lefler and Powell, Colonial North Carolina, 67.
164 Graffenried, Account, 234.
165 Dill, "Eighteenth Century New Bern," 308 footnote 77. John Barnwell, "Journal of 
John Barnwell," VMHB 5:4 (1898), 391-402, 6:1 (1898), 42-55.
166 NCCR, 1: 991.
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positions. Already mentioned were Graffenried’s attempts at amicability with 
surrounding tribes. He pursued a similar policy o f goodwill towards the Tuscaroras. 
Cary’s supporters also strove towards accommodation or more. Rumors raced across 
North Carolina and Virginia, and were made official in a July 1711 warrant for Cary’s 
arrest, that the rebels, “in order to the better Carrying on their Seditious Designes have 
been Discovered to hold a Traitorous Correspondence with the Tuscaroro Indians.”167 
Accusations in particular centered upon a Cary supporter named John Porter who 
during the commotion supposedly was discovered “going in person to severall Indian 
towns and by promises of reward, to bring down the Indians to cut off Man, Woman 
and Child on the Western Shore of Chowan, that has been the only subjects to her 
Majesty that on all occasions has expressed their Loyalty.”168 Other accusations 
focused on Virginia traders blamed for stirring up anger against their North Carolina 
competitors.169 Tuscarora councils listened to, debated, and ultimately rejected such 
proposals, but not without noting the “unnatural Divisions and Animositys among the 
Inhabitants” they represented.170
167 NCCR, 1: 776-75.
168 NCCR, 1: 802
169 John Barnwell, who led a military expedition against the Tuscaroras during the 
Tuscarora War, wrote, “I inquired whether any white men had incited them to it, the 
unanimously answered no, only that ye Virginia traders told them that the people 
Massacred were outlandish [ie, foreigners—the Swiss and Palatines] and not English, 
and so they doubted not but soon to make peace with the Engish and that they were 
then about it.” Barnwell, "Journal," 398. See also, Dill, "Eighteenth Century New 
Bern," 305. For earlier accusations, seeEJCCV, 2: 390, 381-82, 402, 405; 3: 199-200.
170 NCCR, 1:796-97, 783, 810-11.
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Such appeals exacerbated splits among Tuscaroras trying to navigate the best 
course to take with Europeans. In some ways, Tuscaroras mirrored the confusion of 
their colonial counterparts. The Tuscaroras were not ruled by a single unified 
government.171 Rather, language, kinship, and cultural ties loosely united them.172 
One o f the reasons that they were such an enigma to European governments was that 
when authorities dealt with the Tuscarora “nation,” they often met with delegations of 
leaders and councilors representing several towns, unable to force their decisions upon 
other villages. Towns did recognize that strength came from negotiating as a block, 
and attempted to form alliances during times o f war.173 But differences were 
inevitable, as during the Pate dispute with Virginia, when one town had acquiesced 
while the others held firm. Barring full cooperation, they tried to stay out of each 
other’s way and at very least attempted to avoid war with one another by using 
reconciliation processes like the exchange of wampum.
171 Douglas W. Boyce, "Did a Tuscarora Confederacy Exist?" Indian Historian 6, no.
3 (1973): 34-40.
172 A nineteenth-century Tuscarora claimed that the Tuscaroras had been divided into 
three groups—the Kautanohakau, Kauwetseka, and Tuscarora— a fascinating 
suggestion, but one hard to confirm with European sources. Supposedly, they had 
joined an alliance against the Nanticoke Indians, a group from the Maryland area who 
later migrated to New York and Pennsylvania. These divisions may have had some 
correspondence with later divisions during the Tuscarora War. William M. Beauchamp 
and David Cusick, The Iroquois Trail: Or, Footprints o f  the Six Nations in Customs, 
Traditions, and History in Which Are Included David Cusick's Sketches o f  the 
Ancient History o f  the Six Nation (Fayetteville, N. Y .: H. C. Beauchamp, 1892), 35.
173 See Chapter Three. Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail, 35.
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At the village level, Tuscarora politics resembled that of their close cultural 
cousins, the Nottoways, whose leaders Spotswood had derided as mere corporals.174 
Most decisions were ultimately at the village level, headed by the “teetha” or king, a 
semi-hereditary position, whose title literally meant “one who did not have to 
work.”175 Even this person could not enforce spot decisions without the consent and 
advice of the village, represented by family heads, councilors, and war captains.176 
They met together in all “general Councils and Debates, concerning War, Peace,
Trade, Hunting, and all the Adventures and Accidents of Humane Affairs.” Lawson, 
clearly impressed at the order he saw among the Tuscaroras compared to the 
disruptions occurring in North Carolina, noted that all issues would be “argued pro 
and con, very deliberately (without making any manner of Parties or Divisions) for the 
good of the Publick.”177
174 For discussions of Tuscarora politics in North Carolina, see John E. Byrd, 
Tuscarora Subsistence Practices in the Late Woodland Period: The Zooarchaeology 
o f  the Jordan's Landing Site (Raleigh, North Carolina: North Carolina Archaeological 
Council, 1997), 3-5, who discusses the role of trade with the Spanish and later 
Virginians as a possible cause for power be consolidated under increasingly powerful 
chiefs. Douglas W. Boyce, in "Notes on Tuscarora Political Organization” 
convincingly argues, however, that councils were “the most important governing or 
decision-making unit of the Tuscarora” (43). Seventeenth- century references to 
“Emperors” probably reflected a poor understanding and exaggeration o f the strength 
of Tuscarora leaders. One effect of the Tuscarora War was greater consolidation of 
authority into the hands o f a few leaders willing to negotiate with Europeans.
175 Personal communication with Blair Rudes. See Graffenried, Account, 245, for 
heredity.
176 Lawson, New Voyage, 204.
177 Lawson, New Voyage, 204
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Despite Lawson’s belief that consensus could be reached “without any Jars and 
Wrangling,” Tuscaroras did not inhabit an egalitarian paradise.178 Elsewhere, Lawson 
himself discussed political intrigues, poisonings, and false accusations where discord 
could mean torture or death. Divisions over the course to take with Europeans had not 
reached that point—yet—but groups were coalescing. An investigation o f Porter’s 
treacherous meetings with the Tuscaroras revealed that “the Indians own that the 
proposal was accepted by their young men, but that their old men (who bare great 
Sway in all their Councils) being of their own nature, Suspicious o f some trick or else 
directed by a Superior providence, refused to be concerned in that barbarous 
design.”179 In this case the Tuscaroras’ political system worked smoothly, with 
younger men graciously giving way to the experience and wisdom o f their elders. But 
differences were emerging, between towns and within them. An Indian had told a 
settler in 1703 that “2 particular towns do intend for to make war and that one and all 
are agreed for it except 3 Indians.” Another “two towns . . .  are very much against it, 
but as for any of the other towns [they] as yet” have not agreed “to make war with 
the English.”180 Later stories told by Tuscaroras suggest the depth o f internal 
divisions. One tale told o f a reformer (perhaps sent from heaven) who tried to 
revitalize Tuscarora culture by teaching lessons in morality, and by warning against 
conflict with Europeans. But, according to the tale, young men scorned the message
178 Lawson, New Voyage, 204
179 NCCR, 1: 796-97; 783.
180 NCHGR, 2: 194.
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and killed the messenger— a grim portent of internal divisions to come.181 Moreover, 
the relative balance of power within communities may have been undergoing a shift as 
trade, and growing tensions with Europeans positioned some leaders to seize greater 
authority if hostilities broke out.182
Such divisions probably occurred within every community, but some regional 
patterns emerged. Some Tuscaroras favored fleeing the region altogether.183 Others 
favored stability and continued efforts at accommodation with the Europeans. This 
view was more prevalent among the “upper” villages, further inland and closer to 
routes into Virginia, particularly the “Tuscaroro” or “Weecacana” trading path.184 
Their position allowed them to enjoy benefits of extensive trade with Virginia traders, 
while being removed from the direct line o f settlement.185 They had managed to 
capture considerable role as middlemen. A memorial later written by the Virginia 
Indian Company confirmed that there had been “no Trade carried on from hence with 
any forreign Indians, the Tuscaroras only excepted” between 1709 and 1711.186 
Moreover, these upper Tuscaroras were shielded behind and in constant contact with
181Byrd, Prose Works, 303; Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail, 31. These stories are 
discussed in greater detail in chapter eight.
182 The roles o f the two most prominent Tuscarora “kings,” Tom Blount and Hancock, 
will be discussed within the context o f the Tuscarora War in chapters 3-6.
183 Relations with the Iroquois will be discussed in chapter seven.
184 Boyce, “Did a Tuscarora Confederacy Exist?” 37-38.
185 Boyce, “Did a Tuscarora Confederacy Exist?” 37-38.
186 Quoted in Boyce, “Did a Tuscarora Confederacy Exist?” 37.
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Virginia’s tributary tribes. Their language may even have been closer in some respects 
to these tributary groups, particularly the Nottoways and the Meherrins, than with 
some of the Tuscaroras of the lower towns, whose speech gradually shaded off 
southward into a slightly different dialect.187 The tributaries, who had a foot in either 
camp, often had an interest in influencing the Tuscaroras to resolve any conflict 
peacefully. At the same time, the reliance Virginia placed upon its tributary system 
made it hard for that government to bear down too hard upon the Tuscaroras. These 
upper Tuscaroras had learned in the drawn standoff with Virginia over the Pate 
murder that patience could work in their favor and that a tense, but workable, 
settlement could be achieved.188
If accommodation seemed like a possibility for some Tuscaroras, others, 
particularly in the chaotic region around the Pamlico Sound saw little reason for hope.
The inhabitants of these “lower” towns, lived in the direct path o f the disorganized, 
rapid expansion occurring in the lower Neuse and Pamlico basins. Numerous 
encounters had only proved that colonial leaders could or would not control their own 
fractious peoples nor enforce any meaningful agreements. The resulting frustration 
mounted particularly among younger males, who were culturally encouraged to see 
war as a solution.
187 Blair Rudes, personal communication.
188 Unlike Boyce, I feel that the Tuscaroras’ political experiences with Virginia, not 
just their trade connections, encouraged some Tuscaroras to remain neutral and later 
seek a diplomatic solution through Virginia.
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More discontent sounded from retreating coastal tribes who had crowded 
closer to Tuscarora settlements.189 Many o f these groups at one time had been at odds 
with one another. Sometime in late seventeenth century, for example, a group of 
Machapungas who had been invited to a feast by the Coree Indians, on cue drew 
concealed weapons, attacked their hosts, and sold the prisoners as slaves to the 
English.190 The Tuscaroras had threatened to go to war to revenge the Corees.
Within a few years, however, animosities had subsided in the face of the greater threat 
of encroachment, however, and many of these Indians were reported as being in “more 
than ordinary familiarity” with one another. Europeans often misunderstood these 
relationships. North Carolina court officials thought that the Corees, for example, 
were “slaves” o f the Tuscaroras that the larger group could discipline and influence at 
will.191 Instead, the opposite was true. As Tuscaroras came into closer contact and in 
some cases increasingly shared villages with such displaced coastal Indians, the 
newcomers helped sway the population against the settlers.
Few of these Indians imagined entirely driving off the Europeans— later 
treaties reveal how highly they valued trade— but many “could not stand such 
treatment much longer, and began to think of their safety and vengeance.”192 Many
189 Parramore, “Tuscarora Ascendancy,” 319; According to Graffenried, these tribes 
who allied with the lower Tuscaroras included the Mattamuskeet, Bear River,
Weetock, Pamlico, Neusiok, and Coree Indians.
190 Lawson, New Voyage, 209.
191 Parramore, “Tuscarora Ascendancy,” 320; CNCR, 3: 511.
192 Quotation in Lefler and Powell, Colonial North Carolina, 67.
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yearned for the moment that relationships could be redefined under their terms. And 
many thought that the moment would require force.
*  *  *  *
If anyone in 1711 was in a position to know o f these tensions it was John 
Lawson. He was arguably the one European most familiar with the Tuscaroras. As 
surveyor, speculator, trader, and explorer, he had traveled among and lived near them 
for nearly a decade. He laid out the town of New Bern and was in a better position 
than most to witness the tensions that increased settlement were causing among the 
Tuscaroras and their native neighbors. Beyond the Pamlico where he made his home, 
as a participant in the boundary dispute with Virginia he had personally met and 
interviewed settlers and discontented tributary Indians along that contentious 
borderland. He was a political insider who, while steering clear o f direct participation 
in the Cary revolt, moved among the inner circles o f both sides and could see its 
effects upon the colony. He noted injustice to the Indians and had publicly reproached 
his countrymen, claiming that the Indians “are really better to us, than we are to them .
. . We look upon them with Scorn and Disdain and think them little better than Beasts 
in Humane Shape, though if well examined, we shall find that, for all our Religion and 
Education, we possess more Moral Deformities . . . ,”193 In the time since he wrote 
this, partially owing to his own land speculation, tensions had only increased.
193 Lawson, New Voyage, 243.
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More than anybody, Lawson should have known all o f these things. But 
somehow, he was blind to them or underestimated them, or felt that his own familiarity 
would allow him to negotiate himself out o f any bind. His own book, after all, was a 
travel guide, preaching the precepts by which Europeans could adventure among the 
Indians safely. Perhaps he had grown overly accustomed to these tensions and 
considered them the cost of contacts that had become commonplace. Perhaps he was 
lulled by a recent respite in the Cary dispute, fine weather after a drought, a desire to 
pick grapes, and an eagerness to survey a road towards Virginia— all reasons he used 
to convince Graffenried to join him. Together the two men set out once more to 
travel into Tuscarora country. The journey would be Lawson’s last.
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CHAPTER THREE 
A STORM ON THE FRONTIERS
Word raced through the colonies: Lawson was dead. During his journey with 
Graffenried, he had been captured by Tuscaroras and other Indians, tortured, and 
killed. The exact details remained hazy. Graffenried, who survived, recorded that 
some Indians boasted o f slitting Lawson’s throat with a razor found in his sack, but 
“some say he was hanged; others that he was burned. The savages keep it very secret 
how he was killed. May God have pity on his soul.”1 In Virginia, William Byrd 
likewise heard that the Indians “cut his throat from ear to ear.”2 A more gruesome 
version reached South Carolina via an emissary from North Carolina named 
Christopher Gale:
But the fate of Mr. Lawson (if our Indian information be true) was 
much more tragical, for we are informed that they stuck him full of fine
1 Graffenried, Account, 270.
2 Byrd, William, The Prose Works o f  William Byrd ofWestover: Narratives o f  a 
Colonial Virginian, ed. Louis B. Wright (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1966), 303.
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small splinters o f torch wood like hog’s bristles and so set them 
gradually afire.3
Lawson, perhaps more than anybody else, had personified all the potential and failures 
of the freewheeling, disorderly relations between Europeans and Tuscaroras during 
their first decades o f contact in North Carolina. And Tuscaroras killed him.
These accounts came appended to news of broader tragedy. Shortly 
afterwards, in September 1711, an alliance of many Tuscaroras and smaller coastal 
tribes launched coordinated surprise attacks against settlements along the Pamlico 
Sound and Neuse River in North Carolina. Christopher Gale, who had been sent by 
Gov. Edward Hyde, described to a joint session of South Carolina’s council and 
assembly this “grossest piece o f villainy that perhaps was ever heard o f in English 
America.”4 To the north in Virginia, Gov. Alexander Spotswood prepared plans to 
“divert the storm from our own frontiers.”5 Even further abroad, in Boston, 
newspapers carried accounts o f the attack. In New York, Governor Hunter worried 
to the Board of Trade that “the war betwixt the people of North Carolina and the 
Tuscarora Indians is like to embroil us all.”6
3 NCCR, 1: 826. At the time Gale believed Graffenried also to be dead, judging from 
his sleeping mat, which had been found “all daubed with blood.” These various 
accounts are collected together in Lawson, New Voyage, xxxvi.
4 NCCR, 1:826.
5 Alexander Spotswood, The Official Letters o f  Alexander Spotswood, ed. R. A. 
Brock, 2 vols. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1857), 1: 149.
6 NYCD, 5: 343.
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Far from enflaming the whole of British North America, the Indians who 
participated in the attack— predominantly from the Tuscarora “lower towns” and 
communities o f nearby smaller tribes— had anticipated a limited, local conflict. 
Lawson’s killers knew him; likewise, the first attacks came from Indians often 
acquainted with their victims: in some cases settlers even welcomed killers into their 
homes as friends. The jarring assault, these Indians hoped, would end local patterns of 
abuse and institute measures for more equitable relations in the region. Paired with the 
attack, these warring Tuscaroras and their allies also attempted to negotiate a separate 
peace with other settlers. Judging from widespread divisions within the colony and 
with its neighbors, they had anticipated that their opponents would be isolated and the 
war short-lived. Likewise, many other Tuscaroras, predominantly from the “upper 
towns,” thought the conflict would be limited. In the meantime, these Indians 
refrained from participating in the war and instead imagined that neutrality and 
diplomacy could be a viable course. In both cases, these Indians were wrong.
Such miscalculations were understandable but deadly. One distinction o f the 
Tuscarora War was the extent to which a series o f local raids in an isolated corner o f 
North Carolina quickly involved a far-flung cast of participants—North and South 
Carolinians, Virginians, New Yorkers, and Iroquois—who all sought to use the war as 
an opportunity to recast this region in their preferred image. North Carolina’s leaders, 
already weakened by political and religious divisiveness, staggered helplessly from the 
force o f  the blow and spent most of their energies accusing one another o f conspiracy 
and cowardliness. Desperate, they appealed to their neighbors for aid. Subsequently,
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much of the fighting and negotiating was directed by South Carolina and Virginia (and 
to a lesser extent, New York and the Iroquois). Neighborly goodwill played a role in 
the colonies’ participation, but each also carried their own agenda that transformed the 
nature and meaning of the war.
Since South Carolina’s beginning, traders seeking deerskins and Indian slaves 
operated among Indians throughout the Southeast, competing not only with the 
French and Spanish but with rival Virginia traders. In the process they had repeatedly 
inspired or participated in Indian wars meant to provide slaves for market and to 
strengthen bonds with Indian partners. During the Tuscarora War, South Carolina 
sent two expeditions o f booty-seeking adventurers leading a motley assortment of 
Catawbas, Yamasees, and other tribes. Thereafter, although Tuscaroras had targeted 
local settlers, much fighting in the war would consist of Indians fighting Indians. In 
the process, native captive-taking practices dovetailed with and were transformed by a 
desire to capture Tuscaroras for sale in Charleston slave markets. For South 
Carolinians, the fact that Tuscaroras had been prime customers o f Virginia competitors 
sweetened the deal.
Virginia took a different approach. In Virginia’s long history o f employing 
subjugated Indians to secure its frontiers, Tuscaroras had been a sore-spot -  
interacting freely with settlers and tributaries alike, but falling under no formal treaty 
of their own. Recognizing that not all Tuscaroras were equally culpable in the 
uprising, Governor Spotswood sought to use the threat of wholesale retribution to 
force broad segments o f the Tuscaroras -  particularly those who avoided fighting -  to
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accept Virginia rule, thereby transforming North Carolina’s enemies into Virginia’s 
subjects.
Often divided, North Carolina’s leaders swung between and sometimes 
embraced both of these contradictory policies. At times, agents o f the colony 
celebrated South Carolina’s “laudable custom” of utterly exterminating their enemies 
and advertised that thousands of Tuscarora slaves could be purchased from their 
colony. In other instances, especially after it became increasingly clear that South 
Carolina’s military victories alone could not induce a workable peace, North 
Carolina’s governor adopted Virginia’s tactics aimed at acquiring Tuscarora 
tributaries.
Tuscaroras and their native neighbors were unprepared for such a widespread 
response. Rather than rectifying local abuses, they found themselves pinned between 
the colonial aspirations of several different colonies. For both Tuscaroras who had 
participated in the uprising and others who sought neutrality, the result was defeat and 
narrowing choices. Nonetheless, several paths wound through the narrow spaces 
between clashing colonial approaches. This resulted in no single conclusion for the 
Tuscarora War. Instead at the war’s end, Tuscaroras found themselves embarking on 
numerous, different trails.
Meanings in Life and Death:
Treaties and War between Tuscaroras and North Carolina
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Befitting Graffenried’s Germanic roots, his story almost reads like a dark fairy 
tale: a story that began with fair weather, grape-picking, and scouting in the forest 
darkened into captivity, torture, death, and war. Initially, five men embarked up the 
Neuse River: Graffenried, Lawson, and two black slaves shared a boat; an Indian 
interpreter scouted on horseback along the river’s edge. But a detour by the native 
scout through Catechna, a principle Tuscarora town, raised suspicions. The local 
leader, “King” Hancock, dispatched warriors to arrest the intruders. That evening 
Lawson, Graffenried, and the two slaves found themselves captive and being rushed 
“through forests, bushes, and swamps” until they arrived at Catechna where Hancock 
awaited them, “sitting in all his glory upon a raised platform.”7 Within days, Lawson 
lay dead, Graffenried was hostage, and the region was at war— a rapid, bewildering 
turn o f events made even more unclear by the fact that only Graffenried recorded his 
story.8 Lawson could tell no tales and the slaves and Indian guide disappeared from 
the records. The views of Hancock and the other Tuscarora and Coree Indians whose 
decisions determined the course of events survive only insofar as they can be gleaned 
from the views of a frightened outsider. The result is a tale whose importance cannot 
be denied, but whose exact meaning remains difficult to decipher.
Most historians, transfixed by Lawson’s death and the Tuscarora uprising that 
followed, confine discussion of the captivity to how it was the “first overt act” by
7 Graffenried, Account, 264-65.
8 Graffenried’s account is especially problematic because it openly blamed Lawson for 
many o f the problems faced by the New Bern settlement. See Graffenried, Account, 
392.
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disgruntled Indians.9 Viewing the captivity solely as a precursor to war, however, 
inserts preordained certainty into highly contingent events. One standard history of the 
era even posits that hostile Indians had already set the date for the attack— Graffenried 
and Lawson only happened to stumble unluckily into a hornet’s nest o f plotting 
conspirators.10 Close examination, however, reveals captors uncertain about the 
intruders’ intentions and divided among themselves about future actions. Moreover, 
an eye for the native perspective reveals an alternative narrative: while a coalition of 
Tuscaroras and threatened coastal tribes initiated war with Lawson’s death, they also 
spared Graffenried as an avenue towards peace. Graffenried ultimately departed 
Catechna with word of Lawson’s death and  a treaty. It is in this context of 
intertwining tales o f life and death, war and peace, that these events must be 
understood.
Graffenried’s and Lawson’s anxious predawn audience with Hancock upon his 
dais— the first documentary glimpse of the Tuscarora leader— included a speech that 
floundered in the absence of an interpreter. Unfortunately, understanding Hancock’s 
broader motives and intent is similarly difficult. Hancock’s anglicized name, probably 
borrowed from a trader or settler, suggests some prior English contact. Moreover, 
Catechna’s location, less than two days from New Bern, made his town the closest
9Chapman James Milling, Red Carolinians, 2d ed. (Columbia: U. o f South Carolina 
Press, 1969), 115.
10 Hugh Talmage Lefler, and William Stevens Powell, Colonial North Carolina; a 
History, A History o f  the American Colonies (New York: Charles Scribner, 1973), 68- 
69.
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Tuscarora community in the Neuse basin both to European settlements down river and 
to coastal tribes bearing the brunt of contact.11 Catechna’s setting and prominence 
made the community into a fulcrum feeling the full weight o f Tuscarora-English 
relations from both sides, and its teetha (chief) into a likely leader in an emerging 
coalition among disgruntled Tuscaroras and other tribes. As sunrise approached 
during that first meeting with Graffenried and Lawson, however, two things became 
clear: first, despite a history of tensions, a decision on the fate o f the intruders had not 
yet been made; second, despite Hancock’s lofty perch, the decision was not solely his 
to make.
Rather than the captives facing an immediate death sentence, a debate among 
Hancock and several councilors “whether we should be bound as criminals or not” 
resulted in a decision to treat the prisoners with respect and the occasion as an 
opportunity for broad negotiations.12 Indeed, the Indians initially mistook Graffenried 
for Edward Hyde, the governor of North Carolina.13 They were probably only slightly
11 It took Graffenried, exhausted and nearly lame, two days to return to New Bern. 
Graffenried, Account, 261. For the location of Catechna, see John E. Byrd and Charles 
L. Heath, "The Rediscovery of the Tuscarora Homeland: A Final Report o f the 
Archaeological Survey of the Contentnea Creek Drainage, 1995-1997" (East Carolina 
University, David S. Phelps Archaeology Laboratory, 1997).
12 Apparently the Indian interpreter was absent and the discussion exceeded Lawson’s 
linguistic ability. Graffenried, Account, 265.
13 This mistaken identity may have been particularly troubling to the Tuscaroras 
because in a bid for their support during the Carey revolt, John Porter may have 
warned that Hyde intended to take Tuscarora lands. Noeleen Mcllvenna, '"Olivers 
Days Come Again': North Carolina, 1660-1713" (Ph.D. diss., Dept, o f History, Duke 
University, 2004), 233.
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less elated to learn that the man they held was a baron, the colony’s second-highest- 
ranking official, and leader of the nearby New Bern settlement. As Surveyor-General, 
council member, and frequent ambassador to the Indians, Lawson possessed 
credentials nearly equal to Graffenried’s. Therefore, Hancock treated them “very 
politely:” he personally served the involuntary guests a meal of cold boiled venison and 
dumplings (accustomed to finer service, the baron turned up his nose at its 
presentation in a “lousy fur cap”) and granted them the “liberty o f walking about the 
village.”14
The real ordeal was yet to come. The two Europeans spent the day watching 
the steady arrival o f Tuscaroras and other Indians from surrounding communities for a 
meeting that would double as a trial and peace conference. That evening “a great 
number o f Indians with the neighboring kings” assembled in council around a great fire 
in the middle of a broad open space.15 Graffenried and Lawson took their seats in the 
ring upon two wicker mats specially laid out for them as “a sign of great deference and 
honor.”16 Although “King Hancock presided,” and “always formed the questions” to 
be debated, a younger orator did most o f the speaking. Nearby, sat the Indian who 
had set out with Graffenried and Lawson now acting as their “interpreter and 
spokesman.”17
14 Graffenried, Account, 265.
15 Graffenried, Account, 265.
16 Graffenried, Account, 265.
17 Graffenried, Account, 266.
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The questions began with inquiries about their personal actions— “what was 
the cause of our journey? . . . why . . .had we not paid our respects to him 
[Hancock] and communicated our project to him?”— but quickly moved to a broader 
agenda of resolving more “general complaints.”18 These Indians had “been very badly 
treated and detained by the inhabitants o f the Pamtego [Pamlico], Neuse, and Trent 
Rivers, a thing which was no longer to be endured.” (Here, Lawson had to do some 
fast talking, because as surveyor he was specifically named in some of these 
grievances). By the end of the evening, some sort of accord had been reached. “After 
considerable dispute . . . and deliberation” the captors decided to release the 
prisoners—an unlikely decision if they planned a surprise uprising.19 Graffenried and 
Lawson planned to depart the next morning.
Dawn arrived. But before Graffenried’s and Lawson’s canoe could be 
retrieved and made ready, several previously absent chiefs arrived from nearby 
communities and demanded another conference. Graffenried and Lawson again 
trotted out the “same answers” as the night before, but this smaller meeting, held 
privately in Hancock’s hut outside of town, went horribly wrong.20 Among the late 
arrivals was Coree Tom of the Coree community of Cartuca. According to
18 Graffenried, Account, 266.
19 Graffenried, Account, 266.
20 Graffenried, Account, 266.
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Graffenried, Coree Tom “reproached Lawson with something so that they got into a 
quarrel on both sides and became rather angry. This spoiled everything for us.”21
The past experiences of Coree Tom’s people help explain this sudden reversal. 
In these meetings, most Tuscarora complaints centered on trade and the treatment of 
hunters who approached European plantations; complaints about land focused on fears 
offuture European intrusion. On the other hand, Corees, who inhabited coastal plains 
south of the lower Neuse (as well as Neuse, Bear River, and Machapunga Indians), 
already experienced invasion. Tensions had threatened to escalate for several years.
As early as 1703, Gov. Robert Daniel had mustered militias in preparation for a war 
with the Corees that did not occur.22
More recently, Corees had relocated at least one of their towns upriver to the 
junction o f the Neuse with Catechna Creek. But the new location proved no safe 
haven. Soon after the move, Graffenried had riled Coree Tom with cheerfully tactless 
inquiries about relocating his New Bern settlement from the swamps to the Coree’s 
“well situated” and “cooler” new home.23
If  the Corees peered uneasily from their new address towards Swiss, German, 
and English farms only half a day downstream, it is less clear how they felt about well- 
established Tuscarora communities at their backs. The Corees had not removed
21 Graffenried, Account, 266.
22 “War declared against the Core and Nynee Indians, 1703,” in NCHGR 2: 204.
23 Graffenried, Account, 366-67. Throughout the war, other Europeans, including 
Barnwell, Hyde, and Pollock, would each in turn come to covet this tract of land.
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entirely into the assemblage o f Tuscarora towns; instead they carefully settled on the 
outskirts, half-way between the Europeans and Catechna, perhaps reflecting a degree 
of mutual ambivalence. It is uncertain what linguistic and cultural group the Corees 
belonged to, but archeological evidence reveals their homeland to have been in the 
cultural estuary where Cashie (Iroquoian) and Colington (Algonquian) archeological 
traditions mixed and overlapped.24 In other words, while the Corees frequently traded, 
treated, and traveled among the Tuscaroras, they may have retained enough “foreign” 
traits that they did not feel entirely at home among the Tuscaroras. At one point,
North Carolina officials had considered the Corees as “slaves” of the Tuscaroras 
whom the larger group could discipline, influence, and perhaps even sacrifice at will— 
a widely held perception that would continue into the Tuscarora War.25
Did Lawson act with “unguardedness in such a critical condition” because he 
felt that the Corees were militarily weak and unlikely to muster serious support among 
the Tuscaroras?26 Previously at the full council Lawson had “excused himself the best
24 Byrd, "Rediscovery," 7; Kakaliouras, Ann M., "Biological Distance and the 
Ethnolinguistic Classification o f Late Woodland (Ad 800-1650) Native Americans on 
the Coast of North Carolina" (Ph.D. diss., Dept, o f Anthropology, U. o f North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2003); David Sutton Phelps, "Archaeology of the North 
Carolina Coast and Coastal Plain: Problems and Hypotheses," in The Prehistory o f  
North Carolina: An Archaeological Symposium, ed. Mark A. Mathis and Jeffrey J. 
Crow (Raleigh: North Carolina Division o f Archives and History, 1983), 36-37, 43-44; 
Jeffrey D. Irwin, Wayne C. J. Boyko, Joseph M. Herbert, and Chad Bradley, 
"Woodland Burial Mounds in the North Carolina Sandhills and Southern Coastal 
Plain," North Carolina Archaeology 48 (Oct. 1999): 59-86.
25 CNCR, 3: 511.
26 Graffenried, Account, 266.
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he could.” An Indian “dressed like a Christian,” who spoke with Graffenried, 
wondered why then had Lawson stupidly quarreled with Coree Tom and “threatened 
that we would get revenge on the Indians?”27 In Virginia, William Byrd also heard 
that Lawson met disaster because he was “so foolish as to threaten” his captors.28 If 
so, Lawson fatally misjudged the influence of the Corees and the extent that his own 
fate hung in the balance. Coastal tribes had sought Tuscarora assistance against 
Europeans before. Lawson may have provided the perfect moment for Coree Tom to 
secure a military alliance with Tuscarora neighbors once and for all,
Instead of releasing Graffenried and Lawson, the Indians at Catechna resumed 
their councils. These lengthy ceremonies culminated in Lawson’s execution and a 
decision for war. Months later, Tuscarora captives described a split within the council 
along age lines, saying that the “young men were wheedled by Hancock to joine in the 
villanies committed by him, but the old men and chiefs wept bitterly and told them the 
ill consequences would follow.”29 Elders had succeeded in warning off younger, 
more-bellicose men before, but this time they failed and the execution proceeded. War 
would go forward.
But this dramatic finale was not the only result. Simultaneously, the Indians 
pursued a series of ceremonies and negotiations that resulted in promises of neutrality
27 Graffenried, Account, 266.
28 William Byrd, The Secret Diary o f  William Byrd o f  Westover, 1709-1712, ed. Louis 
B. Wright and Marion Tinling (Richmond, Va.: The Dietz Press, 1941), 423-24.
29 Barnwell, “Journal,” 397.
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and pledges o f peaceful future interactions. Therefore, these events need to be 
analyzed in the context o f making war and  peace. Although later codified in the 
formal language o f a treaty, the sentiments were first expressed in the less recognizable 
cadences o f ceremony:
In the middle o f this great space we sat bound side by side, sitting upon 
the ground, the Surveyor-General and I, coats off and bare headed; 
behind me the larger of my negroes; before us was a great fire and 
around about the fire the conjurer, that is an old gray Indian, a priest 
among them, who is commonly a magician, yes, even conjures up the 
devil himself. He made two rings either o f meal or very white sand, I 
do not know which. Right before our feet lay a wolf skin. A little 
farther in front stood an Indian in the most dignified and terrible 
posture that can be imagined. He did not leave the place. Ax in hand, 
he looked to be the executioner. Farther away, before us and beyond 
the fire, was a numerous Indian rabble, young fellows, women, and 
children. In the middle was the priest or conjurer, who, whenever there 
was a pause in the dance, made his conjurations and threats. About the 
dance or ring at each of the four corners stood a sort of officer with a 
gun. They beat time with their feet and urged on the other dancers and 
when a dance was over shot off their guns. Beyond this, in a corner of 
the ring, were two Indians sitting on the ground, who beat upon a little 
drum and sang, and sang so strangely to it, in such a melody, that it
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would provoke anger and sadness rather than joy. Yes, the Indians 
themselves, when tired of dancing, would all run suddenly away into a 
forest with frightful cries and howling, but would soon come back out 
of the forest with faces striped black, white, and red. Part of them, 
besides this, would have their hair hanging loose, full of feathers, down, 
and some in the skins of all sorts o f animals. In short in such 
monstrous shapes that they looked more like a troop o f devils than 
other creatures; if one represents the devil in the most terrible shape 
that can be though of, running and dancing out of the forest. They 
arranged themselves in the old places and danced about the fire.
Meanwhile there were two rows of armed Indians behind us as a guard, 
who never left their post until all was over: Back of this watch was the 
council o f war sitting in a ring on the ground very busy in 
consultation.30
Graffenried remembered passing “the night between life and death,” alternately 
praying and pleading.31 Turning to an Indian who understood English, Graffenried 
touted his innocence and his relation to the great and vengeful Queen of England. He 
offered his “services and all sorts of favors” and promised that his only intent had been
30 Graffenried, Account, 267-68.
31 Graffenried, Account, 269.
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to “live on good terms with them.”32 Finally came results: a flurry o f talks, messengers 
sent to and from other Tuscarora villages, waiting, and sudden salvation. “Oh how 
dumb-founded I was, when . . .  the Indian said to me in my ear, in broken English, 
that I should not fear, they would not kill me, but would kill General Lawson.”33 
Leaving behind the English surveyor to face torture and execution, Graffenried was led 
away to feast among “a great number of the Indian rabble” who “all evidenced a great 
joy at my deliverance.”34
While the exact circumstances of Graffenried1 s experiences were unique, 
comparison with another famous captivity a century earlier helps elucidate their 
meaning.35 In January 1608, Captain John Smith, leader o f the struggling Jamestown 
colony fell into the hands o f Powhatan. Overlaps in their accounts suggest similar 
rites:
early in a morning a great fire was made in a long house, and a mat 
spread on the one side, as on the other, on the one they caused him to 
sit, and all the guard went out of the house. Presently came skipping in
32 Graffenried, Account, 269.
33 Graffenried, Account, 269.
34 Graffenried, Account, 269.
35 Although these events are separated by over a century, and the Powhatans and 
Tuscaroras hailed from distinct cultures, the two peoples traded, fought, made treaties, 
and shared versions o f several ceremonies such as the Huskanaw (a puberty rite). For 
Huskanaw among the Iroquois see Boyce, Douglas W., "Iroquoian Tribes o f the 
Virginia-North Carolina Coastal Plain," in Northeast, ed. Bruce G. Trigger, Handbook 
o f  North American Indians (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 285.
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a great grim fellow, all painted over with coal, mingled with oil; and 
many snakes and weasel’s skins stuffed with moss, and all their tails 
tied together, so as they met on teh crown o f his head in a tassel; and 
round about the tassel was a coronet of feathers, the skins hanging 
round about his head, back and shoulders, and in a manner covered his 
face; with a hellish voice and a rattle in his hand. With most strange 
gestures and passions he began his invocation, and environed the fire 
with a circle of meal. Which done, three more such like devils came 
rushing in with the like antic tricks, painted half black, half red; but all 
their eyes were painted white, and some red strokes like mustaches 
along their cheeks. Round about him those fiends danced a pretty 
while, and then came in three more as ugly as the rest, with red eyes, 
and white strokes over their black faces. At last they all sat down right 
against him, three on the one hand of the chief priest, and three on the 
other. Then all with their rattles began a song, which ended, the chief 
priest laid down five wheat corns, then straining his arms and hands 
with such violence that he seat, and his veins swelled, he began a short 
oration. At the conclusion they all gave a short groan, and then laid 
down three grains more. After that, began their song again, and then 
another oration, ever laying down so many corns as before, until they 
had twice encircled the fire. That done, they took a bunch of little 
sticks prepared for the purpose, continuing still their devotion, and at
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the end of every song and oration, they laid down a stick between the 
divisions o f corn. Until night, neither he nor they did either eat or 
drink, and then they feasted merrily, with the best provisions they could 
make. Three days they used this ceremony, the meaning of which they 
told him was to know if he intended them well or no. The circles of 
meal signified their country, the circles o f corn the bounds o f the sea, 
and the sticks his country. They imagined the world to be flat and 
round, like a trencher, and they in the midst.36
Basic elements overlap: the great fire; the in and out rush of fantastically 
dressed dancers with faces painted red, black, and white; the chanting conjurer in the 
midst o f the swirling activity; and, perhaps most intriguingly o f all, the carefully 
constructed rings o f grain. Examining the Powhatan ceremony, historical 
anthropologist Frederick Gleach, has concluded that it was a “ritual o f redefinition” 
used to establish “the forms of the relationship between the colony and the 
Powhatans.” 37 Perhaps a better phrase would be “ritual of incorporation.” Europeans
36 John Smith, The Generali Historie o f  Virginia, New England, and the Summer Isles 
[1624] in John Smith, The Complete Works o f  Captain John Smith (1580-1631), ed. 
Philip L. Barbour (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1986), 149-50.
37 Frederic W. Gleach, Powhatan's World and Colonial Virginia : A Conflict o f  
Cultures, Studies in the Anthropology o f  North American Indians (Lincoln: U. of 
Nebraska Press, 1997), 114-15. Smith may have heightened the portrayal o f his own 
danger, and emphasized the role of Pocahontas in order to capitalize on her fame 
(Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 38-39). Nonetheless, the parallels to Smith’s 
account support the basic elements of its veracity.
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who asked southeastern Indians to sketch maps often found themselves scratching 
their chins over bewildering diagrams that denoted spiritual and political relationships 
as much as geographic locations.38 The Powhatan ceremony, concludes Gleach, 
served as a sort of symbolic re-mapping, with the rings of meal demonstrating “that 
the Powhatans were redefining the world to include the English colony.”39 Famously, 
Pocahontas saved Smith from sudden death— an act that may have been the next 
carefully staged ritual in a rite to alter the relationship between the English and 
Powhatans. Afterwards Powhatan told Smith, “now they were friends, and presently 
he should go to Jamestown, to send him two great guns, and a grindstone, for which 
he would give him the country of Capahowasick, and forever esteem him as his son 
Nantaquod.”40 The sum of these procedures, concludes Gleach, reveal a ritual 
designed to adopt Smith into Powhatan kin networks and to incorporate Jamestown as 
another village in the Powhatan empire.
Graffenried’s ordeal also ended with a close escape from death, demands of 
tribute, and a redefinition of the terms of the relationship between New Bern and the
38Gregory A. Waselkov, "Indian Maps of the Colonia Southeast," in Powhatan's 
Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast, ed. Gregory A. Waselkov, Peter H. Wood, 
and M. Thomas Hatley (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 
292-343.
39 Gleach, Powhatan's World, 114-15,
40 Smith, Complete Works, 151.
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Indians.41 The next morning, as Graffenried struggled to make sense of the night 
before, the Indians told the baron “that they had it in mind to make war on North 
Carolina.” They hoped “to surprise the people o f Pamtego, Neuse, and Trent Rivers, 
and Core Sound.” There was an exception, however— one that showed that 
Graffenried’s salvation represented a broader political covenant as much as a personal 
judgment: “they promised that Caduca, which is the old [native] name of the little city 
of New Bern, should receive no harm.”42
Already, Graffenried had offered his “services and all sorts o f favors” and 
promised that his only intent had been to “live on good terms with them.”43 In place of 
John Smith’s cannons and grindstone, Graffenried found himself agreeing to fit each of 
the chiefs from ten separate villages with a coat, and to outfit Hancock with two 
powder flasks, five hundred bullets, and two bottles of rum.44 Graffenried refused 
even greater demands o f guns and ammunition. Although he considered these goods 
mere ransom, the Indians, in light o f Smith’s experiences, may have intended them to 
symbolize broader clarifications of power: not ransom, but tribute.
41 Gleach ultimately argues that the whole procedure sought to ritually adopt Smith 
into Powhatan kin networks, and more broadly to incorporate Jamestown as but 
another village in the Powhatan empire. It seems that Graffenried’s experiences, while 
gesturing in this direction, did not strive for quite so much. This shortcoming may 
owe to cultural differences between the Tuscaroras and the Powhatans, or perhaps a 
century of evolving understanding of European intruders and the limits o f diplomatic 
behavior towards them.
42 Graffenried, Account, 270.
43 Graffenried, Account, 269.
44 Graffenried, Account, 271.
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Over several days Graffenried and the Indians refined their agreement into a 
formal treaty. Dictated to a hostage in no position to argue, this remarkable document 
reflected the wishes of Indians assembled at Catechna. Even with Graffenried at their 
mercy, however, the agreement revealed a desire not for the destruction or even the 
full removal of Europeans from the region, but rather for a redefinition o f the 
relationship between the Indians and the settlers into a formalized, workable condition. 
For over two decades, particularly around the raw, young outposts o f southern North 
Carolina, relations with Indians had been ad hoc and unscripted. Given the 
opportunity, it was a coalition of Tuscaroras and coastal allies who sought to inject 
order into the chaos. The treaty’s first point dictated that “both parties shall forget the 
past and henceforth be good friends.” Other points continued this theme, with 
Graffenried promising neutrality in the current war, agreements being made to create 
avenues for resolving conflict by appeals to “the authorities o f both sides,” limits being 
imposed on territorial expansion without Indian approval, and rules enacted to allow 
Indians to hunt near settlers’ farms tempered with promises not to interfere with cattle 
or to set uncontrolled fires. The Indians gained a pledge that “wares and provisions 
shall be allowed to come at a reasonable and just price.” To signal their agreement, 
Graffenried agreed to urge his people to emblaze an “N” (for “Neuse”) on their doors, 
as a signal to marauding Indians to pass over homes like an Old Testament angel of 
death.45 The destruction was yet to come.
45 The text o f the treaty appears in Graffenried, Account, 281-82. No plan was 
arranged for word of the agreement to reach the people of New Bern before the attack 
took place. Graffenried continued to be held hostage for several weeks.
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The Attack as Text
Sunrise on September 22 signaled the beginning of the attack.46 The attack 
came as a complete surprise, especially since no provisions had been made for 
Graffenried to warn his people.47 Within the space of two hours, Indians looted and 
set fire to homes, destroyed crops, and slaughtered or drove off cattle, hogs, and 
horses.48 Approximately sixty English settlers died in the initial attack. Although the 
Indians spared New Bern itself, Palatines farther from the town suffered similar 
casualties.49 Simon Forteskue, who had planted north o f the Pamlico River since 
1704, later recalled how he somehow survived into a world o f loss after “he was shot 
in the head[,] his wife and children taken prisoners and carryed away, his house burnt 
down to the Ground[,] all that he had lost.”50 Another settler from the north shore of 
the Neuse noted a similar litany of loss: one son, one white servant, and two black 
slaves— all dead; another son shot through the shoulder but escaped; “Plantation [,]
46 Spotswood, Letters, 1:116
47 Only a small percentage of Palatine settlers, around twenty families— mostly 
artisans— actually inhabited the town where they would largely escape the initial 
assault. Alonzo T. Dill, "Eighteenth Century New Bern," NCHR XXII, no. 1-4 (Jan., 
April, July, and Oct. 1945): 168.
48 (NCCR, 1: 827-29; 819-20)
49 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 116; The following March Pollock estimated initial 
casualties at 130 or 140 (NCCR, 2: 24); Ffarnifull Green— a settler estimated “they 
have Kill’d about 100 people and have taken prisoners abt 20 or 30” (NCCR, 1: 815).
50 NCCR, 4: 801
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House [,] Stock of Cattle [,] and hogs entirely destroyed and Plundered.”51 Death 
took its ugliest forms. Survivors investigating the gutted and smoldering homes of 
their neighbors found bodies mangled, mutilated, or arranged in grotesque positions. 
Unburied, bodies fell victim to dogs, wolves, and vultures.52
For Christopher Gale, who was quickly dispatched to beg assistance from 
South Carolina, it was the “various and unaccountable” nature o f the targets and 
methods that rendered the morning’s “butchery” so horrific.53 But his own accounts 
reveal patterns and meanings behind the apparent randomness. Far from being 
unconcerned or unaware o f their victims’ identities, many o f the attackers were 
frequent household guests and visitors, in some cases “esteemed as members o f the 
several families where the mischiefs were done.” They had arrived “with smiles in 
their countenances, when their intent was to destroy.”54 The Tuscaroras and other 
Indians attacked the settlers whom they knew best,55 Unlike the conscripted armies of 
Europe and her colonies, war among the Tuscaroras and most other eastern Indian 
tribes was a personal affair. Lawson wrote that Carolina’s Indians “ground their Wars 
on Enmity, not on Interest as the Europeans generally do.”56 Indians who appeared at
51 NCCR, 5: 653
52 NCCR, 1:827.
53 NCCR, 1: 827
54 NCCR, 1: 828.
55 Spotswood asserted that “the first attacks fell upon those Family’s in which the 
Indians were most conversant.” Spotswood, Letters, 2: 114.
56 Lawson, New Voyage, 208.
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colonists’ homes on the morning of September 22 in many cases could probably recite 
victim’s specific offenses.
It would be wrong, however, to ascribe the war merely to retribution for 
individual insults. Nor did the attackers simply intend to cut off all European 
settlement. The Tuscaroras’ willingness, even insistence, on bargaining with 
Graffenried, coupled with evidence of continued trade with Virginia traders suggests 
that the attackers did not seek to empty the region of Europeans. Instead, Hancock 
and other attackers meant to employ a sudden blow to force colonists to reevaluate 
their actions and to restructure relations along lines laid out in the treaty negotiated 
with Graffenried.57
Matching specific wartime acts to points from Graffenried’s treaty would be 
impossible, but a comparison reveals shared themes, transforming aspects o f the war 
into a dark mirror o f the peace that Indian combatants sought. Persistent prewar 
complaints against traders had resulted in treaty provisions that called for goods to be 
delivered fairly and cheaply; it was no coincidence that traders appeared as some of the 
chief victims in the uprising.58 Similarly, worries over colonial encroachments figured 
into the treaty. Besides killing Surveyor-General Lawson, Indians also later burned
57 In "'Something Cloudy in Their Looks': The Origins o f the Yamasee War 
Reconsidered," Journal o f  American History 90, no. 1 (June 2003): 44-76, William L. 
Ramsey similarly argues that the Yamasee War owed its origins to efforts by Indians 
to use violence to break through the confusion of "English diplomatic behaviors that 
can only be described as schizophrenic."
58 NCCR, 1: 828. Traders’ valuable merchandise and proximity to Indians also 
probably contributed to their frequency as targets.
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the home and papers o f Jonathan Lillington, the surveyor of Bath County, thereby 
erasing paper claims to much of the region.59 Around the Pamlico and Neuse rivers 
settlers retreated from exposed farms into eleven garrisons, leaving lands vacant and 
allowing patents to lapse.60 Worries over the impingement o f cattle upon hunting 
territories resurfaced in the form of a “Dayley Destruction in our stocks and horses 
and fencing being burned.”61
To attain these goals the Lower Alliance employed military tactics at the war’s 
outset that echoed a style or “aesthetic” o f warfare widely employed by Indians in the 
region.62 Over a century earlier, members o f the Roanoke voyages to Carolina’s 
shores had noted that “their manner of war amongst themselves is either by sudden 
surprising one another, most commonly about the dawning of the day, or moon light, 
or else by ambushes or some subtle devices.”63 Similarities between past tactics and 
the present conflict did not go unnoticed. The Tuscarora uprising was so “alike in Plot, 
Secrecy” and “Circumstances” to a series o f well-coordinated surprise attacks by 
Powhatan Indians in 1622 and again in 1644 that an observer in South Carolina
59 NCCR, 2: 141.
60 NCCR, 1: 825-27; 2: 239-42.
61 NCCR, 1: 819; 5: 653.
62 Gleach, Powhatan's World, 45; Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way o f  War: 
Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians (Lanham, MD: Madison 
Books, 1991).
63 David Leroy Corbitt, ed., Explorations, Descriptions, and Attempted Settlements o f  
Carolina, 1584-1590 (Raleigh: State Dept, o f Archives and History, 1948), 84.
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privately noted the corresponding pages of Purchas 's Pilgrims, a widely-read Virginia 
history.64
Other instances reveal Indians taking pages from the same playbook. After 
being invited to a Coree feast, and partaking of “victuals, fruit, and such things . . .  to 
make these new Friends welcome” a Machapunga King “gave the Word, and his men 
pull’d their Tamahauks or Hatchets from under their Match-Coats” and killed or 
enslaved their hosts.65 Such reversals could take the most intimate form: a Powhatan 
leader greeted and embraced the “King of Chowan,” but then suddenly “whipt a bow 
string around the King of Chowans neck, and strangled him.”66 Such attacks displayed 
a common cultural sensibility towards war: craft and guile allowed a bold strike deep 
at the heart o f the enemy, allowing a statement of superiority punctuated with 
violence, followed by safe retreat while the enemy reeled in confusion and dismay.
Not surprisingly, European survivors only saw the work of a “hellish crew” who 
“perpetrated the grossest piece of villainy that perhaps was ever heard o f in English 
America.”67
64 Frank J. Klingberg, ed., The Carolina Chronicle o f  Dr. Francis Le Jau (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1956), 104.
65 Lawson, New Voyage, 209.
66 Edward Bland, "The Discovery o f  New Brittaine, 1650," in The First Explorations 
o f  the Trans-Allegheny Region by the Virginians 1650-1674, ed. Clarence Walworth 
Alvord and Lee Bidgood (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark and Co., 1912), 121-22.
67 NCCR, 1: 827. For the tendency of opposing cultures to view each others’ wartime 
tactics as “barbaric” see Thomas S. Abler, “Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism, and Rape:
An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Conflicting Cultural Values in War,” Anthropologica 
41, no. 1 (1992): 3-20.
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The violence, however, revealed an intimacy with its victims combined with a 
systematic desire to act out against authority and influence. Gale related the details of 
the Nevill family’s demise:
the old gentleman himself, after being shot, was laid on the house-floor, 
with a clean pillow under his head, his wife’s head-clothes put upon his 
head, his stockings turned over his shoes, and his body covered all over 
with new linen. His wife was set upon her knees, and her hands lifted 
up as if she was at prayers, leaning against a chair in the chimney 
corner, and her coats turned up over her head. A son o f his was laid 
out in the yard, with a pillow laid under his head and a bunch of 
rosemary laid to his nose. A negro had his right hand cut off and left 
dead. The master of the next house was shot and his body laid flat 
upon his wife’s grave.68
This was hardly the random outcome of a struggle between strangers. This was 
violence with meaning, a chance to show scorn for the victim in a way that displayed 
irony and wit, and added insult to injury. During Virginia’s “starving time” in the 
winter o f 1609-10, settlers had robbed Indian granaries and food stores. In retaliation 
the Powhatans killed a band and left their bodies with mouths crammed full o f bread in 
“contempte and skorne” as a message to the others.69 Deciphering the Nevill postures
68 NCCR, 1: 825-28.
69 Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 51; Percy, “True Relation,” 265.
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is more difficult. Stockings torn down, petticoats pulled up, a woman’s coif crammed 
onto her husband’s head— all gender inversions that suggest sexual insult.70 Nearby, 
women were discovered sprawled on their floors with stakes run up their bodies or 
infants ripped from pregnant bellies. These acts suggest an attack on female settlers’ 
reproductive abilities. The gingerly arranged rosemary, and the careful positioning of 
Mrs. Nevill’s obscene genuflection may have implied contempt towards European 
religion. Overall, an atmosphere of mock tenderness and respect at odds with the 
violence of the moment pervades— an aesthetic not entirely unlike that employed 
during Indian torture ceremonies where captors spoke in terms of “caressing” their 
victims with sharp knives and “warming” their bodies with hot coals.71 The object of 
such acts was to humiliate the victims, to demonstrate their relative weakness and to 
establish the victor’s superiority.72
70 Nancy Shoemaker writes that, “Whether ‘women’ or ‘eunuchs’ was the insult of 
choice, one nation declared power over another by making military conquest akin to 
sexual conquest.” Nancy Shoemaker, “An Alliance between Men: Gender Metaphors 
in Eighteenth-Century American Indian Diplomacy East o f the Mississippi,” 
Ethnohistory 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1999): 239-63.
71 Daniel K. Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," William and Mary 
Quarterly 3rd ser., vol. 40, no. 40 (1983): 528-59 especially page 534; William A. 
Starna and Ralph Watkins, "Northern Iroquoian Slavery," Ethnohistory 38, no. 1 
(Winter, 1991): 34-57.
72 Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 154
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Even as the Indians left a mosaic o f the dead in their wake, they also herded 
captives—mostly women and children—back to their towns.73 A few days after the 
attack, Graffenried reported the heartbreak of watching Swiss, German, and English 
women and children streaming into Catechna, first from the Pamlico settlements, and 
soon afterwards from those around the Neuse and Trent rivers. Quizzing one boy he 
recognized, Graffenried listened as the child wept and related that “his father, mother, 
brother, yes the whole family had been massacred.” 74 Mrs. Pierce entered captivity 
with five of her children; also prisoner in the same camp was the eight-year-old 
daughter of Mr. Taylor.75 Early rumors in Virginia estimated that the number of 
captives to be twenty or thirty.76 Barnwell later learned of at least thirty-four white
73 The literature on Indian captivities is vast. See, for example, James F. Brooks, 
Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest 
Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 2000); Colin G. 
Calloway, “An Uncertain Destiny: Indian Captivities on the Upper Connecticut River,” 
Journal o f  American Studies 17, no. 2 (1983): 189-210; James Axtell, “The White 
Indians o f Colonial America,” William and Mary Quarterly 32, no. 1 (Jan., 1975): 55- 
88; John Demos, The Unredeemed Captive: A Family Story from  Early America 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994); Alden T. Vaughan and Daniel K. Richter, 
“Crossing the Cultural Divide: Indians and New Englanders, 1605-1763,” Proceedings 
o f  the American Antiquarian Society 90, no. 1 (1980): 23-99.
74 Graffenried, Account, 270.
75 Barnwell, “Journal,” 46.
16 NCCR, 1: 815.
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captives in one Tuscarora fort, besides twenty-four black slaves who may have been 
captives or runaways.77
In the same way that during the attack Indians had been able to manipulate and 
mutilate the bodies o f dead settlers as a demonstration of their authority, Lower 
Alliance townspeople could do the same with the living. Prisoners arrived to the 
sounds of the women singing and dancing while twirling black rings around white 
wands. Priests stood “cursing the enemy in the most horrible motions” and 
congratulating the warriors.78 As the most visible trophies o f war, the captives 
allowed the entire community to vicariously experience victory. Torture was one 
option. Graffenried described another: “the priest and the leading women seized the 
poor prisoners, compelled them to go into the dance, and if they did not wish to dance 
they caught them under the arms and dragged them up and down, as a sign that these 
Christians were now dancing to their music and were subject to them.” 79 Taking 
captives reduced enemy numbers and simultaneously increased the community’s own 
strength. Many Indian societies adopted captives in the place of recently deceased 
family members. The Tuscaroras had recently suffered from smallpox and perhaps
77 Barnwell, “Journal,” 47. It seems probable that a high proportion of these slaves 
were runaways, considering that Barnwell was able to retrieve 24 white captives but 
only 2 black captives. Presumably captive whites wanted to return, but runaway 
slaves did not— and for good reason. Barnwell ordered one o f the two slaves, “being 
a notorious Rogue . . . cutt to pieces immediately.” Barnwell, “Journal,” 53.
78 Graffenried, Account, 277
79 Graffenried, Account, 277
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mourning families eyed these women and children as potential adoptees.80 From a 
pragmatic standpoint, as hostages, the captives would later prove to be a valuable 
bargaining chip in negotiations with colonial authorities. With captives in their midst 
and casualties in their wake, the Lower Alliance could conclude that in the opening 
days o f the war they had won back a measure o f authority and influence.
North Carolina’s First Response
“There reigns such stupidity and Dissention in that Governm’t o f No. Carolina, that it 
can neither concert any measures nor perform any Engagements for its own Security.” 
—Spotswood to Commissioners o f Trade, February 11, 171381
As a knockout punch, the Lower Alliance’s first blow nearly succeeded. 
Already weakened by political and religious divisiveness, North Carolina staggered 
helplessly for nearly two years. Several times its settlers struck out wildly against the 
Lower Alliance; at other times they nearly succumbed to confusion and despair, 
accusing one another of conspiracy and cowardice. Internal divisions that left the 
colony vulnerable to attack afterwards prevented the colony from mounting an 
effective response— a result that benefited the Tuscaroras and their allies militarily.
80 For smallpox, see Thomas C. Parramore, "The Tuscarora Ascendancy," NCHR 59, 
no. 4 (1982): 324. No examples, however, survive o f Europeans becoming fully 
adopted during the Tuscarora War.
81 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 11.
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And yet, the Lower Alliance had gone to war in response to chaotic and violent Indian 
relations that had been fostered in part by colonial divisiveness. So even as the Lower 
Alliance gained militarily from splits that remained or even widened within the colony, 
if native strategists thought that their attack was going to change the underlying 
dynamic in the colony’s Indian relations, they were mistaken. By essentially paralyzing 
North Carolina, the Lower Alliance found itself not in a better position to deal with 
that colony, but ultimately fighting for its life against the efforts o f two other colonies 
who carried into the conflict their own sets of ambitions.
It was not until mid-October, several weeks after the initial attack, that settlers 
launched their first disorganized counter-raid. William Brice, who had gathered 
English and Palatine survivors into an impromptu garrison at his fortified home on the 
Trent River, assembled a makeshift army of fifty or sixty men, and stormed towards 
the Indian towns along Catechna Creek.82 Another 150 soldiers at Bath promised to 
rendezvous with him, but never came.83 Near Catechna, Graffenried, who was still 
captive, witnessed Indian runners breathlessly informing Hancock of the approaching 
force.84 The Tuscarora leader calmly sent Graffenried with the women, children, and 
old men to hide in a swampy refuge, and took three hundred warriors to confront the 
invaders. The result was a three-day running battle that sent the settlers abandoning 
food, hats, boots, coats and horses as they retreated. The Indians, “in far greater
82 Graffenried, Account, 273; NCCR, 1: 826.
83 Graffenried, Account, 240.
84 Graffenried, Account, 274.
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number, good shots, and well provided with everything, drove away that poor set of 
Carolinians, like a gang of wolves does a herd of sheep,” mourned Graffenried.85 
Indians returned to Catechna in “triumph” and celebrated around “great fires of 
rejoicing.”86
Simultaneously, while most of Brice’s troops were gone, another group of 
Indians launched an unsuccessful attack on his garrison. The settlers “cut to pieces” 
nine Indian men and enslaved thirty-nine native women and children being held inside 
the garrison who tried to escape during the attack— a dubious victory considering 
these captives had probably been friendly or neutral.87 With the exception o f one other 
small raid, historian Herbert Paschal concluded, “not a single large-scale expedition 
was put in the field by North Carolina” until the arrival of relief forces from South 
Carolina the next year.88
Nonetheless, Hancock released Graffenried, sending him stumbling alone 
towards the remnants o f the Neuse River settlements. When the baron finally lurched
85 NCCR, 1: 949. Christopher Gale recorded 15 Indian casualties and 2 captives; he 
did not specify European loses. Graffenried reports that settlers were “mostly 
wounded and one Englishman was shot to death.” (.NCCR 1: 826; Graffenried,
Account, 274.
86 Graffenried, Account, 274.
87 Gale records that the members “of a certain nation, which we do not know, whether 
they were friends or enemies.” It seems unlikely that Indians privy to the plans of the 
Lower Alliance would have allowed women and children to be among the settlers and 
easily caught at the outset of the war. NCCR. 1: 826.
88 Herbert Richard Paschal, "The Tuscarora Indians in North Carolina" (M.A. thesis,
Dept, o f History, U. o f North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1953), 66-67.
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into view, lame and hobbling on two makeshift crutches, and “black and looking like 
an Indian,” the Palatines at first mistook him for an Indian spy who had donned their 
leader’s blue coat.89
His confused reception served as a gloomy prelude to troubles to come.
Although many settlers celebrated his safe delivery, others continued to wonder that 
maybe he had changed his colors and thrown in his lot with the Indians. Why had he 
returned when so many friends and family had not? A month was a long time to be 
absent during war. Much had changed and not everyone welcomed him back. Indeed, 
Graffenried later wrote that “what happened to me after my arrival among the 
Christians was almost more dangerous and vexatious than when I was among the 
heathens.”90 More important, Graffenried’s personal struggles exposed broader splits 
among the white inhabitants o f North Carolina that prevented any sort of coordinated, 
effective response to the Lower Alliance’s attack. Quite the opposite, the vicissitudes 
of war allowed dissent to take new forms and follow new avenues. From its beginning 
in the stormy days o f the Cary revolt, the Swiss and German settlement o f New Bern 
had struggled to stay afloat in the turbulent waters o f North Carolina where 
allegiances and lines of authority were unclear. These power struggles gained new 
strength at the beginning of the Tuscarora War, as factional leaders took advantage of 
the fluid, changing conditions.
89 For attention to the possibilities of cross-cultural dressing and the anger it could 
provoke, see Ann M. Little, “'Shoot That Rogue, for He Hath an Englishman's Coat 
On!": Cultural Cross-Dressing on the New England Frontier, 1620-1760,” New 
England Quarterly 74, no. 2 (June, 2001): 238-73.
90 Graffenried, Account, 235.
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On his return, Graffenried expected once again to take up the mantle o f 
leadership over the Palatine settlers. As the highest-ranking inhabitant o f the region, 
he also probably planned to organize the defense of nearby English settlers. It was not 
to be. Instead came the angry shock of discovering that approximately half o f “his” 
people— the German and Swiss settlers he had guided from Europe—had sought the 
leadership of William Brice, leader of the flubbed counter-offensive.91 They did not 
come flocking back. Perhaps they abandoned Graffenried because they blamed him for 
the sickness and hunger many had experienced upon arriving in North Carolina. 
Perhaps they disliked Graffenried’s often high-handed approach to leadership. He 
frequently bemoaned the poor and lawless nature of some of his settlers in writing and 
probably did not shy from expressing the same sentiments in person. Cultural tensions 
between Germans and the Swiss Landsassen probably also contributed to the 
unraveling. Besides, Graffenried had been missing. Some Palatines preferred Brice’s 
quick militant response, or sought safety in numbers among English friends and 
neighbors.
Whatever the reasons for their abandonment, Graffenried considered Brice, 
who had once listed his occupation as “butcher,” to be an upstart— “a common man, 
who because of his audacity had been chosen captain.”92 With the same brush he
91 Brice’s wartime guidance of the Palatines extended beyond military affairs. In 1713 
he was the one Englishman appointed to a board o f appraisers of the estates o f 
Palatine orphans. The other three members were Swiss or German. (Dill, “Eighteenth 
Century New Bern,” 461; Craven Court Minutes, October 1713)
92 Dill, “Eighteenth Century New Bern,” 11; Graffenried, Account, 236.
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tarred the other English refugees who sheltered with Brice as “rough, jealous, and 
morose planters or inhabitants.”93 Brice’s fortified home, according to Graffenried, 
was no more than “a garrison composed of rowdies collected together and of disloyal 
palatines.”94 Unfortunately, no records survive of their views towards Graffenried and 
his adherents. Some of these tensions were throwbacks to estrangement from the 
Cary revolt only a few months before. Rather than uniting against a common threat, 
the Indian war pushed factious settlers into separate, armed camps where every 
disagreement could be read as treachery.
A power struggle emerged as Brice and Graffenried wrangled over manpower, 
authority, and slim resources. The two camps on either side o f the Trent River 
worried as much about each other as the Indians who stalked the ruins o f their 
plantations. Brice accumulated a fighting force of at least thirty or forty Englishmen 
and about twenty Palatine men, in addition to members o f their families.95 Graffenried 
lamented that he was left with “a number of women and children” and no more than 
forty armed men. Neither side had adequate provisions. What made things worse, 
from Graffenried’s perspective, was that the very presence o f Brice’s camp as an 
alternative challenged his own authority. Every day, Graffenried feared that Brice’s 
“promises and cunning” would lure more settlers away.
93 Graffenried, Account, 235.
94 Graffenried, Account, 236.
95 Graffenried, Account, 237.
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Exemplifying all o f these fears was a long train of events that began after 
Graffenried sentenced a Palatine blacksmith to community service sawing logs as 
punishment for theft and disobedience.96 Instead, the rebellious smith fled to Brice— a 
devastating loss for a camp desperate to keep its guns in fighting order. But the smith 
had left behind his tools. It was not long before Brice plotted to storm Graffenried’s 
camp, seize the tools, and arrest Graffenried as a traitor. Alerted by an eavesdropping 
youngster, Graffenried ordered the drums beat, called ragged soldier-settlers to 
stations, and locked the gates just as Brice’s men wheeled into view. What, demanded 
an approaching English captain, could prompt such a reception? “Wild Indians and the 
Wild Christians,” came a Swiss corporal’s reply.97 Parlaying face-to-face, Brice and 
Graffenried each accused the other of weakening the settlements in the face o f the 
Indian threat. Then, stalemated, they withdrew to their separate fiefs to glower at one 
another across the waters o f the Trent.
Inevitably, mutual animosities crept into separate responses to the Indian 
uprising. For his part, Graffenried hoped to expand upon the treaty he had negotiated 
during his captivity. In the short run, he thought it would keep his own people safe. 
Doing otherwise, in the opinion of a supporter, would “be madness to expose his 
handful o f people to the fury o f the Indians.”98 More pointedly, Graffenried intended 
to delay paying his “ransom” until the Lower Alliance released its fifteen Palatine
96 Graffenried, Account, 235, 381.
97 Graffenried, Account, 237.
98 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 142.
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prisoners." By broadening the agreement’s scope to include the rest o f the colony at 
least temporarily, he also hoped to give North Carolina breathing room to gather its 
resources and strengthen its position.100 Governor Spotswood in Virginia agreed, 
concluding that the “people o f Carolina receive very great advantage by this 
Neutrality, for by that means the Baron has an opportunity o f discovering and 
communicating to them all the designs o f the Indians, tho’ he runs the Risque of 
paying dear for it if they ever come to know it.” 101
But little breeds contempt in war like neutrality, and these negotiations opened 
Graffenried to accusations o f commiseration. As a result o f his not breaking with the 
Indians, other settlers would “afford him neither provisions o f War or Victuals nor 
Assistance.”102 A whispering campaign threatened to coalesce into a lynch mob when 
Graffenried refused to execute an Indian messenger.103 More formally, twenty 
anonymous articles surfaced against Graffenried.104 First in the colonial council, and 
then in the assembly, the baron used his prestige in failed attempts to browbeat his 
unnamed accusers. William Brice was there, and presumably some of Graffenried’s
99 Graffenried, Account, 237.
100 Graffenried, Account, 231.
101 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 142.
102 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 142.
103 Graffenried, Account, 235.
104 Graffenried, Account, 236.
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old enemies from the Cary rebellion, but they kept low profiles and the baron’s 
counter-charges sailed harmlessly overhead.105
Nor did Graffenried have a monopoly on negotiations with the Lower Alliance. 
Even as he fended off accusations of commiseration, some o f his enemies met the same 
Indian messengers. Graffenried wrote that the troublesome blacksmith conversed 
privately with Indians from the Lower Alliance and “made them very suspicious of me, 
as though my promise was of no value, as though I was deceiving them.”106 Maybe, 
hinted his enemies, Graffenried was secretly supplying arms and ammunition to other 
North Carolinians.107 These contradictory negotiations reveal how extensive contacts 
were between local settlers and Indians even after the outbreak o f war. But these 
same contacts, with each encounter driven by separate agendas, only further confused 
issues and intensified violence.
Already weakened by a whirlwind of contradictory signals, the shaky neutrality 
between New Bern and the Lower Alliance ultimately collapsed after a second raid by 
Brice’s men against the Indians. During the midst of Graffenried’s negotiations,
Brice’s garrison attacked a band of Bay River Indians who had been wavering between 
war and peace, and “roasted” the chief at the stake—proof that members o f the Lower 
Alliance did not hold a monopoly on military brutality. Graffenried blamed later 
Indian atrocities as retaliation for this incident— an overstated charge considering pre­
105 Graffenried, Account, 382-83.
106 Graffenried, Account, 235.
107 Graffenried, Account, 235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
existing patterns o f violence. However, such attacks did make it virtually impossible 
for any Indians living within range of the settlements to refrain from war. More 
broadly, Brice’s attacks helped put an end to talks between Graffenried and his former 
captors, broadening the war and limiting whatever hopes there had been o f peace.
Any chance that the treaty negotiated in the wake of Lawson’s death could 
sprout into a broader agreement withered. Abandoning Graffenried’s treaty, warriors 
of the Lower Alliance ignored marks emblazoned on Palatine doors and renewed their 
attacks with less discrimination: burning, destroying, or taking what furniture and 
goods the Palatines had so far been able to stash away, and killing nearly the last o f the 
cattle. The Lower Alliance had initially thought that they could partition the colony, 
concentrating attacks on some sections, while avoiding confrontation with others.
Late in 1711, however, this pattern dissolved into general hostility.108 Openings for 
negotiations between Indians and settlers around the Pamlico Sound and even in 
Albemarle County closed. Future bargaining would take place between Indians and 
colonists in Virginia, further removed from the epicenter o f violence.
In many ways the divisions experienced by the English and Palatine settlers 
along the lower Neuse exemplified in fierce microcosm the discord throughout the 
colony. Such rifts had contributed to the widespread notion among the Indians that 
the settlers and traders along the Neuse and Pamlico rivers “were only a few vagabond 
persons, that had run away out of other governments, and had settled hear o f their 
own head, without any authority, so that, if they cut them off, there would be none to
108 Graffenried, Account, 238.
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help them.”109 After war began, government o f North Carolina did try to help its 
southern settlers, but its efforts were hindered by internal fractures along with practical 
obstacles created by poverty and geography. Nearly a year after the first attack,
Pollock summed up the colony’s unenviable position: “a barbarous enemy to deal with; 
a scarcity of provisions, being scare able to supply our garrisons and what small forces 
have out; and worst o f all, a divided ungovernable people.”110
One weakness stemmed from unhealed wounds left by the Cary revolt.
Following the Proprietors’ instructions, Governor Hyde issued a general pardon 
(excepting a handful of the hottest firebrands), but for much of the war members of his 
council complained that “some few evil disposed persons [were] still blowing up the 
coals o f dissension . . .  to the great hindrance o f carrying on the wars against the 
Indian Enemies.”111 When Hyde called the assembly in November following the 
attack, its members tried to install several leaders of the opposition. Instead, Hyde 
dissolved the body before war plans could be made.112 Only after Hyde died o f yellow 
fever in the autumn of 1712 and control fell to Thomas Pollock, a powerful Albemarle 
planter and president of the council, did the colony’s elites gradually begin to show a 
united front in governing.
109 NCCR, 2: 40.
110 NCCR  1: 869; Spotswood, Letters, 2: 12.
m NCCR 1: 833, 873.
112 Paschal, “Tuscarora Indians of North Carolina,” 68; Spotswood, Letters, 1: 142;
NCCR, 1: 834.
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A major element o f dissent in the assembly came from members who were 
either Quakers or elected from precincts with high numbers o f Quakers.113 
Unfortunately, their proposals for handling the Tuscarora War do not survive and 
what we do know comes via the bitter writings o f opponents. Quaker fears of 
persecution by Anglicans had been at the heart of the Cary Revolt.114 During the 
Tuscarora War, Quakers in Virginia and North Carolina faced scorn because they 
“would not work themselves, or suffer any of their Servants to be employed in the 
Fortifications, but affirm that their Consciences will not permit them to contribute in 
any manner o f way to the defense of the Country even so much as trusting the 
Government with provisions to support those that do work.”115 In some cases, non- 
Quakers, moved less by an inner light than by opposition to taxes and levies, followed 
the Quakers’ example.116 On the other hand, a few Quakers like Ephram Overman of 
Pasquotank, did take up arms. Afterwards he had to face a tongue-lashing from fellow 
believers at his monthly meeting to answer for his break from pacifist principles.117
m NCCR, 1:885; 876.
114 A persistent accusation was that the Quakers had participated as combatants in the 
Cary revolt but later refused during the Tuscarora War (NCCR, 1: 814, 877). 
Mcllvenna expands upon such accusations to argue that many North Carolina 
colonists refrained from assisting in the Tuscarora War as part o f a long-running effort 
to resist “the imposition of a stratified plantation society” that had manifested earlier in 
the Culpepper and Cary revolts. Mcllvenna, "Olivers Days," 235.
115 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 120; Members o f the monthly meeting at Pasquotank 
agreed to keep personal tallies o f the sums they suffered on account of not bearing 
arms or paying parish levies (NCCR, 2:37)
116 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 12.
117 NCCR, 1: 813.
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Problems in governance only contributed to a more general problem of 
mustering limited resources and manpower from a poor, thinly populated colony. A 
“great drought” during the summer before the Indian uprising had already threatened a 
hungry winter.118 Later, with so many settlers driven from their farms, provisions were 
even more scarce.119 Settlers in Albemarle had to feed their southern neighbors even 
as they looked to their own defense. With little grain or pork for export and the 
deerskin trade stopped, trade suffered, debts mounted, and clothes wore thin.120 North 
Carolina’s government tried to impose a “corn tax” and to limit exports o f grain and 
meat, but the region’s rich tradition o f smuggling continued.121 Hard pressed for cash, 
in the winter o f 1712 North Carolina’s assembly voted to issue L4000; in 1713 they 
issued another L8000—but these grants were o f newly issued paper currency, not 
actual revenue that the colony had been able to collect and spend.122 Nor could the 
colonial government, as a proprietary colony only indirectly subject to the crown, 
successfully petition the queen to pay its wartime expenses.123
118 NCCR, 1: 899.
119 NCCR, 1: 869.
120 NCCR, 1: 874.
121 NCCR, 1: 899; Graffenried, Account, 239, 242; Styrna, “Winds,” 250, 256.
122 NCCR  1: 838, 839; 3: 145; 4: 576. These funds were primarily issued in response 
to the arrival o f South Carolina forces. Backing the paper currency continued to cause 
problems for North Carolina’s government into the 1730s (NCCR, 3: 484).
123 Graffenried, Account, 243.
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“The inhabitants of Albemarle County,” complained Graffenried, sat “with 
folded arms . . . [watching] how their nearest brothers are frightfully murdered.”124 
Part o f the hesitation owed to political divisions between the regions, but geography 
also directly conspired against a unified response. Supplies, arms, and food were 
primarily in the Albemarle region which felt the war only indirectly; stranded settlers 
and later armies were along the Pamlico and Neuse rivers. Bringing one to the other 
meant either an overland route blocked by swamps, marshes, and the threat o f Indian 
ambush, or a water route hindered by unmarked shoals and a shortage of vessels. A 
supply ship hired by Graffenried exploded in a gunpowder accident.125 During the rest 
o f the war, logistics hardly improved.126
In the midst of such disorder, many settlers preferred to manage their own 
defense rather than place their lives and possessions in the hands of a stumbling 
government. But this democratization o f the war effort only complicated the task of 
assembling a fighting force. “Instead of drawing together into one or two bodies of 
well ordered soldiery in order to drive the enemy from the boundaries of the 
settlements,” groused Graffenried, “every one wanted to save his own house and 
defend himself.” 127 In the summer of 1712 a law passed demanding that every able­
124 Graffenried, Account, 263.
125 Graffenried, Account, 241.
126 NCCR, 1: 878-79, 899. The inability of North Carolina to supply the two 
expeditions from South Carolina would later have a major affect on those campaigns.
127 Graffenried, Account, 239.
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bodied male between the ages of sixteen and sixty years should enter military service 
or forfeit L5. But the government could hardly find volunteers to enforce the law, 
much less follow it.128 By 1713, settlers were taking up arms against the government 
to protect themselves from impressments or having to pay fines. When the provost 
marshal attempted to confiscate L5 worth of goods each from six settlers in 
Pasquotank, the angry men seized the officer and did “by fiforce and armes rescue and 
take from him” their property.129 At times private citizens competed with the 
government for scarce manpower: a court convicted Thomas Cox and William 
Stafford of Corretuck because they “did in a Mutinous maner Seduce and draw aside 
divers men who had Enlisted in the Service of this Government.”130 The government 
found itself lacking supplies as well as men, requisitioning equipment as minor as a 
handsaw.131
During the Tuscarora War, North Carolina could never muster even three 
hundred ill-armed troops—this compared with a fighting force among the Lower 
Alliance of perhaps five hundred warriors.132 With so many of North Carolina’s men 
divided into small isolated garrisons, or holed up in fortified homes with a few
128 NCCR, 1: 874, 877.
129 NCCR, 2: 59.
130 NCCR, 1: 870, 872.
131 NCCR, 2: 66.
132 Graffenried, Account, 243.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
neighbors, the Lower Alliance “overpowered one plantation after another.”133 Unable 
to carry out its own defense, North Carolina’s government sent appeals to Virginia, 
South Carolina, and beyond. The Tuscaroras were about to face a very different set of 
enemies.
133 Graffenried, Account, 239.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EFFORTS AT DIPLOMACY: 
VIRGINIA AND THE UPPER TOWNS
“Your Lord’ps will not judge me an idle Spectator o f the 
miserys of my Fellow Subjects”
— Spotswood to Council of Trade, July 26, 17121
Compared to in North Carolinia, war dawned gently upon Virginia. Shortly 
after a breakfast on a fair October 7, William Byrd received an express notifying him 
that “60 people had been killed by the Indians at Neuse and about as many at Pamlico 
in North Carolina.” As a member of Virginia’s executive council, his presence was 
demanded at Major Nathaniel Harrison’s to meet the governor and other councilors.2 
But Byrd delayed; he entertained guests that evening and went to bed in “good health, 
good thoughts, and good humor, thank God Almighty.” The next morning, Byrd 
finally arrived at Harrison’s where Governor Spotswood and several council members
1 Spotswood, Alexander, The Official Letters o f  Alexander Spotswood, ed. R. A. 
Brock, 2 vols. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1857), 1: 169.
2 The meeting was held at the house o f Major Nathaniel Harrison, a frequent agent to 
Indians on Virginia’s Southside who later gained a position on the council. In 1711, 
his father, Benjamin Harrison, was a member of the council.
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were waiting, but hardly in such good humor. They reproached Byrd for tardiness and 
set to work devising a plan, one that reflected the particular concerns o f their colony.3
As Spotswood, Byrd, and the other councilors sat around Harrison’s table 
sifting through reports, they focused on three details: first, the attack; second, 
Graffenried’s captivity; third and perhaps o f greatest interest, the fact that not all of 
the Tuscarora towns had participated. Indeed, over the next several months,
Virginia’s policies focused as much upon anticipating and influencing the actions of 
these neutral Tuscarora communities as inflicting retribution upon warring members of 
the Lower Alliance. A former officer under the Duke of Marlborough, Alexander 
Spotswood had only recently come to office in Virginia in June 1710, but almost 
immediately he had turned his energies to expanding the reach of his government into 
the backcountry.4 The importance of the Indians in any such policies did not escape
3 William Byrd, The Secret Diary o f William Byrd o f  Westover, 1709-1712, ed. Louis 
B. Wright and Marion Tinling (Richmond, Va.: The Dietz Press, 1941), 417-18; 
EJCCV, 3:284-85.
4Warren R. Hoftstra, '"The Extextion of His Majesties Dominions': The Virginia 
Backcountry and the Reconfiguration of Imperial Frontiers," Journal o f  American 
History 84, no. 4 (March, 1998): 1281-312; Alison M.Olson, M aking the Empire 
Work: London and American Interest Groups, 1690-1790 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), describes how Spotswood was desperate to develop 
avenues o f interests and patronage in Virginia as a counterweight to a homogeneous 
Anglican tobacco planter aristocracy. He attempted to use his Indian policies—which 
the governor could closely control— as one remedy. For Spotswood, see also Walter 
Havighurst, Alexander Spotswood; Portrait o f  a Governor (Williamsburg: Colonial 
Williamsburg, 1967); Jack P. Greene, "The Opposition to Lieutenant Governor 
Alexander Spotswood, 1718.," VMHB 70, no. 1 (1962): 35-42; Gwenda Morgan, 
“Spotswood , Alexander (1676-1740),” in Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography, 
ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com. (accessed August 17, 2006).
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him. Therefore, rather than coming as a catastrophic blow, the Tuscarora War,
Spotswood soon realized, could be turned into a diplomatic opportunity to refine 
Virginia’s relations with Indians in the region, particularly Virginia’s tributaries and 
any Tuscaroras who might remain neutral. Here was a chance for Virginia to rein in 
and confirm Indian allies, not unleash the dogs of war. Subsequent histories have 
sometimes painted Virginia in a poor light for its limited military participation in the 
Tuscarora War. Unlike South Carolina, no Virginia armies came crashing through the 
swamps and forests to North Carolina’s rescue. But such martial policies would have 
run counter to Spotswood’s diplomatic objectives of securing existing relations with 
tributary Indians and expanding this sphere to include as many Tuscaroras as possible.
These plans, however, depended upon the willingness of neutral Tuscaroras, 
who often did not oblige. Unlike Spotswood who sent numerous dispatches 
explaining his motives, these Tuscaroras never fully outlined their objectives.
Nonetheless, the towns that remained neutral had particular reasons to seek a 
continued peace with Virginia. In the years before the Tuscarora War, they had 
enjoyed a unique position in trade and diplomacy on the edges o f Virginia’s tributary 
network. Whereas Spotswood hoped to entangle their towns within new bonds of 
alliance, these Tuscaroras had reasons to conserve the status quo in their relations with 
that colony. Therefore, the war years saw Virginia and the so-called “Upper Towns” 
of the Tuscaroras engaged in an awkward diplomatic dance, with each partner 
stubbornly attempting to seize the lead. As often as not, the result was missteps, 
confusion, and painful stumbles.
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Tuscarora communities seeking to avoid war and negotiate chose to direct 
their efforts towards Virginia because they had little other choice. During the war’s 
early years, North Carolina’s government considered every Tuscarora suspect and 
more deserving o f death than negotiation. Christopher Gale worried that “upon strict 
inquiry, it would be found that the whole nation of the Tuscaroras (though some of 
them may not yet be actors) was knowing and consenting to what was done” and soon 
may “join with them in carrying on these bloody designs.”5 South Carolina’s 
government hardly needed such encouragement. When armies from that colony 
arrived in Tuscarora country at North Carolina’s request, they tended to shoot first, 
and ask questions later (if at all). Several supposedly “neutral” Tuscarora towns found 
themselves the unwitting targets of South Carolina attacks.6 Lack of alternatives 
aside, long-standing relationships with Virginia’s government, settlers, and tributaries 
further contributed to the Upper Towns’ willingness to negotiate with Virginia.
Geography and economics were added incentives for these communities to 
negotiate with Virginia.7 Often referred to as “Upper Towns” in contemporary 
sources, these communities clustered principally on the Tar River (the name for the 
upper Pamlico River) and on the uppermost tributaries o f the Neuse and Catechna
5 NCCR, 1: 828.
6 Thomas C. Parramore, "With Tuscarora Jack on the Back Path to Bath," NCHR 64, 
no. 2 (1987): 124-25.
7 In particular, see Douglas W. Boyce, "Did a Tuscarora Confederacy Exist?" Indian 
Historian 6, no. 3 (1973): 36-39.
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water system. Earlier, some may have occupied locations along the Roanoke River.8 
Graffenried described these Upper Towns as “seven villages . . . somewhat farther 
distant, more beyond [i.e. closer to] Virginia.”9 This geographic position put them 
closer to Virginia (and the Albemarle region of North Carolina) where they visited to 
trade and hunt, and further from settlements on North Carolina’s lower Pamlico and 
Neuse Rivers. Initially at least, many Tuscaroras from the Upper Towns may have 
viewed the storm brewing on their southeastern horizon as an isolated squall, o f little 
local concern.
These trade ties created a powerful reason for both the Upper Tuscaroras and 
Virginians to avoid war without first attempting negotiations. Shielded from settler 
abuses by their lower neighbors, these Upper Town Tuscaroras also enjoyed the 
greatest fruits o f trade from a position closest to the “Tuscaroro trading path” also 
called “Weecacana.”10 This trade route wound south from Virginia across the 
Meherrin River and over the Roanoke River into upper Tuscarora communities, and 
served as a principal route for Virginia’s traders to other southern Indian nations.
These communities had only recently recovered from the trade embargo imposed in 
the aftermath of the Pate murder. All-out war could only be worse. Tuscaroras had
8 Edward Bland, "The Discovery o f  New Brittaine, 1650," in The First Explorations o f  
the Trans-Allegheny Region by the Virginians 1650-1674, ed. Clarence Walworth 
Alvord and Lee Bidgood (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark and Co., 1912), 105-30.
9 Graffenried, Account, 276. In other cases, 8 towns are mentioned.
10 Boyce, "Tuscarora Confederacy," 38; EJCCV, 3: 296; Alexander Spotswood [?], 
"Examination of Indians, 1713 (?)," VMHB 19, no. 3 (July, 1911): 274.
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largely weathered the previous stoppage by trading with North Carolinians— but that 
backdoor closed after the September attack. Graffenried felt that the Upper Towns, 
were “loyal yet, keeping their loyalty on the account of trade.”11 Having watched their 
blankets and beads sit moldering in warehouses during the Pate embargo, Virginian 
traders were equally hesitant to abandon their customers.
Beyond the goods they carried, traders played an important role as diplomatic 
go-betweens. A Virginia trader named Peter Poythress had been present in the Upper 
Town of Tasky during Graffenried’s captivity and had been among the first to bring 
news of the attack to Virginia.12 In the next several months, he traveled several times 
back and forth as trader, messenger, interpreter, and spy. On another occasion 
William Byrd learned the latest news of the conflict from “Capt Evans and another 
Indian trader [who] were come from Carolina and had brought [an] abundance of 
skins.”13 Throughout subsequent negotiations, Spotswood attempted to carefully 
regulate trade: alternatively restricting it and then, when alliances seemed to be ailing, 
sending a dose o f goods southward as a diplomatic booster shot.14
Trade alone does not explain connections between Spotswood and Upper 
Towns. Traders were never entirely under government control. Throughout the war, 
Virginia officials struggled against smugglers, isolated backcountry settlers, and
11 Graffenried, Account, 276.
12 Graffenried, Account, 272; EJCCV, 3: 284-85.
13 Byrd, Secret Diary, 447-48.
14 EJCCV, 3: 285, 318.
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disobedient tributaries who conducted illicit trade with the Tuscaroras. Moreover, 
Upper Towns were not unique among Tuscaroras in the desire for trade. Hancock’s 
treaty with Graffenried revealed that the warriors o f Catechna and other members of 
the Lower Alliance likewise strove towards a peaceful, evenhanded trade. Desires 
voiced by Upper Town deputies in talks with Virginia for “a free trade again opened 
between this Colony and their towns” would have met nods of approval in the Lower 
Alliance, who had forced Graffenried to promise goods at “a just price.”15
The Tuscaroras’ various Indian neighbors also played a role in influencing 
differing attitudes towards Virginia and North Carolina. Farther south, in Tuscarora 
towns like Catechna, Tuscaroras felt the rhetoric o f angry neighbors such as Coree 
Tom. Similarly, in the Upper Towns, Tuscaroras felt the opposite pull o f Nottoways, 
Meherrins, Saponies, Nansemonds, and others— all Virginia tributaries. These 
Virginia tributaries knew the stigma of defeat from past colonial wars and enjoyed a 
modicum of security and access to avenues of reconciliation almost entirely absent in 
North Carolina. Because of such interactions, many Tuscaroras— especially inhabitants 
of the Upper Towns— hesitated to break openly with Virginia.
The Tuscaroras’ relationships with Virginia’s tributaries also figured in 
Spotswood’s approach to the war. The Tuscaroras’ presence—unofficial, 
unregulated, but frequent— among Virginia’s outer settlements and tributaries had 
long bothered officials. Recent attempts to prosecute the murderers o f Jeremiah Pate 
had quickly escalated into something more, a struggle over the Tuscaroras’ place
xi EJCCV, 3:293-5.
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within Virginia’s tributary network. After the murder, a few towns had expressed 
some openness to Virginia’s demands.16 Unfortunately no records o f these 
communities’ names or locations survive, but it is likely that they numbered among the 
Upper Towns. Nonetheless, for Virginia, the Pate crises had ended in debacle. In 
many ways, the Tuscarora War acted as an avenue for Virginia officials to revisit the 
same issues.17 Again, the Executive Council quickly moved beyond a mere desire to 
punish the guilty to using the imbroglio as a moment to establish broad new authority 
over the Tuscaroras. Spotswood mainly strove not for the destruction o f Catechna 
and other members o f the Lower Alliance, but to transform the neutral Upper Towns 
who had abstained from the war into tributaries.
The goal, stated most clearly in 1714, was that these Upper Tuscaroras “and 
their posterity shall from henceforth become tributaries to her Majesty of Great Britain 
and her Successors, under the Subjection o f the Government of Virginia; and shall 
submit to such form of Government and be obedient to such Rules as the Governor of 
Virginia shall appoint.”18 The power grab did not stop there. Even while reaching 
towards Tuscaroras Spotswood also sought to strengthen his grip on existing 
tributaries. The governor realized that fear and uncertainty from the war in North
16 EJCCV, 3: 171.
11 NCCR, 1: 810-13.
18 W. Stitt Robinson, ed., Virginia Treaties, 1607-1722, vol. 4, Early American 
Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789 (Frederick, Md.: University 
Publications o f America, 1983), 212.
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Carolina created a moment of flux in which new demands could be placed not only on 
Tuscaroras but on tributaries as well.
This plan to secure the tributaries and absorb Tuscaroras reached foil flower 
over several years, but the arrangement’s first seeds germinated during the council at 
Harrison’s house that Byrd had reached so tardily. There “some o f the Tributaries,” 
recorded Byrd, arrived and “promised to be very faithful to us.” 19 Seeking more 
concrete assurance, the council soon dusted off old treaty provisions for issuing 
copper badges to tributary Indians “to the end that if any disorders be committed by 
any Indians having such badges, the Nation to which they belong many be made 
accountable.”20 Wary of a repeat o f the Lower Alliance’s tactic o f “coming amongst 
the Inhabitants as friends” before launching their attack, steps were taken to ensure 
that these badges did not slip into the hands o f non-tributary Indians. Similarly, the 
tributaries were to be reminded of their long-standing agreements to report any 
“foreign Indians” ranging nearby.21 The council called in a spokesperson for the 
Pamunkey and Chickahominy Indians to find out if “Strange Indians”— presumably 
Tuscaroras or Iroquois allies-—were responsible for the recent murder o f a settler near 
the head of the Pamunkey River.22
19 Byrd, Secret Diary, 417-18.
20 EJCCV, 3: 285-87.
21 EJCCV, 3: 285-87.
22 The officials also took the time to get detailed lists of “of all the men Women and 
Children o f their respective Towns.” EJCCV, 3: 287-88.
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Also during that October 8 meeting, Spotswood ordered notices to be posted 
at courthouses, churches, and chapels forbidding all “trade or traffique with the said 
Tuscaroro or any other Indians for any Sort o f Commodity untill further order.”23 Far 
from wanting to cut off all communications, however, the council ordered the trader 
Peter Poythress to return to the Tuscarora towns with several messages. The first 
promised death and destruction, sparing neither men, women, nor children if 
Graffenried were harmed— a message that sent ripples o f alarm among the baron’s 
captors who had not imagined that Virginia would interfere.24
The second part o f Poythress’s message launched a plan to deepen splits 
between the Upper Tuscaroras and Lower Alliance, and to move those “neuter”
Tuscaroras closer to Virginia’s sphere. Poythress demanded that ambassadors from 
the Upper Towns come to the Nottoway town where the governor would be waiting 
with the assembled militias of three counties. “The making o f a shew of some part of 
the Strength and force o f this Colony may be very necessary to awe the said Tuscaruro 
Indians not only to continue in peace with us but also to joine in the Destruction of 
those Assassines,” recorded the Virginia council’s official minutes.25
Late in the afternoon on October 19 five Tuscarora leaders (their names and 
towns are not recorded) arrived at Nottoway Town to a spectacle that had been in
23 EJCCV, 3: 284-5.
24 Graffenried, Account, 282.
25 EJC C V 3: 284-7; Byrd, Secret Diary, 417-18; NCCR 1: 810-13.
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rehearsal for a day and a half—the drilling o f 600 militia and 30 cavalry.26 They 
“arrived very opportunely,” recounted a delighted Spotswood, “just at the time I had 
brought the Militia under some discipline, and were not a little surprized to find there a 
great body of men in such good order.”27 The troops gamely wheeled through a few 
simple maneuvers and then Spotswood urged the frightened Tuscarora spectators to 
walk the lines of troops— an impression perhaps painfully reminiscent o f the sensation 
they would have felt as captives hauled before the gauntlet at enemy Iroquois or 
Susquehannock communities. It was powerful political theater.28
Having set the stage, Spotswood negotiated according to script. First came 
the matter o f the current war. Standing before the Virginia troops, the envoys,
Spotswood later remembered, were “very desirous to continue in peace” with Virginia 
and North Carolina. They showed less enthusiasm, however, for taking arms against 
fellow Tuscaroras, even though Spotswood optimistically opined they were “well 
enough inclined.”29 As an inducement, Virginia offered six striped blankets “for the 
head o f each man,” and “the usual price o f Slaves” for each Woman and Child brought 
in as captives.30 Spotswood also demanded two hostages from each town “for the
26 Byrd, Secret Diary, 423.
27 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 121.
28 For treaties as political theatre see A. M. Drummond, and Richard Moody, "Indian 
Treaties: The First American Dramas," Quarterly Journal o f  Speech 39 (1953): 15-24; 
James Hart Merrell, Into the American Woods : Negotiators on the Pennsylvania 
Frontier (New York: Norton, 1999), esp. 253-301.
29 EJCCV, 3: 287.
29 EJCCV  3: 287-88.
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better assuring us of their future good behavior.” 31 But Spotswood had more in mind 
than their steadfastness in the current war. The chance to muster troops and pretend 
outrage presented an opportunity to forever reframe future Tuscarora-Virginia 
relations. He confided to the Council of Trade that:
delivering their Children as Hostages will not only prove the most 
effectual Security for their fidelity, but may be a good step towards the 
Conversion of that whole Nation to the Christian faith, and I could not 
hope for a more favorable Conjuncture to make this demand than now, 
when they are under great apprehensions of our Resentment for the late 
barbaritys committed in Carolina, and the impressions made on them by 
the appearance of so great a force as I then showed them.32 
The final act, however, would have to wait. Faced with such demands, the five envoys 
protested that “they had no authority to conclude anything without the concurrence of 
the rest of their Nation.”33 They promised to return in a month.
The Nottoway, Meherrin, Nansemond, Saponi, (and perhaps Pamunkey and 
Chickahominy) headmen in attendance served as more than mere props in 
Spotswood’s spectacle. They too, found themselves confronted by the governor’s 
desires to alter their relationship with Virginia, beginning with demands for hostages 
instead of a tribute of skins and hides. The modest economic loss to Spotswood and
31 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 121.
32 Spotswood, Letters, 1:122
33 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 121.
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future governors incurred by abandoning old hidebound diplomacy would be more 
than compensated by political capital rooted in new religious and cultural ties.34 The 
children would enter into tutelage at the College o f William and Mary alongside Indian 
upper-classmates already purchased as slaves from more remote Indians. Spotswood 
hoped the sight o f “how well these Indian Children are treated,” would win over 
current headmen. Simultaneously these sons, presumably the leaders o f the future, 
would be “brought up to Learning and Christianity”—  double bonds in English 
thinking, sure to repel savage heathenism and French Catholicism.35 All the while, no 
one could forget that as hostages, these children would be the first to pay the price for 
parental disloyalty. With an army drilling in their midst, tributary headmen had little 
choice but to acquiesce.
Such concessions might give the impression that Spotswood had perfectly 
managed these events. The governor delighted in recording the “awe” that disciplined 
troops and forceful diplomacy imposed on the Upper Tuscarora and tributary Indians. 
But the “secret” diaries of William Byrd, who was also there, recorded the far from 
orderly escapades o f young Virginia gentlemen, who made an equal— if far different—
34 Spotswood later sought to reinstate economic ties by channeling Indian trade 
through a state monopoly. For education o f Indians at the College of William and 
Mary, see Helen C. Rountree, Pocahontas's People: The Powhatan Indians o f  
Virginia through Four Centuries, (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1996), 
167-173; James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest o f  Cultures in Colonial 
North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 190-196; Karen A.
Stuart, “‘So Good a Work’: The Brafferton School, 1691-1777” (M.A. Thesis, Dept, 
o f History, College of William and Mary, 1984).
35 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 122.
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impression. The Nottoway king probably hardly contained his bemusement as Byrd 
and other councilors, dressed in fine morning gowns, lay together, tossing and turning 
on mats in the king’s cabin, hardly able to see or breath because of the smoke.36 After 
reveille, the Virginians spent the morning nosing into cabins and chasing after Indian 
women. That afternoon, after drills and the arrival o f the Tuscarora delegates, the 
Virginians watched Indian boys shoot, “girls run for a prize,” a “war dance” by the 
men, and a “love dance” by women. Festivities progressed out o f hand, with the 
Virginians’ evening spent groping Nottoway women. Jenny, “an Indian girl,” “got 
drunk and made us good sport,” noted Byrd. Finally, several of the councilors 
themselves got so drunk that the guard prevented their re-entry; Virginia’s finest spent 
the rest of the night close to the chiefs cabin, dancing and hollering, trying to disturb 
the governor’s rest.37 Elsewhere Byrd noted without irony the wars Europeans 
sparked among Carolina Indians “by abusing their women and evil entreating their 
men.”38 Spotswood had hoped to impress his audience with a show of authority and 
discipline, to calm Indian frustrations at abuse, and to launch a program whereby 
Indian children would be force-fed the graces o f “civilized” society; perceptive Indian 
observers read a far less coherent message.
36 Byrd, Secret Diary, 422.
37 Account and quotations from Byrd, Secret Diary, 422-25.
38 William Byrd, The History o f  the Dividing Line in The Prose Works o f  William 
Byrd o f  Westover: Narratives o f  a Colonial Virginian, ed. Louis B. Wright 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), 311. It is not 
entirely clear here whether he was specifically referring to the Yamasee or Tuscarora 
War.
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Moreover, even while Spotswood tried to use the Tuscarora War to tighten 
tributary bonds, several tributary groups sought to carve out their own advantage. In 
particular, the Pamunkeys and Chickahominies— tidewater groups descended in part 
from the old Powhatan empire— attempted to curtail their rapidly declining influence. 
Within days o f the Nottoway conference, Pamunkey and Chickahominy leaders 
appeared in Williamsburg and obediently presented “a List o f all the men Women and 
Children of their respective towns.” With loyalty at a premium, they made their own 
requests. Yes, they would patrol adjacent territories for strange Indians, but jealous of 
their own rights, they accused the Nottoways o f cooperating with Tuscaroras and 
negotiated a reaffirmation of their exclusive hunting grounds.39 Upset at the outflow 
of their people who found employment among settlers “against the Will o f the Queen 
and the Great Men,” and at masters who trapped such Indians in confining indentures, 
they had Spotswood implement the colonial equivalent of a temporary work visa 
program.40 Finally, the Pamunkey queen, supposedly “so desirous” of gaining the “the 
benefite of Learning” for her people, enrolled an extra child as a servant to her son, 
necessitating a quick bureaucratic scramble to fund the extra slot.41 Not long 
afterwards, a delegation o f Saponi, Occaneechee, and Stukanox Indians, hoping to cut
39 EJCCV, 3: 287-88.
40 EJCCV, 3: 287-88.
41 EJCCV, 3: 290-91; Spotswood, Letters 1: 129-33.
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in on the suspended Tuscarora trade, came to Williamsburg seeking permission to 
relocate onto a tract closer to the Tuscarora trading path.42
Despite a promising start, Tuscaroras from the Upper Towns proved even less 
malleable. November 20, the date set for resumption of negotiations, passed with the 
Tuscarora delegates nowhere in sight. Finally, after tense waiting amid renewed 
discussions o f war, three deputies arrived on December 8 claiming authority from 
eight towns.43 Spotswood and his council, with several representatives from the House 
o f Burgesses in attendance, received these Tuscaroras in opulent council chambers. 
Brass candlesticks and sconces holding large myrtle wax candles gently illuminated 
rows o f law books and a portrait of the queen shrouded in a calico curtain— a far cry 
from the parade ground at Nottoway town, but nonetheless another stage upon which 
to show authority.44 On the surface, the ensuing negotiations looked like a success. 
The Upper Tuscarora deputies again proclaimed they “desire nothing more than to 
continue in peace with this Government” and were willing to join Virginia in war.
Close consideration, however, reveals tepidity lurking behind the Upper 
Tuscaroras’ proclaimed ardor. The small number of deputies— even if illness did stop 
one en route— from the eight communities may hint at a lack of consensus.45 Often
42 EJCCV, 3:296.
43 EJCCV, 3: 293-95; The delegates were Chongkerarise, Rouiatthie, and Rouiattatt 
represented the towns of Raroucaithue, Kinquenarant, Taughoushie, Chounanitz, 
Taughoutnith, Kinthaigh, Touhairoukha, and Unaghnarara.
44 EJCCV, 3: 365-66.
45 EJCCV, 3: 293-95.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
196
during important Anglo-Indian treaty negotiations, virtual tent cities appeared 
overnight, filled by Indians who sought to signify approval and partake o f diplomatic 
gift-giving. The deputies said they had considered a nighttime rescue raid to release 
the captives among the Lower Alliance, but did nothing. They said they were willing 
to deliver hostages, but did not, blaming “an accident” and recent killings by strange 
Indians that left parents terrified to part with their children. At the earliest, they 
claimed, these hostages might come in late March. The envoys said they were 
considering diplomatic gestures to other tribes, but did nothing until Virginia agreed to 
pick up the expense of gifts and even then continued to hesitate. In short, promises 
and offers abounded, actions did not.
Moreover, the Tuscarora deputies accomplished a quiet diplomatic coup by 
shifting the terms of debate. They signified that they would be “willing to make War 
upon and cutt off all the Indians concerned in the late Massacre, even those of the 
town of Caughteghnah [Catechna] tho they are part of their own nation.”46 Carefully 
parsed, the language of this apparent concession actually limited blame among 
Tuscaroras. By implication most of the “Indians concerned” were non-Tuscaroras.
The only “part of their own nation” that did participate, came from the lone town of 
Catechna. Any discussion of the very real possibility that individuals from their own 
towns might be implicated was squelched. Moreover, rather than agreeing to a 
grinding war of attrition, the language tied Upper Tuscarora signers to a police action 
that would last only “untill sufficient Reparation be made for the murders and
46 EJCCV, 3: 293.
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hostilities by them committed.”47 Over time Upper Tuscaroras would even further 
attempt to limit the scope of their involvement to actions against a few individuals 
from Catechna and non-Tuscarora coastal tribes.
These limited military aims suited Spotswood’s greater goal o f incorporating a 
majority of Tuscaroras within Virginia’s sphere. But he struggled to defend this, and 
indeed his entire agenda, from a “violent humour” in the House o f Burgesses “for 
extirpating all the Indians, without distinction o f Friends or Enemys.”48 The assembly 
hesitated to fund his plans to enroll Indian hostages at the College o f William and 
Mary. The executive council found it necessary to send messages to the militant- 
minded assembly informing that body that “it would be Incongruous to pass an Act 
which . . . seems directed against that whole Nation in general when at the Same time 
the most considerable part of ‘em are Engaged in a Strict Allyance with this 
Government.”49 Nonetheless, the burgesses prepared for a broad war by voting to 
raise twenty thousand pounds from new taxes against imports from Britain and other 
colonies— a measure that may have been directed as much against unpopular 
merchants as enemy Indians. Spotswood rejected it. When the burgesses attempted 
conciliation by thanking the government, Spotswood “answered them that he would 
thank them when he saw them act with as little self interest as he had done.”50
47 EJCCV, 3:293-95.
48 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 129-33; JHBV, 1702-1712, 331-33. At times the council 
also agreed with this approach. Byrd, Secret Diary, 444.
49 JHBV, 1702-1712, 331-33.
50 Byrd, Secret Diary, 441.
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Circumventing the troublesome body, he secured a loan of five hundred pounds from 
William Byrd.51
Despite stiff resolve, the governor found himself working even harder to put a 
confident spin on events. In mid-winter, starving English settlers along the Neuse 
River, desperate after their own colony’s inaction and inability, directly petitioned 
Virginia’s government in a frantic plea for aid, appealing to Spotswood’s “paternal 
Tenderness” for a “Considerable forse of men, armes and ammunition.”52 Instead, 
Spotswood sent only “a copy of the said Treaty” so that the desperate North 
Carolinians “may see what care this Government hath already taken for their 
Relief’— small succor for hungry bellies.53 Members of the Lower Alliance had 
gambled that their enemies could be picked off in isolation; in this case they were right.
Although Virginia’s official response hid all trace o f doubt, the council again 
dispatched Peter Poythress into Tuscarora country. Leading a horse laden with 
trading goods (arms and ammunition excepted), he operated under orders “to make 
the strictest Examination he can into the designs” of the Upper Towns. How many 
English captives had been redeemed? How many enemies’ heads had been taken?
None, returned both answers.54
51 EJCCV  3: 299-300.
52 NCCR, 1: 819-20.
53 EJCCV  3: 300-301; Byrd, Secret Diary, 488.
“ E JC C V 3: 300-03.
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In mid-March several envoys from the Upper Towns journeyed to Virginia. If 
they hoped to reassure Spotswood, they failed. Again, they brought no children as 
hostages, instead offering only “some trifling excuses.” Again, they had admitted that 
they had undertaken no campaigns against the Lower Alliance. Spotswood’s patience 
snapped. A witness recorded that the “Governor received the Tuscaroras very cold 
and ordered them to go and help the people o f Carolina and cut off Hancock Town.”55 
But nobody expected them to do so. Faced with nearly half a year o f inaction, 
Spotswood and his advisors abandoned all hope of peace. “The Tuscaroro Indians 
have failed in the performance of every Article o f their Treaty,” concluded the 
executive council.56 In April, after the Tuscarora envoys departed, Virginia’s 
government began planning for war.57
Why, after so much effort, had the alliance between Spotswood and the Upper 
Towns collapsed? Spotswood suspected that the towns had purposefully dragged 
their feet, making promises they never intended to keep as a strategy to delay 
Virginia’s entry into the war. Spotswood’s own obvious desire to bring them in as 
tributaries o f Virginia would only have made him an even easier mark. If there was 
such a scheme, it worked.
But had the envoys from the Upper Towns purposefully deluded the governor? 
It seems that the Upper Towns’ non-compliance resulted just as much from extreme
55 Byrd, Secret Diary, 516; Spotswood, Letters, 1: 149.
56 E JC C V 3 : 301-3.
57 EJCCV  3: 299-303.
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incongruence between what Spotswood sought and what the envoys could deliver. 
Inaction was the result, not the intent. At the heart o f the difficulties was the fact that 
the “Upper Towns” described a loose association of similar communities, not a distinct 
organized polity. Similarly, any sharp division suggested by the terms “Upper Towns” 
and “Lower Alliance” should not be overemphasized. Numerous bonds o f kin, trade, 
intermarriage, and friendship obscured differences created by their different paths in 
the war. Even though Graffenried and other contemporaries tended to treat the Upper 
and Lower Towns as separate geographic entities, there was little consensus on the 
exact location of boundaries, if they existed at all. Contemporary lists o f the towns in 
each group were inconsistent and occasionally overlapped.58 Within towns, attitudes 
may have been similarly hazy. The same winter that Spotswood met members o f the 
Upper Towns, South Carolina military expeditions turned up scalps and booty in 
supposedly neutral Upper Towns. Such discoveries might have meant that some 
Tuscaroras from those towns had participated in the attacks. Alternatively, scalps 
could have served as diplomatic gifts meant to sway Upper Town kin into the conflict. 
Either way, the bloody trophies indicate that any division between the two sets of 
towns was more malleable and permeable than Virginia officials liked to imagine.59
58 Parramore, “With Tuscarora Jack,” 124-26; Boyce, "Tuscarora Political 
Organization," 257-58.
59 Parramore, “With Tuscarora Jack,” Barnwell, "Journal," 125; 396, 400. At times 
during the war, Tuscaroras from the Upper Town promised to act covertly on behalf 
of Virginia among the members of the Lower Alliance. These plans rested upon the 
fact that Tuscaroras from the different communities continued to interact and visit 
during the war (i.e., the attempt to rescue the captives, and especially an attempt to 
assassinate Hancock).
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Not only did the Upper Towns lack any clear cohesion, they lacked lines o f 
authority that would have been necessary to fulfill the treaties with Virginia. One of 
the keys to Virginia’s past successes in dealing with Indians such as the Nottoways, 
Pamunkeys and other tributaries was that colony’s long history o f confining groups to 
distinct reservations and then propping up favored leaders. The leaders o f the Upper 
Towns simply lacked the clout to enforce Virginia’s provisions. The opening days of 
the Tuscarora War, had strained existing lines o f authority in Catechna and other 
Tuscarora towns of the Lower Alliance. The Upper Towns probably also witnessed 
similar internal tensions. Rather than being a concerted policy, what was perceived as 
“neutrality” by outside observers, may have actually represented a closely balanced 
division of interests within communities, with some Tuscaroras favoring war, others 
favoring flight, some outright neutrality, and still others seeking accommodation with 
Europeans.60
The deputies who agreed to Spotswood’s provisions probably represented an 
anglophile faction, or perhaps more specifically, a Virginia-phile faction; getting the 
rest o f their communities to agree was another matter. Moreover, Tuscarora 
communities often acted in consultation with one another, seeking opinions, and 
consensus, but had little or no ability to force other towns to do anything. The 
October meeting at Nottoway town had concluded with the five Upper Town envoys 
admitting that “they had no authority to conclude anything without the concurrence of
60 Barnwell, "Journal," 397.
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the rest of their Nation.”61 They had departed promising to “consult with their 
respective Towns.”62 But had they? In December, three envoys came to Williamsburg 
and claimed to have “full power” to “treat and agree” with Virginia on behalf of eight 
towns. Moreover, they claimed that the proposals “were well liked by all their 
Towns.”63 Such claims may have been inflated, however. Some o f their townspeople 
later countered “what engagements were heretofore entered into by the persons who 
came hither last December was without any authority from their Rulers and never 
communicated to them.”64 Before the Upper Towns could make meaningful 
agreements with Virginia or any other colonial power, leaders would have to emerge 
with the authority to enforce decisions on their own people. In April 1712, that had 
not happened . . . yet.
The April decision for military action took into account more than mistrust of 
the Upper Towns or even persistent pleas from North Carolina. Compounding 
Spotswood’s worries about the Upper Towns were misgivings about the loyalty of 
Virginia’s own traders and tributaries. An investigation into “whether any persons 
within this Government have traded with the said Tuscaroras for arms and ammunition
61 Spotswood, Letter, 1: 121.
62 EJCCV, 3: 287.
63 EJCCV, 3: 294.
64 EJCCV, 3: 320.
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since the Massacre” turned up several names.65 Nathaniel Mallone o f Surrey County, 
and William Parham and James Grasham of Prince George’s County found themselves 
hauled by the sheriff before the council to answer for a “considerable quantity of 
powder” that they may have sold to the Tuscaroras.66 Concern focused on more than 
a few individuals. Convinced that the entire region south of the Meherrin River was a 
nest o f smugglers, the government demanded that the head of every household in the 
area submit a substantial bond of ten pounds sterling, promising not to trade “Arms 
ammunition or other Commoditys” with any Tuscarora or hostile Indian.67 Refusal 
meant immediate eviction.68
Tributaries seemed even less trustworthy. Increasingly, in spring o f 1712 
Spotswood worried that despite his efforts, the “Tuscaruros have been endeavouring 
to seduce” the Nottoway and Meherrin Indians “to joine with them against her 
Majesty’s Subjects of this Colony, and that there is great reason to suspect some 
sudden blow.”69 No such blow came; nor did any tributary tribe officially break with 
Virginia and join the warring Tuscaroras en masse. But just as the Tuscaroras suffered
65 EJCCV, 3: 301-3; Spotswood later admitted that Virginia traders, for the most part 
“indigent persons (who had no other way of living)” traded with the Tuscaroras, “not 
withstanding the repeated orders of the Government against furnishing these Indians 
with stores of war.” (Spotswood, Letters, 2: 147).
66 EJCCV, 3: 310, 324; Byrd, Secret Diary, 520-21.
61 EJCCV, 3: 324.
68 This policy matched Virginia’s long-standing efforts to limit settlement in the area 
until its contested boundaries with North Carolina could be drawn definitively.
69 EJCCV, 3: 303-4.
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internal divisions during the war, similar splits lurked among groups supposedly loyal 
to Virginia.70 Rumors repeatedly surfaced that individuals among the Meherrins 
“supply them [the Tuscaroras] wth what ammunition they use and cary what news they 
know of.”71 As early as November 1711, letters from Governor Hyde o f North 
Carolina and a settler in Nansemond County reported sightings o f Meherrins dressed 
in what looked suspiciously like Palatine clothes.72 Militia combed through 
Nansemond, Nottoway, and Meherrin homes, empowered to arrest entire communities 
if they found “suspected goods.” The Indians carefully hid the contraband— if it 
actually existed— and the troops returned empty-handed.73 Afterwards the council 
decreed that the “Tributary Indians be forthwith strictly charged to keep within the 
Inhabitants and to hold no Correspondence with or give Entertainment to any of the 
Tuscaruro or other Southern Indians on pain o f being treated as Enemys.”74
Despite restrictions, contacts, often o f ambiguous nature and revealing o f splits 
within the tributaries, continued. Exemplifying the confusion that existed throughout 
the war, in October 1713 several Meherrin headmen surrendered one of their own 
people, named “Mister Thomas,” on the grounds that he had been illegally
70 Shannon Lee Dawdy, “The Meherrins Secret History o f the Dividing Line,” NCHR 
72, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 405-7.
71 For a list of Meherrin breaches see Dawdy, “Meherrins Secret History,” 405-7; See 
also NCCR, 1: 893-94; EJC C V3: 352.
72 EJCCV, 3:291.
12 EJCCV, 3:291.
74 EJCCV, 3: 293.
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“corresponding with the Tuscaruros.”75 This may not have been the whole story, 
however, for Thomas retorted that he had been “taken and carryed prisoner” by the 
Tuscaroras against his will. Unsure whom among his tributaries to believe, 
Spotswood ordered Thomas to be kept under house arrest in his own community. In 
the meantime, Thomas’s sons had to prove their father’s and their own loyalty by 
accompanying a Virginia official traveling to the mountains to meet with several 
Tuscarora leaders.76
In the case of the Meherrins, any involvement by individuals on the side of 
insurgent Tuscaroras probably stemmed from long-standing animosity towards 
encroachment by North Carolina settlers on the Chowan and Meherrin Rivers. 
Graffenried later swore that “one Nick Major in Particular being one of the present 
Meherrin Indians Satt with the Tuscarooroes at his Tryall and was among them when 
Mr. Lawson the Surv[eyor] Gen[era]l was killed by them.”77 It was an odd reunion, 
since only months earlier Lawson, acting as surveyor, had met the old Meherrin and 
taken his deposition while investigating North Carolina’s claims to the lands around 
Major’s home.78 That Nick Major had found common cause with Coree Tom and
75 EJCCV, 3: 352.
76 EJCCV, 3: 352.
77 NCCR, 2: 644.
78 William G. Stanard, “The Indians of Southern Virginia, 1650-1711: Depositions in 
the Virginia and North Carolina Boundary Case,” VMHB 8, no. 1 (July 1900): 9-11; 
Dawdy, “Meherrins Secret History,” 405-6.
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Hancock who faced similar difficulties along the Neuse and Pamlico Rivers came as no 
coincidence.
Troubles were not confined to the Meherrins. In late December 1711, only 
days after members o f the Upper Towns had signed Spotswood’s treaty at 
Williamsburg, a “Christian Slave” named John Philips revealed that a Nottoway named 
Treweeks had “discovered to him that the said Nottoway Indians together with the 
Senecas and Tuscaruros designed to cutt off the Inhabitants o f this colony on the 
Southside of James River.”79 Why Treweeks had confided in the slave, and why 
Philips broke that trust remains unanswered, but the confession hints at the uncertain 
lines o f affinity among tributaries, slaves, masters, Tuscaroras, and Iroquois in the 
region. Again investigations revealed little and the blow never came.
But as months passed and spring approached, distrust towards the tributaries 
and the Upper Towns grew. Suspicions surfaced that the Upper Town delegates who 
had come in late March, ostensibly to treat with Spotswood, had detoured for secret 
talks with the tributaries. The council commissioned Harrison to investigate.80 
Within days, “several examinations of Indians” revealed that “that our Indians knew of 
the design of the Tuscaroras” and continued to commiserate.81 While the councilors 
mulled over this news and prepared for war, in Williamsburg the young Nottoway, 
Nansemond, and Meherrin hostages, perhaps catching wind of the shift and fearing for
79 EJCCV, 3: 296-97.
80 EJCCV, 3: 303.
81 Byrd, Secret Diary, 517.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
207
their own safety, ran away— an act that only escalated fears among Virginians.82 
Desperate, the councilors seized several Indian leaders in their stead until the boys 
were recaptured near Nottoway Town.83 Convinced that Upper Towns could not be 
trusted, and that tributary Indians “are too much affected to the Tuscaruros and keep a 
secret Correspondence with the Indian Enemy,” Spotswood determined to break the 
bonds.84 Therefore, in addition to commissioning a hundred colonial troops,
Spotswood planned to enact old treaty provisions to call up a equal number of 
Virginia Indian warriors. His intent: by “engaging them in this War, the 
Correspondence and Amity they have hitherto had with the Indian Enemy may be 
broke.”85
But then preparations for war suddenly stopped. The day after securing 
resolutions to raise troops for war, Spotswood met with Governor Hyde of North 
Carolina to make arrangements. The conference resulted in yet another reversal o f 
Virginia policy. North Carolina would not (and realistically could not) reimburse the 
expedition. Improbably, however, North Carolina even threatened to enforce import 
duties on provisions that Virginia troops brought for themselves! But other news 
provided the real reason for aborting the mission. Already Virginia officials had heard 
rumors of an army of nearly a thousand South Carolina Indians accompanied by a
82 Byrd, Secret Diary, 516.
83 EJCCV, 3: 306; Byrd, Secret Diary, 520-21.
84 EJCCV, 3: 302.
85 EJCCV, 3: 302.
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much smaller force of South Carolina whites attacking Tuscaroras in North Carolina. 
Great battles had been fought. That day, Spotswood learned that the leader o f this 
force had signed his own treaty with the Tuscaroras without consulting Virginia or 
North Carolina.86 Spotswood had hoped to harness the conflict in North Carolina to 
restructure Indian relations to his liking and failed; meanwhile another colony had 
seized the reins.
S6 E JC C V ,3: 313; Spotswood, Letters, 1: 170.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DANGEROUS TRAILS.
FACING SOUTH CAROLINA AND SLAVERY
Spotswood did not hide his displeasure at South Carolina’s entry into the fray. 
Ostensibly, he had blown up during his meeting with Hyde because Col. John Barnwell 
of South Carolina had negotiated with the Tuscaroras without consulting or 
considering Virginia. But tensions between the colonies ran deeper. Since South 
Carolina’s founding in 1670, when the earliest Virginia traders were tentatively 
crossing into and through the southern piedmont, the two colonies had been at odds. 
Before rice, plantations, and African slaves, South Carolina built itself on the trade of 
deerskins and Indian slaves. Positioned where its agents and traders could trek around 
the southern flank of the Appalachians, the colony did more than any other English 
settlement to extend Britain’s reach among Indians into an interior where only the 
traders and missionaries of France and Spain had mingled before.1 To a lesser extent, 
the colony also set its sights upon North Carolina.2 During his travels, Lawson had
1 Verner Winslow Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (reprint: New York: 
Norton, 1981) remains the classic work on this subject.
2 Technically, North Carolina was a political sub-region of South Carolina. Both 
colonies answered to the same set of proprietors. In practice, however, the two 
operated as separate entities. Moreover, the fact that early settlement had come 
principally from Virginia into the adjoining Albemarle region meant that North 
Carolina also had strong economic and cultural ties to that colony.
209
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followed the well-trodden routes of South Carolina traders.3 These men principally 
plied their wares among the numerous Siouan villages of the North Carolina piedmont, 
but either directly or through native middlemen, some undoubtedly counted 
Tuscaroras among their customers.
A few agents o f the crown tried to direct South Carolina’s trade and slaving 
expeditions for the glory of a greater British Empire, but in a colony cleaved among 
hardnosed businessmen, more often the reverse prevailed, with colonial policies being 
directed for the sake of slaves and trade.4 One of the few points o f agreement among 
South Carolina’s traders and politicians was that Virginia traders were interlopers, not 
allies. Therefore, during the Tuscarora War, meaningful cooperation between the 
colonies would be strained at best, and often openly bitter. But harmony was never 
the objective.5 Unlike Spotswood who schemed to extend Virginia’s reach among
3 The route went inland from Charleston between the Ashley and Cooper Rivers to the 
Santee River; up the Santee River to the Congaree opposite present-day Columbia. 
The route then crossed the Congaree and went up the west bank of the Wateree River 
to the Waxaws near present-day Charlotte. The course bent east across the Pedee 
River (also called the Yadkin) and into North Carolina across the Saxapahaw River 
(Cape Fear River), and from there the area where the Eno River became the Neuse. 
The route could continue northeast to Virginia, or southeast to the area around New 
Bern. This route would later be followed by the second South Carolina expedition. 
Joseph Barnwell, "The Second Tuscarora Expedition," South Carolina Historical and  
Genealogical Magazine 10 (Jan., 1909): 34-35.
4 Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade : The Rise o f  the English Empire in the 
American South, 1670-1717 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), provides an 
excellent analysis o f the affects o f the Indian slave trade on South Carolina.
5 Crane contends that the lone breaks in this animosity occurred “when Indian wars in 
1711 and 1715 prompted some mutual aid.” (Crane, Southern Frontier, 154) I believe 
that tension between the colonies shaped their wartime policies.
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Tuscaroras through diplomacy, South Carolina’s government leapt into the fray, 
ultimately sending two armies through Tuscarora territory. These expeditions could 
profit South Carolina slave traders and strengthen ties to Indian allies— all at the 
expense of Tuscaroras and Virginia. South Carolina’s involvement replaced 
Spotswood’s diplomatic quill with a military hammer. Neither the Tuscaroras of the 
Upper Towns nor the Lower Alliance were prepared for the blows to come.
A History of Violence
Over a decade before the Tuscarora War, South Carolina and Virginia began 
to employ a bevy of tactical tricks in their competition for Indian clients. Appealing to 
higher authority, Virginia’s officials wrote to the Board of Trade touting their colony’s 
precedence and royal status compared to South Carolina, whom they painted as 
proprietary upstarts. Moreover, claimed Spotswood, with a little training in practical 
geometry and a proper sextant, Virginia traders could prove that Cherokees, Creeks, 
and other clients lived within the bounds of Virginia’s sea-to-sea charter.6 Even he 
admitted, however, that en route, Virginia’s traders were “barely passing through” 
South Carolina. Taking advantage of the trespass, politicians in Charleston took 
legislative actions to cork the bottleneck. Twice, in 1698 and in 1701, South 
Carolina’s assembly resolved that “Virginians be Prohibited from Tradeing in this
6 Alexander Spotswood, The Official Letters o f  Alexander Spotswood, ed. R. A.
Brock, 2 vols. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1857), 1: \12., EJCCV3\ 194, 
316.
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Province” and provided for the confiscation o f goods. Only the failure o f the larger 
Indian bills, of which these resolves were part, prevented their passage.7 Another 
1701 bill took a more roundabout route to hobble Virginia’s pack trains by making it 
illegal for horses to be brought overland into South Carolina from the north.8
South Carolina escalated the multiyear dispute in 1707. Under the guise of 
collecting duties on deerskin exports, its agents began seizing Virginia traders’ cargo.9 
That year Robert Hix and several other Virginia traders found their storehouse among 
the Shuterees empty, its cache of nearly fifteen hundred deerskins confiscated by 
South Carolina agents, who also took the occasion to convince the Shuterees to rob 
Hix o f his clothes and remaining goods.10 During the years leading up to the 
Tuscarora War, flurries of letters crisscrossed the Atlantic as officials from both 
colonies continued to plead their case in England, but the matter remained 
unresolved.11
Continuing confiscations doubly hurt Virginia’s trade, since they occurred 
nearly simultaneously with Virginia’s self-imposed embargo in the wake of the Pate 
murder. Virginia’s traders, prohibited from trading with the Tuscaroras and tributary
7 Crane, Southern Frontier, 154.
8 Thomas Cooper, ed., Statutes at Large o f  South Carolina, 10 vols. (Columbia: A. S. 
Johnston, 1836-1841), 2: 164; Crane, Southern Frontier, 155.
9 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 212; Crane, Southern Frontier, 155-56.
10 James H. Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from  
European Contact through the Era o f  Removal (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1989), 52-3; EJCCV, 3: 177-78, 201, 217, 235.
11 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 212.
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Indians, could not easily skirt these tribes and trade farther south and west without the 
risk o f losing their goods to South Carolina agents. The twin blows o f being cut off 
from trade with its Tuscarora partners, and being hindered from trade in South 
Carolina proved disastrous for Virginia’s skin trade. In 1706 Virginia exported 24,400 
deerskins; in 1707 that number approximately halved to 12,000. A year later exports 
plummeted further, to about 2,350, a total decrease of roughly 90 per cent.12
For similar reasons, South Carolina stood to gain an advantage over Virginia 
several years later during the Tuscarora War. South Carolina’s traders could continue 
unobstructed with their largest trading partners to the southwest while slow-moving, 
vulnerable Virginia pack trains had to detour hundreds o f miles to skirt the conflict.13 
Even Virginia’s requirements that their traders “go out in such a body that they may be 
able to defend themselves against any stragling Indians o f the Tuscaruro Nation” did 
not guarantee safety.14 In 1713 the unlucky Robert Hix, at the head o f  a huge, eighty- 
horse caravan on the shores of the Eno River found himself again set upon, this time 
by Iroquois sympathetic to the Tuscaroras. They killed one o f Hix’s men, “shot most 
o f their Horses and made Booty of all the Goods” (valued at LI 000), declaring “their
12 Crane, Southern Frontier, appendix A, table I.
13 Hening, Statutes, 4: 553-54; Spotswood, Letters, 1: 172; EJCCV, 3: 313-14.
14 EJCCV, 3: 316; For an example o f such a bond signed by a trader, see CVSP, 1:
155. Spotswood in turn issued passes to such traders that “her Majesty’s Subjects of 
the sevl Colonys and plantations through wch you may have occasion to  pass” allow 
the traders to “freely and quietly pass and repass with your goods and Merchandizes, 
without Lett, hindrance, or Molestation, on pretence of any Dutys Or Impositions” 
(CVSP, 1: 155-56).
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reason for so doing was because they did not carry their Ammunition to the 
Tuscaroras”15
A desire to minimize such losses had entered into Spotswood’s calculations as 
he structured Virginia’s policies to preserve ties with at least some of the Tuscaroras. 
On the other hand, by taking a different approach and sending troops to war, South 
Carolina would be able to march under the twin banners of altruism towards its North 
Carolina neighbors and self-preservation against its Virginia competitors. Throughout 
1711, South Carolina’s assembly had been considering further measures against 
Virginia intruders.16 In August, South Carolina’s Indian commissioners renewed a 
bounty against intruding Virginia traders: anyone who intended to “export any Indian 
Slave or Slaves, Skins, or Furs by Land to Virginia” would first have to “come down 
to Charles Town to enter the same and pay the Duty.”17
Word of the Tuscarora attack reached South Carolina in the midst o f passing 
these measures.18 Quickly, South Carolina moved towards a military solution.19 On
15 MPCP, 3: 82-89; Spotswood, Letters, 2: 25; Robert Livingston, The Livingston 
Indian Records, 1666-1723, ed. Lawrence H. Leder (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania 
Historical Association, 1956), 222-3; NYCD, 5: 491.
16 February 2, 1711, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, 
(1706- 1711): 515-17; February 13, 1711, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green 
Transcripts, SCDAH, (1706- 1711): 526- 27 [all such references are to the microfilm 
edition found in “Microfilm Collection of the Early State Records” aka “Records of 
the States of the United States” prepared by the Library of Congress]; W. L 
McDowell, ed., Journals o f the Commissioners o f  the Indian Trade, September 20, 
1710- August 29, 1718, Colonial Records o f  South Carolina (Columbia: South 
Carolina Archives Department, 1955), 14.
17 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 14, 16.
18 NCCR, 1: 820-24.
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November 11, 1711, South Carolina’s assembly sent a “humble address” to its Lord 
Proprietors with two headings: the first outlined an “intended expedition” against the 
Tuscaroras; the second described “the great mischief and danger to this Province by 
the intrusions and approachments o f the Virginia Traders Trading with the Indians 
living within the limits o f and in amity with this Government.”20
At the same time that South Carolina had been experimenting with ways to 
exclude Virginia, its traders and agents were also seeking enrich themselves and 
strengthen their colony’s bonds with native partners through slavery. South Carolina 
had been founded later than Virginia, at a time when the existence o f slavery in British 
North America was no longer a matter o f doubt. Its founding generations had come 
not from Europe but indirectly through Barbados, and carried with them the mentality 
and slave codes o f that Caribbean slave society.21 In addition to a continued trade in 
enslaved Africans, South Carolinians had enthusiastically embraced the Indian slave 
trade. They had learned that marching alongside Indians in war, especially when 
providing the guns, powder, and shot in return for captured slaves, formed strong ties. 
South Carolina used these methods to wean numerous native groups from the French
19 October 26, 1711, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH,
(1706- 1711): 584-85; November 2, 1711, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green 
Transcripts, SCDAH, (1706- 1711): 587- 88
20 NCCR 1: 823; November 3, 1711, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green 
Transcripts, SCDAH, (1706- 1711): 589- 90. Seizures o f Virginia traders’ wares 
continued apace during the Tuscarora War (May 16, S.C. Commons House Journals,
Green Transcripts, SCDAH, [1712- 1716]: 30- 33).
21 Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from  1670 
through the Stono Rebellion (New York: Norton, 1975).
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in Louisiana and the Spanish in Florida, in the process wreaking havoc on those other 
Europeans’ alliance networks.22 In the first decade o f the 1700s, South Carolina 
began to pay particular attention to bolstering its ties to the numerous Siouan groups 
on the Carolina piedmont. A moment of opportunity and necessity arose in 1707-1708 
when Savannah Indians (with whom Virginia frequently traded) began raiding these 
Siouan groups.23 South Carolina rushed fifty guns, a thousand flints, powder, and shot 
along with a few troops to the Catawbas and other Indians; together they defeated the 
Savannahs. A majority fled to territories claimed by Pennsylvania (where they came to 
be referred to as Shawnees), seeking protection under that government and falling 
under an uncertain supervision by the Iroquois Confederacy. These events— the attack 
on a troublesome native group to secure ties with the Catawbas and their neighbors, 
strategic war that undermined Virginia, the defeated Savannahs’ subsequent flight 
north that spawned a population stream out of the Carolinas— all foreshadowed 
aspects o f the Tuscarora War.24
22 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade', Almon Wheeler Lauber, Indian Slavery in Colonial 
Times within the Present Limits o f the United States (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1913), 119-122.
23 For an account of this Savannah conflict, see Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 210-12; 
Chapman James Milling, Red Carolinians, 2d ed. (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1969), 85-89; Merrell, Indians’ New World, 56-57.
24 During the Tuscarora War, New York officials had difficulties distinguishing 
between Savannahs who arrived on their borders in 1712, and Tuscarora refugees 
who were beginning to arrive in the same region (NY, Council Minutes, 115-16 in 
IDH, Reel 7, 1712/07/03).
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Slavery as practiced by Europeans did not exist among the Tuscaroras before 
European contact. But among Southeastern native societies there did exist a status of 
servitude and degradation that Europeans often termed “slavery.”25 Unlike chattel 
slavery, this bondage was not formed at the intersection of economics and race. 
Instead, it can best be understood in the broader context o f grief, kinship, spiritual 
power, and warfare.26 Although this “mourning warfare” complex has been best 
described for the peoples of the Northeast woodlands, especially the Iroquois, one 
authority writes that “archaeological, linguistic, and folkloric evidence indicates that 
almost everywhere in eastern North America and long before contact with Europeans, 
warfare had involved the taking of captives, at least some of whom were either 
adopted or enslaved by their victors.” Among these participants were the 
Tuscaroras.27 Any death rent a society’s ties o f kinship and spiritual force and depleted
25 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade; Theda Perdue, Slavery and the Evolution o f  Cherokee 
Society, 1540-1866 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1979); William A. 
Starna and Ralph Watkins, “Northern Iroquoian Slavery,” Ethnohistory 38, no. 1 
(Winter 1991): 34-57; Brett Rushforth, “'A Little Flesh We Offer You': The Origins of 
Indian Slavery in New France,” WMQ, 60, no. 4 (October, 2003): 777-808; Kathryn 
E. Holland Braund, “The Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery,” Journal o f  Southern 
History 57, no. 4 (Nov., 1991): 601-36; James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: 
Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: 
University o f North Carolina Press, 2000); William L. Ramsey, '"All & Singular the 
Slaves': A Demographic Profile o f Indian Slavery in Colonial South Carolina'," in 
Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution o f  a Planter Society in Colonial South 
Carolina, ed. Jack P. Green, Rosemary Brana-Shute and Randy Sparks (Columbia: 
University o f South Carolina Press, 2001), 170-90. Still extremely useful is Lauber, 
Indian Slavery.
26 Daniel K. Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” WMQ 3rd Ser., 
vol. 40, no. 4 (1983): 528-59.
27 Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from  Indian Country: A Native History o f  Early 
America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 62-67.
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the community’s labor. In response, young warriors gained glory by raiding enemies 
for captives or, as a more portable spiritual substitute, scalps.28 Some captives, 
especially women and children who were considered more tractable, were adopted into 
families, bolstering populations and spiritually filling the place of the deceased.
Others, particularly dangerous warriors, were tortured and executed, allowing captors 
to spiritually absorb the victims’ power.29
Somewhere in the hazy realm between life and death dwelt a third group of 
captives, those people who Europeans called slaves. Neither adopted into society nor 
killed, they inhabited an uncertain existence. Not dead, they had no right to live.30 
Alive, they occupied no place in local kinship networks or clans—which in native 
minds was a contradiction in terms. To be truly human meant being linked through a 
series o f reciprocal relations to one’s community and kin. Among the Cherokees, 
occupiers of this status were called the atsi nahsa ’i: people who “had no legal rights 
or protection because these stemmed from kinship and the blood vengeance which
28 Lawson, New Voyage, 207-8; James Axtell, “The Moral Dilemmas of Scalping,” in 
Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins o f North America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 259-79; Helen C. Rountree, Powhatan Foreign Relations, 
1500-1722 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 50.
29 Analysis of skulls recovered from Early to Late Woodland sites reveals that male 
skulls differed between regions, whereas a broader array of skull types were recovered 
on sites with little regional variation. Such differences may reflect the widespread 
adoption o f captive females. Rountree, Powhatan Foreign Relations, 74
3(1 This argument has been put forward generally for slavery in Orlando Patterson, 
Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1984). Starna and Watkins, "Northern Iroquioan Slavery" apply it 
specifically to the case of Indian slaves.
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clans practiced.” They were an “anomaly because they had a human form but could 
not lead a normal human existence.”31 These may have corresponded with the “black 
boys” described among Virginia Indians by Robert Beverley: they were a “people o f a 
rank inferior . . ., a sort of servants among them” who were “attendant upon the 
gentry” and performed “their servile offices.”32 Almost all faced torture that marked 
them with scars as lifelong reminders o f their status. Some of these unfortunates 
might eventually be adopted into families, or fate could swing the other way and they 
could be killed. Even adoptees, who could normally expect a lifetime of acceptance 
and social respectability among their new families might revert if they rebelled against 
their newly imposed identities.33 Only the children o f the captives, born into the 
captors’ societies, permanently escaped this liminal existence.34 In addition to serving 
as living reminders of the importance of kinship ties, these bondspeople labored at 
menial tasks, served as prestige symbols for their masters, and could be exchanged in 
trade or diplomacy.
31 Perdue, Slavery and the Evolution o f  Cherokee Society, 16. Much of Perdue’s 
evidence for slavery among the Cherokees comes from the writings o f Lawson and 
Brickell, which actually have much more direct relevance to Tuscarora society.
32 Robert Beverley, The History o f  Virginia, in Four Parts (1720; reprint, Richmond, 
Va.: J.W. Randolph, 1855), 179. The description o f them as “black” suggests an 
adoption o f Virginian racial ideology.
33 Starna and Watkins, "Northern Iroquioan Slavery," 42-43; Rushforth, "A Little 
Flesh," 780-82.
34 Braund, "Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery," 603.
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Language provides further clues to understanding this bondage. Western 
Algonquian speakers such as the Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Crees referred to their 
captives as awahkan, which also means “animals kept as pets.”35 In the Iroquoian 
Mohawk and Onondaga languages, similarly, enaskwa meant both “captive” and 
“domesticated animal.”36 Captives among the Tuscaroras carried similar verbal 
markers. Looking in vain for parallels to a social hierarchy o f titles and ranks parallel 
to European society, Lawson concluded:
as for Servant, they have no such thing, except Slave, and their Dogs,
Cats, tame or domestick Beasts, and Birds are call’d by the same 
Name: For the Indian Word for Slave includes them all. So when an 
Indian tells you he has got a Slave for you, it may (in general Terms, as 
they use) be a young Eagle, a Dog, Otter, or any other thing o f that 
Nature, which is obsequiously to depend on the Master for its 
Sustenance.37
Europeans coming to the new world carried their own complex and mutable 
notions of bound labor that ultimately culminated in chattel slavery. Almost from the 
beginning, Virginia’s planners had hoped to include Indians—both bound and free—
35 Rushforth, "A Little Flesh," 783.
36 Rushforth, "A Little Flesh," 783; Starna and Watkins, "Northern Iroquioan Slavery," 
47-49.
37 Lawson, New Voyage, 210.
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within their labor force.38 For many decades, the small number o f African slaves 
coinciding with a heavy use of white indentured servants gave that region’s labor 
system a flexibility in both practice and its supporting legal statutes that would later 
disappear. Within this inchoate system, some Indian servants appeared in the records 
as if they had indentures— albeit for longer periods than typically experienced by 
whites. Others appeared as slaves. In 1649, 1655, and 1658 the Virginia assembly had 
to pass laws asserting that Indian children who had been hired out by their parents as 
servants to settlers were not slaves. The 1670s witnessed a rapid shift away from 
white indentured servitude and greater reliance on African slavery. At almost the same 
time, during Bacon’s Rebellion, the enslavement o f Indians captured during wartime 
was formally legalized.39 Later, laws intending to protect Virginia’s tributary Indians 
meant that the main supply of Indian slaves would come from trade or war with 
Indians beyond that colony’s borders, from Indians like the Tuscaroras.40
Therefore, slavery and bondage cast a long shadow over early Tuscarora- 
European relations. Initially, Tuscaroras held the upper hand. Some of the earliest 
English colonists abandoned at Roanoke may have ended their days involuntarily
38 Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal o f  
Colonial Virginia (New York: Norton, 1975), 99; Lauber, Indian Slavery, 185-87, 
197-98.
39 Morgan, American Slavery, 328-29; Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 136-43.
40 Hening, Statutes, 3: 69. Laws allowing Indian Slaves to be brought into Virginia 
were later repealed, but the trade continued nonetheless. Lauber, Indian Slavery, 185- 
86 .
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experiencing bondage as laborers at Ocanahowan.41 A half-centuiy later, the situation 
reversed. In 1650, when Bland ventured into the same area he found the Tuscaroras 
hesitant to trade with Virginians because of a reputed penchant for kidnapping 
Indians.42 A mid-seventeenth century attempt at settlement by New Englanders along 
the Cape Fear River quickly collapsed in part because of Indian retaliation against the 
settlers’ “irregular practices” of capturing native children under the “Pretence of 
instructing ‘em in Learning and the Principles o f the Christian Religion.”43 
Nonetheless, as trade and settlement extended into North Carolina, pretense fell aside 
and the exchange of Indian slaves became regular practice, with Europeans typically 
avoiding direct confrontation by purchasing Indians who had been captured by other 
Indians.44 Even before guns had become common, Machapungas were able to find 
English buyers for Coree prisoners they had snared in an ambush.45
41 William Strachey, The History o f  Travels into Virginia Britannia (1612), ed. Louis 
B. Wright and Virginia Freund, (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1953), 34; Philip 
Barbour, “Ocanahowan and Recently Discovered Linguistic Fragments from Southern 
Virginia, c. 1650,” in Papers o f  the Seventh A Igonquian Conference, 1975, ed. 
William Cowan (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1976); Edward Bland, uThe Discovery 
o f New Brittaine, 165 O f in The First Explorations o f  the Trans-Allegheny Region by 
the Virginians 1650-1674, ed. Clarence Walworth Alvord and Lee Bidgood 
(Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark and Co., 1912), 117-20.
42 Bland, Discovery, 119.
43 Lawson, New Voyage, 79-80.
44 CRNC, 3: 350-51 for an Albemarle County trader’s expectation to purchase Indian 
slaves along with buckskins, “Doo skins,” beaver, and otter in 1699.
45 Lawson, New Voyage, 209.
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At the start o f the eighteenth century, when Lawson arrived in the Tuscarora 
borderlands, the explorer could frequently spot native slaves among Europeans and 
Indians.46 Eno Will (who himself owned a slave captured from the Saxapahaws) 
served as Lawson’s guide. Indian and European practices both overlapped and existed 
side by side, making it almost impossible to draw distinct lines between forms of 
bondage. Young men preparing for war still sang about how “they will kill, roast, 
sculp, beat, and make Captive, such and such Numbers o f ’ Enemies.47 Tortures and 
executions continued, although now armed with iron manacles and the option of 
selling male captives to Europeans, more men may have survived into slavery.48 Some 
of these captives ended their days toiling among the colonists where Lawson noted 
they learn “Handicraft-Trades very well and speedily” in addition to the drudgery they 
undoubtedly performed.49 Others labored in Indian towns preparing skins for 
market—the sort of menial labor they probably would have performed a century 
earlier, but now feeding European markets.50 When at a great man’s funeral, native 
orators enumerated “his Guns, Slaves and almost every thing he was possess’d of
46 Lawson, New Voyage, 64.
47 Lawson, New Voyage, 177.
48 Considering how often female slaves were mentioned in contemporary sources, 
Gallay notes a higher than expected proportion of male Indian slaves in colonial South 
Carolina perhaps owing to such factors (Indian Slave Trade, 200); William Robert 
Snell, "Indian Slavery in Colonial North Carolina, 1671-1795" (Ph.D. diss., Dept, of 
History, U. of Alabama, 1972), 98.
49 Lawson, New Voyage, 175; For court records involving Indian slaves in early North 
Carolina, see CRNC, 3: 267, 350-51; 2NCCR, 4: 36, 149, 204-5.
50 Lawson, New Voyage, 217.
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when living,” speakers were simultaneously extolling the dead man’s valor and 
prowess in war, and  his wealth as measured in the emerging market.51
Tuscaroras inhabited this universe on two simultaneous planes, as slavers and 
enslaved. In 1708 a naked and hungry Indian appeared at the home o f Richard Clark 
in King and Queen County, Virginia.52 Throwing himself at the Virginians’ mercy, he 
“shed tears and Shewed them how his hands were galled and Swelled by being tyed 
before.” With the help o f a Tuscarora Indian who served as interpreter, Col. John 
Walker recorded his story. The Indian’s name was Lamhatty. He was a Towesa, from 
one o f nine towns on the Gulf of Mexico. Nine months earlier Tuscaroras (probably 
alongside Creeks) had attacked: “the first time the Tuscaroras made warr, they swept 
off 3 o f their nations [towns] clear and the next time 4 more, and the other three run 
away.” As a captive o f these raids, Lamhatty spent the next several months being 
traded and sold among eight different Indian communities and several different tribes. 
In one they “made him worke in the Ground between 3 and 4 months;” the family of 
another community employed him as a burdener hunting on the upper Rappahannock 
River for six weeks before he had narrowly escaped. Lamhatty’s odyssey was
51 Lawson, New Voyage, 187.
52 Various versions of this episode exist. David I. Bushnell, “The Account of 
Lamhatty,” American Anthropologist, vol. 10 no. 4 (Oct., 1908) 568-74; For a 
reproduction of the document, see William P. Cumming, The Southeast in Early 
Maps, 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1998) pp 86-7, 199, 
plate 43a; Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 307-08; Gregory A. Waselkov, “Indian Maps of 
the Colonial Southeast,” in Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast, ed. 
Gregory A. Waselkov Peter H. Wood, and M. Thomas Hatley (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1989), 313-320. Quotations below are from Waselkov, pp 314-16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
225
remarkable, but he was not the only Towesa Indian in Virginia: others had arrived in 
Virginia not as escapees, but as slaves via Indian trade networks that probably 
included Tuscaroras.53
Participation as slavers, however, offered Tuscaroras little immunity from 
themselves being enslaved. Tuscaroras caught stealing found themselves being sold to 
Europeans by members o f their own community.54 More often it was Europeans or 
other Indians who ensnared hapless Tuscaroras. In 1691 Daniel Pugh ofNansemond 
County, Virginia seized several Tuscaroras and sold them onto ships bound for sugar 
plantations in the Caribbean—an act that had Tuscarora leaders threatening revenge or 
even war.55 For help, fuming Tuscarora leaders sought the intervention o f William 
Duckenfield of North Carolina, a man with whom they may have shared their own past 
of cooperating in the Indian slave trade.56
53 Initially, Lamhatty’s hosts treated him kindly; but after the discovery that he was not 
a novelty the sorrowful Towesa began to be “ill used.” For months he “became verry 
meloncholly often fasting and crying Several days together Sometimes using little 
Conjurations and when Warme weather came he went away and was never more heard 
of.” Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 307-8.
54 Selling thieves to Europeans appears to be an extension of the practice o f enslaving 
thieves until they repaid their crime. See Lawson, New Voyage, 212, 225. 
Unfortunately, sales o f slaves by Tuscaroras were rarely recorded because they rarely 
took place within eyeshot o f colonial officials who would tax such transactions. For 
example, Governor Pollock complained about a slave trader named Roach who slipped 
his sloop into the Neuse River “and there trades for slaves and other goods.” If  the 
collector did approach, Roach plied the “simple man” with threats and drink until the 
official cleared his vessel. NCCR 2: 46.
55 EJCCV, 1: 147, 157-58.
56 EJCCV, 1: 147, 157-58. For Duckenfield’s participation in the Indian slave trade, 
see CRNC, 4: 204-05
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The same fears o f Tuscarora retaliation that spurred a frightened Duckenfield 
to rush to Virginia’s council, coupled with those Indians’ value as trade partners, 
prevented the wholesale systematic enslavement o f Tuscaroras before 1711. 
Nonetheless, those instances that did occur, coupled with raids by Iroquois and other 
northern Indians upon Tuscaroras for captives, certainly added to the Tuscaroras’ 
sense that they were under siege. Even when Tuscaroras were not the clear victims, 
they felt uneasy at the sacrifice o f cultural and economic independence that 
accompanied the sale o f slaves to Europeans.”57
For all these reasons, it should not be surprising that slavery colored the 
Tuscarora War from its beginning. The white captives Graffenried had watched 
pathetically dance for their Tuscarora captors might have inhabited one end o f a 
spectrum o f captivity and enslavement. Tuscaroras from the Lower Alliance likewise 
sold or surrendered Indians suspected of treachery to Iroquois allies to be taken to 
distant lands.58 Virginians and North Carolinians also took part. In North Carolina, 
Captain Brice had immediately seized and sold Indian women and children when 
hostilities broke out.59 Virginia officials approached the subject with nonchalance, 
offering to buy women and children taken captive by erstwhile Upper Town allies for 
the “usual price of slaves.”60
57 Barnwell, "Tuscarora Expedition," 397; Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 265.
58 EJCCV, 3: 352.
59 NCCR, 1: 826.
60 EJCCV, 3:287-88.
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Such offers, however, were but the dabbling o f neophytes in a process that 
South Carolina had long since perfected into a gruesome art. A minister working 
among the colonists, slaves, and Indians o f South Carolina complained of the 
“perpetual warrs” promoted by South Carolinians “amongst the Indians for the onely 
reason of making slaves to pay for their trading goods.”61 Coming on the heels o f a 
decade of successful slave wars against Spanish mission Indians in Florida, French- 
allied Indians in Louisiana, and Savannah Indians closer to home, South Carolina’s 
government quickly turned its sights towards the Tuscaroras in response to North 
Carolina’s plea for aid.
The First Invasion and a Peace Betrayed
To head the mission, South Carolina’s assembly appointed John Barnwell, an 
Irish-born military officer and South Carolina assembly member, who would soon earn 
the nickname “Tuscarora Jack” for his role in the Tuscarora War.62 Through mid- 
January, Barnwell recruited a motley crew of Indians. From Charleston he marched 
inland along the Santee River to the Congaree Indian town, then northwest along the 
Occaneechee Path to the Waterees and then to the Waxsaws. Turning east along the
61 Frank J. Klingberg, ed., The Carolina Chronicle o f  Dr. Francis Le Jau (Berkeley: 
U. o f California Press, 1956), 116.
62 Alan Gallay, “Barnwell, John (c. 1671-1724),” in Oxford Dictionary o f  National 
Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com. (accessed August 17, 2006).
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Sara Path towards the Pee Dee River he paused at Sara and Pedee towns.63 When he 
finally turned north overland towards North Carolina, Barnwell led an army of 528 
troops. In addition to thirty-three whites, this force included three companies o f 
Indians loosely assembled by region and ethnicity.64 A “Yamasee Company” 
comprised o f 158 Yamasees, Hog Logees, Apalachees, and Corasboys contained 
Indians from South Carolina’s low country and refugees from Florida. Captain Jack, a 
Catawba war captain led an “Essaw Company” o f 155 Waterees, Sugarees, Catawbas, 
Shuterees, Waxsaws, Congarees, and Sattees—these Indians inhabited the piedmont 
and were collectively referred to by South Carolinians as the colony’s “northern 
Indians.” Also from the piedmont but farther northeast came another company of 117 
Waterees, Pedees, Winyaws, Cape Fear Indians, Hoopengs, and Wareperes led by a 
warrior named Captain Bull.65 To this last company Barnwell also added 182 Saras 
and Saxapahaws who had recently fled to South Carolina from North Carolina after 
Tuscaroras had attacked and killed several for refusing to join the uprising. Barnwell 
recommended the Saxapahaws to the governor’s protection as “brave men and good.” 
As was the case with all o f his native troops, Barnwell hoped that including the
63 Herbert Richard Paschal, "The Tuscarora Indians in North Carolina" (M. A. Thesis, 
Dept, o f History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1953), 73; This route is 
reconstructed on a ca. 1716 map of North and South Carolina showing the paths of 
military expeditions during the Tuscarora and Yamasee Wars. (CO/700-Carolina 4) 
from the Public Record Office, Kew, Surry, England reproduced in Thomas C. 
Parramore, "With Tuscarora Jack on the Back Path to Bath," NCHR 64, no. 2 (1987): 
126-27. Parramore and Gallay provide the best secondary accounts o f Barnwell’s 
invasion.
64 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 267-68.
65 Barnwell, “Journal,” 393-94; Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 267-68
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Saxapahaws in the expedition would cement these refugees’ allegiance to South 
Carolina in addition to bringing slave profit.66
These Indians had their own reasons to join Barnwell. In the months before 
the war, South Carolina’s Indian commissioners listened to stories o f run-away debt 
among many of their Indian trading partners. One South Carolina Indian official in 
1711 estimated that “the Indians in our friendship” owed debts valued at 100,000 
deerskins, or about 250 skins per man.67 In August 1711, the commissioners sent 
instructions to the Yamasees assuring that they would not hold these Indians 
accountable for debts arising from buying rum, but unscrupulous traders continued to 
exploit loopholes to ensure that liquor tabs were paid.68 Scant months before the war, 
headmen among the Yamasees, Waxhaws, Esaws, and Catawbas—the same groups 
who formed a bulk o f Barnwell’s expedition— conferred in Savannah Town to discuss 
their debt.69 Rumors abounded among the Yamasees that their lands would be taken
66 Barnwell, “Journal,” 394; South Carolina’s governor later met with some o f these 
Saxapahaws, “who came to desire the protection o f this Government and to have 
liberty to settle themselves amongst our Northern Indians. They have brought me a 
present of sixty odd skins . . . [and] some Scalps they have brought from the 
Enemies.” (April 9, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, 
SCDAH, (1712- 1716): 19). South Carolina’s general assembly also extended 
relations to other Indians during the conflict by sending messages “to our Northern 
Indians the Esaws and Wacksaws to assure them of our protection and that we will 
take the best methods we can to keep them from the insults o f their Enemies and 
encourage to plant good quantities o f corn to supply our forces in case we shall have 
occasion to send any that way,” (April 4, 1712 , S.C. Commons House Journals, 
Green Transcripts, SCDAH, [ 1712- 1716]: 8).
67 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 249.
68 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 14.
69 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 14.
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from them because o f their debts.70 With Indian slaves in high demand, valued at 
about two hundred deerskins per adult captive, war appeared to offer a way out o f the 
deepening fiscal hole.71 In the same breath as he described the Tuscarora War, 
missionary Francis Le Jau, suspected “there is no other Necessity” for South 
Carolina’s Indian partners “to Warr against their Neighbours but that o f making slaves 
to pay for the goods the traders Sell them, for the Skins trade do’s not flourish as 
formerly.”72 The fate of the Westos and Savannahs, who had been killed, captured as 
slaves, or expelled after falling out o f favor with South Carolina, stood as a grim 
warning: enslave or become slaves.
Participation, however, required a tremendous gamble. Many of these Indians 
inhabited the same ambivalent relationship with slavery as did the Tuscaroras. After 
illegally harboring an escaped Indian slave, one Waxhaw Indian fled the law and his 
creditors by joining the expedition; he died in North Carolina.73 In April 1712, the 
Indian commissioners learned about another Indian, a slave who had already paid half 
of his manumission had gone “to Warr to gett the remayning Part o f his Freedom.”74 
In seeking his own freedom, he sought to enslave others. No record tells if he
70 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 28, 31.
71 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 53.
72 Klingberg, ed., Carolina Chronicle, 134; Richard L. Haan, "The 'Trade Do's Not 
Flourish as Formerly': The Ecological Origins of the Yamasee War of 1715,"
Ethnohistory 28, no. 4 (Autumn 1981): 341-58.
73 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 33.
74 Such participation was technically illegal, but in this case an exception was made 
because it was a fa it  accompli. McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 23, 33.
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succeeded. Whatever their individual motives, the makeup o f this army meant that the 
Tuscarora War would become a conflict fought primarily by Indians against Indians.
For the Tuscaroras, the arrival o f this mostly Indian army at the Neuse River 
on January 28, 1712 began a fortnight of destruction.75 Barnwell’s force marched 
northwest to the southern reaches of Nahunta Swamp and through the neighborhood 
of open farmland native homes known to Tuscaroras as Torhunta. In response,
Tuscaroras scattered into forests or huddled into numerous newly constructed forts.
On January 30, Barnwell’s men sacked a fort known as Narhontes in a desperate brawl 
that killed most o f the defenders, including a cadre of defiant women who fought to 
the death armed with bows and makeshift weapons.76 Barnwell worried about his own 
losses o f 32 wounded and 7 killed including the Wateree king, but was satisfied to see 
that the Tuscaroras, “terrified at the quick work made here, quitted all their forts, and 
left a fine Country open full of provisions.”77
Hindered by rain that flooded streams and swamps and lacking a guide (until 
he coerced a Tuscarora captive), Barnwell nonetheless followed Catechna Creek 
downstream, methodically laying waste to the towns of Kenta, Tonarooka
75 For detailed summaries o f Barnwell’s expedition, see Parramore, "With Tuscarora 
Jack;” Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 267-73; Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians," 72-89; for 
archeological attempts to trace his route, see John E. Byrd, and Charles L. Heath,
"The Rediscovery of the Tuscarora Homeland: A Final Report of the Archaeological 
Survey of the Contentnea Creek Drainage, 1995-1997" (East Carolina University,
David S. Phelps Archaeology Laboratory, 1997).
76 Barnwell counted 52 scalps, another 10 killed, and “about 30 slaves.” (Barnwell, 
“Journal,” 396).
77 Barnwell, “Journal,” 396.
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(Nohoroka), Innennits, and Caunookehoe.78 “Everywhere,” he saw “marks” o f the 
Tuscaroras’ raids against the colonists that turned the towns into “a world of 
plunder.”79
Reaching a fork in the road, Barnwell chose the one most traveled: it led 
though the heart o f Tuscarora towns and open farmland where soldiers on horseback 
could be put to good use, rather than wandering into tangled forests where a 
straggling army would be easy prey to Tuscarora ambushes.80 Nonetheless,
Tuscaroras launched several counterattacks. Men from Kenta harassed the force with 
gunfire from a distance before melting away (but not before members of Captain 
Jack’s company took nine scalps, and two prisoners). Several times at difficult river 
crossings, Tuscaroras attacked Barnwell’s exposed rear.81 Barnwell recorded that 
early one dawn, as he warmed by the campfire, Tuscaroras “poured a volley at us, and 
I had reason to believe most o f the shott was directed at me for it made strange work 
with my things and several shott plunged the tree I leaned against.”82 Seeking a 
conclusive battle, Barnwell railed against these “skulking dogs,” who repeatedly led 
his Indians on goose chases and often slipped away unharmed.83
78 Byrd, "Rediscovery," 41-46.
79 Barnwell, “Journal,” 396, 400.
80 Barnwell, “Journal,” 400.
81 Barnwell, “Journal,” 398, 401.
82 Barnwell, “Journal,” 402.
83 Barnwell, “Journal,” 398-99.
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By February 10, Barnwell had crossed northward overland to the Neuse River; 
turning downstream he passed through the “well ruined” remains o f English 
plantations and emerged to the “incredible wonder and amazement o f the poor 
distressed wretches” at Bath. These colonists’ suffering, however, could be matched 
by a backwards glance at the damage he left among Tuscaroras in his wake. By his 
own estimate, he burned 374 houses and no fewer than 2,000 bushels o f corn. Even 
while destroying, he scanned Tuscaroras’ fruited plains and fields o f grain with an eye 
towards future European settlement, ordering “the Fruit trees w ’ch are plenty both of 
Apples and peaches and Quinces to be preserved.”84 Barnwell’s journal mentioned 
killing 78 Tuscaroras and enslaving 38 more, although because Barnwell did not 
carefully account for those taken by his Indians, the actual number was probably much 
higher. Moreover, the aftershocks of the march meant that harm ran deeper. Towns 
came apart. Hunger arrived. Captives described how “old men women and children” 
had fled north towards Virginia’s hill country and “dispersed into small parcells 
because they had no provisions but must gather hickory nutts.”85
Beyond the physical distress, historian Thomas Parramore noted that the raid 
also disrupted political debate among the Tuscaroras on what course to take in the 
war.86 Barnwell’s men spent two hours torching the “great town called Innennits.”87
84 Barnwell, “Journal,” 396.
85 Barnwell, “Journal,” 400.
86 Parramore, "With Tuscarora Jack," 122-28; Spotswood, Letters, 1: 170
87 Barnwell, “Journal,” 400.
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Two months earlier, deputies from this Upper Town had signed articles o f peace with 
Spotswood.88 Similarly, occupants o f Torhunta, site o f Barnwell’s bloody victory 
over the fort, also appeared as a signatory in Williamsburg.89 For Tuscaroras weighing 
which course to take, the appearance of several dozen white South Carolinians 
alongside hundreds o f Indian invaders further confused an already chaotic situation. In 
March 1712, when Spotswood finally lost patience with the Upper Towns, their 
deputies argued that they could have easily cut off the intruders, “but that they saw 
some English among them which hindered them.” They wanted to know “whether 
they might defend themselves in case they’re attacked.”90 The result was the same 
inaction that Spotswood decried as treachery. The attacks widened splits within 
Tuscarora communities. Whereas some Tuscaroras fled deeper into the backcountry, 
prisoners speculated to Barnwell that “most of the men belonging to the towns 
destroyed will fly” to Hancock.91 If Barnwell’s invasion had meant to end the 
Tuscarora War, it also widened it.
Whatever the effects on Virginia’s negotiations, Barnwell did not care. As a 
South Carolina agent accustomed to competing with Virginia traders, he scanned for
88 EJCCV, 3: 293-95. It appears in this record as “Chounanitz.”
89 EJCCV, 3: 293-95. Torhunta appears as Taughoutnith in this record.
90 Byrd, Secret Diary, 499.
91 Barnwell, “Journal,” 397.
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evidence that the Virginians had incited the uprising, or at least profited from it.92 He 
scoffed at Spotswood’s conference at Nottoway town, bragging sarcastically that: 
to the immortal Glory of South Carolina [his own army’s march] has 
struck the Dominion of Virginia into amazement and wonder, who a 
month before with 1,500 men in arms believed (to their great shame) 
they had obtained a glorious victory, when by the dreadful terrour of 
their troops they begged a most ignominious neutrality o f those 
cowardly miscreants, which they were so gracious to grant upon 
Condition to have goods at a cheaper rate and their children brought up 
at the College.93
Not surprisingly, Virginia’s council considered the journal o f Barnwell’s expedition a 
“scurilous paper” full o f “false and unjust reflections on this Government.”94 For these 
clashing colonies who had embarked on contradictory schemes, the Tuscarora War 
was not big enough for the two of them.
Barnwell preferred a more straightforward policy of punishing the Tuscaroras 
by killing or enslaving any he encountered. But an Indian army bent on slaving did not 
always prove compatible with goals o f broader retribution, or even tractable to his 
direction. His allies’ style of warfare made them well-suited to “making excursions
92 Barnwell, “Journal,” 398, 43-44, 52.
93 Barnwell, “Journal,” 400. Barnwell repeatedly interrogated his prisoners seeking 
evidence that Virginia’s traders could be blamed for instigating the massacre, or 
supplying the Tuscarora combatants after it began (see “Journal,” 398, 52, 53).
94EJCCV, 3: 318.
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and destroying the Country” (396). Barnwell estimated that his allies “outdo . . . [the 
Tuscaroras] very much either at bush or Swamp” and were limited only by the 
Tuscaroras’ greater familiarity with the countryside.95 This martial aptitude as scouts 
and rangers, however, left the Indians cold to the task o f costly frontal assaults. Some 
of the Yamasees had pushed for the storming of Narhontes, but as casualties mounted, 
their ardor diminished. Despite Indian participation and casualties, whites bore the 
brunt o f the attack.96 Indians, “will never of themselves attempt the taking of any fort,” 
Barnwell later advised.97
Moreover, the quest for slaves could prove a deadly distraction. At Narhontes, 
some o f Barnwell’s Indians had begun plundering and securing prisoners even before 
the fighting had finished, “which proved the destruction of several.” Not that Barnwell 
did not covet his own share of captives: “while we were putting the men to the 
sword,” rued Barnwell, “our Indians got all the slaves and plunder, only one girl we 
gott.”98 As soon as they rounded up as many hapless Tuscaroras as they could safely 
handle, these Catawbas, Waxhaws, Pedees, and the rest expected to quickly return 
home, their bravery proven and wealth (or at least temporary freedom from debt)
95 Barnwell, “Journal,” 397.
96 Barnwell, “Journal,” 395.
97 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 278; August 7, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, 
Green Transcripts, SCDAH, (1712- 1716): 97- 99.
98 Barnwell, “Journal,” 395, 42.
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assured." Desertions more than halved Barnwell’s force. Captain Bull’s force left, as 
did most of the Esaw Company except Captain Jack and twenty-three others. Their 
commander’s vain pleas only earned pledges that “when they had secured their plunder 
. . . and their Slaves [to South Carolina], they would return.”100 Only the Yamasee 
Company remained largely intact. Therefore, despite fiery talk o f a conclusive battle, 
Barnwell had steered a course to Bath that avoided the Lower Alliance forces who 
gathered at King Hancock’s recently constructed fort at Catechna.
Barnwell came to Bath expecting reinforcements and supplies from North 
Carolina. Indeed, Barnwell had arranged to meet Gale when South Carolina’s forces 
first reached the Neuse, but a French privateer had captured the North Carolina envoy 
as he sailed home and the rendezvous never happened.101 For the same reason, North 
Carolina’s officials knew nothing of Barnwell’s expedition. No preparations had been 
made; no supplies awaited, only “300 widows and orphans that are here without 
provision or clothing and ill used” who expressed “mad joy” at the army’s sudden 
arrival and then pondered the question o f how to feed it.102 A divided and disordered 
North Carolina government tried to rouse itself by calling a session of the assembly 
and passing several provisioning laws but its members provided little real aid, instead
99 Not all captives were channeled into the slave trade. South Carolina Indians 
“cooked and ate the flesh” of a Coree Indian, (Graffenried, Account, 243).
100 Barnwell, “Journal,” 399; April 9, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green 
Transcripts, SCDAH, (1712- 1716): 19.
101 NCCR, 2:234-35.
102 Barnwell, “Journal,” 42, 402.
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getting drunk and dancing “stark naked” in celebration o f Barnwell’s arrival and then 
drifting back into stupor and discord.103 Barnwell, who in South Carolina had 
opposed efforts to exclude dissenters from government, did himself few favors by 
joining into party politics alongside Quakers and Cary-ites in the assembly against 
Gov. Hyde.104 Eventually, sixty-seven North Carolinians joined Barnwell’s force, but 
Barnwell considered them a “country cowardly crew” for whom he could scarcely 
scrounge even ten shots per man.105 Finally, on February 27, the army set out against 
Catechna, driven as much by hunger and hopes to plunder stores o f corn they expected 
to find among the Indians as in pursuit o f Hancock.106
As he approached Catechna, Barnwell crowed that he would end the war in a 
“stroke” with all the “principle murderers” from among Hancock’s allied Tuscaroras, 
Corees, Bear Rivers, Pamlicos, and Neusioks confined to “a pen.”107 But Catechna 
was far more than a flimsy cage. Rumors of the fort’s strength did little to prepare 
Barnwell for the intimidating sight that soon confronted him through his spyglass. 
Approximately twenty-four African slaves had absconded to, or been captured by the
103 Barnwell, “Journal,” 49. Resolutions were passed to collect corn, but proved 
ineffectual; similarly, the government issued bills o f credit valued at £4,000, but were 
able to channel little of this to Barnwell before his departure, Paschal, “Tuscarora 
Indians,” 77-79.
104 NCCR, 2: 20, 46.
105 Barnwell, “Journal,” 43.
106 Barnwell, “Journal,”43, 50
107 Barnwell, “Journal,” 45; Graffenried, Account, 244.
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Lower Alliance.108 Among them was one named Harry who had belonged to a South 
Carolinian before being sold into Virginia “for roguery;” afterwards he “fled to the 
Tuscaroras.” Somewhere in his travels Harry had acquired a knowledge of 
fortifications. Combining Indian, European, and perhaps African styles, he helped the 
Tuscaroras engineer a substantial fort complete with surrounding trenches, timber 
walls fireproofed by an earthen outer layer, two tiers of port holes, and four round 
flankers to allow enfilading fire. Abati o f sharpened tree limbs and reeds promised to 
entangle and trip up any charge. Careful placement o f the fort in a river bend provided 
further protection.109 The fact that many of the Tuscarora women and children hid 
elsewhere in a swamp while 130 men guarded its walls suggests that the Lower 
Alliance intended the edifice to serve as much as an offensive fighting platform as a 
bastion of last defense.
Successive pitched battles at the fort resulted in stalemate. The first night, 
Barnwell’s men charged through the rain, screened behind large wooden shields until 
the defenders’ furious fire put them to flight and according to a frustrated Barnwell, 
“deservedly shott sevll o f them in their arses.”110 Shifting tactics, Barnwell spent
108 Barnwell, “Journal,” 47.
109 Barnwell, “Journal,” 44-45. For a discussion of the Tuscaroras’ adaptation and use 
of fortifications against Europeans, see Wayne E. Lee, "Fortify, Fight, or Flee:
Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Culture Adaptation," Journal 
o f  Militiary History 68, no. 3 (2004): 713-70; Charles L. Heath, and David S. Phelps, 
"Architecture of a Tuscarora Fortress: Neoheroka Fort and the Tuscarora War" (paper 
presented at the 63 rd Annual Meeting of the Society for American Archaeology,
Seattle, Washington, January 1998).
110 Barnwell, “Journal,” 45.
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several days throwing up breastworks that overlooked the riverbanks, forcing trapped 
defenders to send European hostages into the crossfire to fetch water. Overwhelmed 
with their own wounded, short on food and ammunition, and distraught from the 
screams of hostage children whom the Lower Alliance began to torture and kill, on 
March 7 Barnwell agreed to an armistice that effected the immediate release of twelve 
captives and set the stage for a treaty to be negotiated eleven days later. But deputies 
from the Lower Alliance did not arrive at the appointed meeting place and the fighting 
resumed.111 Nineteenth-century oral histories among the Tuscaroras also remembered 
the short ceasefire:
[a Tuscarora woman] went out and followed the soldiers. When she 
caught up with them she said, “You nearly conquered us that time.”
When she had finished speaking they knocked her on the head and 
killed her. They returned and fought again . . . ,112
Barnwell had used the intervening time to muster additional troops and several 
small artillery pieces; the Lower Alliance in turn had expanded Catechna’s palisade and
111 Suspicions of Barnwell’s motives for a trip to New Bern during this time may have 
caused the Lower Alliance leader not to attend (Parramore, "With Tuscaora Jack," 
130.) Alternately, disease gripped Barnwell and a number o f his Indian allies at the 
time, forcing Barnwell to send deputies in his stead; it may have similarly crippled 
negotiators from the Lower Alliance.
112 “Tuscaroras Leave N.C.” Gatschet after Adam Williams, 44, Tusc., ca. 16 Sept. 
1885. Free Rendering by A. F. C. Wallace, BAE Box 372b in Extracts BAE 
Tuscarora Collection, F. R. Johnson Papers, NCSA, Raleigh. The account states that 
this occurred at Neohoroka (site of a siege a year later, described below) but the 
mention o f the cease-fire seems to better match events at Catechna. It would have 
been easy to conflate the two incidents.
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trenches.113 A ten-day siege began April 7, which “for variety o f action, salleys, 
attempts to be relieved from without, can’t I believe be parallelled agst Indians,” 
marveled Barnwell. As Barnwell’s men sought to mine ever closer to the walls, the 
Tuscaroras dug counter trenches and made sorties against what Barnwell estimated to 
be forty-to-one odds. Despite terrible casualties among the Tuscaroras, cramped 
hand-to-hand combat in the pits “flinted the edge of those Raw [North Carolina] 
soldiers.”114 It was too much. Ten days o f combat for fifteen feet o f ground left both 
sides willing to negotiate. Outside the walls o f Catechna, with wounds still fresh and 
the sound of battle only having just stilled, Barnwell and the defenders o f Catechna 
signed a provisional treaty.
This was the “clapt up” peace that Spotswood denounced so heartily.115 
Governor Hyde of North Carolina added his voice to the condemnations, objecting to 
battlefield negotiations conducted without his own supervision.116 A year later, Hyde’s 
successor even hinted that Barnwell (whom some thought aspired to become governor 
of the colony) had aimed to “blacken Governor Hyde’s administration” by negotiating
113 Graffenried, Account, 244. Barnwell recorded that he had 153 white men and 128 
Indians in his force during this battle (Barnwell, “Journal,” 51).
114 Contemplating high casualties among the Tuscaroras that resulting from their 
furious sallies, Barnwell wondered that it was “inconcievable what they meant by it, 
for we had 40 to one when they entangled themselves in our trenches,” (Barnwell, 
“Journal,” 52).
115 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 150, 169-70.
116 NCCR, 1: 899-901; Klingberg, ed., Carolina Chronicle, 113-14.
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a flawed peace.117 At the heart of these complaints were feelings by officials that 
Barnwell had prematurely ended his siege and then granted too light o f terms. The 
treaty would “no doubt render . . .[the Tuscaroras] more insolent when they perceive 
how weakly they have hitherto been attacked and how easily they can obtain a peace 
after all the barbaritys they have committed,” judged Spotswood.118 Likewise, Hyde 
complained that Barnwell attacked Catechna twice and had “not taken it [which] hath 
much encouraged them.”119 Even Barnwell admitted that hunger and news that the 
Tuscaroras had received fresh shipments o f ammunition (possibly from Virginia 
traders) forced him to the bargaining table early, preventing a “glorious end of the 
war” and leaving “above 100 murderers unpunished.”120
117 NCCR, 2: 20, 46. Hyde and Barnwell may also have shared ill will because they 
both aspired to the same tract of land on the former site of Core Town (which 
Graffenried also openly coveted) (NCCR, 1: 878).
118 Spotswood, Letters', 1: 169-70.
119 NCCR, 1: 899-901. The harshest such accusation came from the Swiss colonel 
Mitchell who commanded some North Carolina troops during the attack. He claimed 
that the besieging army had drawn “the trenches within eleven yards o f their fort, being 
only palisades and had raised a battery very near, and had planted two great guns, had 
got great quantities of lightwood and combustible faggots to fill all up between the end 
o f the trenches and the palisades so that the Indians within the forts . . . would have 
surrendered on any terms” (NCCR, 1: 875). For Barnwell’s response to Mitchell, see 
December 11, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, 
(1712- 1716): 158-60. The president of North Carolina’s council claimed that “the 
taking of this fort (where most of our Enemy Indians were) would have discouraged 
the rest so much that they would have either complied on our terms, or left the 
country, and would have encouraged our people much in taking so many slaves,” 
(NCCR, 1: 875).
120 Barnwell, “Journal,” 52; Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 273.
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In other words, even though Barnwell had hoped for a military solution, 
stalwart defense by the Lower Alliance reopened the door for diplomacy. The position 
o f the Tuscaroras—neither victorious nor wholly defeated— meant that any treaty 
discussion in the spring of 1712 had not only to take into account the goals of 
Barnwell, but to be at least somewhat acceptable to the warring Tuscaroras and their 
allies. If  some of the provisions, according to Spotswood, were “very odd and 
unaccountable,” it was because the Tuscaroras, who still commanded their Catechna 
stronghold, ensured they would be that way.121 The result was a mishmash of 
provisions, fulfilled to varying extents.
Several treaty points roared for immediate acts of restitution but proved to be 
toothless paper tigers. Barnwell recorded some of these in his official journal: 
point 1\ “deliver up all the white captives and negroes immediately that 
are in the Fort the rest in 10 days”
response-partial: “24 Captives children were delivered and 2 negroes 
one of wch being a notorious Rogue was cutt to pieces immediately”
(probably Harry) Where were the twenty-two other form er African 
slaves?
point 2 :“ . . . deliver up K. Hancock and 3 notorious murderers . . . ”
121 Spotswood, Letters, 1: 150. Parramore, "With Tuscarora Jack," 132 takes an 
opposite view, that the acceptance of a treaty by the Tuscaroras suggests that 
Hancock’s people “were in extremities worse than those of the attackers.”
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response—nothing:: “King Hancock was gone to Virginia and they will 
deliver him and 3 others [later].” They did not.
point 3: “deliver up all the horses, skins & plunder”
response—almost nothing: “Most o f the horses skins and plunder they
sold the Virginia Traders, the remainder which but little they
delivered.”
point 6: “furnish me with all the corn in the Fort for the departure o f 
my Indians”
response—partial: “This was the hardest article, . . .  I got as much as 
furnished 40 Indians Essaws and Palachees [Apalachees] and sent them 
away.”122
Not all o f the treaty met such a stony response from the Tuscaroras. Several 
points attempted to order previously ad hoc Indian relations in North Carolina by 
having the Indians agree to negotiate future provisions with Governor Hyde, pay a 
yearly tribute, and channel complaints “regularly to Magistrates upon any quarrel.” 
Here, the Tuscaroras agreed. They had gone to war to end abuses, not end contacts. 
These were concessions to be sure, but some provisions would need to be made to 
enable peace to succeed. Moreover, at the war’s outset Tuscaroras themselves had
122 Barnwell, “Journal,” 52-54.
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insisted upon similar provisions in the treaty they forced upon Graffenried.123 During a 
pause in the fighting at Catechna, Tuscaroras had called out from the riverbanks at 
canoes bearing Barnwell’s wounded men, speaking “kindly to them, and told them 
they hoped before long to be good friends.”124
Further points demanded land concessions, limiting the Lower Alliance to 
hunting, planting, and fishing along the upper Neuse and its tributaries, including 
Catechna Creek. The area below Catechna Creek would be open to white settlement. 
Barnwell rewarded his Indian allies by granting them the territory between the Neuse 
and Cape Fear Rivers. These concessions were “Intirely agreed to by the Tuscaruro 
Indians,” probably because they were hardly concessions at all. The Tuscaroras who 
had participated in the war retained the bulk of their lands. The only Tuscaroras who 
lived outside this block along the Neuse occupied several Upper Towns to the north 
that had been distancing themselves politically from the Lower Alliance. The signers 
even could have interpreted the provision to mean that lands inside these bounds 
would be protected from future white encroachment.125
The final provision dictated that the Tuscaroras break down a wall o f their fort 
and allow Barnwell’s force to march through, colors flying and men huzza-ing. Even 
then victory was not complete. The colonel’s military eye noted that a continued siege
123 Graffenried, Account, 281.
124 Barnwell, “Journal,” 47.
125 Compare this to point 3 o f Graffenried’s treaty, which ensured that settlers will 
“take no more territory, up toward them,” (Graffenried, Account, 281).
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would have required “a good many . . .  be killed before it could be taken.” 126 The 
Indians inside, awash in the stench and gore o f their sick, wounded, and dead, 
prostrated themselves before Barnwell. Nonetheless, Barnwell noted, the men still 
“hid all their arms.” 127 So armed, even seventy warriors, Barnwell estimated, would 
be enough to continue war and interfere with the colonists’ spring planting. Barnwell 
had probably squeezed as many concessions as he could.
But provisions that were innocuous or at least acceptable for the Tuscarora 
defenders would be disastrous for other Indians from the Lower Alliance. In 
particular, provisions limiting lands and directing complaints through white magistrates 
angered the Corees. More than the Tuscaroras, the Corees had reasons to resent 
European encroachment. With a swipe of the pen, the agreement would cross out any 
claim to their former lands along the coast and lower Neuse, eliminating the uneasy 
mixture of native and European settlements that had existed for over a decade.128 The 
Indian cabins that Graffenried sketched amid Swiss farms and mills in his early map of 
New Bern would either collapse into disrepair or be replaced. Greater first hand 
experience with day-to-day contacts with settlers also made Corees less willing to 
place their trust in neighboring magistrates. Therefore, arrangements agreed to by 
Tuscaroras were “gruntted at by the Coves [Corees] upon which they quarrelled.”129
126 Barnwell, “Journal,” 54.
127 Barnwell, “Journal,” 54.
128 Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians," 84.
129 Barnwell, “Journal,” 54.
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From an outsider’s perspective, the Lower Alliance seemed to be coming apart.
Barnwell speculated that if he only had a few days more food, that he could contrive 
“the matter so well that in that time I could oblige the Tuscaroras to have delivered all 
the Corees for slaves.” 130 The prospect was tempting.
Indeed, in the following weeks, somebody attacked the Corees, although the 
identity o f the perpetrators is a matter of dispute.131 Graffenried, Governor Hyde, and 
Governor Spotswood cast the blame on Barnwell—he had, after all, confessed to the 
temptation. It was no secret that Barnwell, who had lost five horses and personally 
spent over L I00 on supplies during the campaign, felt disenchanted that he had not 
received just compensation, or even due “honor and kindness” from North Carolina.132 
Adding to his woes, South Carolina Indians had seized most o f the captives.
According to his detractors, Barnwell sought to settle debts by using the fiction of 
further peace talks to meet with a “goodly number” o f Corees, Bare River, Neuse, 
and Machapunga Indians who considered themselves “equally concerned” in the 
Tuscarora treaty. Instead, supposedly Barnwell’s men sprung a trap, killing forty to 
fifty, and capturing nearly two hundred women and children, whom they led home as
130 Barnwell, “Journal,” 54.
131 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 274-75.
132 NCCR, 1: 904; Parramore, "With Tuscarora Jack," 133-34; August 9, 1712, S.C. 
Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, (1712- 1716): 104; December 
11, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, (1712- 1716): 
158-60.
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“living plunder.”133 If  this was the case, here was clear evidence of how the 
compulsion to capture slaves could overcome and subvert other war aims, even to the 
point o f restarting the war. However, Barnwell never admitted to the act. Taking up 
his defense, several historians think that Barnwell, who had sustained an accidental 
gunshot wound in his leg, had already boarded a sloop bound for South Carolina. Any 
attack, according to this theory, must have been committed by vengeful North 
Carolinians who were already on record decrying any peaceful settlement with the 
Lower Alliance.134
A final possibility, not fully considered by other historians, was that South 
Carolina Indians outside o f Barnwell’s direct supervision committed the betrayal. At 
least forty Esaws and Apalachees journeyed home separately. Barnwell learned the 
limits o f his authority over these former charges when one o f his slaves ran away with 
the departing Indians. Throughout the campaign, these Indians had showed off a 
particular penchant for procuring prisoners. Indeed, even Graffenried, who blamed 
Barnwell, admitted that the South Carolina Indians were “entirely inclined because 
they hoped to get a considerable sum from each prisoner.”135 Elsewhere Graffenried 
described an attack on Coree Town—perhaps the same attack, for there are
133 Graffenried, Account, 244-45; NCCR, 1: 875, 900-01; Spotswood, Letters, 1: 170- 
71; NCCR, 1: 843; Parramore, "With Tuscarora Jack," 134.
134 Hugh Talmage Lefler, and William Stevens Powell, Colonial North Carolina: A 
History (New York: Charles Scribner, 1973), 78; Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 274-75 
points out reasons for distrusting Graffenried, Spotswood, and Hyde when discussing 
Barnwell, because they were all hostile towards him.
135 Graffenried, Account, 244-45.
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indications that the trap was sprung there— in which South Carolina Indians “got into 
such a frenzy . . .  that they cooked and ate the flesh o f one o f the Carolina Indians that 
had been shot down.”136 If true, the act suggests that European slave markets had not 
entirely soured tastes for other rituals o f incorporation; the two coexisted. Together 
they beckoned Barnwell’s native allies into acts o f violence that he did not or could 
not control. Coupled with revenge, the desire for captives proved a powerful motive 
for mobilizing troops; the same temptations made it equally difficult to break off a war. 
Treaties, peace, and accommodation offered scant rewards for Europeans and Indians 
who went to war in pursuit of slaves.
Regardless of the perpetrators’ identity, any belief that the Corees and other 
smaller groups from the Lower Alliance could be picked off without incurring 
retaliation from recently pacified Tuscaroras was mistaken.137 The splits Barnwell 
imagined did not run so deep. Tuscaroras and other Indians o f the Lower Alliance 
instead learned the exact lesson that Barnwell had expressed a hope to avoid, namely 
that “there could be no dependence in our promises.”138 The door o f diplomacy again 
slammed shut.
Hancock had presented one diplomatic plan to Graffenried in the autumn of 
1711— it failed. Again, in the spring of 1712 when body counts climbed on both sides 
of the ramparts at Catechna, Tuscaroras from the Lower Alliance returned to the
136 Graffenried, Account, 243.
137 NCCR, 1: 875.
138 Barnwell, “Journal,” 54.
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bargaining table, even at the cost o f alienating Coree allies; this treaty also failed. 
Thereafter, no longer would they be fighting to create a middle ground with terms 
upon which they could coexist with European neighbors. As opportunities for 
negotiation evaporated within the Lower Alliance, splits with the Upper Towns and 
other Tuscaroras willing to negotiate with Europeans became more evident, opening 
new opportunities for leaders to consolidate control over particular factions. In the 
summer and fall o f 1712, new leaders would emerge among the Upper Towns willing 
to take unprecedented steps to negotiate a peace with colonists. On the other hand, 
members o f Lower Alliance found themselves backed in a corner, fighting a war where 
increasingly destruction or expulsion could be the only outcome.
The Second Invasion
In the wake of betrayal and with Barnwell’s native army departed, members of 
the Lower Alliance again rose up in new attacks, which in Graffenried’s opinion were 
worse than the earlier assaults.139 Again they struck at settlers along the Neuse. “It is 
likely they will not stop there,” Spotswood accurately surmised.140 In late summer 
approximately two hundred attacked Reading’s Fort on the Pamlico, killing one 
defender and burning a sloop anchored there, before being beaten back with a loss of 
five warriors. Other raids burnt houses on plantations near the mouth o f the Pamlico
139 Graffenried, Account, 245. During this time, however, shortages of ammunition 
began to be apparent among the Tuscaroras (NCCR, 1: 879).
140 Spotswood, Lexers, 1: 169.
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River.141 Less expected, they also directed efforts farther north, killing several black 
slaves near the Roanoke River.142
If the Lower Alliance sought to strike fear in their enemies, they succeeded. In 
late July 1712, the missionary John Rainsford wrote to his superiors:
Most families o f Pamlico hourly feeling the effects o f their Cruelty nor 
truly can the Govr promise himself one hours safety being continually 
alarmed by the Tuskarora spies in his own Quarters . . . .  They sculk so 
in parties in the Woods that common prudence obliges the inhabitants 
(as the surest method of preservation) to keep to their plantations and 
several of them told me that when they lie down in their beds (they are 
so often invaded) that they cant say they shall rise morning.143
Barnwell’s predictions that such roving parties could prevent planting proved correct. 
Fields lay untended; pork and grain exports stopped; refugees ate up remaining stores; 
impoverished settlers could not pay quitrents to the proprietors.144 The colony sank 
into further deb t.145 By the end of the summer, a North Carolina official reported that 
along the Neuse and Pamlico, settlers had “most of their houses and household goods
141 NCCR, 1: 882.
142 August 6, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, 
(1712- 1716): 90-96; NCCR, 1: 898-901.
143 NCCR, 1: 857-60.
144 NCCR, 1: 857-60; 873-76
145 NCCR, 1: 857-60; 873-76
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burnt, their stocks o f Cattle, hogs, horses, etc killed, and carried away and their 
plantations ruined.” Settlers farther north fared a little better, but even those in 
Albemarle County cowered in forts and fortified homes.146
The same familiar difficulties in recruiting troops and gathering supplies 
hindered efforts by North Carolina’s government to meet the threat. Leaders 
complained of men who were “poor, dispirited, undisciplined, timorous, divided, and 
generally disobedient”—understandable behavior considering they lacked arms, pay, or 
even sufficient clothing.147 Defeats added to the woes. Rainsford reported that one 
party marched forth, but the leader, Colonel Boyd, was “unfortunately shot though the 
head and few of his men came home but what shared in his fate.”148 Under the 
command of several veterans from the Barnwell expedition, Governor Hyde managed 
to assemble 130 to 140 men along the Neuse— a number that even his supporters 
admitted was “too few in number to conquer the Tuscaroras.” Hyde vowed to join 
the troops and personally lead them to “British Glory,” even if it meant “the hazarding 
of my life for them.” Yellow fever and poor diet conquered the erstwhile commander 
first.149 After Hyde’s death, the president o f the council, Colonel Pollock, assumed the 
post o f governor and helped issue in a new period of diplomacy with several Tuscarora 
leaders, but hopes of a military victory again rested with South Carolina.
146 NCCR 1: 873-76; 882.
141 NCCR, 1: 874.
148 NCCR, 1: 857-60.
149 NCCR, 1: 874; NCHGR, 1: 438.
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Shortly after Barnwell’s departure, North Carolina’s government again sent an 
agent, John Foster, to South Carolina to petition for aid, with one caveat— that 
Barnwell not lead a second expedition. After listening to Foster’s excuses for the lack 
of supplies and scarcity of troops that had met the first South Carolina force, the 
government decided to put aside past failings. Choosing to “act upon nobler 
principles” and the “secret pleasure of doing good,” South Carolina agreed to send 
another army to aid its northern neighbors.150 But it was no secret that baser 
temptations were also at work. Foster regaled the assembly with “the great advantage 
. . . [that] may be made of slaves there being many hundreds o f them women and 
children may we believe 3 or 4 thousand.”151 The mixture o f motives was clear to 
missionary Le Jau: “[in order] to bring those Murderers to due punishment we think to 
destroy the whole Nation, that is kill the Men and make the women and children 
Slaves, this is the way of our Warrs upon the like provocations.”152 Whereas 
Virginia’s determination to gain tributaries through the conflict had encouraged its 
officials to tirelessly work to differentiate enemies from allies, South Carolina’s 
dependence on slavery encouraged a cruder view of the war.
The assembly voted to use unexpended money from Barnwell’s first expedition 
to supply arms to the second and to create a scalp bounty.153 The main reward,
150 Barnwell, "Second Tuscarora Expedition," 41.
151 August 6, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH,
(1712- 1716): 90-96;
152 Klingberg, ed., Carolina Chronicle, 122-23.
153 NCCR, 1: 901.
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however, would be slaves, which the assembly assumed would be “sufficient 
encouragement” for white traders to join “without any further gratification from the 
Publick.”154 Linking a public war to private gain entailed some risk. When Governor 
Craven visited the rendezvous point at the Congarees, he discovered that some traders 
among the Creeks and Cherokees had dissuaded their customers from participating. 
These traders— subsequently brought up on charges before the government-—feared a 
disruption in trade or hoped to direct their own wars where “they thought fitt.”155
South Carolina finally settled on Col. James Moore, son of a former governor 
who had made a reputation as a slave raider against Indians in Florida, to head the 
expedition.156 The force was comprised of thirty-three white men and nearly nine 
hundred Cherokees, Catawbas and Yamasees.157 Leaving South Carolina in early 
autumn, the Indian army initially bent a slightly more western course than Barnwell’s 
expedition, first passing through the Occaneechee settlements in the upper reaches of 
the Saxapahaw River before turning east through the Catechna Creek towns.158 But in
154 August 7, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, 
(1712- 1716): 97- 99.
155 November 18, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, 
(1712- 1716): 108-10; December 2, 1712, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green 
Transcripts, SCDAH, (1712- 1716): 133- 38.
156 Alexander Moore, “Moore, James, Junior (1675x80-1724),” in Oxford Dictionary 
o f National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com (accessed August 18, 2006).
157 The best accounts of this second expedition are Joseph Barnwell, “The Second 
Tuscarora Expedition,” South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine 10 
(Jan. 1909): 33-48, and Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians."
158 Barnwell, "Second Tuscarora Expedition," map opp. 32.
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other ways, Moore clearly walked in his predecessor’s footsteps. Tuscaroras also had 
learned lessons from the first invasion. Again, the Tuscaroras took to their forts, one 
of which Moore’s Indians besieged for three days before quitting because o f a 
shortage of food and of the picks and shovels necessary to dig in for a longer siege.
Like Barnwell, Moore found it difficult to encourage native allies questing for slaves 
to endure a wearisome blockade.159 Unable to continue the attack, M oore’s force 
retreated to the rendezvous point at Fort Barnwell, where he found the expected 
supplies entirely consumed by the small garrison there.160 Therefore they marched 
farther north to Albemarle, but found the situation little better.
The Yamasees, Cherokees, and Creeks found themselves quartered among a 
population that bore little love for Indians and possessed few supplies to offer.
Hungry warriors quickly ate through scarce provisions and disbursed “without orders” 
to rove and forage, eating “all the Catle wherever they have come.”161 Pollock missed 
a military summit with Spotswood in Virginia because he needed to be on hand 
“fearing every hour of hearing of differences and quarrels between our people and the 
Indians.” “Several people . . .[were in] such a ferment that they were more ready to 
Fall upon the South Carolina Indians, than march out against the enemy,” apologized 
Pollock to the snubbed Virginia governor.162 Spotswood in turn stoked fears against
159 NCCR, 1: 893. This fort was probably Neoheroka (NCCR, 2:4).
160 NCCR, 2: 19.
161 NCCR, 2: 4, 6-7.
162 NCCR, 2: 6-7.
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South Carolina rivals by warning that “a body o f Men, peic’d up of so many nations of 
Savages” should fall apart “after being once baffled.” If M oore’s army met trouble, 
speculated the Virginia governor,
they would immediately disperse, and such a disorderly multitude, let 
loose among the Inhabitants, would prove as destructive as the Enemy;
Since experience has already show’d how little of discipline or Rule 
there is among them, and that even Colo. Moore’s presence and 
authority Could not restrain them from such ravages among the stocks 
o f y’r People.163
Slave-war tactics suitable for use against distant Indians allied to the French around 
Mobile or the Spanish around Fort Augustine proved troublesome closer to English 
settlements. Even victories, Pollock worried, might bring the same undesirable 
outcome. Such an army might win a battle, but then having “got Slaves or other Booty 
may desert,” thereby losing the war.164
Fearing reprisals from the populace, these Indians, accompanied by Moore, the 
small cadre o f South Carolina traders, and about seventy North Carolinians, embarked 
again for the Catechna basin in late January. Owing to unusually deep snows, they did 
not reach the Tuscaroras until the end of February or the beginning of March.165 
Passing the shattered hulk of fort Catechna, the army marched several miles further to
163 Spotswood, Letters 2:5.
164 NCCR, 1: 893.
165 NCCR, 2: 4; Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians," 104.
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a new fortification the Tuscaroras had constructed called Neoheroka. There would be 
the battle.
Moore afterwards reported that the ensuing struggle was “as hard an 
engagement as ever was amongst Indians, since the settling o f the English.”166 
Barnwell had made similar boasts, but the fight in 1713 surpassed the earlier siege in 
ferocity and scope in part because both sides had taken to heart lessons from the 
previous year. Tuscaroras had learned that a properly designed, adequately supplied 
fort could hold off poorly provided attackers, bringing stalemate or victory.
Therefore, in addition to the blockhouses, loopholes, and sturdy palisade present at 
Catechna, Neoheroka boasted several additional preparations and improvements.
Shortages in food and the difficulties of retrieving water had hindered the Tuscaroras 
at Catechna. At Neoheroka, archeologists have found storage pits with the charred 
remains o f thousands of peach pits, in addition to corn, beans, and other food stores.167 
To solve the problem of a drinking supply, this fort included a strongly fortified 
passageway for defenders safely to reach the adjoining creek.
Barnwell had only managed to fire a few rounds from damaged artillery pieces; 
nonetheless, these had contributed to the Lower Alliance’s surrender in 1712.
Therefore, at Neoheroka the Tuscaroras built what puzzled European attackers 
referred to as “Caves”—underground bunkers constructed by digging large holes,
166 NCCR, 2: 37.
167 John E. Byrd, Tuscarora Subsistence Practices in the Late Woodland Period: The 
Zooarchaeology o f  the Jordan's Landing Site (Raleigh: North Carolina Archaeological 
Council, 1997), 7-9.
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covering each with a roof o f sturdy timber, and then piling a mound of earth over the 
timber roof. At least four o f these were connected by tunnels. Among American 
Indians, these were virtually a unique solution to European artillery and were made 
possible largely because of the iron hoes and shovels Tuscaroras had acquired through 
trade.168 Some of these bunkers included even deeper levels, constructed to shelter the 
very old and the very young who could not fight.
Moore also applied lessons. He came better prepared with tools and a supply 
line o f food in order to methodically engage in a lengthy siege. His predecessor had 
learned the disciplinary costs of allowing his Indian allies to win small skirmishes and 
then depart home with slaves in tow, or of engaging in a costly battle that concluded 
with too few captives. Moore felt that victory would have to be decisive. Twice 
during Barnwell’s campaign, Tuscaroras and their attackers had attempted to break off 
hostilities and impose a peace. But in the end, both the Tuscaroras and their enemies 
had felt betrayed. This time, at Neoheroka, negotiation was never an option.
Over several weeks, Moore’s men fortified themselves in three “batteries.”169 
One manned by 310 Cherokees and 10 white men peered from across the branch of 
Catechna Creek that looped behind the fort. Another was erected behind rows of 
graves in a Tuscarora cemetery. A third Yamasee battery directly faced the front of
168 For a summary and analysis of archeological finds associated with the fort and 
particularly the bunkers, see Heath and Phelps, “Architecture of a Tuscarora Fortress.”
169 The primary source for details from this battle come from an anonymous map and 
an attached lengthy commentary probably written by one o f M oore’s officers. This is 
reproduced and transcribed in Barnwell, "Second Tuscarora Expedition."
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the fort. From this last battery, men with picks and shovels dug a network of trenches 
and mines towards the fort walls. At ten in the morning on March 20, M oore’s men 
fired a store o f gunpowder underneath one fort wall, but the plan nearly fizzled, the 
“powder being damnified.” Nonetheless the assault continued from every side. By the 
end of the first day, Moore’s Indian and white troops had been able to set fire to the 
fort walls. Some defenders, who “made verry great resistance,” perished in the flames. 
Even with the fort breached, fighting continued for two more days. Some Tuscaroras 
made a stand at the fortified watering place which they had hurriedly reinforced even 
as the main walls burned. Others holed up in their underground bunkers and “did 
verry much mischief.” Even these offered no final refuge. Archeologists have been 
able to determine the orientation of some of these bunkers’ entrances from the 
numerous bullets buried in the opposite walls— silent evidence of the relentless musket 
fire that attackers poured in upon the Tuscaroras during the final hours.170
The final numbers, estimated by Moore in a terse note hurried off after the 
battle, were terrible:
the enemies destroyed is as follows— prisoners 392, scolps 192, out of 
the sd fort— and att Least 200 kill’d and Burnt in the fort— and 166 
kill’d and taken out of the fort on the Scout.
M oore’s army had suffered 35 Indians killed and another 58 wounded. There had 
been a loss of 22 white men killed and 24 wounded.171 Some Tuscarora survivors,
170 Heath and Phelps, "Architecture of a Tuscarora Fortress."
171 NCCR, 2: 27.
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according to nineteenth-century Tuscarora memories, crossed the river on rafts, killed 
a ferryman, and gave a final defiant shout before fleeing.172 According to a captive, 
other Tuscaroras, who had gathered in a fort called Cohunke, upon hearing of the loss 
“all scattered, and left their fort;” most fled towards the foothills around the head of 
the Roanoke River.173 This time there was no disputing the victor.
“It has fallen out, as I conjectured,” reported Pollock, “that Col. M oore’s 
Indians, upon taking the Fort and getting some slaves, would march, the most part of 
them, home with their booty, so that they have now all gone home, only 180 that stay 
with him about Neuse River.”174 These captives joined the flow of other Tuscaroras 
and members o f the Lower Alliance who fell captive during the war. Breaking down 
the numbers, Gallay estimates a low range of 1,000 to 1,200 and a high range of 1,800 
to 2,000 Tuscaroras and allies captured. These comprised a poignant part o f a big 
picture that counted between 24,000 and 51,000 southern Indians who were sold into 
South Carolina’s slave trade between 1670 and 1715.175 If one speaks o f a diaspora of 
Tuscaroras from North Carolina at the conclusion of the Tuscarora war, the first 
group to consider is the numerous captives snatched from their homes and transported
172 “Tuscaroras Leave N.C.” Gatschet after Adam Williams, 44, Tusc., ca. 16 Sept. 
1885. Free Rendering by A. F. C. Wallace, BAE Box 372b in Extracts BAE 
Tuscarora Collection, F. R. Johnson Papers, NCSA.
173 NCCR, 2: 38; Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians," 107.
174 NCCR, 2: 29-30.
175 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 298-99.
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across the British Atlantic world. Unfortunately, these are also some of the hardest to 
trace.
Many Tuscarora captives reached South Carolina, where they occasionally 
surfaced in court and legal records as slaves. One of the largest single transactions of 
Indian slaves in the South Carolina records, a sale in 1714 by John Wright o f thirty- 
two captives, thirteen of whom were women, included one slave listed as “Tuscarora 
Betty.” Presumably other kin stood alongside her on the block that day.176 A great 
number of these Tuscaroras first came to the region on foot, leashed behind Indian 
captors walking to native villages. There they would enter into Indian networks of 
bondage and trade or be met by eager South Carolina traders. As a partial stopgap 
against fraud and the illegal enslavement o f friendly Indians and to allow Indian sellers 
time to find fair bargains, South Carolina had rules mandating that traders wait three 
days before purchasing slaves or skins from Indians recently returned to their villages.
John Jones jumped the gun and found himself facing charges for “buying two 
Tuscarora Slaves from a Coweta Indian” at the Apalachee town “before they had been 
three Dayes in their Townes.” He also “bought a Slave Girl o f a Chatahooche Indian 
coming from the Tuscarora War att the Toomela Town.”177
So many Tuscaroras fell captive, however, that leading them by foot became a 
troublesome and potentially dangerous task. Moreover, officers grew frustrated 
watching their Indian allies suddenly depart to personally escort captives, leaving a
176 Snell, "Indian Slavery," 87.
177 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 15, 57
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weakened, emptied army. North Carolina’s council took the step of hiring a sloop 
(referred to in records as the “Yamasee Galley” or “Yamasee Transport”) belonging to 
Alexander Mackey, one of Moore’s officers, “to carry off what slaves the Indians have 
here.” 178 However, it, or its officers, provided less than reliable service. Theophilus 
Hastings, another o f Moore’s officers, convinced the “Coosata King” to shuttle seven 
captives from North Carolina to South Carolina on the vessel. Forgoing native 
networks entirely, slaves from this abbreviated middle passage were to be delivered to 
a lawyer named John Stanyarn in Charleston. But, complained the Cherokee leader to 
South Carolina’s Indian commissioners, the valuable captives disappeared and he 
could “hear Nothing of them.” The court agreed, and ruled that Hastings must “pay to 
the Coosata King . . . two hundred Skins for Each of the five Slaves and sixty Skins 
for Each of the two small Ones.”179 Another Indian warrior named “Egabugga” 
similarly complained that “Capt. Mackey gott a Slave from him and has not paid 
him.” 180 Despite Barnwell’s complaints that Indian allies captured most o f the 
Tuscaroras, South Carolina traders did their part to siphon some o f the profits.
Whether arriving by land or by sea, many Tuscaroras undoubtedly ended their 
days as slaves in South Carolina. A greater number o f captives faced re-export.
Gallay has pointed out that as much as Charleston served as an Ellis Island for African
178 NCCR, 2: 44-47, 59-60, 62. North Carolina also commissioned another sloop 
belonging to a Mr. Lahorn (NCCR, 2: 45).
179 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 53; Milling, Red Carolinians, 138.
180 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 57.
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slaves arriving to the American mainland, before 1715 even greater numbers o f Indian 
slaves passed through its docks in the other direction as exports.181 Estimates of 
Indians sold are difficult to verify since most transactions were kept off the books to 
avoid duties; but if correct, such numbers overturn old assumptions that Indians, 
unaccustomed to plantation-style labor and prone to disease made inferior— and 
therefore unprofitable— slaves.182 South Carolinians sold Indian slaves to Barbados, 
Jamaica, and Nevis. Facing lower shipping costs, fewer disruptions from blockades 
during Queen Anne’s War, and no imperial taxes, importers o f slaves from South 
Carolina had advantages over competitors bringing slaves from Africa.183
Other captives were loaded into shallow coasting vessels whose smaller cargo 
size and shorter sailing distances enabled traders to exploit niche markets like New 
England and Virginia’s “upper district of York,” where larger vessels coming from 
Africa only rarely frequented.184 So many Tuscaroras and other “Carolina Indians” 
arrived in New England, who according to the pre-amble to one Massachusetts law 
were “malicious, surly, and revengeful,” that Massachusetts and Connecticut soon 
passed anti-import bills so that they would not import and inherit North Carolina’s
181 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 298-99.
182 For a statement to this effect, see Richard S.Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise o f  
the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (New York: Norton, 1973),
74. I would like to thank Brett Rushforth for calling my attention to this passage.
183 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 301.
184 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 305; Snell, "Indian Slavery," 87; Elizabeth Donnan, 
Documents Illustrative o f  the History o f  the Slave Trade to America, 4 vols. (reprint,
New York: Octagon Books, 1965), 4: 174-182; Hewitt, "Tuscarora," 85.
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enemies.185 Nonetheless, large numbers o f “Carolina Indians” began to appear for sale 
in Boston.186 In South Carolina, profits were used to purchase African slaves who, far 
from their native lands, could be more safely exploited. In this sense, Indian slavery 
helped pay for the creation of South Carolina’s black plantation society.187
Not all captives from the Tuscaroras and Lower Alliance channeled through 
South Carolina. The North Carolina-Virginia borderlands, which had a well- 
established but modest Indian slave trade, experienced its own sudden glut o f captives 
in the wake of South Carolina’s victories. In such an atmosphere, disputes about who 
owned a slave, or even who was a slave, were inevitable. Two Indians captured near 
the Virginia border were judged to be escaped Coree Indians belonging to soldiers 
from South Carolina and were delivered up to Moore.188 On the other hand, in the
185 Ames Ellis, and Abner Cheney Goodnell, eds., The Acts and Resolves, Public and 
Private, o f  the Province o f  the Massachusetts Bay, 21 vols. (Boston: Wright and 
Potter, 1869-1922), 1: 698; Connecticut Colonial Records, 5: 516; Gallay, Indian 
Slave Trade, 301-05; Christine A. Styrna, "The Winds of War and Change: The 
Impact of the Tuscarora War on Proprietary North Carolina, 1690-1729" (Ph.D. diss., 
Dept, o f History, College of William and Mary, 1990), 258.
186 See, for example, Boston New Letter, June 9-June 16, 1712; July 14-July 21, 1712; 
Sept. 1-Sept.8, 1712; Sept. 22-Sept. 29, 1712; Jan. 12-Jan. 19, 1713; March 2-March 
9, 1713; March 16-March 23, 1713; May 4-May 11, 1713; May 11-May 18, 1713; 
May 25-June 1, 1713; Aug. 17-Aug. 24, 1713; Nov. 23-Nov. 30, 1713; April 12-April 
19, 1714; May 24-May 31, 1714; July 5-July 12, 1714; June 27-July 4, 1715; Feb. 13- 
Feb20, 1716. Unfortunately, while many o f these notices describe the Indians as 
“Carolina Indians,” the presence of some who could speak Spanish suggests that some 
came from other wars or trade. Spanish speaking Indians are excluded from the list 
above. I would like to thank Brett Rushforth and his students for making this material 
available.
187 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade.
188 NCCR, 2: 2.
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summer o f 1713 Bath county officials arrested Richard Jasper for illegally enslaving 
and selling a “friendly Indian.”189 Plaintiffs brought defendants to court charging failure 
to deliver captives for whom they had paid.190 Government officials got into the act, 
either acquiring Tuscarora and Lower Alliance captives as rewards for service to the 
colony or using their posts to purchase them for a discounted price o f L10 apiece, and 
then re-selling them for profit abroad in the Caribbean.191 Other Tuscaroras faced 
export to the West Indies by unscrupulous smugglers like one named Roach who, it 
was accused, slipped his sloop into the Neuse River and “there trades for slaves and 
other goods without entering or clearing with the collector, but gets a simple man by 
threatening and drink to enter and clear his Vessel, and so is gone without paying the 
duties.”192 By the summer of 1713, with the help o f their southern neighbors North 
Carolinians, had gone from desperately begging for aid to squabbling over the spoils.
A thousand or more of their people enslaved; forts destroyed; towns emptied 
as thousands more fled as refugees— could the Tuscaroras o f the Lower Alliance have 
envisioned such an outcome? Hancock and his allies had initially planned a limited war. 
They had thought that they would be able to attack isolated offending parties, exact 
retribution, and perhaps wrest a settlement that would re-negotiate terms of contact.
189 NCCR, 2: 55.
190 NCCR, 2: 95, 97.
191 NCCR, 2: 1-2, 35, 52.
192 NCCR, 2: 46. These accusations may have been equally influenced by the fact that 
Roach was out o f political favor because he had been a chief supporter o f Cary in the 
late insurrection (NCCR, 1: 873).
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Even within the Neuse and Pamlico region, through preemptive treaties with 
Graffenried, the Lower Alliance had sought to limit the scope of the conflict even 
while offering a road map to future peace. Briefly, it seemed, Tuscarora strategists 
had been correct. At first, the war had been limited. North Carolina’s government 
had been unable to provide meaningful military resistance and settlers in the immediate 
region were divided. In Virginia, Spotswood had blustered with diplomatic indignity, 
but in the end his carousing troops never ventured farther than the parade grounds at 
Nottoway town. South Carolina’s involvement, however, fundamentally transformed 
the conflict. This owed to the elevated role of slavery.
At the start of the Tuscarora War, slavery had figured among the Lower 
Alliance’s grievances even as many of its members themselves participated in the 
trade. It was South Carolina’s entry, however, that transformed the Tuscarora War 
into a slave war. Slavery served as both a tool and an objective in its own right. South 
Carolina used the slave trade to muster two expeditions to come to the aid of 
distressed northern neighbors. The slave trade also turned the war from a moment of 
distress into a moment of economic opportunity. Altruism alone did not move Indian 
traders from South Carolina to wade through flooded swamps, plod through 
Tuscarora fields, and die outside Tuscarora forts. These white mercenaries comprised 
only a small percentage of the two armies when compared to the overwhelming 
numbers of Cherokees, Catawbas, Yamasees, Saxapahaws, Waterees, Pedees,
Winyaws, and others. The slave trade helped ensure that most o f the fighting in the 
Tuscarora war would be accomplished by Indians against Indians. Taking captives had
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long been a vital part of Indian warfare. The consumption of bits o f cooked Coree 
flesh suggests that South Carolina’s Indian allies continued to view captive taking 
within broader patterns of incorporation. The exchange and gift o f captives had long 
been an integral part o f diplomacy among Indians, and between Indians and 
Europeans. These functions continued. But with warriors venturing forth to relieve 
their own bonds of debt, with captives being smuggled onto ships for direct export to 
Caribbean sugar factories or Charleston lawyers, with slaves’ prices being haggled in 
colonial courts, meanings changed.
For Tuscaroras the result was a war whose scope and ferocity could not have 
been anticipated. South Carolina’s agents and traders could congratulate themselves: 
they had broadened military, political, and economic ties with nearby Indians; 
Virginia’s trade connections in the region were in shambles; they had broken the main 
military strength o f the Tuscaroras. The Tuscarora War, it seemed, had been won.
But could there be peace?
Several hostile bands from the Lower Alliance remained. Isolated guerrilla 
attacks continued.193 At the end of March 1713, Pollock reported “some Matamaskit 
Indians disturbing the people at Mathepungo” and “some Cores about Mackayes.”194 
Two days later, Pollock received further bad news: “the matamuskeet Indians have 
killed and carried away about twenty persons at Roanoke Island and at Croatan, and 
two Tuscaroras have killed a man upon this shore, about twelve miles distant from
193 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 286.
l94NCCR, 2: 29.
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where I live.”195 The bad news continued: about fifty Machapungas combined with 
Corees and Tuscaroras from Catechna, learned Pollock, had “fallen on the inhabitants 
o f Alligator River and killed or captured between sixteen and twenty settlers before 
disappearing by canoe into surrounding quagmires and cane swamps, “one of the 
greatest deserts in the world, where it is almost impossible for white men to follow.”196 
“A handful of Indians . . . have spilt more innocent blood than all the rest and we 
cannot cause our men to go against them nor willingly pay those that will,” vented a 
frustrated settler. Maybe the remaining few South Carolina Indians could flush them 
out, or perhaps a garrison of white soldiers could “hinder their making of corn, and 
make some discovery where they keep their wives and children”— but neither option 
seemed promising.197
Only the prospect of capturing significant numbers o f slaves could keep a large 
army in the field. Although Colonel Moore stayed several months longer in North 
Carolina, only about 180 Yamasees remained from the once large army; most Indians 
had returned home with their living plunder.198 Even if a larger army had remained, 
the extra mouths would have returned North Carolina to the brink of starvation. The
195 NCCR, 2:31.
196 NCCR, 2: 39, 45. Another settler wrote that “a handful o f Indians . . . have spilt 
more innocent blood than all the rest and we cannot cause our men to go aginst them 
nor willingly pay those that will, they rove from place to place cut of 2 or 3 Families 
today and within 2 or 3 days do the like a hundred miles off form the former they are 
like deer—there is no finding them” (NCCR, 2: 138).
197 NCCR, 2: 39.
198 NCCR, 2: 28; Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians," 108.
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colony had only about eight hundred bushels of corn, thirty-two barrels o f meat, and 
slender prospects for more.199 The colony’s military preparedness quickly dropped. In 
the early summer o f 1713, South Carolina’s Governor Craven had arranged for 
another expedition to assist North Carolina, but Pollock’s messengers turned them 
back before they arrived. “Your forces that are coming in can expect no advantage to 
themselves by slaves, and besides all our corn here . . .  is quite spent,” explained 
Pollock. Fighting continued, but another Indian army, might “cause an insurrection 
against the government.”200
A war waged for slaves could not solve North Carolina’s problems. The entry 
of South Carolina into the Tuscarora War had caused hardship for the Tuscaroras and 
other hostile Indians in North Carolina. But the “laudable custom” o f South Carolina 
had not brought peace.201 North Carolina had sent entreaties to South Carolina hoping 
to bring an “end of this troublesome war by your means.”202 But that means did not 
work. Peace would require some sort of settlement.
199 Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians," 108.
200 NCCR, 2: 52-53; Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 285.
201 “Laudable custom,” in Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 288.
202 NCCR, 1: 881.
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C H A P T E R  S IX
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE TUSCARORA BORDERLANDS
Despite twin invasions from South Carolina, diplomacy never entirely ceased. 
Diplomatic meetings with the neutrality-seeking Upper Towns resumed after 
Barnwell’s failed peace, continued through Moore’s invasion, and carried on into the 
uncertain aftermath of the battle at Neoheroka. The first of these meetings occurred in 
August 1712 after the collapse of Barnwell’s treaty when three Tuscaroras from 
Taughairouhha (Toherooka) and another from Tastiahk came to Williamsburg to 
indicate that “the eight upper Towns” were “desirous to reestablish a peace,” even 
offering “to deliver up alive to the Governor the Indian named King Hancock, the 
Ringleader in the late Massacre.” 1 As proof o f their sincerity, two Tuscaroras agreed 
to stay as hostages in Williamsburg where they would alternate turns, one having 
liberty to walk about the town while the other remained in the prison.2
Similar agreements, however, had already foundered. It would take more than 
a few stints in jail to throw off the pall o f past failed pacts. “What engagements were 
heretofore entered into by the persons who came hither . . . was without any authority
1EJCCV, 3: 320-21.
2 One o f these hostages escaped the following November; JH B V 1712-1726, 5:15.
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from their Rulers and never communicated to them,” explained the hostages.3 
Divisions and unclear leadership among the Upper Towns had meant that colonial 
authorities could never be certain that they were speaking to delegates whose word 
carried broad weight. But even an accurate diagnosis did not guarantee an immediate 
cure. Old symptoms reemerged. When the interpreter read aloud Spotswood’s formal 
articles, which included further demands to “cut o ff’ members o f the Lower Alliance, 
the delegates reacted favorably, but a familiar note of caution crept into their assent: 
yet again the four Tuscaroras were not “fully empowered to conclude a peace;” they 
“would not promise further than they had been directed by their Greatmen.”4
If the Tuscaroras seemed like a slippery diplomatic target, in the minds of 
Indian negotiators their colonial counterparts seemed just as divided. So far, most 
Tuscarora negotiations had been directed at Virginia, but that government wielded 
uncertain influence. The war was being fought primarily in North Carolina but 
counterattacks emanated from South Carolina. Although Virginia’s leaders had been 
the most diplomatic o f the three colonies, they seemed the least able to alter the war.
So far, treaties there had accomplished little but mutual frustration. Despite renewed 
expressions o f goodwill, the meeting in August 1712 ended with peace as elusive as 
ever.
In the following months, however, diplomacy in the Tuscarora borderlands 
would undergo a radical change. A leader named Tom Blount rose to preeminence
3 EJCCV, 3: 320-21.
4EJCCV, 3: 320-21.
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among other accommodationist Tuscaroras, initiating a new phase o f direct, personal 
diplomacy. Relations with Virginia continued—indeed they took on renewed 
importance—but, led by Blount, Tuscaroras also began to deal directly with North 
Carolina. There, Blount met with Thomas Pollock, who as president of North 
Carolina’s council had assumed the role o f acting governor at Hyde’s death. In a 
divided and fractious colony with limited military resources, Indian diplomacy served 
as one avenue of authority for the North Carolina leader.5
In a sense, then, the fates of the two rising political stars were linked. The 
success o f Pollock’s war aims would depend on Blount’s ability to command support 
among large numbers o f Tuscaroras. In succeeding months, Pollock would strive 
mightily to bolster Blount’s authority. Blount, in turn, attempted to use his unique 
relationship with the leaders of North Carolina and Virginia to cement his own tenuous 
grip among Tuscaroras unaccustomed to such influence resting in the hands o f one 
man. Officials in both Virginia and North Carolina both came to think that in Blount 
they had found an instrument that they could control. Indeed, leaders o f the two
5 In November 1713, North Carolina’s council legitimized a role that Pollock had 
already assumed by granting him authority to “give such instructions and make such 
agreemts or Treatys wth the said Coll. Moore or the Indyans in relation to carrying on 
this warr as he shall think convenient and Enter into such other Articles or agreemt 
wth Tom Blount or any other of our Neighbouring Indyans as he shall think proper,” 
(NCCR, 2: 72).
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colonies eventually quarreled over who would hold the strings o f authority. But, they 
discovered, Blount was no puppet.6
“King” of the Tuscaroras
Unlike Tuscarora delegates whose names are mentioned only once, twice, or 
not at all, flitting briefly into the beam of documentary evidence before disappearing 
back into anonymous gloom, in the late summer of 1712 Blount strode onto the stage 
from which he would not depart for two decades. Despite the Tuscarora leader’s 
eventual prominence, early evidence is only fragmentary. Graffenried had met Blount 
briefly during his captivity and described the Tuscarora as a “king or leader o f a 
considerable [number of] wild Indians.” Blount had argued for the baron’s release. 
Graffenried, in return, considered him a man of “very good understanding” and “very 
well inclined towards the English.”7 Although Blount’s influence would later extend to 
other Tuscarora communities, originally he resided at Ucouhnerunt; on maps and 
documents this town sometimes later appeared as King Blount’s Town.8 This
6 Boyce refers to Blount as “the White colonial government’s man”— a view that, 
while not inaccurate, I hope to show is too simplistic (Douglas W. Boyce, "Notes on 
Tuscarora Political Organization, 1650-1713" [M.A. thesis, Dept, o f History, U. of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1971], 22.)
7 Graffenried, Account, 276.
8 Boyce, “Tuscarora Political Organization,” 258; See, for example, Edward Moseley,
“A New and Correct Map of the Province o f North Carolina, 1733,” in William P. 
Cumming, The Southeast in Early Maps, 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill: U. o f North Carolina 
Press, 1998), pi. 51; Barnwell-Hammerton, “[Southeastern North America, ca 1721],” 
in Cumming, Southeast in Early Maps, pi. 48a.
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community had participated in negotiations with Spotswood alongside other Upper 
Towns during the preceding year. But if Blount had appeared in person at the talks, 
his presence was not recorded— evidence either that Virginia officials possessed a 
blind eye for Indian politics or that Blount had initially cut an unremarkable figure.9
Much, perhaps too much, can be made of a name.10 Often this Tuscarora 
leader’s name appeared spelled “Blunt” in the records, perhaps a punning reference to 
his brusque manner and tendency to voice complaints.11 Tactful circumspection was 
not his style. A more likely genesis for the appellation, however, stems from some 
sort o f contact with a settler, trader, or diplomat. An Englishman named Thomas 
Blount briefly served as an interpreter for Virginia in the 1690s; another Thomas 
Blount traded with Indians in North Carolina around the same time.12 During the 
Tuscarora War, a man named Thomas Blount served as a council member in the 
Chowan precinct.13 Any of these men may have served as namesakes for the 
Tuscarora leader.
9 See EJCCV, 3: 183-85 for names o f negotiators and towns in the December 1711 
treaty. He was not present at the meeting in Williamsburg in August 1712, but 
evidence suggests that delegates there had mentioned him and Spotswood expected to 
meet with him later. EJCCV, 3: 320-21; NCCR, 1: 880-84.
10 See Herbert Richard Paschal, "The Tuscarora Indians in North Carolina" (M.A. 
Thesis, Dept, of History, U. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1953), 118 for a treatment 
of possible namesakes.
11 James Merrell, '"Minding the Business of the Nation': Hagler as Catawba Leader," 
Eihnohistory 33, no. 1 (1985): 58, for a similar case of an anglicized name that may 
have punned on a personal trait (i.e “King Hagler” was known to haggle.)
12 EJCCV, 2: 22; NCCR, 1: 517.
13 NCHGR, 3: 81-82.
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Blount’s English moniker may also reflect that he lived geographically and 
culturally closer to colonial settlements than did other members o f the Upper Towns. 
Among Tuscaroras whose names were recorded, Blount was one o f the few leaders 
among the Upper Towns to have possessed an anglicized name.14 His town of 
Ucouhnerunt, located on the Tar River upstream from Bath, was located closer to 
North Carolina coastal settlements than other communities among the Upper Towns. 
Other Upper Towns dealt primarily through trade links with Virginia officials: when 
the going got rough, their inhabitants tended to flee northwest into that colony out of 
easy reach of North Carolina. Blount’s focus, on the other hand, tended downriver 
towards the European settlements in coastal North Carolina. Blount played a crucial 
role in redirecting diplomacy by the Upper Towns to include North Carolina. In an 
early gesture towards these neighbors, in spring 1712 he personally appeared among 
settlements near the Chowan River to return a mare.15
In late September 1712, Blount again came to Albemarle and personally met 
with Pollock, starting years of frequent conferences. Initially, these discussions 
extended diplomatic threads first spun between the Upper Towns and Virginia. 
Pollock, too, coordinated strategies through constant letters with his Virginia
14 EJCCV, 3: 293-95; “Preliminary Articles . . .  25 November, 1712,” in Thomas 
Pollock Papers, NCSA, Raleigh, N.C. transcribed in App. B of Paschal, “Tuscarora 
Indians;” EJCCV, 3: 352; Alexander Spotswood [?], "Examination o f Indians, 1713 
(?)," VMHB 19, no. 3 (July, 1911): 272-75; CVSP, 1:173; W. Stitt Robinson, ed., 
Virginia Treaties, 1607-1722, vol. 4, Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and 
Laws, 1607-1789 (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications o f America, 1983), 
211-16.
15 NCHGR, 3: 81-82; NCCR, 1: 852.
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counterpart, Spotswood. The result was a series o f meetings in North Carolina that on 
the surface appeared similar to encounters north o f the border. Like other Tuscaroras 
from the Upper Towns, Blount expressed a desire for peace and a resumption of trade. 
Like Spotswood, Pollock demanded that Blount deliver up Hancock and the scalps of 
everyone else who “had any hand in killing and robbing the inhabitants here.”16 
Pollock repeated habitual demands for hostages as a show of good faith, although he 
upped the ante to an unprecedented twelve hostages per town.
Unexpectedly, however, stale demands yielded fresh results. As early as 
October, Blount leaked crucial intelligence on the scarcity o f food and ammunition 
among the Lower Alliance.17 The real break came in late November when Blount 
arrived in the North Carolina settlements with King Hancock captive and in tow— an 
accomplishment that Barnwell’s invasion and all o f Spotswood’s negotiations had been 
unable to achieve. Pausing only long enough to inflict “exquisite tortures,” Pollock’s 
men executed the Lower Alliance leader.18 (Although often considered leader of the 
Lower Alliance during the Tuscarora War, Hancock only survived its first year.) In the 
wake o f the execution, Pollock and a delegation o f Upper Town leaders headed by 
Blount signed a formal treaty—the first such agreement between North Carolina’s 
government and any members o f the Tuscaroras.
16 NCCR, 1: 880-84.
17 NCCR, 1: 879.
18 C raP , 1: 166-67; NCCR, 1: 890-91.
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Blount had reached this crossroads by seizing a new role, a willingness to 
challenge old patterns o f political paralysis among the Upper Towns that had 
previously spawned more words than action. In his first meeting, Blount did not claim 
to speak for all o f the Upper Towns; like others before him, he indicated he would 
have to consult with townspeople and their leaders. He did, however, claim backing 
from four o f the communities— a hint, perhaps, of expanding claims o f influence.
Soon, however, Blount began acting independently. In a second meeting, Blount had 
arrived with no other negotiators, only “sixteen of his men.” His plan for capturing 
Hancock used trickery and stealth to accomplish what could not be decided through 
open consensus among other towns. Blount proposed to join Hancock in feigned 
friendship while hunting. At an opportune moment, he would summon a band from his 
own town to overwhelm the Catechna leader. In a single stroke, Blount’s seizure had 
left behind patterns o f consensus that had previously hindered action among the Upper 
Towns and struck a first blow against the Lower Alliance on behalf o f the English. 
Despite pressure by colonial leaders, previously Tuscaroras had avoided fighting one 
another. Blount may have hoped the single killing would prevent further fratricide 
among the Tuscaroras and end fighting against the colonists. That did not happen.
The coup, however, did secure Blount’s privileged position among the English. 
In the November 1712 treaty negotiated after Hancock’s execution, Blount emerged 
as the favored spokesperson despite being accompanied by four other “chief men of 
several o f the Tuscarora Towns.” Of these four, two were listed as “absent” during 
the final signing, leaving Blount and two others to fix their mark on behalf o f nine
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
communities. The treaty itself hardly differed from earlier agreements. The treaty 
included limitations similar to those negotiated by Barnwell on where Tuscaroras 
could hunt (only in groups of three or fewer Indians and with permission near 
settlements) and plant (only on the upper waters of the Pamlico and Neuse Rivers). 
Prisoners and booty would be returned. The towns would hand over “six o f the 
chiefest women and children” as hostages and pay a symbolic yearly tribute. In return 
there would be peace, “a free and open trade . . .  as existed formerly,” and a 
commission to investigate future complaints.19 Echoing language from treaties in 
Virginia, Blount and the other leaders promised to capture nine Lower Alliance leaders 
and deliver them with “three hoops” under a white flag o f peace at the gates of 
Reading’s Garrison. They pledged to war upon the “towns or nations of Catchny, 
Cores, Nuse, Bare River and Pamptico,” giving no quarter to men and enslaving boys 
under the age of fourteen. Within this framework, Pollock bolstered ties with Blount 
by extending to him the privileges of a favorite. No hostages would have to come 
from Blount’s town. No boundaries dictated where Blount’s people could travel and 
hunt. Pollock extended these exemptions to Blount, he explained, out o f “the trust 
that we put in him.”20
19 “Preliminary Articles . . .  25 November, 1712,” in Thomas Pollock Papers, North 
Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, N.C.” transcribed in App. B of Paschal, "Tuscarora 
Indians;” NCCR, 2: 19. Another copy of the treaty appears in the John Devereux 
Papers, Land Records 1712-1872, NCSA.
20 NCCR, 1: 880-84.
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But Pollock could profess such trust as loudly as he wished, and still not 
drown out suspicion and doubt. Both sides sensed conspiracy, Pollock worried 
Blount’s that friendliness masked efforts to delay colonial troops until Tuscaroras 
safely harvested their corn.21 This is why Pollock had refused to negotiate until Blount 
proved his good faith by capturing Hancock. But Blount’s ambush of the Catechna 
leader only fueled English suspicions that “there is no dependence on his promises, 
who will act so treacherously to those o f his own nation and his near relations.”22 In 
almost the same breath, however, Pollock admitted his own prevarication—that he 
was “forced at present to bear with, and prolong the time with Tom Blount, by reason 
the forces from Ashley River [are not] yet arrived, and we being open to him.”23 
The stalling ended. Only days after the treaty was signed, Moore’s army 
arrived in Bath. Unexpectedly finding himself backed by an army, Pollock immediately 
tightened the screws on Blount, threatening to “secure him and the people o f his Fort 
from his [Moore’s] Indians” only on condition o f Blount’s people openly attacking the 
Lower Alliance at once.24 Otherwise colonial forces would “attack him as an 
enemy.”25 The imprisonment o f Blount’s brother and cousin who had been arrested 
during a diplomatic mission to Virginia added to tensions.26 In December, upon
21 NCCR, 1: 873-76.
22 NCCR, 1: 883.
23 NCCR, 1: 883.
24 NCCR, 1: 894.
25 NCCR, 2 :5 .
26 NCCR, 1:894.
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learning that Moore’s troops were to pass near Ucouhnerunt, Blount rushed home.
Parting, the frustrated Tuscarora leader upbraided the North Carolina governor “for 
giving him nothing for all he is done only words.”27
Officials heard little more of Blount for several months. Bogged down by 
heavy snow and scarce supplies, and with Neoheroka’s walls looming large in their 
sights, South Carolina forces spared Ucouhnerunt. Nor did Virginia ever answer 
Pollock’s call to send troops across the border to pressure the Upper Towns. In early 
March, as Neoheroka’s defenders braced for the final onslaught, Blount sensed which 
way the winds were blowing. He suddenly approached Pollock to reiterate that “he 
was not concerned with the other Tuscaroroes against the English.” The savvy 
leader boosted his credentials by showing a letter from New York and claiming to 
have played a role in keeping the Iroquois from spoiling M oore’s siege.29
The question of Blount’s role re-exerted itself in the wake of the Lower 
Alliance defeat at Neoheroka. Sensing blood in the water, Pollock circled in for the 
kill. North Carolina could not survive another inconclusive victory. “This blow ought 
to be vigorously followed, until the Indians submit themselves,” Pollock asserted.30 
But how? Most South Carolina Indians returned home with their captives and 
plunder. “There is wanted men, provisions, and ammunition; sufficiency of neither of
21 NCCR, 1: 894.
28 NCCR, 2: 23-25.
29 NCCR, 2: 23-25.
30 NCCR, 2: 29-31.
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which is to be raised or had in this government.”31 Would Virginia supply these?— 
inquired Pollock. No, came Spotswood’s response. After congratulating Pollock on 
the victory at Neoheroka, Virginia’s governor agreed that “pursuing this blow is the 
surest way to put an end to the war,” but the “difficulties in the execution thereof. . . 
are too great.”32 Besides, Pollock should well know how “ruinous the continuance of 
this war” would be for his poor colony.33
Spotswood had a different plan. “Where other means are uncertain, it is 
prudent to make the best use o f such as are in ones’ own power,” philosophized 
Spotswood.34 In other words, the “best expedient to free you from yr troubles, and in 
all probability to quiet the Tuscoruroes for a long time” would be an “honorable 
peace.” 35 The best way to do this would be to “talk high” to Blount.36 Pretend that 
troops o f Virginia rangers were on the way. Then, “stir up his ambition.” 37 Tell him, 
you are willing to “conclude a peace with him and all the other Indians o f the 
Tuscaroro . . .[and Lower Alliance nations], that will put themselves under his 
Government.” 38 Tell him “you will make him King of all those Indians under the
NCCR, 2: 29-31.
NCCR, 2: 31; CVSP 1: 164.
NCCR, 2: 31; CVSP 1: 164.
NCCR, 2: 31; CVSP 1: 164.
NCCR, 2: 31; CVSP 1: 164.
NCCR, 2: 31; CVSP 1: 164.
NCCR, 2: 31; CVSP 1: 164.
NCCR, 2: 31; CVSP 1: 164.
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protection o f North Carolina.” This would be the way to “oblige him to be faithful to 
the English for the future.”39 As for those troublesome holdouts creating such trouble 
from their marshy hideouts, Spotswood felt sure that this plan would “engage Blunt to 
deliver . . .  the greater part o f the murderers that are yet alive.”40
Blount found himself a bind. Despite mass desertions among the South 
Carolina Indians, enough warriors remained to cause trouble for Tuscarora 
communities unwilling to flee to swamps or the Appalachian foothills. He could not 
tell if Virginia troops might finally make an appearance. Potentially hostile Iroquois 
warriors also operated nearby.41
Moreover, Pollock and Spotswood had accurately identified a glowing ember 
o f ambition in Blount that could be nursed into flame. True, other Indians were 
warning him that the English “only amused him with fair words to keep him from 
doing them mischief, but when they had destroyed the rest o f his nations; he might be 
sure to be destroyed likewise.”42 Nonetheless, here was a unique offer for Blount— an 
opportunity to end the disjointed politics that had existed between and within the 
Tuscarora towns and to thrust Blount into a position where he could guide his people
39 NCCR, 2: 31; CVSP 1: 164.
40 NCCR, 2 :31; CVSP 1: 164; Spotswood was motivated, in part, by the certainty that 
Virginia’s assembly could not be “prevailed on to give any fresh Supplys towards the 
Assistance o f the Carolina, considering the present poverty” o f Virginia (EJCCV, 3:
333).
41 NCCR, 2: 38.
42 NCCR, 2:38.
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through a desert o f dangerous colonial relations. If the Tuscarora War had largely 
resulted from a snarl of Tuscarora-colonial encounters, Blount may have hoped he 
could untangle it. Therefore, in early April Blount signed proposals that 
acknowledged him “King and Commander in Chief’ o f Indians in the region.43 In 
return he would have to extradite twenty of the chief perpetrators along with any other 
“of his Indians” that Pollock could later “make appear hath had any hand in the 
massacre.” 44 He would lead his people against holdouts among the Lower Alliance 
and deliver up two hostages from each town.45 For the next two decades, Blount 
would assiduously protect “his” people, the Tuscaroras who submitted to him, and  his 
authority over them.
In Spotswood’s opinion, however, Pollock’s initial measures exhibited too 
much eagerness for a crushing victory and not enough consideration for creating 
tributaries for the peace ahead. Colonial authorities could not risk overturning the 
king they had just crowned. “Consider how shocking this will be to all the 
considerable men of that nation, who will without doubt, believe that they themselves 
will be the persons pointed at,” lectured Spotswood; some Tuscaroras would “rather 
choose to hazard their lives, by the chance o f war, than submitt to a certain death.”46 
More important would be establishing invaluable new tributaries. Therefore, Pollock
43 NCCR, 2: 38.
44 NCCR, 2:38.
45 NCCR, 2: 38.
46 CVSP 1: 166.
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should only seek “the delivery of two or three of the Ringleaders” and not venture 
anything that would make the Indians “averse to this Treaty, and render Blunt, 
incapable o f Executing what engagements he shall make.”47 In other words, securing 
Blount’s authority should take precedence over prosecuting war crimes. Blount 
signed final articles several weeks later. These papers have never been found, but it 
seems that Pollock followed Spotswood’s lead and relaxed the most draconian 
requirements.
Unlike Virginia, North Carolina never had a strong tradition o f relating to 
Indians as tributaries, but eventually Pollock and his council came to appreciate the 
worth of Blount and his followers. Earlier, in appeals to South Carolina at the start of 
the war, North Carolina officials had recognized the value of enlisting other Indians 
“acquainted in their manner of fighting” to battle the Lower Alliance. However, these 
officials exhibited little desire to trust any Indians living too close.48 Presumably 
Yamasees, Catawbas, and Cherokees were attractive because they would accomplish 
their mission and go home. After a year o f fighting, however, officials began to warm 
to the idea o f permanent tributaries. They sought more permanent guards and invited 
Saponi warriors to bring their wives and children, who would be “protected and 
provide for” by North Carolina.49
47 CVSP 1: 166.
4*NCCR, 1: 827-29.
49 NCCR, 1: 866. The Saponies, who had become tributaries o f Virginia in the 
aftermath of the Pate crisis, remained in Virginia.
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After Pollock’s treaty with Blount, North Carolina’s appreciation o f tributaries 
increased. In the summer of 1713, Pollock expressed “great confidence in King 
Blount” and cherished his people as the “back-guard o f our frontiers.”50 Another 
settler judged Blount “indefatigable.”51 Although Pollock’s plan called for Blount to 
cut off “what stragglers may be left” o f the Corees, Machapungas, and Hancock’s 
town o f Catechna, Blount personally might have been more selective. He “obliged 
himself to clear the West Shore o f Chowan River”—the precise corner of the conflict 
region farthest from Tuscarora survivors along Catechna creek.52 In June, Blount 
delivered eight Lower Alliance combatants to Pollock (who promptly loaded them as 
slaves on the first ship bound for the Caribbean.)53 By November Blount’s people had 
brought in thirty scalps.54 In return, Pollock channeled scarce corn supplies to 
Blount’s warriors and attempted to prevent remaining South Carolina Indians from 
launching unauthorized strikes against Blount’s town.55 Tuscaroras— at least those 
under Blount— had begun a new era as tributaries under North Carolina.
Whose Tributary?
50 NCCR, 2: 46; 60, 61-62, 74.
51 NCCR, 2: 54.
52 NCCR, 2: 62.
53 NCCR, 2: 52.
54 NCCR, 2:74.
55 NCCR, 2: 49-50, 60, 117.
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This era o f good feelings, however, did not extend into Virginia. Virginia’s 
executive council complained that the colony had been excluded from the recent treaty 
between North Carolina and Blount’s Tuscaroras. This exclusion, they concluded, 
was “highly prejudicial to her Majesty’s Service, very disrespectful to this Country, 
and ill deserving that Assistance” that Virginia imagined it had provided.56 Virginia 
would remain at war—holding prisoners and capturing trespassers—until Blount 
negotiated a separate peace. It was not just the end of fighting that was a concern; 
Spotswood wanted to set the terms for future relations with the Tuscaroras and 
perhaps even enlist them as tributaries of his colony. Troops might be on the lookout 
for Tuscaroras, but the real tensions were with North Carolina’s government. Both 
sides wanted to secure Blount and his Tuscaroras as their tributaries. Pollock learned 
of the resolution and wrote to Spotswood that “we have a report here that you are on 
some treaty with the Tuscaroras, and that there are intentions o f drawing them in 
under your protection, and settling them in your limits.” The plan, Pollock continued, 
“seems to me so unjust, and the consequences so apparently destructive to her 
Majesty’s subjects” that he could hardly believe it. Tensions ran to icy politeness. 
“Hon[ore]d Sir,” concluded Pollock’s letter, “I have on my part earnestly endeavoured 
for a fair and friendly correspondence, which would be most acceptable.”57
56 EJCCV, 3: 347; NCCR, 2: 57.
57 NCCR, 2: 73-75. Spotswood, who already felt insulted, replied that “if hereafter I 
shall receive any such Letters from you I shall think my honour so far enraged, as not 
to return an answer to any Letter wch contain such Calumnys,” (CVSP, 1: 172).
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Bickering over primacy in Tuscarora affairs, however, had long since ceased to 
be either fair or friendly. Blount had carried on simultaneous negotiations with 
Virginia and North Carolina since the autumn of 1712, provoking jealous spats 
between the two colonies. Spotswood felt cheated when Hancock, whom he felt had 
been promised to him, was delivered into the hands o f North Carolina executioners 
instead. “One who stood more on punctillios than I do would be a little startled at the 
suddenness o f his Execution without my knowledge,” Spotswood had whined. “The 
taking of Hancock was in pursuance of an Engagement entered into with this Governt 
by Blounts people,” insisted Spotswood, “he was in effect a prisoner to this Govrnt.”58 
Arguing over Hancock’s cold body was moot; the real issue was which government 
would Blount answer to, or as Spotswood later put it, whether or not the Indians were 
“subject to divided Authorities.”59
The dispute surrounding the Tuscaroras grew heated because it fronted 
broader tensions over the postwar governance of the disputed borderlands between 
North Carolina and Virginia. Ancient Tuscarora claims to the region that emerged in 
depositions among Indians and settlers just before the outbreak of the war ensured that 
the Tuscaroras would play a role.60 Debates over ownership of the area with its 
undefined boundaries raged before the war, dimmed briefly during the fighting, but
58 CVSP, 1: 156.
59 CVSP, 1: 173.
60 William G. Stanard, "The Indians of Southern Virginia, 1650-1711: Depositions in 
the Virginia and North Carolina Boundary Case," VMHB 7, no. 4 and 8, no. 1 (April,
July 1900): 337-58, 1-11.
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never entirely went away. During the war, in May 1712, Spotswood resumed 
complaints about North Carolina underpricing land to attract settlers into the boundary 
zone.61 In part, Virginia’s council blamed the Tuscarora War on North Carolina’s 
practice of encouraging “an abundance of disorderly people going out to settle on 
Roanoke River,” who have carried on a constant illegal “Trade and Correspondance 
with the Tuscaruros, and made them less inclined [to] an accommodation with the 
English.”62 As Moore’s force had prepared to embark against Neoheroka, Spotswood 
tried to force the issue by offering supplies on condition that North Carolina 
“mortgage all the lands of the north side” of the Roanoke River.63 These debates 
resumed full force in the decade after the war’s conclusion. Pollock’s barely polite 
reproach towards Virginia’s Tuscarora policy emerged in a letter disputing the 
“controverted bounds” and governance of the Indians there.64
The dispute reached an even more feverish pitch over the Tuscaroras’ northern 
neighbors, particularly the Meherrins.65 Before the war, North Carolina’s government 
had usually directed its efforts towards expelling or confining the Meherrins who 
quarreled with settlers. But changing attitudes towards tributaries in the colony 
engendered a new response. Success with Blount taught North Carolina to covet
61 NCCR, 1: 847-49.
62 EJCCV, 3: 367.
63 NCCR, 2: 7.
64 NCCR, 2:74-75.
65 The plight of the Meherrins is described in Shannon Lee Dawdy, "The Meherrins'
Secret History o f the Dividing Line," NCHR 72, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 386-415.
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more tributaries. In October 1713 Meherrin leaders complained to Spotswood that 
Pollock “hath not only demanded Tribute o f them, but hath sent his Orders to 
command their men to assist that Government, as if they were Tributaries thereto.” 
Pollock defended his actions with a bit of revisionist history, arguing that the 
Meherrins had long “answered to our Courts, they have submitted themselves to this 
government, they have paid tribute here; so that they have not always been accounted 
in your government; but on the contrary, have always here been taken to be in this.” 
Besides, he continued, with the Meherrins “living in the controverted bounds, [they] 
are as much in our government as in yours, until the line determines under which they 
are.” 66 Spotswood would have none of this. Virginia’s council countered with a 
declaration that
the said Indians ought not to acknowledge any Subjection to the 
Government of Carolina, they having been constantly Tributaries to 
Virginia since the Treaty of Peace made at Middle plantation in the year 
1677 [at the end of Bacon’s Rebellion], and living with the bounds 
claimed by Virginia. And it is ordered, that the said Indians do not 
obey any Summons sent them by the Government of Carolina, nor 
furnish any men upon such summons.67
66 NCCR, 2: 73-75. In 1726 North Carolina settlers resumed the opposite stance, that 
“they were never received or became Tributaries o f this Government nor ever assisted 
the English in their warrs against the Indians but were on the contrary very much 
suspected to have assisted the Tuskarooroes at the massacree,” (NCCR, 2: 643-44).
67 EJCCV, 3: 352.
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Spotswood’s concerns about Indians in the region extended beyond efforts to 
shore up claims to contested parcels o f land. From the Tuscarora W ar’s beginning, he 
had planned to extend Virginia’s network of tributary Indians. Now at the war’s 
conclusion he pushed ahead his “new project for securing our frontiers” with all the 
speed and force that an ambitious governor could muster.68 On one hand, Spotswood 
wanted to build upon the tributaries’ tried and true defensive functions. He also 
sought to incorporate lessons “fatally verified” by the Tuscarora War, perhaps the 
most important o f which was that Indians and colonists could not be suffered to 
mingle too freely. Contacts were necessary since neither colonies nor Indians could 
easily survive without the other. But if contacts had to take place, they ought to do so 
in carefully prepared settings, preferably beyond the edges of main settlement. Indians 
who too often frequented colonial settlements, who walked unnoticed among homes, 
and who traded freely at plantations might only lose respect for a colony while learning 
its weaknesses.69 The question, then, was how to prevent dangerous intermixture 
while permitting interactions that could transform Indians into loyal, God-fearing 
English subjects.
The solution Spotswood enacted had several interlocking parts. First, 
tributaries must relocate to new six-mile square reservations at the western headwaters 
of Virginia’s major rivers. Old reserves had become practically overrun by 
settlements, transforming them from defensive outposts into potential hot spots around
68 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 51.
69 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 114.
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which “Accidental Quarrels” between settlers and Indians could reach critical, 
explosive mass.70 Even worse, the two groups might cooperate (an eventuality that 
Spotswood considered an unlikely but troubling threat to the governor’s monopoly on 
Indian policy). The new locations would make the reservations “less lyable to 
differences with the English settlements” and renew the old tributaries’ function as 
sentinels of Virginia’s outer bounds.71 Indian men could follow the culturally 
acceptable masculine pursuits o f hunting and warring rather than sliding into 
dangerous boredom and discontent.
Forts, erected and garrisoned at each reservation, enabled contacts with the 
English to continue, but in a closely guarded setting. Soldiers patrolling alongside 
Indians, estimated Spotswood, could project imperial power into the outer reaches of 
Virginia more effectively and at as little as a fifth of the price o f colonial rangers 
alone.72 Meanwhile, when white soldiers were not trooping alongside native 
comrades, they would be snooping “as so many Spyes upon all their [the Indians’] 
actions.”73
Outwardly defensive, these forts were also designed to mount a quiet invasion 
o f Indian culture. Spotswood had already substituted hostage children for old tribute 
payments; pound of pound, they were worth more than their weight in deerskins as
70 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 145.
71 EJCCV, 3: 366-67.
72 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 57
73 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 57.
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symbols of submission. Rather than having Indian deerskins and furs transformed into 
saddles, capes, and trim for English markets, Spotswood tried to use the college to 
transform Indian youth into religious-minded young gentlemen loyal to God and 
crown. Spotswood continued this program, but realized that parents were hesitant to 
part with their children, and that re-educating the greater part o f the colony’s Indian 
youth at William and Mary would be impractical. Whereas the cost o f bringing 
students to the school soon overburdened the Boyle fund, bringing the school to the 
Indians in the form of schoolmasters employed to teach letters and the catechism at the 
forts could be cheaper. Tender plants could bear the greatest fruit, believed 
Spotswood: “in a generation or two, [the program could] banish their present savage 
customs and bind them by the Obligations o f Religion to be good subjects and useful 
neighbours.”74
The final crucial cog in this machine was trade. Spotswood reached the same 
conclusion that had long guided native exchanges: trade and diplomacy were 
inseparable. But the Tuscarora War had proved to Spotswood that unregulated 
traders could not be trusted in affairs of state. “Notwithstanding the repeated Orders 
of the Government against furnishing these Indians with Stores o f War,” remembered 
Spotswood, “it is but too certain they had Supplys, both from the people o f Carolina 
and Virginia.”75 A relative of Peter Poythress, Virginia’s interpreter to the Tuscaroras,
74 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 57.
75 Spotswood, Letters 2: 147.
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even faced charges of illegal trade.76 Tuscaroras had only to raise offers until greed 
overcame loyalty and some trader decided to sell. Just as often, traders competed for 
Indian customers by cutting prices or disparaging fellow traders. All o f these practices 
had the effect of “filling the minds of the Indians with Presentments,” lowering the 
Indians’ estimation of the colonists, and raising their own.77 Spotswood, who always 
thought that government oversight—more specifically, his oversight— provided a 
solution, proposed an official monopoly. This Virginia Indian Company would have a 
control over trade for twenty years. Henceforth, all sales would take place at 
designated market days at reservation forts six times per year under the watchful eyes 
of the post commander or a magistrate, whereby “all unjust and fraudulent dealing 
might be discovered.”78 The freewheeling days of inebriating customers, employing 
faulty scales, and ignoring embargoes would come to an end; trade would be put to 
solid diplomatic use. The “trade carryed to their Towns and settled on a just and equal 
footing,” promised Spotswood, “will create in them a liking to our Laws and 
Governm’t and secure a necessary dependence on this colony for supply o f all their 
wants.”79
Monetary considerations entered into the equation as well. Allowing 
established planters (men of “circumstance”) farther from the frontier to purchase
76 The trader’s name was Robert Poythress. EJCCV, 3: 366.
77 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 145.
78 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 144.
79 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 57.
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shares in the monopoly would invigorate the trade by injecting valuable capital and 
shift ultimate control away from poorer traders whom Spotswood considered 
untrustworthy. Gentlemen investors had the added advantage o f being better equipped 
to handle inevitable legal disputes with South Carolina officials eager to ward off 
competitors.80 Just as important, the monopoly would free the governor from the 
fiscal whims of the assembly by independently funding a public gunpowder magazine, 
warehouses, roads, bridges, forts, and Indian schools.
If this program can be said to have enjoyed success, it did so among the 
approximately three hundred Saponis, Occaneechee, Stukanox, and Totero Indians, 
who gathered around Fort Christanna. All o f these groups were loosely related Siouan 
peoples whom Spotswood described as “speaking much the same language, and 
therefore confederated together, tho’ still preserving their different rules.”81 In 
contemporary records they typically appear together under the “general name” of the 
Saponis.82 They had suffered from disease and Iroquois attacks in the previous two 
decades, shifting locations repeatedly before reappearing in Virginia on the eve of the 
Tuscarora War during the Pate crisis to request respite from their troubles and a 
renewal of their old tributary status. Spotswood later settled them in the shadow of 
Fort Christanna, a massive five-sided palisade raised in 1714 on the banks of the
80 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 95, 146.
81 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 93-103.
82 Spotswood, Letter, 2: 113-16.
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83Meherrin River. There the schoolmaster, Charles Griffin, “a person whose 
inclination, as well as Capacity, renders him very fitt for this Employment” instructed 
approximately seventy students in October 1715; by the following February he gained 
another thirty. At the end of the inaugural year, approving observers noted that many 
could “already say the Lord’s Prayer and Creed.”84 John Fontaine, an Irish Huguenot 
who toured the region gave a more skeptical view, counting only eight boys who 
seemed fully aware of what they read.85 But even Fontaine admitted that the “Indians 
so loved and adored . . . [Griffin] that I have seen them hug him and lift him up in their 
arms, and fain would have chosen him for a king of the Sapony nation.”86
Spotswood hoped that others— Indians and white—were watching. He made 
Fort Christanna a showcase for diplomacy with other Indians where he could sell 
potential allies on Virginia’s military, religious, and economic advantages.
Remembering how he had overawed Tuscarora delegates with his militia at Nottoway 
Town at the beginning of the Tuscarora War, Spotswood endeavored to create 
conditions at Christanna to have a “like effect” on the minds of Catawbas during the 
Yamasee War.87 Later when his policies came under fire, Spotswood touted
83 "Brunswick County and Fort Christanna," WMQ 9, no. 4 (Apr. 1901): 214-18.
84 W. Stitt Robinson, "Indian Education and Missions in Colonial Virginia," Journal o f  
Southern History 18, no. 2 (May, 1952): 163-4; Spotswood, Letters, 2: 138.
85 James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest o f  Cultures in Colonial North 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 193.
86 Axtell, Invasion Within, 192; Edward P. Alexander,ed., The Journal o f  John 
Fontaine (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 1972), 90-94.
87 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 147, 207.
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Christanna and its precocious pupils to church and state officials in England as the 
brightest example of his plan’s success.88
But Christanna was a brief, shining star in a cold, dark universe. Other Indians 
who had already established trajectories within Virginia’s orbit saw little reason to 
allow themselves to be shuffled around and suffer further losses o f autonomy.
Mergers that might be welcomed among Indian groups who had shrunk to a dozen or 
so adult males could seem onerous to larger groups with their own viable 
communities. Spotswood proposed merging the Meherrins with the Nottoways, and 
the Nansemonds with the Saponis— neither combination took place.89
A plan to establish a sister fort to Christanna among the Nottoways near the 
fork of the James River failed because the Nottoways refused to relocate out of 
fondness for their old reservation and dislike of the new location, a barren patch 
where, they feared, neither corn nor community would take root.90 Nottoways refused 
another plan to relocate to Fort Christanna, across the Meherrin River from the 
Saponis. The Nottoways did briefly agreed to move a short distance up the Nottoway 
River to a place called “Tommahittons” and to send their children into Griffin’s care at 
Christanna, but months later they appeared before the executive council “obstinately
88 A coalition of planters and merchants led by William Byrd protested the monopoly 
and eventually appealed successfully before the Board of Trade to have it disallowed.
Jack P. Greene, "The Opposition to Lieutenant Governor Alexander Spotswood,
1718," VMHB 70, no. 1 (1962): 35-42.
*9 EJCCV, 3: 366-67.
90 EJCCV, 3: 375-76; Spotswood, Letters, 2: 199.
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refusing to do either.”91 John Simmons and Edward Goodrich, who Spotswood 
considered “two little buisy fellows living in their Neighbourhood,” had helped the 
Nottoways draw up a petition appealing to the general assembly to overrule the 
governor’s authority— an act that Spotswood considered as “insolent behaviour as 
was never before seen at the Council Board.”92 Determined to “root out o f their 
Heads” the “dangerous notion” that Spotswood was anything less than the colony’s 
supreme authority, the governor threw the Nottoway headmen into iron shackles for 
several days and let them reflect on the true meaning of gubernatorial prerogative. 
Nonetheless, a year later Spotswood ruefully related to his own authorities that the 
Nottoways “continued (as they do to this day) upon their old land.”93 An attempt to 
move the Meherrins by “seizing their wives and children to be conveyed to Christanna 
. . . and put[ting them] under the care of the guard there until such time as the said 
Indians shall Voluntarily remove themselves to the land which shall be assigned them 
there” met similar rebuffs.94
Most Tuscaroras had even less incentive to enlist in Virginia’s plans for 
postwar reconstruction. Despite the appearance of being a colonial instrument,
Blount’s own ambitions ran counter to the tenor of the project. Spotswood first called 
attention to the potential use of Blount’s aspirations; he cautioned Pollock against
91 EJCCV, 3: 397, 407-8
92 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 197.
93 Spotswood, Letters 2: 197.
94 EJCCV, 3: 396.
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pressing Blount with overly vigorous terms. But the Virginia governor failed to 
recognize that his own plans for pushing and shoving Indian groups around the 
Virginia landscape into easily monitored pens, for seizing children, and for confining 
trade to a six-day calendar could feel like bullying. In January 1713 Blount refused 
persistent demands for hostages, and complained more generally that Virginia 
authorities “were not good and would scold.”95
For the time being, Spotswood persisted in calling Blount “King of the 
Tuscaroros.” But for other Indians, Virginia’s council ordered that “the Appellations 
of King or Queen heretofore used in Treaties . . .  be from henceforth discontinued; and 
that for the future, the sd Chiefs be Treated only with the same denomination which is 
given them in their own proper Language.”96 When Virginians later treated with 
“Hoonskeys” (among Saponies, Toteros, Occaneechees and Stukanox) or “Teerhers” 
(among Meherrins and Nottoways), they did so not out of a refreshing sense o f 
ethnographic correctness, but a conviction that royal titles were a dangerous 
aggrandizement for Indian leaders who “every one knows . . .  are o f no great 
Consideration among the English, or of much authority among their own People.”97 
What sort of respect could Blount expect from a governor who perceived among
95 The contents of this report (and the fact that it was penned by Pollock) make this 
report’s probable date January 1713, not 1712 as it appears in CVSP, 1: 153-54.
There is some confusion whether the speaker was actually Blount or “one o f the young 
men” accompanying him.
96 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 114, EJCCV, 3: 365-66.
97 Spotswood, Letters 2: 200— Iroquoian-speaking Tuscaroras also traditionally used 
“Teetha” or “Teerher.”
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Indians no more kingly distinction than “there is between a Corperal and the private 
Centinels” in the army?98 For Blount, who was engaged in his own project to innovate 
authority, the spectacle of shackled Nottoway leaders shuffling the streets of 
Williamsburg offered little reassurance.
Blount eventually did make a separate peace with Virginia, but signed no 
formal treaty as a tributary.99 Instead, the Tuscarora leader chose to remain with his 
followers in North Carolina. In the arena of face-to-face politics, clashing 
personalities, not just with the governors but with their agents, may have played a role. 
Blount expressed a marked preference for North Carolina’s interpreter, William 
Charleton (who also knew Blount’s brother and cousin) ,over the services of 
Virginia’s translator.100 In North Carolina, continued conflicts with holdouts from the 
Tuscarora War, the threat of another general conflagration spilling over from the 1714 
Yamasee War in South Carolina, and persistent weakness in North Carolina’s 
government gave Blount greater bargaining room for himself and his people. As 
opposed to in Virginia, where treaties stipulated that all disputes would be resolved 
according to the “rules of Virginia,” a 1715 act in North Carolina enacted to remedy 
“daily and grievous” depredations by settlers before the Tuscarora war emphasized the 
settling of disputes by commissions comprised of a magistrate acting jointly with the
98 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 200,
99 EJCCV, 3:396-98.
100 NCCR, 1: 880-81, 892-3, 895; 2: 4, 295-96
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“ruler or headman” o f the Indian community -  namely, Blount.101 Depredations did 
not stop, but for the next several decades, the prerogative was one that Blount would 
vigorously defend and employ. Interpreters occasionally visited Blount’s community 
to spy upon his people’s actions, but no garrison made its home there and no preacher 
tried to convert Tuscarora children. No Indian company officially monopolized trade. 
Trade resumed unabated except with injunctions that traders and Indians not defraud, 
“abuse or injure” each other.102
Initially, North Carolina’s peace articles had limited Blount’s community to a 
tract o f land between the Pamlico and Neuse rivers. Continued tensions with Indians 
from South Carolina compelled Blount to petition for a new tract, farther north, on the 
north shore of the Roanoke River. The government o f North Carolina agreed, citing 
that “the said Blount and his Indyans have been very Servicable to this Government 
and still Continues to be and as a particular mark o f favor from this Government they 
do hereby Give [the requested tract] unto him the said Blount for his futher and better 
support o f himselfe and his Indyans.”103
In North Carolina, when Blount moved, it was his choice. The piece of land, 
subsequently known as “Indian Woods,” lay exasperatingly close to the Virginia
101 “Spotswood’s Treaty with Nottoways, Feb. 27, 1714,” in Robinson, Virginia 
Treaties, 216-17; “Spotswood’s Treaty with Tuscaroras,” in Robinson, Virginia 
Treaties, 213; “Spotswood’s Treaty with Saponies” in Robinson, Virginia Treaties,
221; NCHGR 2: 275-76.
102 NCHGR  2: 276
103 NCCR, 2: 283.
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border and Fort Christanna. It would be home to the majority o f Tuscaroras in North 
Carolina for the remainder of the eighteenth century.
A Trail to Virginia?
In the immediate aftermath of the Tuscarora War, however, Blount did not 
head all, or even a majority, o f the Tuscaroras. For a brief period, Spotswood hoped 
to cull tributaries from other bands. In September 1713, reports began to circulate 
that “a great number” of Tuscaroras and “other strange Indians” had removed to the 
upper reaches o f the Roanoke River in western Virginia.104 Rumors of thefts and 
violence spread; frontier settlers fled east with families and stocks.105 It seemed, 
perhaps, that the Tuscarora War had finally metastasized into Virginia. Initially, 
Spotswood planned to march at the head of an army of two hundred militiamen and 
tributary Indians, either “to bring the Indians to a secure Peace or to drive them further 
from our Frontiers.”106 Despite a general “Clamour for some course to be taken to 
cutt off the Indians,” however, Spotswood failed to assemble enough volunteers. 
Instead, he sent a detachment of fifty tributaries headed by Robert Hix and another 
trader to meet the Tuscaroras and “sound their Inclinations towards peace.” After ten 
days, Hix’s expedition found nearly 1,500 Tuscaroras in a pathetic state, “dispers’d in
104EJCCV, 3: 350; Spotswood, Letters, 2: 37.
105 Spotswood, Letters, 2:37.
106 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 37; EJCCV, 3: 350-51.
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small partys upon the head of the Roanoke, and about the Mountains in very miserable 
condition, without any habitation or provision of Corne for their Subsistence, but 
living like wild beasts on what the Woods afforded.”107 These were the starved faces 
o f refugees, not an invading army.
In interviews with Hix, the Virginia tributaries, and eventually Spotswood, 
these Tuscaroras’ story emerged: “They say they are some of 5 towns scattered up 
and down”—intermixed with an “ungovernable multitude o f other Towns.”108 
Attacks by South Carolina Indians had forced them to flee north, but they denied 
having fought Moore at Nohoroka or having taken part in the recent war. Instead, 
spokesmen of these Upper Towns claimed that they had attempted to remain neutral 
and came to Virginia “with no intention to injure any.”109 These towns had treated 
with Virginia several times earlier during the war. Virginians could spot familiar 
countenances among the hunger-pinched faces: Raii-att-att, who had signed a treaty in 
Williamsburg two years before; Haweesaris, brother of another signer o f the 
December 1711 Treaty; an unnamed Tuscarora who had announced Hancock’s 
capture in Virginia in 1712. Now these same Tuscaroras asserted that they wished “to 
make peace and make all straight.”110
107 Spotswood, Letters 2: 42.
108 Spotswood [?], "Examination of Indians," 273. Raroocaiththee, Junonitz,
Kinthaigh, Tawhaghkee (alternate spellings of Tyahooka? And Tookoo?), and 
Narhunta—in CVSP, 1: 173; “Spotswood’s Treaty with Tuscaroras,” in Robinson,
Virginia Treaties, 212.
109 EJCCV, 3: 357
110 Spotswood [?], "Examination of Indians," 273.
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Within these sad narrations emerged a subplot o f misgivings towards the 
increasingly exclusive pact being formed between Pollock and Blount in North 
Carolina. A year earlier, these communities and Blount’s were “all together,” testified 
two speakers.111 But they had grown uncomfortable with Blount’s exclusion of other 
voices from negotiations in North Carolina and so had gone their separate way:
—Question: “Why don’t they then go to Collo. Pollock?”
Tuscarora Answer. “He knows nothing of him for none goes there but 
Blunt.”
—Question'. “Did Blunt never desire them to come in and make peace?”
Tuscarora Answer: “No, Blunt kept the letter that was sent to them, in 
disdain of the English, for that he would not be their letter Caryer.”112 
When “King” Blount spoke, he did so as leader o f his people; the role o f a
diplomat or “letter Caryer” was not for him. Nor by 1714 did he depend much upon
the voice of his council. These displaced Tuscaroras in Virginia, on the other hand, 
continued patterns o f consensus abandoned by Blount. When Hix presented offers of 
peace to the scattered refugees, they assembled an impromptu “short consultation with 
about 160 of their men that could be got together on the sudden” before agreeing to 
send two deputies to Williamsburg. These two Tuscaroras, Haweesaris (anglicized as 
Basket) and Naroniackkos (anglicized as George) were careful to tell Spotswood that 
they had been sent by their towns only “to hear what the Gov’r says or has to
111 Spotswood [?], "Examination of Indians, "273-74.
112 Spotswood [?], "Examination of Indians," 274.
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propose.”113 They insisted on having “no other power than only to hear what shall be 
demanded of them in order to establish a peace.”114 Months later, “several o f the 
Great men of the Tuscaruro Nation” arrived to negotiate; upon listening to 
Spotswood’s proposals, they again “desired time”— nearly two months— “to consult 
with the rest of their Nation.”115 This conduct suggests that besides being war 
refugees, these Tuscaroras had come to Virginia to preserve a different, more 
consensus-driven political system than Blount’s. No single, clear path emerged at the 
end o f the Tuscarora War; choices had to be made.
But every choice had its cost. These Tuscaroras could remain in Virginia, but 
to do so, they would have to become tributaries. Spotswood had not been successful 
in wooing Blount to pledge allegiance formally to Virginia. Here was a second chance 
to secure Tuscaroras in the aftermath o f the war. Spotswood envisioned them as a 
keystone o f his emerging postwar reconstruction. Over a series o f meetings with their 
leaders Spotswood laid out his proposals, attempting “to persuade those Indians of the 
advantages they would receive by this Settlement, such as their having a large tract of 
land to hunt in, a body of the English to live among them, and to instruct their 
Children, in Literature and the principles o f Christianity, to bring them to a more
113 Spotswood [?], "Examination of Indians, "274; The name “Baskett” would continue 
to figure prominently as a surname in Tuscarora deeds throughout the eighteenth 
century. See, for example, “Record of Deed, July 12, 1766” in Bertie County,
Deedbooks, Book L, pp. 56-58 at NCSA, and “Record o f Deed, March 28, 1777” in 
Bertie County Deedbooks, Book M-PP, pp. 315-316 at NCSA.
114EJCCV, 3: 357; Spotswood, Letters, 2: 42.
115 EJCCV, 3 : 363.
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civilized and plentiful manner of living, and to establish a constant intercourse of Trade 
between them and the Inhabitants o f this Colony.”116
These Tuscaroras desired to settle along the Roanoke River, close to the 
Weecacana trading path that led to their relations and former lands.117 But Spotswood 
insisted on relocating them to a future fort site farther north, between the James and 
Rappahannock rivers, “with a design to cutt off all Communication between them and 
North Carolina.”118 Spotswood was through with divided loyalties. On February 27,
1714 three deputies signed a formal treaty by which they agreed to become tributaries, 
to surrender hostages, and to remove to their assigned post in seven months.119 Ever 
hopeful of expanding tributary numbers, Spotswood included provisions to assimilate 
“any other o f the Tuscarora Nation” who might happen to arrive, barring only those 
“notoriously guilty” in the late war.120
The Tuscarora signatories probably had no way of realizing that Spotswood 
was wary of their numbers and considered it unwise to treat them as “a despicable 
Enemy, nor . . .  in any way advisable to drive them to despair by too hard terms.”121
116 EJCCV, 3: 363.
117 Spotswood [?], "Examination o f Indians," 274; EJCCV, 3: 363.
118 EJCCV, 3: 363; see also Spotswood, Letters, 2: 55-61.
119 EJCCV, 3: 365; “Spotswood’s Treaty with Tuscaroras,” in Robinson, Virginia 
Treaties, 211-16. See also “Treaty Between Virginia and Tuscarora Nation, February 
27, 1713” in Fulham Palace Papers Relating to the American Colonies, microfilm, reel 
4, volume 11.
120 “Spotswood’s Treaty with Tuscaroras,” in Robinson, Virginia Treaties, 215
121 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 42.
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Instead, Tuscarora deputies had “seem’d willing to submit to any terms.”122 Their 
people were starving. Even before signing the treaty, over fifteen hundred men, 
women, and children had moved closer the frontier settlements to buy, steal, or beg 
corn.123 “There’s . . . little question to be made of them,” reported Spotswood, 
“considering the aversion they have to return into Carolina and the impossibility o f 
their subsisting long without Trade.”124 South Carolina Indians threatened from the 
south, Iroquois threatened from the north. Finally, it seemed, Virginia would achieve 
formal political control over at least a portion of the Tuscaroras.
Therefore, it came as a shock and a disappointment to Spotswood when, after 
several weeks, these Tuscaroras took no steps towards fulfilling the treaty. In late 
March 1714, Hix reported that almost all of these Tuscaroras had returned to North 
Carolina.125 They had hinted at misgivings towards Blount, but Spotswood had made 
the costs of the alternative, maintaining a separate existence in Virginia, too 
burdensome. Given the choice between two systems, many chose to join Blount and 
soon disappeared as recognizable entities. A few remained in Virginia and turned up 
at the Nottoway town seeking to join that community. The Nottoways reported 
themselves “very desirous to be incorporated” and “willing to accept such an addition
122 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 42.
123 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 42.
124 Spotswood, Letters 2: 58.
125 EJCCV, 3: 368; Spotswood claimed that they reported that they were “induced” by 
North Carolina, but it is not clear what he means by this. Spotswood, Letters, 2: 71 .
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to their people.”126 Whether they remained, becoming indistinguishable from 
Nottoways in surviving records or soon departed is unclear. In 1720 Robert Beverley 
wrote that the Nottoways were almost unique among Virginia Indians in that “of late” 
they had become “a thriving and increasing people”— a clue perhaps that some 
Tuscaroras removed there.127 Several temporarily established their own small 
community nearby on the Nottoway River, but Spotswood later engaged Blount to 
rebuke them for entering the region without passports.128 Spotswood’s patience for 
stray bands of Tuscaroras with no formal ties to Virginia had passed.
A Trail to South Carolina?
A trail to South Carolina presented still further options. In 1715 during the 
Yamasee War, a group of Tuscaroras journeyed to South Carolina and became 
“settlement Indians,” the equivalent of that colony’s tributary Indians.129 Not 
surprisingly in the case of South Carolina, the Indian slave trade played a role. The 
rampaging debt that many South Carolina Indians had sought to escape by pursuing 
slaves in the Tuscarora War continued unabated, or even worsened due to market
m  EJCCV, 3 :368,373.
127 Robert Beverley, The History o f Virginia, in Four Parts (1720; reprint, Richmond:
J.W. Randolph, 1855), 184.
128 EJCCV, 3: 397.
129 See Cooper, SC Statutes, 3: 141 for Tuscaroras at Port Royal as “settlement 
Indians.”
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forces that the Indians could not control and did not fully understand. Moreover, the 
wholesale breakdown in orderly Indian relations that had presaged the Tuscarora War 
repeated in South Carolina, owing to bitter competition between the colony’s two 
Indian agents. South Carolina had enlisted nearby tribes in the Tuscarora War in part 
to strengthen relations with these Indians; instead, the expeditions may have afforded 
erstwhile allies from different Indian groups an opportunity to forge their own 
conspiratorial bonds across cultural lines.130 On Good Friday 1715, a broad coalition, 
including Yamasees, Catawbas, and others who had cooperated in campaigns against 
the Tuscaroras, rose against the English, killing South Carolina traders and driving 
back settlements to the outskirts of Charleston.131 In a sudden role reversal, South 
Carolina desperately appealed to its northern neighbors: one hundred white North 
Carolinians and sixty Tuscaroras and Corees marched to the colony’s assistance.132
130 Merrell, Indians ’ New World.
131 For origins o f the Yamasee War, see William L. Ramsey, "Heathenish 
Combination': The Natives o f the North American Southeast During the Era o f the 
Yamasee War" (Ph.D. diss., Dept, of History, Tulane University, 1999) and William L. 
Ramsey, '"Something Cloudy in Their Looks': The Origins o f the Yamasee War 
Reconsidered," Journal o f  American History 90, no. 1 (June 2003): 44-76. Ramsey 
emphasizes particular abuses by traders that insulted cultural sensibilities, more than 
the economics o f the trade itself. Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise o f  
the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2002), 315-44, focuses on the role of slavery. See also Steven J. Oatis, A 
Colonial Complex: South Carolina's Frontiers in the Era o f  the Yamasee War, 1680- 
1730 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); Verner Winslow Crane, The 
Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (New York: Norton, 1981).
132 Aug. 20, 1715, Proprieties,. B.T., Vol. 10, 266 Sainsbury SC Transcripts, 6: 133. 
They were guided by Maurice Moore (not closely related to James Moore), who had 
taken a lead role in North Carolina’s frontier defense.
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South Carolina had been no friend of the Tuscaroras, but now that colony’s 
enemies included many of the same Indians who had inflicted the bulk o f destruction 
during the Tuscarora War. From a Tuscarora perspective, the Yamasee War was 
largely a continuation o f the Tuscarora War. But revenge and the chance to settle old 
scores was not the only motive. For Tuscaroras, the Yamasee War also became a war 
of liberation.
In August 1715 the South Carolina assembly decided to reward the “Tuscarora 
Indians now come to our assistance” by granting them the “liberty o f redeeming what 
Indians of their nation are now slaves in this Province.”133 This broad, generalized 
declaration made in the first flush of gratitude at the Tuscaroras’ arrival, however, 
remained inchoate and off the statute books until March 1716 when “several of the 
head warriors” came to Charleston and demanded specifics: “they will stay in the 
service o f this Province until fall o f this year” and then South Carolina should have “a 
vessel got ready to send them home.” Before departure, they would have “delivered 
to each of them a gun and a hatchet, and for every slave they shall take [among 
Yamasees and other enemy Indians], they may have the liberty to exchange the same 
for a slave here o f their own nation whenever they can find one.”134
133 For a discussion of such practices in South Carolina, including the release of 
Tuscarora slaves, see William L. Ramsey, "A Coat for 'Indian Cuflfy': Mapping the 
Boundary between Freedom and Slavery in Colonial South Carolina," South Carolina 
Historical Magazine 103, no. 1 (January 2002): 48-66. Quotation in August 20, 1715,
S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, (1712- 1716): 441
134 March 17, 1716, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH,
(1716- 1721): 47-48. Most of these demands were soon instituted as statutes.
Cooper, SC Statutes, 2: 636-37.
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This last phrase— “whenever they can find one”— elicits images o f Tuscarora 
warriors combing through war-ravaged South Carolina settlements in search of 
specific loved ones and kin. For scattered Tuscaroras, the Yamasee War represented a 
chance not only at revenge but at reunion. Such investigations discovered “a 
Tuskaroras woman slave in the possession of one Jones at Wampee who was wife to 
one o f the head warriors now in the country’s service.” The warrior regained his wife, 
but in doing so perpetuated cycles of bondage by exchanging “another Indian woman 
slave now in his possession in lieu of his said wife.” 135 Not just any exchange would 
do. Officials mindful of potential outrage among profit-minded planters inserted 
clauses that exchanged slaves had to be “of the same size” and value as appraised by a 
justice o f the peace and two freeholders.136 The deal negotiated by Tuscarora warriors 
ensured that even death and defeat might bear some triumph: “if any of the said 
Tuscaroras Indians going on our service shall happen to be killed therein, that then the 
nation of the Tuskaroras shall have one slave delivered up to them in lieu o f such 
person killed.” 137 Death for one might bring freedom for another.
135 March 17, 1716, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH,
(1716- 1721): 47-48
136 March 9, 1716, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH,
(1716- 1721): 32; Cooper, SC Statutes, 2: 636-37. This in turn raises the morbid 
possibility of Tuscarora warriors hunting among their enemies for physiological look- 
alikes (similar weight, age, etc.) of their enslaved kin suitable for trade— in some ways 
an odd continuation o f practices in some native societies of seeking captives to 
resuscitate deceased loved ones.
137 March 17, 1716, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH,
(1716- 1721): 47-48
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These negotiations suggest the efforts of some Tuscaroras to reconstitute 
community and family in South Carolina in the face o f dispersal. The ubiquitous King 
Blount had joined the Tuscarora expedition to South Carolina.138 He returned home 
the following year, probably with a majority o f the Tuscarora force. Some warriors, 
however, had come to South Carolina with an eye towards a longer stay, negotiating 
for “the passages” from North Carolina o f those “mens wives who came to serve this 
Province to be paid by the public.”139 Some of these families remained for close to a 
decade.
More than a legal curiosity, these South Carolina concessions and the attendant 
migration among the Tuscaroras call into question paradigms for understanding Indian 
slavery. Often it has been stated that Indians made poor slaves because o f their ability 
to escape to their people. Even more troublesome, enslavement might provoke war 
and hostility between the colony and the slave’s compatriots.140 But in this instance, 
rather than Tuscarora slaves absconding to their kin, numbers o f free  Tuscaroras
138 He demanded and apparently received a “new coat” in repayment for “a coat and 
some other things stolen from him” by South Carolina colonists. March 17, 1716, S.C. 
Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, (1716- 1721): 47-48. His 
participation made practical sense on several fronts. Joining would have helped 
reconstitute ties with Lower Alliance Tuscaroras ,who, as the chief victims of the 
Tuscarora War, would have been most eager to retrieve slaves and inflict revenge on 
South Carolina Indians. Participation would also secure the support o f North Carolina 
and the gratitude o f South Carolina.
139 March 17, 1716, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, 
(1716- 1721): 47-48.
140 Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise o f  the Planter Class in the English 
West Indies, 1624-1713 (New York: Norton, 1973), 74.
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moved closer to enslaved brethren at South Carolina and became allies o f that colony. 
Slavery became a magnet for attracting allies. Evidence for wholesale Tuscarora 
releases during the Yamasee War does not exist; presumably some Tuscaroras 
remained enslaved in South Carolina, living in proximity to free Tuscaroras who had 
come looking for them.141
Most free Tuscaroras continued to live as “settlement Indians” around Port 
Royal, a trading post, port, and ten-gun fort north o f the mouth of the Savannah 
River.142 During the Yamasee War this had been a staging ground for sorties against 
the nearby Yamasees and later served as a point of departure against more distant 
Indians who had retreated to the shadow of Fort Augustine in Spanish Florida.143 
Afterwards a small number of Tuscaroras stayed on at Port Royal as part o f the 
garrison drawing pay of twenty shillings a month.144 A 1721 report found the fort had 
became “a good deal neglected,” but the community, because o f its “excellent
141 For mention of interactions between free and enslaved Indians, see Ramsey, "Coat 
for 'Indian Cuffy,'" and Philip D. Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the 
Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry (Chapel Hill: U. o f North Carolina, 
1998), 481.
142 For mention of the Tuscaroras at Port Royal see, for example, Cooper, SC Statutes, 
2: 634- 41; 3: 141; W. L McDowell, ed., Journals o f  the Commissioners o f  the Indian 
Trade, September 20, 1710- August 29, 1718, Colonial Records o f  South Carolina 
(Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1955), 251-52. Port Royal was 
about eight days distant from Charleston via a heavily-loaded flatboat. McDowell, 
Journals 1710-1718, 109.
143 Cooper, SC Statutes, 635-36; April 1720, Props B.T., vol 10L 2.202, Sainsbury SC 
transcripts, BPRO, 8: 1-4.
144 June 14, 1717, S.C. Commons House Journals, Green Transcripts, SCDAH, (1716- 
1721): 323
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harbour” and location as a “frontier town, lyes ready for the supply o f the Indian 
Trade.” 145 Some Tuscaroras, like one named Sauhoe, made the transition by 
registering as a “pack horse man” who earned three pounds a month in the Creek 
trade.146 Others remained in Port Royal, either dressing raw skins shipped down the 
river before reshipping them to Charleston (a trade overseen by officials) or 
participating in a less formal, unregulated local trade open to such Indians deemed to 
“reside constantly in the Settlements.”147
For a short while, this group led an existence in contact with, but separate 
from, those Tuscaroras under Blount in North Carolina. South Carolina recognized a 
leader named Forster as “chief of the Tuscaroras at Port Royal.”148 In 1718— around 
the time that Blount was consolidating many Tuscaroras in Indian Woods— Forster 
journeyed to Charleston and indicated that he was “desirous o f bringing over the 
Remainder o f his People (which remain at North Carolina) to settle at Part o f the 
Province.” South Carolina officials approved of the plan and promised assistance in 
the form of passports and letters, but no evidence shows that large numbers came. As 
the Yamasee War faded, the brief opportunity to free kin that had first attracted these
145 Sept. 8, 1721, Plantations Genl B.T., vol. 38, 296, Sainsbury SC transcripts,
BPRO, 9: 70.
146 Others, presumably whites, earned slightly more than three times that amount.
147 Perhaps reflecting ties owing to the enslavement o f some of their kin during the 
Tuscarora War, the official factor over the Tuscaroras in this trade at Port Royal was 
“Tuscarora” Jack Barnwell, leader of the first South Carolina expedition. McDowell, 
Journals 1710-1718, 251-52, 262; Cooper, SC Statutes, 3: 141.
148 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 262.
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Tuscaroras reversed, leaving them feeling themselves vulnerable to enslavement. In a 
dispute over a canoe, a trader named Callihaun threatened Forster that “since the 
Government had now no further service for him or his People, that ‘twas designed to 
knock some of them on the Head and enslave the rest.” In this instance officials 
reassured Forster. Nonetheless, under such pressures, the attractiveness o f South 
Carolina declined.149 Eventually, Tuscaroras in South Carolina either merged with 
other nearby Indians, migrated back to Blount, or journeyed even farther north.150
*  *  *  *
Tuscaroras and other Indians within the Lower Alliance had probably 
envisioned their war as a brief, sharp rebuke meant to force more equitable relations 
with nearby settlers and traders. Almost from the beginning, however, multiple 
governments moved beyond simple defense and attempted to turn the war to their own 
purposes, transforming the conflict into a broader contest over the region’s political 
and cultural structure. South Carolina enmeshed the war in the slave trade to 
strengthen the double-braided bonds o f war and trade with Catawbas, Cherokees, 
Yamasees, and other Indian allies. The Tuscarora War can be seen as the high point of
149 A resumption of hostilities between South Carolina and Tuscaroras from among the 
Iroquois and from Indian Woods in the 1720s (described below) likely caused the final 
collapse o f this community.
150 McDowell, Journals 1710-1718, 262, 277. Forster had hatched this plan to bring 
Tuscaroras to South Carolina in the wake of this threat, perhaps in an effort to relieve 
feelings o f vulnerability through increased numbers.
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South Carolina’s Indian-slaving empire before its final denouement in the Yamasee 
War shortly afterwards. North Carolina began divided, torn between Graffenried’s 
efforts to negotiate with the Tuscaroras as neighbors and a broader desire for revenge. 
Eventually the acting governor, Pollock, came to see value in acquiring Indians as 
allies, including large numbers of Tuscaroras, chiefly as a tool to quell holdouts from 
the war. Building upon a long history of tributary relations, Virginia initially viewed 
the war as a test o f this system, and then as an opportunity to expand its scope and 
scale. Such efforts were not confined to the Tuscaroras, or even to Indians. After his 
failures with the Tuscaroras, Spotswood quickly turned to the next suitable group of 
refugees, inviting Palatines displaced from New Bern to fortify the Rappahannock 
location formerly slated for Tuscaroras. The community became Germanna, a 
prominent frontier town.151 Having seen the backcountry come apart, leaders were 
afforded the opportunity to rebuild it in the image of their choosing.
But colonial manipulation did not mean colonial control. Tuscaroras who had 
not been killed or enslaved were still able to weigh their options, however restricted 
and unpleasant, and to make tough choices. Three colonies presented at least as 
many paths. In North Carolina, Tom Blount emerged from the Tuscarora War as the 
preeminent new leader, albeit as a leader in a paradoxical position. On one hand, he 
achieved a level of authority over his fellow Tuscaroras that was probably 
unprecedented during the colonial period. On the other hand, this role came at the 
cost o f attaching himself as a dependent of North Carolina’s government and attacking
151 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 196; Alexander, ed.,,Journal o f  Fontaine.
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fellow Tuscaroras and neighboring coastal tribes o f the Lower Alliance— an act that 
most “neutral” Tuscaroras had avoided for much of the war. Not all Tuscaroras made 
the transition under Blount easily. Some members of the Lower Alliance held out in 
North Carolina’s swamps for years. Some Tuscaroras briefly considered a separate 
existence as tributaries under Virginia, others in South Carolina. In succeeding years, 
Tuscaroras in North Carolina would face a two-pronged struggle: to constitute a 
community among themselves, and to fend off impositions by outsiders.
There was another path, another option. Throughout the war, colonial officials 
had worried about possible involvement by warriors from the powerful five-nation 
Iroquois Confederacy in New York and Pennsylvania. At the war’s conclusion, the 
Iroquois continued to play a role, making their own bid in the scramble for displaced 
Tuscaroras. On Virginia’s frontiers Hix had found the Tuscaroras there “in despair 
whether to return to their old Settlements in No. Carolina and run the risque of being 
knock’d in the head by the English and So. Carolina Indians or to submit themselves to 
the Senecas who had made them large offers of Assistance to revenge themselves on 
the English, upon condition of incorporating with them.”152
Other Tuscaroras received similar offers. They could leave the region and 
journey north among the Iroquois. The trail lay open. Between fifteen hundred and 
two thousand made the choice.
152 Spotswood, Letters, 2: 42.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
TRAIL TO THE IROQUOIS
Far from being an end, military defeat for many Tuscaroras represented the 
beginning of a remarkable journey that covered considerable cultural and geographic 
ground. Significant numbers of Tuscaroras abandoned their troubled Carolina 
homeland to relocate along the Susquehanna River and near Oneida Lake — locations 
within and on the edge of territories claimed by Pennsylvania and New York. 
Regardless o f these colonies’ territorial aspirations, in practice both governments 
bowed to the regional cultural and political influence of the Five Nations. Sometimes 
willingly, sometimes grudgingly, other Indian groups living in the Susquehanna and 
Delaware watersheds that drained south from the region likewise often looked to the 
Five Nations for leadership, guidance, or representation in colonial councils. For these 
reasons, historians and anthropologists have taken to calling the vast area -- ranging 
across present-day central New York and north-central Pennsylvania — to which the 
Tuscaroras relocated, “Iroquoia.” Tuscarora newcomers used to dominating affairs in 
the North Carolina coastal plains would be finding their way into a terrain that was as 
culturally and politically unfamiliar as the hills, lakes, and valleys o f their new northern 
homes.
317
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
318
The journey was undoubtedly arduous. It was undertaken by Tuscarora 
families already forced by war to flee familiar farms and fields, to forge in upland 
forests, and to beg and steal from backcountry settlers. Warriors and hunters might 
travel light, relying on their guns and handfuls o f parched corn, but for large-scale 
relocations, Indians, like any colonists setting out to a new land with their families, 
knew the necessity o f provisions and careful preparation. That any Tuscaroras chose 
to begin such a journey with little opportunity to lay in supplies testified to the 
desperation of their circumstances and their hopefulness o f finding better at the trail’s 
end. As much as any seafaring Englishmen, Tuscaroras came as pilgrims, fleeing 
oppression and seeking better lives in new lands among new neighbors, Indian and 
white.
The journey also widened by miles rifts that had already existed within 
Tuscarora society. In North Carolina, Tuscaroras had long been linked more by 
common culture than by uniform politics. Nonetheless, as neighbors, Tuscaroras from 
different towns and of different political stripes usually strove for cooperation, and 
when that proved elusive, for peaceful coexistence. Hostility was a last resort—its 
presence among Tuscarora upper and lower towns, even when coerced by colonial 
officials and rarely acted upon, was one o f the most shocking aspects of the war. The 
decision to stay or go encompassed many considerations, and probably did not break 
down along precise political lines. But in the aftermath of the infighting during the 
Tuscarora War, a higher proportion of those dissatisfied, first with colonial 
governments and then with Blount’s bid for power, departed. Therefore, physical
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separation confirmed and clarified distinctions that had already developed. Under 
these separate pulls, a sense o f shared identity between those Tuscaroras who departed 
north and those who stayed in North Carolina, stretched nearly to the point of 
breaking but, as events would show, did not snap.
The endurance o f Tuscarora culture proved all the more remarkable in light of 
other transformations taking place. In addition to physical distance, the Tuscaroras’ 
trail led them on a course of political and cultural alterations. Tuscaroras never lost 
their own sense of distinctiveness. Nevertheless, weakened and dependent, migrants 
adopted many of the traits of the Iroquois who were their hosts and neighbors.
Numerous other Indian groups in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had made 
similar journeys into Iroquoia with various results: some had virtually disintegrated, 
leaving isolated atoms of individuals and random cultural components; other groups 
maintained greater autonomy, often as uneasy “dependents” of the Iroquois. Only the 
Tuscaroras’ trail ended at a different destination, a unique status within the hitherto 
five-nation Iroquois Confederacy as the adopted “sixth nation.”
Until the American Revolution, the story of the Tuscaroras would be the tale 
of how some adapted to circumstances in Iroquoia, how others adapted to 
circumstances in North Carolina, and how both reacted to the changes in each other.
Iroquois-Tuscarora Relations Before the Tuscarora War 
“These Indians went out heretofore from us. . . . ”
—Teganissorens, Onondaga speaking for Iroquois, 1713.
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One understanding of the Tuscaroras' journey to Iroquoia was that they were 
drawn there by preexisting links stemming from the Tuscaroras' and Five Nations' 
distantly shared "Iroquoian" cultural ancestry. While such connections played a role, 
the story o f these cultural connections is far more convoluted than such a simple 
statement would suggest.
Oral tradition, archeological finds, and linguistic analyses all confirm that the 
Tuscaroras and Iroquois shared cultural similarities stemming from a shared ancestry 
through ancient proto-Iroquoian stock.1 In a sense, the northward flight o f 1,500 or 
more Tuscaroras at the end of the Tuscarora War reversed an earlier ancient migration 
and reaffirmed ancestral links between the Tuscaroras and the Iroquois of the Five 
Nations. No doubt linguistic and cultural similarities helped ease the transition when,
1 Douglas W. Boyce, "‘As the Wind Scatters the Smoke’: The Tuscaroras in the 
Eighteenth Century," in Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their 
Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800, Daniel Richter and James H. Merrell, 
eds. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 151-163 offers the most detailed 
examination o f the relationship between the Tuscaroras and Iroquois to date. Also see 
David Landy, "Tuscarora among the Iroquois," (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institution; 1978), 518-524. For evidence o f early shared roots, see Floyd G. 
Lounsbury, “Iroquoian Languages,” in HNAI, 15: 334-35; Blair A. Rudes, Tuscarora- 
English/English-Tuscarora Dictionary (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1999), 
xv; Wallace L. Chafe, “How to Say They Drank in Iroquois,” in Extending the 
Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroquoian Studies, ed. Michael K. Foster, 
Jack Campisi, and Marianne Mithun (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 
1984), 300-311; Marianne Mithun, “The Proto-Iroquoians: Cultural Reconstruction 
From Lexical Materials,” in Extending the Rafters, 259-281; David Cusick, Sketches 
o f  the Ancient History o f  the Six Nations in William M. Beauchamp and David Cusick, 
The Iroquois Trail: or, Footprints o f  the Six Nations in Customs, Traditions, and  
History (Fayetteville, N.Y.: H. C. Beauchamp, 1892); A distinctive “Cashie”-style 
pottery in North Carolina linked in historic times to Tuscaroras has been dated using 
radiocarbon to as early as A.D. 673 (H. Trawick Ward and R. P. Stephen Davis Jr., 
Time Before History: The Archeology o f  North Carolina (Chapel Hill: U. o f North 
Carolina Press, 1999), 224.)
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hundreds of years later, Tuscaroras returned north. As one Iroquois speaker explained 
when migrants arrived after the Tuscarora War, “they were o f us and went from us 
long ago and are now returned.”2
Such statements, and several others like them, are tantalizing, but a fuller 
explication of the Tuscaroras’ and Iroquois understanding of their shared ancestry 
went unrecorded for white outsiders until the nineteenth century. In a series of 
“sketches” first published in 1825, David Cusick, an influential Tuscarora warrior and 
scholar, outlined the genesis o f those who eventually became the Six Nations.3 In 
1881, a Tuscarora chief named Elias Johnson picked up, repeated, and in some cases 
expanded upon these narrations.4 Some danger lies in over-reliance upon 
“upstreaming” from these accounts to understand the 1710s since they may reflect 
subsequent efforts by Cusick and Johnson to more fully integrate Tuscaroras into an 
imagined historical community with the other nations of the Iroquois Confederacy. If 
so, these tellings offer a fascinating glimpse at one tactic by which outsiders become
2 NYCD, 5: 387. Also see Peter Wraxall, An Abridgement o f  the Indian Affairs 
Contained in Four Folio Volumes, Transacted in the Colony o f  New York, from  the 
Year 1678 to the Year 1751, ed. Charles Howard Mcllwain (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1915), 101; NYCD, 5: 376; MPCP, 2: 511.
3 Russell A. Judkins, “David Cusick's Ancient History o f  the Six Nations: A Neglected 
Classic,” in Iroquois Studies: A Guide to Documentary and Ethnohistoric Resources 
from  Western New York and the Genesee Valley, ed. Russell A. Judkins (Geneseo, 
New York: State University o f New York, 1987), 26-40. Cusick’s Ancient History is 
reprinted in its entirety with notes within Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail.
4 Elias Johnson, Legends, Traditions, and Laws o f  the Iroquois, or Six Nations, and 
History o f  the Tuscarora Indians, reprint of 1881 ed. (New York: AMS Press, 1978).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
322
insiders.5 Nonetheless, scattered eighteenth-century statements such as the one above 
suggest that Cusick’s and Johnson’s later accounts illuminate inherited traditional 
understandings o f these bonds.
Together, Cusick and Johnson describe a dreamlike age when Tarenyawagen, 
the “Holder of the Heavens,” guided a household of six families— predecessors of the 
Tuscaroras and Five Nations. They already had lived together for millennia, surviving 
assaults by giants, horned serpents, and monstrous elk. Under Tarenyawagen’s 
direction, the company relocated to the upper Hudson and then gradually westward, 
leaving a family at every remove, one by one planting the ancestral Mohawks,
Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas in what became their respective 
homelands. Each in turn received their name.
For the sixth family, the journey continued. They traveled west, first to the 
Great Lakes, then to the banks of the Mississippi. There, part o f the sixth family 
crossed the river by means o f an immense grape vine that broke, stranding some on the 
east, others on the west. The group remaining on the east bank turned around, re­
crossed the Appalachians, and eventually arrived near the tributaries o f the Neuse 
River at a place they called “Cau-ta-noh,” meaning “pine in water” (a reference to the 
region’s frequently submerged, swampy pine lands).6
5 Susan Kalter, “Finding a Place for David Cusick in Native American Literary 
History,” Melus 27, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 9-34.
6 The above account is based on Johnson, Legends, 41-2; Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail, 
11-13.
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There, like pines in the marshy soil, they took root in the lands they would 
inhabit into the age o f European contact, with the ancient place name, Cau-ta-noh, 
being preserved as Hancock’s town Catechna. Speaking with Indians in the region, 
Lawson recorded that “when you ask them whence their Fore-Fathers came,” their 
response was to point west.7 Lederer also recorded a tradition among the region’s 
Indians (although it is unclear if the speakers were Siouan or Iroquoian) that they were 
driven by enemies from the Northwest and “invited to sit down here by an oracle about 
four hundred years since.”8
As a systematic chronology, these narratives leave much to be desired. 
Nonetheless, they give a sense o f native perceptions of the ancient ties and  the gulfs of 
time and distance between the Tuscarora and Five Nations. Culturally, Tuscaroras and 
the other Iroquois were related, but they had not lived together for a long, long time. 
Aspects, moreover, reinforce certain findings from modern archeological and linguistic 
investigations.
Early in their perambulations, according to Cusick, “the people were yet in one 
language.” At each remove, “their language was altered” but not “so far as to lose the 
understanding of each others’ language.”9 Linguists also describe a process of 
linguistic divergence whereby separate languages broke olf from a single proto-
7 Lawson, New Voyage, 173.
8 John Lederer, “Discoveries of John Lederer,” in First Explorations o f  the Trans- 
Allegheny Region by the Virginians, 1650-1674, ed. Clarence Walworth Alvord and 
Lee Bidgood (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1912), 142.
9 Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail, 11-13
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Iroquoian “speech community.”10 Reversing Cusick’s sequence, glottochronology 
suggests that speakers of the Tuscarora-Nottoway-Meherrin language (excepting 
slight local variations — these southern languages were similar, if not identical) broke 
off extremely early, perhaps “in the neighborhood of 2000 years ago.” 11 Only 
hundreds of years later did the speech of the remaining northern Iroquois separate and 
differentiate into distinct languages for each o f the five nations in addition to the 
Hurons, Wyandots, and Susquehannocks. Therefore, although all o f these languages 
shared a common heritage, owing to the extreme age o f the Tuscarora-Nottoway- 
Meherrin split, the greatest number o f differences arose between the northern and 
these southernmost languages.
10 Chafe,"How to Say They Drank," 302.
11 For discussion of the relation o f the Meherrin, Nottoway, and Iroquois languages 
see Blair A. Rudes, "The Meherrin in the Nineteenth Century," Algonquian and  
Iroquoian Linguistics 6, no. 3 (1981): 31- 34. Nottoway may have been “the more 
conservative in phonology” (Shannon Lee Dawdy, "The Secret History of the 
Meherrin" (M.A. thesis, Dept, o f Anthropology, College of William and Mary, 1994), 
35; Lounsbury, “Iroquoian Languages,” 335. The Coree and Neusiok Indians (also 
known as the Neuse River Indians) to the east o f the Tuscarora core area may also 
spoken Iroquoian languages, but this identification is largely speculative, based largely 
upon their association with the Iroquois during the Tuscarora War, and a statement by 
Lawson that the Coree spoke the same language as a group of Indians “beyond the 
mountains.” Douglas W. Boyce, "Iroquoian Tribes o f the Virginia-North Carolina 
Coastal Plain," in vol. 15 Northeast, ed. Bruce G. Trigger, Handbook o f  North 
American Indians (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 282. For the 
dating of the Tuscarora linguistic split: Chafe,"How to Say They Drank,", 302; 
Michael K. Foster, "Language and the Cultural History o f North America," in vol. 17 
Languages, ed. William C Sturtevant, Handbook o f  North American Indians 
(Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1996), 64-110. Chafe suggests that 
ancestral Cayugas may have joined this Tuscarora-Nottoway group briefly, before re- 
converging with ancestors of the other five nations. Only the distantly related 
Iroquoian Cherokees broke off earlier than the Tuscaroras.
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Efforts to reconstruct this mother tongue from before the Tuscarora separation 
reveal the divergence which took place early in these societies’ cultural growth: before 
the development o f complex political structures and their accompanying terminology. 
While hunting terms abound, terms for horticulture and farming can only be 
reconstructed unambiguously after the Tuscarora-Nottoway departure, suggesting 
shared roots in a simpler hunter-gatherer society o f small bands. Terms point towards 
a material culture at the time of the split that included baskets, wooden troughs, 
dishes, bowls, kettles, axes, knives, and cradleboards.12
No substantive efforts have been made to track the proto-Tuscaroras’ 
archeological trail. Debates still rage among researchers whether ancient Iroquoians 
developed in an original homeland near their historic location (the in situ theory) or 
migrated from Ohio, Pennsylvania, or farther south (migration theories), making it 
hard to hypothesize even where to begin scouting for diverging proto-Tuscaroras.13 
Again, hints may come from linguistic clues. The shared proto-Iroquoian language
12 Mithun, "Proto-Iroquoians," 276-77.
13 Early adherents o f ancient Iroquois migrations included Lewis Henry Morgan and 
Arthur Parker. William Ritchie and Richard MacNeish, on the other hand, argued for 
Iroquois inhabitation o f their historic sites for upwards of two thousand years. The 
theory that the proto-Iroquois migrated out of Pennsylvania has been most vocally 
espoused recently by Dean Snow (see Dean R. Snow, The Iroquois (Oxford, U.K.: 
Blackwell, 1994), 10-33; DeanR. Snow, “Migration in Prehistory; The Northern 
Iroquoian Case,” American Antiquity 60, no. 1 (1995): 59-79; Dean R. Snow, “More 
on Migration in Prehistory: Accommodating New Evidence in the Northern Iroquoian 
Cas q ” American Antiquity 61, no. 4 (1996): 791-796. For contradictory evidence, 
see Gary W. Crawford and David G. Smith, “Migration in Prehistory: Princess Point 
and the Northern Iroquoian Case,” American Antiquity 61, no. 4 (1996): 782-789. 
Also James A. Tuck, “Northern Iroquoian Prehistory,” in Northeast, ed. Trigger, 
HNAI, 322-33.
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contained words for elm, slippery elm, basswood, and pine, but not more northerly 
species such as white ash, birch, balsam fir, and tamarack—hints o f a common 
homeland in the mid-Atlantic Appalachians, from which the proto-Tuscaroras 
presumably departed before the proto-five nations made their own northward 
migration into their historic locations.14
While points o f departure remain unclear, archeologists have been more 
successful in uncovering the arrival o f the proto-Tuscaroras in North Carolina. North 
Carolina’s coastal plain had long acted as a meeting point for northeastern and 
southeastern Indian cultures.15 As early as 4,000 B.C. certain northern influences, 
recognizable through finds of Halifax projectile points, had been felt in the region. A 
sequence of archeological finds known as the Cashie Phase, dating from about A.D. 
800 likely represented the arrival of the Tuscaroras’ prehistoric ancestors in North
14 Mithun, "Proto-Iroquoians." See Foster, "Languages," 64-110, for a discussion of 
how linguistic evidence relates to different theories o f the Iroquois original homeland. 
John E. Byrd, and Charles L. Heath, '"the Country Here Is Very Thick of Indian 
Towns and Plantations . . .": Tuscarora Settlement Patterns as Revealed by the 
Contentnea Creek Survey," in Indian and European Contact in Context: The Mid- 
Atlantic Region, ed. Dennis B. Blanton and Julia King (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 2004), 242-44, also discusses this evidence in relation to the origins of 
Tuscarora culture.
15 The HNAI, for example, includes the Tuscaroras and other Iroquoians o f the 
Virginia-North Carolina Coastal Plain within its volume on the Northeast (volume 15). 
Boyce, "Iroquoian," 282-89.
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Carolina’s coastal plain.16 This date matches favorably with an estimate, made by 
Dean Snow, o f A.D. 600 as the period when Iroquoian-speaking peoples possibly 
expanded from a postulated central-Appalachian homeland.17
The previous inhabitants, according to ancient recollections recorded by 
Lederer, were “far more rude and barbarous, feeding only on raw flesh and fish, until 
these taught them to plant corn, and shewed them the use o f it.” 18 Such differences 
might have been as much overblown insult as recollection, but archeological 
investigations have unearthed cultural distinctions. Unlike their predecessors and 
neighbors in the region, these Iroquoian newcomers to North Carolina frequently 
palisaded their villages and used pebbles and small stones to “temper” or strengthen 
their pottery. When burying their dead, they interred bundles o f bones alongside those 
o f two to five kin, offering a few bone awls or other modest grave goods interspersed
16 Byrd and Heath, "Country Here;" Byrd and Heath, “Rediscovery,” 8; Dean R.
Snow, "More on Migration in Prehistory.” Radiocarbon techniques may push back this 
date to as early as A.D. 673 (Ward and Davis, Time Before History, 224.) For efforts 
to uncover evidence o f Iroquoian intrusions and cultural mingling in the North 
Carolina Piedmont see Daniel Simpkins, “Aboriginal Intersite Settlement System 
Change in the Northeastern North Carolina Piedmont During the Contact Period” 
(Ph.D. diss., Dept, o f Anthropology, University o f North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1992).
17 Snow, "Migration in Prehistory;" Snow, "More on Migration;" Byrd and Heath, 
“Rediscovery” 8; Byrd and Heath, “Country Here.”
18 “Discoveries of John Lederer,” 142.
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among the invariable hundreds or even thousands o f Marginella shell beads acquired 
through trade with the coast.19
Combined, Cashie Phase traits, according to a recent archeological study, 
signaled the arrival of a new culture that was “intrusive and did not develop in situ 
from the Coastal Plain’s . . . [earlier] period.” These artifact patterns continued into 
the historic period where their makers were identified as Tuscaroras. During the same 
period, the Algonquian ancestors o f the Tuscaroras’ tidewater neighbors also began to 
leave their distinctive archeological mark through mass community burials and 
“Collington ware” pottery tempered with crushed oyster or mussel shells.20 
Intermixture of styles at sites suggests cross-cultural sharing, either through captives 
or trade.
Despite ancient cultural ties between the people who eventually became the 
Tuscaroras and the Five Nations, it would be a mistake to assume that the Tuscaroras’ 
eighteenth-century integration as the Sixth Nation can be explained merely as the 
ethnic homecoming o f a prodigal son. During intervening centuries, the Tuscaroras 
and Five Nations evolved along separate cultural paths. Only after the Tuscaroras’
19 This description of Cashie traits is most fully outlined in David Sutton Phelps, 
“Archaeology of the North Carolina Coast and Coastal Plain: Problems and 
Hypotheses,” in The Prehistory o f  North Carolina: An Archaeological Symposium, 
ed. Mark A. Mathis and Jeffrey J. Crow (Raleigh: North Carolina Division o f Archives 
and History, 1983), 1-51. For the development o f a sand burial-mound tradition to the 
south of the Tuscarora core area, see Jeffrey D. Irwin et al., “Woodland Burial 
Mounds in the North Carolina Sandhills and Southern Coastal Plain,” North Carolina 
Archaeology 48 (Oct., 1999): 59-86.
20 Phelps, "Archaeology of the North Carolina Coast," 36-43
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departure, according to Cusick, Tarenyawagen, “solemnly visits the [northern] 
families, and he instructs them in various things respecting the infinity, matrimony, 
moral rules, worship, etc.” 21 Tuscaroras arriving among the Iroquois centuries later 
would discover that even their basic worldviews had evolved along separate paths.
Indeed, archeology agrees that the highpoint of changes among the Iroquois 
ancestors came after the proto-Tuscaroras emerged in North Carolina. Archeological 
remains of the “Oswasco culture” in the Northeast indicate that the centuries around
A.D. 1,000 saw a transition so dramatic as to suggest that either there was the 
introduction of a new Iroquoian population from elsewhere or there were rapid 
internal changes. These ancestors o f the Iroquois experienced an agricultural 
revolution, increasing their populations and becoming more sedentary as they 
reoriented their communities fully around the cultivation of maize, beans, and squash 
for the first time. Remains of palisades and weapons evidenced a “continual cycle of 
feuding.” Clans congregated into larger communities, but at the same time, isolation 
between communities in an era wracked by warfare helped create the remaining 
separate languages and cultures out o f the proto-Iroquois.22
It was in reaction to these cycles o f violence in the Northeast that reciprocal 
ceremonies o f condolence, peace making, and limited political cooperation through a 
joint council developed, culminating in the creation o f the Iroquois League. Among
21 Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail, 13.
22 For a summary of these finds, see Daniel Richter, The Ordeal o f  the Longhouse:
The Peoples o f  the Iroquois League in the Era o f  European Colonization (Chapel 
Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1992), 14-15; Snow, Iroquois, 21-53.
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the Five Nations, this political and cultural genesis was remembered in the founding 
epic o f Deganawidah. As repeated by successive generations, Deganawidah, with the 
aid o f his convert Hiawatha, succeeded in winning over leaders o f the Mohawks, 
Senecas, Oneidas, Cayugas, and finally the Onondagas away from barbarism to the 
“good message of peace and power.” The names of these early converts were 
subsequently memorialized as titles within the grand council’s roll call o f fifty chiefs. 
Together these early statesmen wove their peoples together into a cooperative league 
and metaphorically planted a great white pine, the Tree o f Peace, on the shore of 
Onondaga Lake.23
The political transformations underlying this epic stood central to the Iroquois 
understanding of themselves and the outside world. According to historian 
Christopher Vecsey:
The stories define and express the teleology of Iroquois national life: its 
grounding in human nature and human problems; its rules o f ritual 
propriety; its incorporation o f seemingly conflicting forces; its hope of 
transforming individuals and groups. These are stories— I should say 
this is a story— of nation-formation, with its infrastructure, 
transcending loyalties, reciprocal duties, and principles for promoting
23 This story and its ramifications are summarized in Richter, Ordeal o f  the 
Longhouse, 31-41; Elisabeth J. Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois: Its History, 
Politics, and Ritual," in Northeast, ed. Trigger, HNAI, 418-41; Snow, Iroquois, 53-76. 
The categorization o f an Oswasco culture has recently been challenged by Hetty Jo 
Brumbach and John P. Hart in “The Death of Oswasco” American Antiquity 68 no. 4 
(Oct. 2003): 737-52.
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human life according to divine models and accomplished through 
supernatural intervention and power. An analysis o f such a story can 
help to illuminate the relationships among myth, religion, and national 
identity.24
And yet, though exact chronologies are uncertain, it is clear that these changes 
took place after and independent from the departing proto-Tuscaroras—perhaps as 
recently as the fifteenth or sixteenth century.25 In Elias Johnson’s recollection of this 
epic, Tarenyawagen assumed a human form as Hiawatha to teach the Five Nations to 
have “one fire, one pipe, one war club” after departing the Tuscaroras whom he had 
guided south.26 Similar ancestries they might share, joint membership in the Iroquois 
League they did not.
24 Christopher Vecsey, "The Story and Structure o f the Iroquois Confederacy," 
Journal o f  the American Academy o f  Religion, vol. 54, no. 1 (Spring 1986), 79.
25 In the Tuscarora language, words related to concepts of the Iroquois League had to 
be borrowed from other Iroquois languages— evidence that these words and 
ceremonies were learned after their eighteenth century return to Iroquoia. Rudes, 
Tuscarora-English Dictionary, xvi-xvii. For discussion of possible dates for the 
founding of the League see Tooker, "League of the Iroquois," 418-22; William N. 
Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History o f  the Iroquois 
Confederacy (Norman: U. of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 66-84. Richter distinguishes 
between the League as a cultural and ritual institution and the Confederacy as a 
political and diplomatic entity in Daniel K. Richter, “Ordeals of the Longhouse: The 
Five Nations in Early American History,” in Beyond the Covenant Chain, 11-27.
26 Johnson, Legends, 46-54.
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Friends or Foe?
“their Kings will Come and sue for the peace they so much desire.” 
—Tuscarora Diplomat speaking at Conestoga, 1710
This particular relationship between the Tuscaroras and the Five Nations— a 
distantly shared cultural ancestry and yet divergent political tracks— actually made it 
more likely that future interactions between the two groups would be hostile. The 
League reduced internal strife among its five members. The grim flip side o f an 
internal peaceable kingdom, however, was near-constant external warfare as grief and 
anger directed outwards as “mourning wars” coupled at times with a near crusader­
like fervor for extending the roots of the Tree of Peace to include other peoples.27 “I 
am Deganawidah,” proclaimed the founding epic, “I now send you out amongst hostile 
nations and you shall show them this Constitution and proclaim to them the
27 Daniel K. Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” William and Mary 
Quarterly 3rd ser., no. 40 (1983): 528-59; Article 80 of the Iroquois Great Law states: 
“When the council o f the League has for its object the establishment o f the Great 
Peace among the people o f an outside nation and that nation refuses to accept the 
Great Peace, then by such refusal they bring a declaration of war upon themselves 
from the Five Nations. Then shall the Five Nations seek to establish the Great Peace 
by a conquest o f the rebellious nation” quoted in Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous 
Iroquois Empire : The Covenant Chain Confederation o f  Indian Tribes with English 
Colonies from  Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty o f  1744 (New York: Norton,
1984), 162-63; Cadwallader Colden described: “It has been a constant Maxim with the 
Five Nations, to save the Children and Young Men of the People they Conquer, to 
adopt them into their own Nation, and to educate them as their own Children, without 
Distinction; These young People soon forget their own Country and Nation; and by 
this Policy the Five Nations make up the Losses which their Nation suffers by the 
Popel they loose in War” (Colden, History, 8).
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unchallengeable laws of peace.”28 In the seventeenth century, the desire for captives 
and remnant populations from smashed villages spurred the so-called Beaver Wars— 
misnamed because prisoners and refugees for adoption, not pelts, were main object of 
the Iroquois.29 As Cadwallader Colden described:
It has been a constant Maxim with the Five Nations, to save the 
Children and Young Men of the People they Conquer, to adopt them 
into their own Nation, and to educate them as their own Children, 
without Distinction; These young people soon forget their own 
Country and Nation; and by this Policy the Five Nations make up the 
Losses which their Nation suffers by the people they lose in War.30 
In these wars for assimilation, far from being protected by shared genealogies, 
other Iroquoian peoples from around the Great Lakes such as the Hurons, Petuns, and 
Neutrals suffered the heaviest blows. Cultural similarities, related languages, and 
shared religious beliefs made them better targets for incorporation.31 Such cultural
28 Paul A. W. Wallace, The White Roots o f  Peace (Philadelphia: U. o f Pennsylvania 
Press, 1946), 240-42. Caution needs to be applied to the use o f anachronistic English 
terms (i.e. “constitution.”) in such accounts. “You of the different nations o f the south, 
and you of the west, may place yourselves under our protection, and we will protect 
you. We earnestly desire the alliance and friendship o f you all,” stated Hiawatha 
according to Johnson in Legends, 51. This Tuscarora version may have emphasized 
connections with other nations.
29 Josae Antaonio Brandao, Your Fyre Shall Burn No More : Iroquois Policy toward 
New France and Its Native Allies to 1701 (Lincoln: U. of Nebraska Press, 1997).
30 Colden, History, 8.
31 Richter, "War and Culture," 541. William A. Starna, and Ralph Watkins, "Northern 
Iroquoian Slavery," Ethnohistory 38, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 34-57.
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overlaps would prove crucial: helping to forestall a wholesale identity crisis and 
breakdown of Iroquois society by 1661 when a French missionary remarked that, “[i]f 
any one should compute the number o f pure-blooded Iroquois, he would have 
difficulty in finding more than twelve hundred of them in all the five Nations, since 
these are, for the most part, only aggregations of different tribes whom they have 
conquered.”32 Despite the scope of the influx, survivors from shattered nations 
carried back to Iroquoia lacked the cohesiveness to maintain a separate ethnic identity; 
although a more limited sense of distinctiveness may have let them contribute to the 
creation o f several new clans within Iroquois society.33
Tuscaroras and their Nottoway and Meherrin neighbors found themselves 
targets for similar reasons.34 In addition to the “Beaver Wars” around the Great
32 J.R  45: 207 as quoted in Richter, “Ordeals o f the Longhouse,” 20.
33 William Engelbrecht, Iroquoia: the Development o f  a Native World (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2003), 63 n. 17; The incorporation o f outsiders with fewer 
kin-ties may have contributed to the gradual decline o f the multi-family longhouse 
architecture during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Engelbrecht, Iroquoia,
69. John Demos, The Unredeemed Captive: A Family Story from  Early America 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1994), suggests that the Catholicism o f mission villages of 
Kahnawake was especially attractive to Iroquois adoptees. See also Daniel K. Richter, 
Facing East from  Indian Country: A Native History o f  Early America (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 88. James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The 
Contest o f  Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press,
1985).
34 Cusick asserted that “perhaps about 150 years before Columbus discovered 
America” the Tuscaroras “renewed their intercourse with the five nations” and formed 
an alliance against nearby enemies. Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail, 36-37. Ancient joint 
war ventures would have invigorated a sense among the Tuscaroras and other Iroquois 
nations that they shared common bonds of interest and ethnicity. If such cooperation 
had occurred, by the late seventeenth century when European observers began to take 
note, Tuscarora-Iroquois relations had taken a dramatic turn for the worse—towards 
war, not peace.
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Lakes, Iroquois warriors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also frequently 
raided south, much to the distress o f Virginia’s government who alternated between 
sending militias and diplomatic delegations to head off war parties which “perpetrated 
great Spoiles on the stocks,” “riffled some houses,” and “reduced” Indian allies.35 On 
at least one occasion Virginia paid a ransom to help recover captured Indian allies.36 
Raids worsened in the wake of the Grand Settlement of 1701 when the Iroquois 
withdrew from conflicts around the Great Lakes, leaving Virginia and the Carolinas as 
an outlet for war parties. Moreover, the incorporation of defeated Susquehannocks— 
enemies o f Virginia and many of the region’s Indians during Bacon’s Rebellion—may 
have added impetus to Iroquois southern war aims.37
On the region’s long list o f victims, Tuscaroras stood out as a frequent, 
perhaps even preferred, target.38 In 1703, twenty “strange Indians,” who probably 
included Senecas and Susquehannocks, “set upon” a band o f Nottoways, killing five
35 Quotation from EJCCV, 1: 52-54; for further examples see EJCCV, 1: 117, 259, 
262, 322, 506. For southern wars by the Iroquois see James H. Merrell, "‘Their Very 
Bones Shall Fight’: The Catawba-Iroquois Wars," in Beyond the Covenant Chain, 
115-33.
36 EJCCV, 1: 192.
37 Boyce, "As the Wind," 153; Merrell, "Their Very Bones," 117. In 1684 Virginia 
negotiated a treaty to try to keep the Iroquois from venturing too close to Virginian 
plantations. Such restrictions, albeit virtually ignored, may have helped redirect the 
brunt o f raids around Virginia’s Indian tributaries and against the Tuscaroras.
38 Attacks on Nottoways and Rappahannocks: EJCCV,, 1: 54; Attacks on 
Chickahominies, Saponies, Catawbas, Occaneechees, and Appomattox: EJCCV,, 1: 
192. Around the time of the Tuscarora War, Catawbas and Cherokees replaced the 
Tuscaroras as preferred targets.
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and capturing several others, including the Nottoway chief. Later, a spokesperson for 
the attackers claimed they were “only in search o f the Tuscoruro Indians without any 
design to disturb the Inhabitants of this country.”39 As the region’s largest Iroquoian 
group, and outside the official protection of any colony, Tuscaroras ranked high 
among logical replacements for earlier enemies from the Beaver Wars who were either 
destroyed or no longer accessible. However, any particular basis o f animosity remains 
a mystery. Long repetition gave the raids logic o f their own. According to Lawson, 
“If you go to persuade them to live peaceably with the Tuskeruros, and let them be 
one People, and in case those Indians desire it, and will submit to them, they will 
answer you, that they cannot live without War, which they have ever been used to.”40 
Attacks by the Iroquois, coming on top of European encroachment, diseases, 
and slave raids, had a devastating effect on the Tuscaroras. Lawson encountered a 
Keyauwee man who had escaped Iroquois captors despite their having flayed and 
mutilated his feet. The wounds ran deep. Lawson remarked that the survivor “had 
little Heart to go far from home, and carry’d always a Case o f Pistols in his Girdle, 
besides a Cutless, and a Fuzee.”41 Nearby, whole communities o f Tuscaroras carried 
similar scars, mental and physical. In 1710, Tuscarora speakers outlined the ills o f a 
people in profound distress: “older women” afraid to venture out for “wood and 
water;” “children born and those yet in the womb” unable to “sport and play;” young
39 Quotation in EJCCV, 2: 331. Also see EJCCV, 2: 369, 380; 3: 45.
40 Lawson, New Voyage, 207.
41 Lawson, New Voyage, 59; Merrell, "Their Very Bones," 117.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
337
men unable to go hunting for “fear of Death or Slavery;” a nation o f people unable to 
trade or treat with neighbors, skittish at the sounds o f a mouse, “or any other thing 
that Ruffles the Leaves.”42
The effects o f such fears extended beyond deeply personal emotional trauma to 
tangible effects such as the rerouting of native trade networks. Tuscaroras had often 
benefited as middlemen between the coast and the interior. In the wake of attacks, a 
few hardy souls willing to risk the “great Danger o f the Sinnagars or Iroquois” could 
make a hefty profit by venturing out to gather and sell a red root used for dye that only 
grew in the western hill country. Most stayed at home and made do with an inferior 
local “Pecoon-Root” or were driven to seek substitute dyes from European traders.43 
Looking into one of the Southeast's ubiquitous trade mirrors, a Tuscarora would see in 
his own crimson-painted features a reminder o f the effects o f Iroquois raiders.
Uneasy Europeans also held up a glass to the spiraling warfare’s effects on 
diplomatic networks and did not like what they saw. In 1704, Maryland’s government 
launched an investigation into the “Strength and Alliances” o f the Piscataway Indians 
after discovering that they had stopped paying their customary tribute in preparation 
for “joining the Senecas in order to war with the Tuskaroras.”44 Virginia officials, for 
their part, warily took notice as members o f six Virginia tributary tribes joined several 
Tuscaroras who went north to appeal for peace and the release o f the Nottoway
42 MPCP, 2: 511.
43 Lawson, New Voyage, 174-75.
44M dArch. 26: 38, 114-15.
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king— evidence that one unintended side-effect may have been increased cooperation 
among the Tuscaroras and similarly besieged tribes. Such joint appeals failed, 
however, and war continued.
More surprising, and ultimately more troubling for colonists, were the new 
bonds that could be established between Tuscaroras and Iroquois even as war bred 
bloodshed and animosity. Even before 1713, when the first mass exodus o f refugees 
from the Tuscarora War arrived in Iroquoia, a smaller earlier flow of Tuscaroras 
trickled north as prisoners and potential adoptees. When Tuscaroras and Iroquois later 
spoke of shared kinship, besides older cultural backgrounds, one must also take into 
account the double ties o f individuals born as Tuscaroras, snatched from Carolina 
homes, and “requickened” as Iroquois kin.45 A half-century earlier a lone Huron had 
encountered a Mohawk war party. “I have been seeking you,” said the Huron, “I am 
going to my country, to seek out my relatives and friends. The country o f the Hurons 
is no longer where it was, —you have transported it into your own: it is there that I 
was going, to join my relatives and compatriots, who are now but one people with 
yourselves.” His old country, he claimed, was inhabited but with “the phantoms of a 
people who are no more.”46 Tuscarora losses were never so drastic; nonetheless, they,
45 For similar patterns in the Southwest, see James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: 
Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: U. of 
North Carolina Press, 2000).
46 JR, 35, 217; Richter, Ordeal, 72. It should be pointed out that the Huron speaker 
was seeking to deceive his captors, but the fact that his ruse worked indicates that 
such statements were considered plausible.
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too, could have felt a powerful draw to join the Iroquois even as they reeled from their 
attacks.
These influences came to the surface in 1710 when Tuscaroras sent three chiefs 
to Conestoga, a multi-ethnic Indian town on the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania.47 
There they sued for peace before the town’s inhabitants and a visiting delegation of 
“Seneques Kings.” Adopting protocol normal among the Iroquois and other 
northeastern groups, the three Tuscaroras used eight wampum belts to offer the 
previously described entreaties from every man, woman, and child.48 If  the Iroquois 
and their allies in the Susquehanna basin sought a repeat o f the Beaver Wars’ early 
successes— smashing the Tuscaroras until their shattered remnants embraced the Great 
Tree o f Peace and voluntarily removed to Iroquoia—it seemed they were on the verge 
o f success. The Tuscarora delegates begged for peace and discussed resettling in 
central Pennsylvania near the Iroquois “southern door”— a drastic step, but one that 
would doubly allow them to escape abuses by North Carolina settlers and end Iroquois 
attacks.
Such Tuscarora-Iroquois interactions did not take place in a vacuum free from 
European influence. Records of the Conestoga meeting survive through the writings 
of Pennsylvania officials who participated. During the eighteenth century, Iroquois 
politicians seeking an alternative to their relationship with New York increasingly
47 Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the precise origins o f the Tuscarora 
delegates at Conestoga—whether they hailed from Upper or Lower towns.
4SMPCP, 2: 511.
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advertised claims of control over the land and Indian peoples of Pennsylvania’s 
backcountry. For its part, Pennsylvania’s government inclined towards recognizing 
“the fiction of Iroquois suzerainty” as a means o f centralizing and simplifying relations 
with the region’s disparate Indian groups, and dealing with an absentee landlord 
willing to sell.49
In 1710, when Tuscarora delegates arrived in Conestoga, however, these 
patterns were just taking shape; it was unclear to whom they should direct their 
appeals for peace and permission to relocate: the Indian residents at Conestoga, 
visiting Iroquois representatives, or the two Pennsylvania commissioners. Predictably, 
the results were frustratingly equivocal. With regards to relocating, the 
Pennsylvanians seized the prerogative. The Tuscaroras were not the first group of 
southern Indians to eye the region. Besides being known as the “best poor man’s 
country” among European immigrants fleeing poverty and persecution,
Pennsylvania—in particular the Susquehanna Valley— through William Penn’s early 
efforts to establish friendship with Indians, was becoming a refugee haven for
49 Sometimes this Pennsylvania-Iroquois relationship was called a “Chain of 
Friendship.” Daniel Richter, “Indian Pennsylvania,” in A Guide to the History o f  
Pennsylvania, ed. Dennis B. Downey and Francis J. Bremer (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1993), 37-38; Francis Jennings, “The Delaware Interregnum,” 
PMHB 89 (1965): 174-98; Francis Jennings, “'Pennsylvania Indians' and the Iroquois,” 
in Beyond the Covenant Chain, 75- 91; David L. Preston, “Squatters, Indians, 
Proprietary Government, and Land in the Susquehanna Valley,” in Friends and  
Indians in Penn's Woods, ed. William A. Pencak and Daniel K. Richter (University 
Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 2004), 180-200; quotation from William A. 
Starna, “The Diplomatic Career of Canasatego,” in Friends and Enemies in Penn's 
Woods, 144.
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displaced Indian migrants as well.50 For example, the conference’s Shawnee hosts at 
Conestoga had drifted across much of the eastern continent, most recently from the 
hostile borders o f South Carolina into Pennsylvania’s hill country. In the Tuscaroras’ 
case, before Pennsylvania would “take them by the hand and lead them,” that colony’s 
commissioners demanded a certificate o f good behavior “to confirm the sincerity o f 
their past carriage towards the English, and to raise in us a good opinion of them”— an 
impossible demand that year before the Tuscarora War.51 Pennsylvania representatives 
also may have unintentionally dimmed hopes of relocating or appealing to other 
colonies still further by insisting that all English people were essentially the same, “tho’ 
divided into several Govmts.”52 Ultimately, this rebuffby Pennsylvania officials may 
had the unintentional effect o f making war in North Carolina more likely, by 
frustrating efforts by some Tuscaroras to relocate out of the region.
Appeals to the Iroquois met somewhat better success. Representatives agreed 
to carry the belts on to the Five Nations, beginning the process by which their leaders 
would gradually decide on a course to take with the petitioners.53 For their part, the 
Tuscarora speakers had declared that they were only delegates and not decision
50 James T. Lemon, The Best Poor Man's Country: A Geographical Study o f  Early 
Southeastern Pennsylvania (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); John 
Bartram, Lewis Evans, and Conrad Weiser, A Journey from  Pennsylvania to 
Onondaga in 1743 (Barre, Mass.: Imprint Society, 1973), 24.
51 Jennings writes that this was the “only instance on record o f a rebuffby a 
Pennsylvanian to Indians seeking hospitality” (Jennings, "Pennsylvania Indians," 83.)
52MPCP, 2:511.
53 MPCP, 2: 511.
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makers; the belts they carried were “only sent as an introduction and in order to break 
off hostilities till next spring.” At that time “their Kings” would come and “sue for the 
peace they so much desire.”54
More broadly, the prospect of peace and the potential for a Tuscarora 
migration helped spur another meeting weeks later in which Iroquois and Pennsylvania 
officials established what Francis Jennings has described as a secret “charter” to dictate 
future behavior in the Susquehanna Valley. “Indians may settle wherever Corn could 
be made;” “new settlements in these parts may be industrious;” “strangers may be 
helped for that was [the] Custom;” “peace might everywhere be known”—these are a 
sampling of the provisions recorded in the unofficial minutes. While laying out this 
framework, an Iroquois speaker there declared that “a peace between the Tuscaroroes 
and them being now in agitation, none of the young people here should war agt that 
Nation.”55
But when did the Tuscarora-Iroquois peace actually occur? The question is 
important because, despite promises o f a Tuscarora delegation in the spring o f 1711, 
records make no mention of the anticipated Tuscarora-Iroquois summit. Without an
54 MPCP, 2:511. It is unclear whether the three Tuscarora representatives,
Iwaagenst, Terrutawanaren, and Teonnottein, represented all o f the Tuscarora nation 
or only specific towns. The “kings” who were to come later would probably have 
more directly represented specific towns. This, then, might represent an example of 
the structure of politics in Tuscarora foreign affairs: generally individual towns 
attempted to coordinate their actions, but final decision-making remained in the hands 
of town leaders, who ideally represented a consensus o f their townspeople.
55 “Minutes, 31 July 1710,” in Penn Papers, Indian Affairs. Also see Jennings, 
"Pennsylvania Indians," 82-85 for a discussion of this treaty.
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official declaration of peace, hostilities continued to simmer. Violence resumed. As 
late as June 1711, Gov. Charles Gookin o f Pennsylvania met with the inhabitants o f 
Conestoga (several Senecas and Shawnees were also in attendance) to inform them of 
his intention o f establishing settlers along the branches of the Potomac, where 
hopefully they would reside in “mutual friendship” with the native inhabitants. No, 
replied the Indian leaders. Their reason: “as they are at present in Warr with the 
Toscororoes and other Indians, they think that place not safe for any Christians.” The 
proposed location lay astride the warpath, and Indian leaders worried that "if any 
Damage should happen to these [settlers] the blame will be laid upon them ."36
Perhaps the Indians at Conestoga purposefully painted relations in the worst 
possible light to forestall encroachment. Perhaps the Tuscarora leaders had not yet 
come. Perhaps the delegation had come but had temporarily failed in their objective of 
peace.37 Whatever the outcome, it was soon obscured by the outbreak of the 
Tuscarora War.
A survey of Tuscarora-Iroquois relations before 1711 reveals a long history 
that influenced some Tuscaroras to feel drawn northward even before the Tuscarora
56MPCP, 2: 533.
37 This continuation o f warfare with the Indians of the Susquehanna Valley as late as 
1711 may explain why Tuscaroras unhappy with their lot in North Carolina felt they 
could not merely depart. With no obvious way out, war with North Carolina 
settlements may have seemed a more viable option. Hints o f a rapprochement between 
the Iroquois and some of the Iroquoians o f the North Carolina and Virginia coastal 
plains is suggested by rumors that emerged in March 1711 that the “Nottoway and 
several Northern Indians had conferred together” to conspire against Virginia. See 
William Byrd, The Secret Diary o f  William Byrd o f  Westover, 1709-1712, ed. Louis
B. Wright and Marion Tinling (Richmond, Va.: The Dietz Press, 1941), 319.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
War. But these pulls were not the result o f deeply rooted friendship and cultural 
compatibility. Instead, talk o f migration represented a last-ditch effort to end Iroquois 
predation, paired with the push of aggressive colonial neighbors. Even then, talk of 
moving north never amounted to more than that—mere talk. Actual flight to Iroquoia 
did not take place until after the Tuscarora War made North Carolina homelands 
untenable for some emigrants. As long as Tuscaroras still had a choice, most chose 
not to go. Upon arrival, migrants would be building upon a history o f violence as 
much as shared cultural roots. Likewise, during the Tuscarora War itself and despite 
many colonists’ fears o f an outright Tuscarora-Iroquois alliance, what actually 
occurred was far more complex.
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A War to Embroil Us All?
Because the Tuscarora War erupted during the midst o f Tuscarora-Iroquois 
diplomacy, it would be no mere local conflict, easily stamped out. We have already 
seen how the conflagration in North Carolina’s Pamlico and Neuse basins sounded 
alarms along the volatile frontiers o f Virginia, South Carolina, and beyond, hastening 
politicians and soldiers to contain the blaze even while attempting to harness its energy 
to reshape the frontiers. Nonetheless, it seemed likely to spread, not just among small 
previously defeated bands of Virginia Indians or larger groups of Catawbas and their 
neighbors to the south. These skirmishes were mere kindling compared to that 
powder keg to the north, the Iroquois. What would they do?58 Would Iroquois 
warriors rush southward into the brewing free-for-all? If  so, predicted Governors 
Hyde and Pollock in North Carolina, the added weight o f Iroquois blows would break 
the colony’s back. Likewise, Spotswood and his predecessors in Virginia had long 
sought to deter passing Iroquois war parties, but now greater numbers threatened to 
transform the fringes of Virginia’s settlements into a perilous thoroughfare of 
crisscrossing marauders.
58 Tracing Iroquois participation in the Tuscarora War is an extremely difficult task. 
Fenton, Great Law, offers an excellent analysis o f some of the councils in New York 
related to the issue; but depending mostly upon published sources, he passes over 
several early key meetings and entirely neglects the Iroquois actual participation in 
North Carolina. Boyce spends little time on the actual participation o f the Iroquois in 
the Tuscarora War. See also Richter, Ordeal o f  the Longhouse, 238-39.
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In New York, the center o f Anglo-Iroquois diplomacy, Gov. Robert Hunter 
shared similar fears. The colonial conclusion of the War of Spanish Succession, 
known in the Americas as Queen Anne’s War, depended in no small part upon 
precarious Iroquois neutrality that prevented neither the French nor English from 
seizing the valuable corridor of the eastern Great Lakes.59 Even this neutrality, 
however, was something of an illusion, the result o f precariously balanced divisions 
within Iroquoia between anglophile and francophile factions.60 It seemed possible, 
indeed likely, that alliance with— or worse yet— adoption of, English-hating 
Tuscaroras from the south might tip the delicate balance. A conspiracy between 
Tuscaroras in North Carolina and Iroquois from New York might signal the start o f a 
general uprising among Indians along the entire the length of the Appalachians. From 
this perspective, what the Iroquois would do became the question o f the Tuscarora 
War.
But at other times— and this is what makes Hunter so interesting—the New 
York governor’s thoughts swung to the opposite extreme: a belief that the Iroquois, 
under New York’s direction, could impose peace upon the Tuscaroras and extend 
English authority across the backcountry. These beliefs grew out o f his confidence in 
a relationship between the English (in practice, usually New York) and the Iroquois 
called the “Covenant Chain.” This metaphorical bond of friendship born of decades of
59 Although hostilities did not formally end until the Treaty o f Utrecht in 1713, fighting 
in North America virtually ended by 1711.
60 Richter, Ordeal o f  the Longhouse, 214-15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
347
ongoing diplomacy that employed European and Iroquois protocols could lengthen to 
include other groups—in theory. What this process actually looked like remained 
undefined. The Tuscaroras, Hunter felt, had recently submitted themselves to the 
Iroquois; and the Iroquois, he mused, were tied by the Covenant Chain to New York. 
Therefore, he reasoned, the Iroquois should prove their friendship and goodwill by 
imposing authority over the Tuscaroras on New York’s behalf. Anything else would 
imply hostility.
Thus, New York’s agents repeatedly queried Iroquois politicians on the course 
they would take. But with sphinx-like inscrutability, Iroquois eyes stared back with 
questions o f their own: what course would the English—in particular New Yorkers— 
take? What did their actions signify? Remarkably, Indian observers in Onondaga, 
learning of events in the Carolinas, reached conclusions that mirrored back English 
fears in reverse. They, too, looked to English actions hundreds o f miles away in the 
Carolinas for clues to the state of Anglo-Iroquois relations. They, too, feared that the 
Tuscarora war would engulf them. However, they worried not o f an Indian 
conspiracy, but of the beginning of a general pan-English conspiracy designed 
ultimately to shatter the Covenant Chain and uproot the Tree of Peace. The war, 
some Iroquois feared, might even bespeak a broader English effort to roll back not just 
the Iroquois, but more broadly, other Indians like them. The fact that South 
Carolinians came to war alongside Catawbas, Yamasees, Cherokees, Creeks, and 
other Indians did little to alleviate fears. Historically these groups had often been 
enemies o f the Iroquois. If anything, the fact that North and South Carolinians, with
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whom New York’s envoys repeatedly claimed to be one people, would ally themselves 
with such traditional Iroquois enemies only heightened mistrust.
The ironies here are profound. Governor Hunter’s fondest hope was not to 
box in the Iroquois. Quite the opposite: under his supervision he wanted to extend the 
reach of Iroquois influence and use it as a tool to impose order into hard-to-reach 
corners o f the English colonial backcountry. During the decade of the Tuscarora War, 
New York policy envisioned the Iroquois acting and coordinating with the English as 
far south as the Carolinas. Likewise, a significant portion o f Iroquois politicians hoped 
to use their relationship with New York to influence English policies among distant 
colonies. Both groups expected cooperation to bring a speedy end to the conflict.
But failures at coordination fed flames o f mutual mistrust and hinted that dangerous 
schemes were afoot.
Linked to these tensions were the torrents of truths, half-truths, rumors, and 
lies that raced between the Carolinas and Iroquoia.61 During the early eighteenth 
century, the Iroquois increased their communications and relations southward with 
Indian groups in the Susquehanna Valley and beyond in what has been described as 
their “Southern Strategy” by historians and a “more than ordinary intercourse” by 
contemporaries.62 The same period, which witnessed England’s transformation into
61 Fenton also points out the importance of stories of white aggression spread by 
fleeing Indian refugees during this period (Fenton, Great Law, 387).
62 Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration : Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial 
Frontier, 1701-1754 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983); M dArch., 25: 
310.
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the British Empire after the Act of Union, also saw an increase o f cooperation among 
colonial governors according to new imperial strategies. The result was a rough 
rewiring o f the colonial borderlands into at least two distinct, yet linked networks. 
Like parallel circuits, one carried signals among Indians associated with the Iroquois, 
another linked colonial heads o f government.63
Often faulty and prone to interference, each network carried its share o f news 
and false static great distances. Not only did these new linkages allow the Iroquois 
and English to each re-conceptualize their own broad strategies (and eventually 
notions o f racial identity); they allowed each to scan the distant horizon for evidence 
of conspiracies among the other. Englishmen could piece together events of the 
Tuscarora War with unexplained behaviors among the Iroquois and imagine that 
Indians must be colluding. The opposite also held true. North Carolina Tuscaroras 
and New York Iroquois could compare local incidents, connect the dots, and for the
63 Stephen Saunders Webb argued for the creation of an interconnected imperial 
government during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a theory that 
has come under some fire. One does not have to fully agree with the inner workings 
of his “garrison-government” thesis to note an increasing interconnectedness among 
colonial officials, especially in Indian affairs, during this period. Warren Hofstra, for 
example, has recently investigated the role o f matters o f Indian defense, including the 
Tuscarora War, in creating a more unified British approach to the settlement and 
governance o f the frontiers. Stephen Saunders Webb makes his case in several works 
including Lord Churchill’s  Coup (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995) and 1676: The 
End o f  American Independence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984); for a sampling 
of critiques, see Erik Hinderaker, Review of Lord Churchill’s  Coup in New England 
Quarterly, 70, no. 1. (Mar., 1997), 150-53, and Richard R. Johnson, “The Imperial 
Webb: The Thesis o f Garrison Government in Early American Considered,” WMQ, 3rd 
ser., vol. 43, no. 3 (July 1986), 408-30. Warren R. Hofstra, ‘“ The Extention of His 
Majesties Dominions’: The Virginia Backcountry and the Reconfiguration of Imperial 
Frontiers,” Journal o f  American History, 84, no. 4 (March 1998), 1281-1312.
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first time discern broad patterns of English behavior. Meetings meant to brighten the 
Covenant Chain might only heighten discord by bringing together clashing 
interpretations, making Indians and Iroquois each appear to be liars in the eyes o f the 
other. In such a setting, resolving the crises created by the Tuscarora War would be no 
easy task.
Iroquois in the Tuscarora War
Deciphering the role o f the Iroquois in the Tuscarora War is difficult in part 
because the state o f Iroquois-Tuscarora relations was unclear at the war’s outbreak. 
Hostility between Tuscaroras and Iroquois had continued until the eve of the war, if 
not later. Contradictory accounts of hostility or collusion appeared throughout the 
war years. Moreover, neither the Tuscaroras nor the Iroquois acted as a single, 
unified body. Therefore, the greatest effect o f the Iroquois was the uncertainty they 
caused for participants on every side.
The local causes for the war in North Carolina have already been described.
Did the Iroquois contribute to these? Seeking to uncover the war’s roots, in January 
1712 John Barnwell learned through interrogations o f Tuscarora prisoners that twelve 
Iroquois had come recently and “made peace with them.” The Iroquois listened to 
stories o f abuses, particularly an incident where a settler had set upon a Tuscarora for 
an insult committed while drinking.64 The Iroquois, who like the Tuscaroras, blamed
64 Barnwell, “Journal,” 397.
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inebriated incidents on the drink and not the drinker, would have sided with the 
speaker. Anger provoked by an Iroquois war captain’s recent death at the hands o f 
whites while hunting near Virginia may have furthered Iroquois sympathy for the 
Tuscaroras’ plight.65
Despite sympathies, the Iroquois response was part offer o f assistance, part 
bravado sure to rile former enemies turned hosts:
whites had imposed upon them[, claimed the Iroquois speaker,] and 
that when the whites had used them so, they knocked them on the 
head, they advised them that they were fools to slave and hunt to 
furnish themselves with the white people’s food, it was but killing of 
them and become possessed of their substance, that they did not fear 
the want o f ammunition for that, they would come twice a year and 
furnish them with it.66 
Considering subsequent confusion over the Iroquois position, it is unclear whether this 
half-derisive offer o f assistance represented formal promises o f aid on the part o f the 
Iroquois Confederacy or tongue wagging by a few hotheaded warriors. Moreover, 
accepting such an offer, with its implicit economic, military, and cultural hierarchy, 
might entail exchanging one form of dependency for another.
Nonetheless, accounts quickly circulated of aid amounting to more than 
powder and shot. In November 1711, when Christopher Gale arrived in South
65 CSP (1710-1711), 355-57.
66 Barnwell, “Journal,” 397-98.
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Carolina to beg for help, he added to his colony’s list o f woes news that the 
Tuscaroras and “Senekoes” had “become one nation” and that he was “certainly 
informed” that a “considerable number” were “coming to cohabit with the Tuscaroras, 
our enemies this winter.”67 A few months later, Spotswood wrote to Lord Dartmouth 
detailing reports “from persons who had lately lived among the Indians” that the 
Iroquois have been “very industrious to unite all the scattered bodys o f Indians on the 
frontiers o f this and the neighboring Governments.” “Such a combination o f all our 
neighbouring Indians,” he dryly surmised, “might put our frontiers in a very unhappy 
condition.”68
But despite colonists’ fears of Iroquois-Tuscarora collusion, even Tuscaroras 
taking part in the war wondered over the meaning of the evolving relationship and did 
their best to shape it. In New York, Governor Hunter in April 1712 got wind of a 
Tuscarora delegation on its way north to present “several belts o f wampum” to the 
Iroquois.69 Rather than attempting to “engage the Five Nations in their quarrel,” the
67 NCCR 1: 829.
68 CSP (1710-1711), 355-57; Spotswood, Letters, 1: 138-46. The language that these 
reports share of “one nation” and plans to “unite all the scattered bodys of Indians,” 
suggest once-removed perceptions among colonial leaders o f the expanding roots of 
the Tree o f Peace.
69 Cadwallader Colden, "History of the Five Indian Nations, Continuation, 1707- 
1720," in The Letters and Papers o f  Cadwallader Colden, vol. 9, New York Historical 
Society Collections (New York: New York Historical Society, 1937), 409 [hereafter 
Colden, Continuation].
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Tuscarora delegates hoped the Iroquois would stay out.70 The representatives 
speaking to the Iroquois “desire[d] them not to Joyn with her Majesty’s [forces]”, not 
to “assist them [the colonists] is this Warr, nor to resent the[ir] entring into it.”71 The 
reticence makes sense considering their recent rivalry. Any alliance with Iroquois 
warriors, formerly the scourge of Tuscarora towns, would be young and shaky. What 
was to prevent the Iroquois from partnering with North Carolina?
Whereas some Tuscaroras feared Iroquois intervention, Governor Hunter 
recognized the same possibility and hoped for it. Even before the Tuscarora 
emissaries had arrived among the Iroquois in New York, instead preceded by “3 
Indians who gave an Acct that they were on the way,” Hunter hurried to enact a 
counterplan.72 Unlike leaders of the southern colonies who quaked at the thought o f a 
Tuscarora-Iroquois relationship, Hunter hoped to take advantage of it. His view
70 Quotation from Colden, Continuation, 409. Colden presents one o f the most useful 
descriptions o f Iroquois-Tuscarora diplomacy during this period. However, from my 
reading of New York’s colonial council minutes, I disagree with Colden’s assessment 
that the Tuscaroras did “engage the Five Nations in their quarrel” at this meeting.
71 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 5 April, New York Council Minutes, 11: 69- 
70.Unfortunately this document is extremely fragmented physically, particularly 
around the key passage from which I quote above. I feel that my interpretation of the 
text best corresponds to collaborating circumstances. Several other sources portray 
the same document as a direct appeal by the Tuscaroras for Iroquois aid (see, for 
example, Colden, Continuation, 409, NY Council, Calendar, 246.) Further confusing 
the issue, it is unclear if these Tuscaroras came from the Upper or Lower Towns. 
Subsequent events suggest that Blount may have played a hand from early on in trying 
to prevent the Iroquois from participating in the war. This would suggest, from the 
beginning of the conflict, that Blount saw the war from its beginning in terms o f a 
threat to his people’s autonomy at the hands of the Iroquois.
72 Colden, Continuation, 409.
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demonstrated a different vision of what such an alliance might mean. Rather than an 
equal partnership, Hunter thought he perceived a chain o f domination that extended 
from the Tuscaroras to the Iroquois and ultimately back into his hands. Therefore, 
Hunter commissioned Lawrence Claessen, an interpreter who had spent his youth as 
an adopted captive among the Mohawks, to travel to Onondaga and deliver word that 
he “expects the[m] [to] interpose their interest and authority” over the Tuscaroras in 
order to immediately end the w ar.73 If the Tuscaroras refused to heed their superiors, 
then Hunter demanded that the Iroquois should join with “her Majestys Subjects 
w[ith] whom the[y] are in alliance and . . . Carry on the War with all possible] vigour 
agst the Tuscaroro Indians.”74
Thus, at the war’s outset, several interpretations o f the Tuscaroras-Iroquois 
relationship presented themselves. For the Tuscaroras, were the Iroquois comrades, 
mollified enemies, or sovereign lords? Instead, the Iroquois attempted to chart a 
course different from any of these, one that reveals much about the Iroquois 
perception o f the Covenant Chain and their role in Indian-European diplomacy.
After listening to Claessen at Onondaga, the Iroquois council— or at least 
members o f the anglophile faction— accepted the need to settle the conflict in North 
Carolina. But rather than volunteering as New York’s thugs, they sought to be 
peacemakers. The chief function of the Iroquois League was condolence. The
73 He was captured by Canadian Iroquois during the 1690 raid on Schenectady. 
Richter, Ordeal, 220; Axtell, Invasion Within, 262.
74 Quotations from Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 7, 1712 5 April, New York Council Minutes, 
11:69-70.
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Iroquois envisioned themselves expanding League principles by assuming a symbolic 
role o f the keeper o f the fire who sat and mediated between two angered parties.75 
Moreover, the speakers at Onondaga hoped to negotiate this peace within the context 
o f the Covenant Chain that bound the Iroquois and New York together as partners. 
Both must act together.
Therefore, the Iroquois replied to Claessen that they “promised to send 
Messengers” to North Carolina only if Hunter would also send some emissaries “to act 
in concert with them.” 76 Together these “wise men . . . sent from the govt o f New 
York” would “meet wt the Sachems they design’d” and “hear and examine into the 
occasions of the Differences . . .to determine between the contending parties” having 
“taken the hatchet out of the hands of the Tuscaroras that the Messengers or Deputys 
on both sides might meet with more freedom.”77 “They were sure o f performing what 
was desir’d if this method were taken and any reasonable terms proposed.”78 On 
behalf o f Hunter and New York, Claessen agreed.
Despite this roadmap to peace, whereby Iroquois and New York cooperation 
would stop war in North Carolina, the two parties found themselves veering 
unexpectedly into a wilderness of distrust and estrangement. One sign of the rocky
75 Fenton, Great Law, 25-33.
76 Colden, Continuation, 409.
77 Colden, Continuation, 411. The implication here is that New York’s emissaries 
were similarly responsible for taking the hatchet out o f the hands of North Carolina. 
Peace was to be mutual, not a one-sided affair with a victor and a loser.
78 Colden, Continuation, 409.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
356
road ahead came from the note of suspicion the Iroquois sensed in Claessen’s 
mission—exacerbated when the Iroquois surely detected him gathering intelligence on 
the Five Nation military strength.79 Afterwards, in time-honored fashion, Hunter sent 
word that if the Iroquois imagined the “least jealousy of their fidelity to her Majesty,” 
they could blame the messenger.80
Competing stories reaching Onondaga furthered Iroquois doubts. Hunter 
instructed Claessen to convince Iroquois listeners that it was the “Tuscararo Indians 
who are the aggressors and who without any Declaration of Warr began it in a very 
barbarous way.”81 But the Tuscarora envoys claimed fighting “was occasion’d by the 
Christians” when a planter had seized two Tuscaroras for taking “tobacco from a 
Gentlemans.”82 The planter, according to Tuscarora informants, killed one and 
whipped the other, who subsequently fled to one of their towns. Some time 
afterwards (perhaps after the war had begun?) the Carolinians had “made an assault on 
that Castle but were beaten off.”83 For Iroquois listeners, who had a lengthy memory 
of being similarly driven from colonists’ doorsteps and accused of theft, the story had
79 Robert Livingston, The Livingston Indian Records, 1666-1723, ed. Lawrence H 
Leder (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 1956), 220-21; Iroq. Doc. 
Hist., reel 7; 1712 13 May, “Order from N. Y. Gov. Hunter for an account o f strength 
o f the Five Nations,” Livingston Family Papers, Indian Affairs.
80 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 10 May, New York Council Minutes, 11: 81-83.
81 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 5 April, New York Council Minutes, 11: 69-70.
82 The variety o f such different accounts among Tuscaroras raises the possibility that 
Tuscaroras had perceived themselves already to be in a state of war begun by 
Europeans before the September 1711 uprising.
83 Colden, Continuation, 409.
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a ring o f truth; but neither account could be confirmed. The predicament illustrates 
the difficulties o f listening at the end of two parallel communication networks, one 
native and one colonial, neither entirely reliable.84
Moreover, Hunter and the Iroquois council blithely walked away with two 
different interpretations o f their agreement. Hunter sent thanks to the Iroquois for 
“interposing their endeavours for a peace between her Majestys subjects o f Carolina 
and the Tuscarora Indians.”85 Whereas from the Iroquois perspective taking the 
hatchet from the Tuscaroras signified the first step towards multi-party negotiations, 
Hunter persisted in his notion that the Iroquois should force  a peace unilaterally upon 
the Tuscaroras. Contacts between the Iroquois and the Tuscaroras that did not result 
in a speedy cessation of war might hint that the Iroquois were not being entirely 
trustworthy, and might even be cooperating with the Tuscaroras.
At the same time that the Iroquois were finding themselves unwilling actors in 
an unexpected role, the New York governor was himself failing to perform the 
Iroquois version o f the script. Send ambassadors— urged the Iroquois— let them join
84 For an example o f these networks in action among Indians and colonial officials, see 
the March 6, 1713 letter from Pollock to Hunter (NCCR, 2: 23-25). In it Pollock 
mentions the sequence by which a rumor (regarding the death o f two Iroquois in 
North Carolina) moved: 1) from Indians in North Carolina to Iroquois in New York 
(possibly to Claessen) ; 2) to Col. Schuyler; 3) to Gov. Hunter; 4) to Secretary Clarke; 
5) to Gov. Hyde to Pollock. This same rumor may also have traveled native networks 
via Tuscarora messengers and then through Indian runners. See Colden, Continuation, 
409 and Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 5 April, New York Council Minutes, 11: 69-70. 
The number of Indians killed changed from one to two. The process took 
approximately a year. Pollock insisted that the entire story was false.
85 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 10 May, New York Council Minutes, 11: 81-83.
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counterparts from Onondaga on a trip to North Carolina to end the war there. But 
Hunter did not. He offered no representatives to accompany Iroquois peace 
delegations. Instead, Hunter informed Iroquois leaders that he must first coordinate 
separately with the governor o f North Carolina.86 Speed was not his forte. Only 
months later, in late July 1712, did he finally pen a letter to Governor Hyde in North 
Carolina. Even then, he complained that New York could not afford to send the 
ambassadors that the Iroquois wanted until Hyde somehow came up with the money 
and wrote back to him— a several month process. Instead, time passed, North 
Carolina spiraled deeper into debt, and Hyde died.87
Even more damning to the Iroquois proposals was North Carolina’s secret 
opposition. Hyde would never admit as much to Hunter, but in a message to South 
Carolina the North Carolina governor laid out his resistance to allowing New York 
and the Iroquois to become powerbrokers for peace: depending on assistance from a 
royal colony such as New York “would not do so well” for either North or South 
Carolina, “it being a fair way” for the Carolinas’ Proprietors “to lose their Province to 
the Queen by reason of not being able to defend it.”88 As if New York’s meddling was 
not bad enough, if the “five nations o f Indians should come in and destroy the
86 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 10 May, New York Council Minutes, 11: 81-83.
87 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1712 July, Letter from N.Y. Gov. Hunter to Col. Edward 
Hyde, New York State Archives, Colonial Manuscripts, 58: 2; NCCR 1: 874; 2:23-25.
88 This same attitude helps explain the rocky relationship between the royal colony 
Virginia and proprietary colony North Carolina during this period. The fact that New 
York and Virginia were both royal colonies, however, did not prevent their governors 
from arguing about the role of the Iroquois.
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Tuscaroras,” wrote Hyde, “they would not only have all the advantage o f the slaves 
but by pretending a privilege in the Tusquerora country that they had conquered, they 
would become bad neighbors to their Indians, either to destroy them, [or] join with 
them against the Government.”89 The Iroquois authority that Hunter sought, Hyde 
feared: why trade one set o f Indian enemies for another set o f Indian overlords?
Hunter may not have been entirely at fault, but the Iroquois perceived such 
delays as evidence that the New York governor only feigned interest in peace.
Instead, to Iroquois observers, his sluggish insistence on first coordinating with North 
Carolinians suggested a willingness to put aside the Covenant Chain in favor of 
cooperation with distant English governments. Hunter insisted that colonists from 
New York to the Carolinas were all one people, owing allegiance to one government 
and coordinating their actions. Meant as reassurance, such statements did the reverse, 
making it possible for Iroquois to suspect that Tuscarora tales o f thefts, murder, and 
enslavement were not isolated North Carolina events—they might be part o f a broad 
English scheme.90 Rumors traveling along the same paths o f other skirmishes between 
settlers and Indians around Maryland in early 1712 further darkened the atmosphere.91 
Thus, at the same time that English leaders scanned the horizon for signs o f a 
Tuscarora-Iroquois storm, the Iroquois read the winds of a pan-English conspiracy.
89 NCCR, 1: 900. Pollock did express similar views openly in a letter to Hunter on 
May 12, 1712 (NCCR, 2:23-25).
90 At the meeting with Pennsylvania officials at Conestoga in 1710, officials similarly 
informed the Tuscaroras that “most of this Continent were the subjects o f the Crown 
o f Great Britain, tho’ divided into several Govmts,” (MPCP, 2: 511).
91 N Y  Legislative Journal, 337.
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French agents did their best to add to the gloomy forecast.92 Among the 
Iroquois, this was a period o f extreme oscillation, where the “political pendulum 
swung wildly from francophile to anglophile extremes.”93 The Tuscarora War offered 
an opportunity to sway the Iroquois against the English. French missionaries and 
agents asserted that “the English o f New York had join’d with the People o f  Carolina 
and had promised to fall upon the 5 nations because o f their being confederates to the 
Tuscaroras.”94
To prove their case, emissaries o f New France assembled the pieces o f a 
scattered puzzle. First, English forces that expelled French traders from several 
Iroquois towns had hung placards bearing the queen’s arms— an act, the French told 
them, which was intended to signify English possession of Iroquois lands.95 Then 
there were the disappointments o f the “ill success o f the Expeditions against 
Canada.”96 Those repeated failures of military cooperation between the Iroquois and
92 In the spring 1711, distrust towards Europeans had risen to such a level among the 
Iroquois that they had questioned French agents if the English were secretly 
cooperating with the French in a secret European conspiracy against the Indians 
(Colden, Continuation, 399).
93 Richter, Ordeal o f  the Longhouse, 214-15.
94 Quotation from Colden, Continuation, 410; N Y Legislative Journal, 337.
95 Wraxall, Abridgement, 92; Colden, Continuation, 410.
96 In 1709 a joint Iroquois-English mission against Canada had been aborted. Again, 
in 1711, 682 Iroquois (and Shawnee) warriors joined another expedition that got only 
as far as the tributaries of Lake Champlain before turning back upon hearing of the 
destruction o f the English fleet in the Saint Lawrence River. On this occasion sachems 
had complained, “Brethren we have now tried twice with you to go to Canada to 
reduce it to her Majesties Obedience, We are therefore now so ashamed that we must 
cover our Faces” (Wraxall, Abridgement, 92).
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English had bred deep distrust in English manliness and their willingness to join the 
Iroquois in concerted action. Atop this, the French asserted that a chest recovered 
from an English shipwreck contained secret plans for the English to turn against “all 
the Indians” after defeating New France.97
Economics completed the puzzle. French spokespeople pointed out recent 
English stinginess in presents (actually the result o f a cash-strapped legislature torn by 
divisions between old Dutch elites and English officials, and debt incurred by the 
Canada expeditions) and high powder prices as evidence of an English plan that the 
Iroquois “might have none to defend themselves” and thereby “lose their country.”98 
The Iroquois, like most Indians, equated fair, equitable trade with a state o f peace and 
harmony. Rising prices signaled eroding friendship.99 In contrast, the French handed 
out powder to the Five Nations to go “out a fighting to the Southward” alongside the 
Tuscaroras.100
97 Wraxall, Abridgement, 92; Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 14 June, New York 
Council Minutes, 11: 100-103.
98 Wraxall, Abridgement, 92; Colden, Continuation, 410.
99 Ramsey makes a similar argument about the relationship of prices to diplomacy in 
his explanation of the Yamasee War. William L. Ramsey, '"Something Cloudy in Their 
Looks': The Origins of the Yamasee War Reconsidered," Journal o f  American History 
90, no. 1 (June 2003): 44-76. See NYCD, 5: 441, for an example o f Hunter trying to 
convince an Iroquois audience in 1715 that “the prices ofBever etc does not at all 
depend upon the pleasure of any man or number o f men, but intirely upon the demands 
there happen to be for those commodities in the European markets.”
100 N Y  Legislative Journal, 337.
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Acting on fear and French promises, the francophile faction became more 
vocal, asserting that “they will not join with her Majestys Interest if there should be 
occasion.”101 So far, Iroquois warriors had taken little real action either for or against 
the warring Tuscaroras. But increasingly it seemed, even to some Iroquois leaders, 
that dissatisfaction with the English would transform into concerted acts on behalf of 
Hancock’s Tuscaroras. Which way would the Iroquois pendulum swing?
Riding ahead of the brewing storm, the Onondaga sachem, Teganissorens, 
reached Albany in mid-June 1712 to report that young men were passing belts of 
wampum seven-hands wide, signifying that they were “making bullets and getting their 
Warriors ready in order to go and cut off the Christians.”102 These militants planned a 
“meeting on the Tuskohana [Susquehanna] River to joine the Tuscarora Indians.”103 
Driving their actions, New York officials learned, were suspicions “mistrusting that 
wee are joined with those of Carolina to distroy them”—again, evidence that Iroquois 
viewed Hunters’ laggardly efforts at coordination though a lens o f doubt.104 In 
response, New York commissioners gathered several Mohawk sachems at Albany and 
dressed them down for “their inhumane Intentions, their Infidelity and Baseness in 
Attempting to break a sacred Covenant.”105 Iroquois apologies did little to allay fears.
101 N Y  Legislative Journal, 337.
102 Wraxall, Abridgement, 93. Teganissorens also appears in the records as 
Decanesora, Canassore, and de Cannasora. Fenton, Great Law, 389-91.
103 N Y  Legislative Journal, 340.
1,14 N Y  Legislative Journal, 340.
105 Wraxall, Abridgement, 93.
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Robert Hunter afterwards worried to the Board o f Trade that “the war betwixt the 
people of North Carolina and the Tuscarora Indians is like to embroil us all.” 106 
For months, such rumblings rolled through the South. In early 1713, a 
Meherrin named John Querro reported rumors among the Tuscaroras that “about the 
time o f the leaves coming or between that time and hott weather the Sinnagars were 
Expected, perhaps a thousand or more.”107 Similarly, the following summer, when a 
Tuscarora leader was captured and executed, his dying words included an admission 
that the Senecas “have promised them a powerful assistance” and that they would 
arrive in late August. The news echoed letters to the same effect coming via official 
channels from Governor H unter.108 The North Carolina Council resolved on July 31 
to send an express to an Indian trader named Martin at the head of the Potomac to 
“gett Intelligence from him of the motion of the Seneca Indyans.”109
Nonetheless, the massive invasion never came, in part because o f the ongoing 
efforts of New York officials. Hunter secured from the assembly £50 for gifts and 
another £50 to pay for a journey to Onondaga by a virtual Who’s Who list o f Albany’s 
Indian affairs experts: besides Lawrence Claessen, who was returning to Onondaga yet
m NYCD  5:343.
107 CVSP, 1: 153-54.
108 CSP (1712-1714), 13-20. In the same letter Spotswood continued: “It was but the 
other day that a party o f Tuscaroras killed 3 and wounded two Nottoway Indians our 
Tributarys as they were hunting near our inhabitants, which seems only a prelude to 
what we may expect after their conjunction with the Senequas.”
109 NCCR 1: 866.
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again, there was Peter Schuyler, a Commissioner of Indian Affairs and former mayor 
of Albany, Elizabeth "Madam" Catherine Montour, a skilled interpreter who was the 
daughter o f a French trader and an Algonquin Indian, and M ontour’s Iroquois 
husband.110 Their mission: to “disswade [the Iroquois] from this fatall design”111 and 
“indeceive them of the ill impressions they have rec’d from the ffrench [and] and to 
Engage them to a firm adherence to their covenants and promises to this 
Government.”112 Schuyler was to refute “groundless reports” and “continue to 
preserve and cultivate a good understanding and lasting friendship” by thanking them 
for their earlier proposals to negotiate a Tuscarora peace, and to assure the Iroquois 
that the English had no plans to claim their lands.113 Most o f all Hunter hoped that “ 
they will upon his [Schuyler’s] oration renew their Covenant with him and continue in
110 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1712 16 June, Letter from N.Y. Gov. Hunter to Col. Peter 
Schuyler, N.Y., Colonial Manuscripts, 57: 169.
111NYCD  5: 343
112 N Y Legislative Journal, 337.
113 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 14 June, N.Y., Council Minutes, 11: 100-103. See 
also Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1712 16 June (II), Letter o f N.Y. Gov. Hunter to the 
Commissioners for Indian Affairs N.Y., Colonial Manuscripts, 57: 170.
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the same joint interest ”114 To seal their friendship and allay accusations o f stinginess, 
he was to offer them five barrels of powder waiting for them at Albany.115
On July 3, 1712, Schuyler reached Onondaga and carried out his charge. 
Turning previous accusations on their head, he argued that it was the French who 
were trying to engage the Iroquois in the Tuscarora War: “merely that their fighting 
Men might be sent far away and they have an Opportunity o f falling upon their 
defenceless Wives and Children in their Absence.”116 The Iroquois agreed to renew 
the Covenant Chain, but in doing so, took the opportunity to demand a reduction in 
the prices of English goods as a sign o f goodwill.117 Moreover, they called attention 
to New York’s failure at joint diplomacy to end the Tuscarora War. They were still 
waiting for “some fit Persons should be sent from New York thither.”118 “It seemed
114 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 14 June, N.Y., Council Minutes, 11: 100-103. See 
also Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1712 16 June (II), Letter of N.Y. Gov. Hunter to the 
Commissioners for Indian Affairs N.Y., Colonial Manuscripts, 57: 170.
115 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 14 June, N.Y., Council Minutes, 11: 100-103. Iroq. 
Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1712 16 June (II), Letter o f N.Y. Gov. Hunter to the 
Commissioners for Indian Affairs N.Y., Colonial Manuscripts, 57: 170 differs in that it 
includes the caveot that if Schuyler feels suspicious towards the Iroquois, he was not 
to mention the powder.
116 This is quoted from Wraxall, Abridgement, 94, but seems to match the partially 
illegible instructions issued to Schuyler in Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7; 1712 14 June, N.Y., 
Council Minutes, 11: 100-103.
117 Quoted from Wraxall, Abridgement, 95; Colden, Continuation, 411. Complaints of 
gouging continued. In October, Iroquois met officials from Pennsylvania who 
recorded that the Indians desired “to “come to Buy and sell with us” because they had 
been “ill used by those o f Albany.” (MPCP, 2: 557; Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1712 14 
Oct, Pennsylvania Provincial Council Minutes, Pennsylvania Provincial Records, Vol. 
D, pp 288-289).
118 Wraxall, Abridgement, 96
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strange that you took no Notice o f our Proposal,” continued the speaker. “It is an 
Affront when one writes to another and they return no Answer. . . ”119
The meeting did head off the creation o f a large pro-Tuscarora army: indeed, 
Iroquois politicians claimed— inaccurately—to have “taken the hatchet from the hands 
of the Tuscarora Indians.”120 Nonetheless, politicians at Onondaga did not or could 
not prevent smaller warrior bands from heading south. Hunter later claimed that these 
were “chiefly some loose and stragling Indians o f the Five Nations who joyn’d the 
Tucaruros.”121 But on the receiving end in Virginia, Spotswood guessed the number 
to be about two hundred. 122 It was one such band that ambushed the trader Robert 
Hix’s caravan near the Eno River as it unsuccessfully attempted to skirt the Tuscarora 
War. Survivors reported that the perpetrators “did not disown their being Mohacks 
and other Northern Indians.”123 Some of the plunder was intended for desperately 
under-supplied Lower Town Tuscaroras; the rest, Spotswood complained to Hunter,
119 Wraxall, Abridgement, 96; Colden writes that “the Govr had sent an Answer to this 
Proposal of Sending Deputys but for what reason I know not the Comrs did not 
communicate in the usual form to the 5 Nations which is the reason they complain of 
having no answer and thinking themselves neglected” (Colden, Continuation, 411).
120 Wraxall, Abridgement, 96.
121 NYCD, 5: 548-49. This quote is from 1720—but it was probably partially in 
response to Spotswood’s accusations that the Iroquois raided traders during the 
Tuscarora War.
122 CSP (1719-1720), Item No. 535 pp. 323-27.
123 NCCR, 2: 48-49. Livingston, Indian Records, 222-24; NYCD, 5: 491. O f course, 
there is the possibility, explored in a later section, that such incidents offered the 
opportunity for imposture.
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was “publickly vended to the northward, [so] that it is no secret to your people at 
Albany.”124 Afterwards small Iroquois bands spread fears across the North Carolina 
and Virginia frontier, but fled before Virginia’s more cumbersome militia.125 In North 
Carolina, Pollock also reported hearing that some Iroquois were “now among the 
Tuscaroras.”126
More than anything, these conflicting reports o f Iroquois behavior reveal that 
the sort of compulsory, top-down authority that Hunter hoped to employ through the 
Covenant Chain did not really exist in Iroquois society. Hunter envisioned using 
power politics to impose peace in North Carolina from his seat hundreds o f miles 
away, but the tools for such coercion did not exist.
At the same time that some Iroquois warriors were providing limited assistance 
to the Lower Alliance, other Iroquois diplomats attempted to make good on offers to 
mediate the conflict, but met foreseeable difficulties. An Oneida named Anethae 
journeyed to North Carolina to “caution the Tuscaroras against going to warr with the 
English here.”127 His mission came to an abrupt halt in early 1713 when Colonel 
M oore’s South Carolinians killed a party of Tuscaroras and captured Anethae among 
them. The Iroquois diplomat’s explanation that he was in Carolina “persuant to an
™MPCP, 3:82-89.
125 NCCR, 2: 48-49.
126 NCCR, 2: 23-25.
127 NCCR, 2: 1-2.
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order from the Government o f New York” saved his life, but not the mission. Pollock 
packed his unwilling guest onto the next sloop bound for Manhattan and touted the 
incident as proof o f the extraordinary lengths to which he was willing to go to 
preserve peace and prove goodwill towards the Iroquois.128
From the deck of a ship, however, Anethae was literally out to sea, unable to 
accomplish anything. For good measure, Pollock sent along a note disapproving o f any 
plan to “fly to the Indians and hire them to be mediators of a peace.”129 Then, adding 
to the insult, Pollock forced Hunter’s government to pay for Anethae’s passage. The 
incident proved what the Iroquois had been saying all along: namely, Iroquois 
ambassadors, by themselves, must fail. One can only imagine the difference, if a New 
York official— say Claessen or Schuyler— had been by Anethae’s side when Carolina 
troops encountered him
Anethae’s unexpected voyage at least saved him from the challenge of 
negotiating the rocky waters of divided and, at times, hostile Tuscarora factions.
Iroquois warriors, for example, became involved in inter-Tuscarora strife when 
members o f the Lower Alliance captured an Upper Town delegate and gave him to the 
Iroquois.130 Tuscarora politics, it has already been shown, were a confusing swirl of
128 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1713 28 Oct, Account o f Hendrick Hansen for supplies to 
the Indians and Disbursments on his journey to Onondaga, N.Y., Colonial 
Manuscripts, 58: 173-175.
129 NCCR, 2:23-25.
130 EJCCV, 3: 352; Spotswood, “examination of the Indians,”
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conflicting factions during the war years. Even if they wanted peace, where would 
Iroquois diplomats begin?131
Some Tuscaroras who were inclined towards peace, nonetheless did not 
welcome Iroquois interference. The skilled Tuscarora politician Tom Blount was 
never one to allow himself to be shut out from any aspect o f negotiations. He claimed 
responsibility for sending four ambassadors to New York who met with the 
Commissioners of Indian Affairs in Albany. They returned in late winter 1713 with a 
letter from the commissioners.132 Characteristically, Blount described the letter to the 
North Carolina officials, but never introduced to them an Iroquois sachem named 
Conaguanee who accompanied the letter. Instead, Blount preserved his own 
exclusive role as Indian spokesperson to North Carolina.
There may also have been a deeper, more fundamental tension. Eager to 
maintain and build his own position, Blount joined North Carolina officials in being 
wary towards inviting Iroquois interference. Blount’s message from Iroquoia, that 
“there is no great danger o f the Seneca Indians, coming to help the Enemy,” makes it 
possible that they were those mentioned by Hunter in the spring o f 1712.133 Their 
objective, to keep Iroquois warriors at bay, suggests that from the war’s initial outset, 
Blount feared Iroquois dominance as much as colonial retaliation. In other words,
131 They seem to have come to both the Lower Towns (for example, Anethae was 
captured among Tuscarora combatants) and to the Upper Towns (Conaguanee, for 
example, met with Blount).
122 NCCR, 2: 21, 23-25.
m  NCCR, 2: 21, 23-25.
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Blount wanted to end the war, but not on Iroquois terms. In fact, one wonders, 
whether Blount’s position during the war and his willingness to deal with North 
Carolina authorities can be understood primarily in terms o f his wariness towards the 
Iroquois.
The question stood: would Blount escape the violence of the Tuscarora War 
through the Iroquois or through North Carolina? Which choice would better protect 
his people? Which choice would preserve and elevate Blount’s authority? Tensions 
reached a head when Conaguanee reproached Blount, telling him that the English 
“only amused him with fair words to keep him from doing them mischief, but when 
they had destroyed the rest of his nations, he might be sure to be destroyed likewise.”
Then, the Iroquois diplomat attempted to use the moment to strengthen the 
Confederacy in its time-honored tradition of assimilation— a maneuver sure to rile 
Blount. “If he would take his advice,” suggested Conaguanee, “he would settle him 
out o f danger of the English.” Blount’s response was sharp: “He would not hear him;” 
the Iroquois sachem should “leave them to themselves and mind his own concerns.”134
For everyone involved, the possibility o f Iroquois intrusion in the Tuscarora 
War provoked great consternation; but it remained only that— a possibility. Far from 
either single-handedly ending the war or from turning British frontiers into an 
unbroken horizon of destruction, the Iroquois were reduced to little more than hapless 
bystanders. Stymied at nearly every turn, the Iroquois exerted little real influence even
134 NCCR, 2: 21
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as the war raced towards its bloody end. In March 1713, as M oore’s army besieged 
Neoheroka in what would prove the decisive battle, “a considerable body of northern 
Indians,” Spotswood later discovered, “came into the Tuscaroruro Country, and 
would have persuaded the neutral towns to join with them in raising that siege.”135 
Iroquois warriors and peaceful emissaries alike would have blanched at the impending 
slaughter; neither could prevent it. Neoheroka fell; its inhabitants were killed, 
enslaved, and put to flight. Only in the aftermath did the Iroquois indirectly have some 
ameliorative effect. Persistent rumors that the Iroquois— even then— might step in 
encouraged English forces to move speedily towards negotiations, rather than inflict 
further revenge.136
135 NCCR, 2: 38, 48-49.
136 NCCR, 2: 48-49.
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Reactions to Refugees
Neoheroka’s destruction did little to calm tensions in the region, nor did it 
divert the dangerous orbits of New Yorkers, Southern colonists, and Iroquois caught 
in the gravitational pull o f the Tuscaroras’ struggle. During the war, authorities had 
repeatedly feared that Iroquois might come south to join the Lower Alliance in its war 
efforts. Such worries had provoked great sound and fury but signified nothing. 
Increasingly, however, new fears mounted about a flow in the other direction, as 
Tuscarora refugees fled north and resettled near and among the Iroquois. The 
contentious postwar construction of lines o f authority so diligently debated by 
Spotswood, Pollock, and Blount extended beyond the Carolinas and Virginia into New 
York and Iroquoia.
Tuscarora refugees began to arrive in New York’s backcountry as early as the 
summer o f 1712. Justices from Ulster County reported that the sachems of the 
Esopus Indians— an Algonquian group also sometimes known as “River Indians” who 
fled the Hudson Valley towards the northern headwaters of the Susquehanna in the 
late seventeenth century—“desire to settle some others among them whom its believed 
are some o f those who are in Warr with North Carolina.”137 The timing of these 
Tuscaroras’ arrival suggests that they fled during the early days o f Barnwell’s invasion. 
They claimed to be neutral, that they “have lost their Country” because they would
137 Iroq, Doc. Hist. , reel 7, 1712 3 July, N.Y., Council Minutes, 11: 115-116; N Y  
Council Calendar, 248.
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“not be engaged in the Warr against the people of North Carolina.” Left with little 
recourse in the face o f this surprise arrival, New York’s Council granted permission 
for this charter band of Tuscarora migrants “in the meane time” to “Continue where 
they are” on reassurances that they stay out o f the war. In return, New York’s 
government pledged to “Endeavor to dispose the people of Carolina to make peace 
with them and to restore them to their ancient settlements again.”138 Their stay, New 
York officials hoped, would be short.
But the next year, after the fall of Neoheroka, this trickle became a flood. By 
May 1713, New York’s council received word from North Carolina reporting defeat 
o f the Tuscaroras and requesting that “no succour” be given the refugees.139 Soon 
similar news arrived via Indian channels that “it is plain” that the Tuscaroras “are 
coming to settle with the five nations.”140
That the Tuscaroras were coming may have been plain; less clear were the 
reasons these Tuscaroras chose to come or what effects they would have when they 
arrived. Even before the outbreak of the Tuscarora War, the 1710 talks at Conestoga 
revealed that some Tuscaroras were considering going north to avoid war with the 
Iroquois and perhaps to rejoin captured kin. Reversed, Iroquois war routes, with their
138 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1712 3 July, N.Y., Council Minutes, 11: 115-116.
139 Francis Jennings, William N. Fenton, Mary A. Drake, and David R. Miller, The 
History and Culture o f  Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the 
Treaties o f  the Six Nations and Their League (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1985), 169, 251.
140 NY Legislative Journal, 356.
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closely spaced communities accustomed to offering supplies to passersby, now 
channeled and hosted passing parties o f migrants.141 The early wave of Tuscarora 
migrants to Ulster County apparently gained an additional modicum of security by 
joining a larger stream of approximately six hundred Shawnees departing South 
Carolina in 1711.142 Conaguanee’s statements to Blount indicate that after the war 
had begun, Iroquois leaders continued their pattern of inviting outsiders to join them. 
By offering refuge, the Iroquois continued earlier practices o f assimilating defeated 
groups, thereby bolstering their own numbers and prestige. The Five Nations “have 
never appeared so haughty,” wrote a French official in 1715, “as they are at present 
for they have been strengthened by the accession of a nation . . . who were settled near 
Carolina and took refuge among them.”143 Even though defeat this time came not at 
the hands of Iroquois warriors, the wording of Iroquois invitations still carried thinly 
concealed threats suggesting that refusal would invite retribution. In Virginia, 
Spotswood had tried to counter Iroquois offers for the Tuscarora refugees to “submit
141 The role of communities as way stations for travelers will be discussed in a later 
chapter.
142 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1712 3 July, New York Council Minutes, 11: 115-116; NY  
Council Calendar, 248. Unfortunately this document is damaged. For Shawnees 
departing the Carolinas see Chapman James Milling, Red Carolinians, 2d ed. 
(Columbia: U. of South Carolina Press, 1969), 85-89.
143 “Extracts from Letters o f Ramezay and Began to the French Minister, dated Sept. 
13, 16, 1714,” in Lyman Copeland Draper, and Reuben Gold Thwaites, eds., 
Collections o f  the State Historical Society o f  Wisconsin (Madison: State Historical 
Society ofWisconsin, 1903) 16: 321. Also quoted in Boyce, "As the Wind," 155. 
Later evidence suggests that this statement should not be taken to mean that the 
Tuscaroras were made the Sixth Nation o f the Iroquois at this time, but merely they 
had relocated and put themselves under the Iroquois.
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themselves” to the Iroquois, by promising to protect those Tuscaroras from Iroquois 
attacks.144 On the other hand, some Tuscaroras saw the Iroquois as an alternative to 
reservation life under Blount and southern governments. Colonists and South 
Carolina Indians who continued to capture, kill, and enslave Tuscaroras in the 
unsettled months after Neoheroka gave added inducement to flee. Whatever the 
migrants’ reasons, the status of the Tuscaroras among the Iroquois— as guests, 
victims, allies, and kin—would be ambiguous for nearly a decade. Not until a treaty in 
Albany in 1722 were the Tuscaroras recognized as the “Sixth Nation” o f the Iroquois. 
Therefore any understanding of the Tuscaroras’ place among the Iroquois during this 
first decade requires tracing the events that led to this treaty.
For colonial officials, migration by the Tuscaroras entailed great uncertainty. 
The danger came on two related fronts. First, although Governor Hunter had been 
eager for the Iroquois to establish some sort of authority over the Tuscaroras, he did 
not want between fifteen hundred and two thousand Tuscaroras with a dangerous 
track record coming into his colonial backyard. Instead of the Covenant Chain 
extending New York’s influence, it often seemed during the ensuing decade that anti- 
English Tuscarora migrants might shatter links of friendship. Second, South 
Carolina’s Indian allies, especially the Catawbas, and their neighbors— collectively 
referred to in derision by the Iroquois as “flatheads”— had long been targets of
144 “Treaty with the Tuscaroras, Feb. 27, 1714” in W. Stitt Robinson, ed., Virginia 
Treaties, 1607-1722, vol. 4, Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 
1607-1789 (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1983), 213; 
Spotswood, Letters, 2: 42.
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Iroquois animosity. Iroquois warriors repeatedly made forays against these flatheads 
much to the dismay of southern colonists who counted them as allies. After the 
Tuscarora War, colonial leaders often blamed Tuscarora migrants for exacerbating this 
bloodshed. Therefore, for at least a decade, colonial officials did their best to limit the 
potentially disastrous effects of the migrants’ influence on the Iroquois.
Not long after the Tuscaroras’ arrival, the Onondaga spokesman Teganissorens 
confirmed these worst fears, that bands o f Iroquois were joining recent Tuscarora 
migrants in retaliatory raids against the “fflattheads.” Therefore, in 1713 the 
legislature sent belts to the Iroquois demanding that they “not upon any pretence 
whatsoever receive any of the Tuscaroras amongst them nor permitt them to settle 
with them nor to give them any countenance or assistance.”145 Belts were not enough. 
When the Iroquois rejected these, the legislature thought it “absolutely necessary” to 
send “some Gentlemen of the best Note” armed with presents to Onondaga to 
“prevent the five Nations from joining the Tuscaroras and with them entring into a 
Warr with the fflat heads”146
Plans for the diplomatic mission stalled for part of the summer as the 
legislature, governor, and Albany Commissioners tussled over who would pay for it.
All the while, strains increased, especially after August when the Mohawk chief 
Hendrick secretly informed that the Iroquois were planning to have a general council
145 N Y  Legislative Journal, 356.
146 N Y Legislative Journal, 357.
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to discuss “making Warr on her Majestys Subjects.”147 Hunter continued to write the 
Albany Commissioners urging them to send “proper persons to the Five Nations to 
prevent the ill designs o f the Indians in general, and in particular, to hinder the 
Tuscaroras Indians from settling amongst them”148 Old nightmares o f a frontier in 
flames recurred. Consumed with worries that “the five nations are hardly to be 
diswaded from sheltering the Tuscaruro Indians,” Hunter finally decided to pay for the 
envoys and their gifts personally from his own pocket.149 These would hardly be the 
“presents they expect upon all such occasions,” but they would have to do.150
The journal o f Hendrick Hansen, the envoy appointed by New York, recorded 
a journey to Onondaga made more difficult by also having to traverse a political terrain 
strewn with mutual accusations and apprehension.151 Only a day out, on a hill above 
Schenectady, a trader named Jan Baptist van Eps approached Hansen with dark 
warnings of an “evil design.” “Friend I am in conscience bound to tell you what I am 
warned o f by Indians” that if any English ambassador went to Onondaga, “care would 
be taken that he should not bring any thing back from there.” Hansen forged on, but 
several o f his Indian companions were not so confident, especially since they feared
147 Jennings, et. al., History and Culture, 170.
148 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1713 14 Aug, Letter from N.Y. Gov. Hunter to the 
Commissioners for Indian Affairs, N.Y., Colonial Manuscripts, 58: 161.
149NYCD, 5: 371
150 NYCD, 5: 371.
151 The following account, including the quotations, comes from the “Journal o f a 
Mission to Onondaga,” by Hendrick Hansen in NYCD, 5: 373-76.
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that Hansen might have been sent by colonial authorities to signal war with the 
Iroquois. One Mohawk backed out feigning illness. Another quit a day later, also sick 
from fear. Restless, the prominent Onondaga speaker, Teganissorens, privately pulled 
Hansen aside and begged to learn Hansen’s charge.152 Hansen reassured him that he 
came to make peace, not end it. In return, Teganissorens let Hansen in on a secret: 
two belts had arrived, one from the French, another from the Tuscaroras in the 
Carolinas via Conestoga, signifying that “the English have resolved to kill and destroy 
all who had Black Pates, meaning thereby all the Nations o f Indians.” English and 
Indians each feared that the others were uniting against them. The arrival o f the 
Tuscaroras had brought the Iroquois and New York to a crossroads; collision seemed 
imminent.
Hansen arrived to an unusually intimidating welcome at a W ood’s Edge 
Ceremony where 150 “old and young . . . surrounded us and set up a wild shrieking 
and uproar.” Despite the sinking sensation o f marching into verbal confrontation that 
could quickly progress beyond a war of words, fingers stayed off rhetorical triggers 
and avoided the first shot; with circumspection both parties carefully talked around the 
sore spot. For days they spoke, only once indirectly alluding to the Tuscarora crisis: 
Hansen asked the Iroquois “not to render any sort o f assistance to the enemies of her 
Majesty, or o f any of her subjects, either in person or with powder, lead or otherwise, 
nor afford the least protection.” The Iroquois response showed that they understood
152 Decanesora also appears in records and some secondary sources as Teganissorens.
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the oblique reference. They agreed not to abet attacks on the English “at the South . .
. [or] anywhere else.”
Only at the end, after the Covenant Chain had been symbolically renewed and 
Hansen appeared ready to depart, did the sachems dare to broach the real subject of 
the conference—the Tuscaroras. First, the Iroquois sachems showed Hansen the belt 
from Carolina that Teganissorens had furtively mentioned on the trail, the one 
reporting that “Corlaer”— meaning New York—“designed to destroy all that were 
Indians.” Hansen did not take the message lightly: It is “Devil’s news, not men’s,” he 
preached, “for the Devil is the father of all lies, and whenever he perceives the brethren 
living in friendly alliance, he is always busy sowing his bad seed between them; but we 
tell you not to believe a particle of it.” The Iroquois agreed. They would maintain 
peace and goodwill with New Yorkers by willfully ignoring stories from Tuscaroras 
and other displaced southern Indians— an act, when proclaimed by sachems, that was 
easy enough in theory, but almost impossible in practice, especially when Tuscaroras 
were settling near and among them.
Hunter had hoped to avert such difficulties altogether by having the Iroquois 
turn the refugees away. Instead, the Iroquois had a different plan. They would 
welcome the Tuscaroras, but tried to assure Hansen by promising to exert authority 
over the newcomers—the same sort of authority that Hunter had previously hoped for 
during the Tuscarora War. First, Iroquois speakers claimed ancient kinship ties 
despite lengthy physical separation, stating that “these Indians went out heretofore
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from us.” Next, they proclaimed an end to the need for fighting since “the English 
have got the upper hand of them; that they have abandoned their Castles and are 
scattered hither and thither; let that suffice.” Now was the time for peace, and Hunter 
should play the role Onondaga had long urged on him by joining the Iroquois in 
mediating a settlement. Finally, the Iroquois proclaimed suzerainty over the 
Tuscaroras: “we assure that we will oblige them not to do the English any more harm; 
for they are no longer a Nation with a name, being once dispersed.” With the carpet 
rhetorically swept from under him, Hansen had no reply except that he would inform 
the governor.
Henson’s sermon notwithstanding, tensions mounted the ensuing year as both 
sides listened to the “Devil’s news.” The English heard stories o f a hidden conference 
to unite Indians “living at the Jeseys, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Carolina, etc” 
and did their best to send spies, despite the meetings reputedly being so top secret that 
“if any Person divulged it they were to suffer Death.” 153 Alternately, Iroquois 
sachems, for their part, heard stories that diverse English governments conspired to 
“cutt off and disperse” the Five Nations.154 Neither set proved true.
A conference held in Albany in late September 1714 revealed how little had 
changed in a year. Before, it had been Hansen who had nervously eyed his hosts; a
153 Wraxall, Abridgement, 97; Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 8, 1714 13 May Letter from N.Y. 
Commissioners for Indian Affairs to Gov. Hunter, N.Y., Colonial Manuscripts, 59: 47; 
Livingston, Indian Records, 221; Iroq Doc Hist., reel 8, 1714 25 M ayN.Y., Council 
Minutes, 11: 241-242; Fenton, Great Law, 386-87.
154 Wraxall, Abridgement, 98; Fenton, Great Law, 387.
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year later, it was the Iroquois sachems who admitted that among their people, “all are 
in confusion and think nothing less than that some mischief will befall us” in Albany. 
Again sachems informed New York officials—this time Governor Hunter in person— 
that the “Tuscarore Indians are come to shelter among the Five Nations.” Again they 
re-affirmed ancient kinship ties, stating that “they were of us and went from us long 
ago and are now returned and promise to live peaceably among us.” And again, they 
proclaimed authority over the adoptees, this time as “our Children who shall obey our 
commands and live peaceably and orderly.”155 Nonetheless, a year had done little to 
prepare Hunter. According to historian Francis Jennings, there was “no response by 
the governor to the Tuscarora statement which is in the draft records but omitted from 
[secretary] Robert Livingston’s official minutes forwarded to the crown.”156
Reassurances aside, there was little evidence that the Tuscaroras actually were 
living “peaceably and orderly,” meekly following the commands o f Iroquois fathers. 
Much of the rest o f the conference centered on rumors spread by several belts and “by 
word of mouth” that the “English Colonies on this Mayne of America have concluded 
to cut of[f] the five nations.”157 The force of these in turn had incited 40 Senecas and 
100 Onondagas south into the Carolinas against the flatheads, en route raising the
155 NYCD, 5: 387.
156 Jennings, et al., History and Culture, 170. Jennings’ statement is somewhat 
confusing because the copy in the Public Records Office C05/1050 “Proceedings of 
conference at Albany” does have this statement. Perhaps Jennings is referring to 
evidence from the unavailable Livingston Family Papers.
151 NYCD, 5: 383.
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usual havoc of killed cattle, razed fields, and burnt fences. “I enjoyn you,” beseeched 
Hunter in an oblique reference to the Tuscaroras, “to putt a stop to the present designs 
of your young men who as I am informed are gone out to make War upon her 
Majesties subjects or such Indians who live under the protection o f Her Governmt and 
have been aiding and assisting to her subjects o f the other Provinces against those who 
have contrary to their Covenants and their duty attackd them.”158 The sachems replied 
that they would try to convince the young men to “bury the Hatchett they have taken 
up against the Flatheads.” But they were not even sure if the warriors would “hearken 
and obey us.” In return, they revived their old request that New York officials take an 
active role negotiating peace between “the Christians of Carolina and the Indians”— 
evidence that in Iroquois minds, the tensions unearthed by the recent Tuscarora War 
and brought north by migrants had not yet been buried.159
Fortuitously, the beginning of the Yamasee War in early 1715 accomplished 
what two years of diplomacy had not— a respite from a situation in which Iroquois and 
New York officials had been hampered by suspicion, unable to coordinate their 
actions, and incapable o f agreement. Whereas previously Hunter had unsuccessfully 
tried to have Iroquois sachems “stop up” war parties against the flatheads, now these 
forays could be praised and encouraged. Hunter sent messengers to the Iroquois and 
the assorted towns on the Susquehanna River (where many Tuscaroras probably lived
158 In other words, the Iroquois should not attack South Carolina Indians who had just 
recently helped against the Tuscarora Lower Alliance.
159 NYCD, 5: 386.
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at this point) “to perswade them to make war upon these who have lately attacked 
Carolina.” He eagerly reported to his superiors in London that already these Indians 
had brought back thirty prisoners.160
Hunter even revived hopes of using the Iroquois as enforcers of unified British 
rule in the southern backcountry. He wrote to the Lords of Trade:
“I have strong hopes o f perswading them [the Iroquois] to interpose in the 
Carolina War, if that Government will send terms of accommodation with their 
Indian enemies I am confident that our Indians will offer and inforce them. I 
have wrote to the Governor [of South Carolina] to that purpose and there is no 
other way devisable to put an end to that war and restore that Colony to its 
former tranquillity.”161 
In other words, South Carolina only had to tell Hunter what terms of peace it wanted, 
and Hunter would have the Iroquois force those terms upon the Yamasees. “It is a 
matter o f wonder,” he congratulated himself, “that hitherto no effectual method has 
been thought of for uniting the divided strength of these Provinces on the continent, 
for the defense of the whole.”162 The puzzle to the continent had been unlocked, and 
the Iroquois were the key.
Or so Hunter liked to think. In meetings with the Iroquois, Hunter 
accomplished far less of a stroke of diplomatic dominance. After all, it was the
160 NYCD, 5: 417-18.
161 NYCD, 5: 420.
162 NYCD, 5: 417-18.
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English who had come around to the Iroquois position, that the Catawbas, Yamasees, 
and other Indians involved in the Yamasee War were a perfidious people who 
deserved destruction. Moreover, Hunter’s explanation for the English policy shift fell 
flat. Hunter put out that the “cause of their [the Yamasee and other South Carolina 
Indians’] fury against his majesties subjects is chiefly this that when the Flatheads 
implored their assistance against the 5 Nations they absolutely refused it because you 
were even in strict alliance with the Crown and good friends to the Subjects o f Great 
Brittain.”163 The Yamasees had attacked because o f the South Carolinian love of the 
Iroquois! Like other New Yorkers, Hunter knew better.164
Ultimately, Iroquois and Tuscarora participation contributed to English victory 
in the Yamasee War. But ancient animosities and recent Tuscarora arrivals, not 
Hunter’s directives, guided them. They would make peace on their own terms and in 
their own time. In the meanwhile, war would continue, despite the wishes o f colonial 
officials. In April 1717, forty Tuscaroras and Iroquois warriors launched a surprise 
attack on a Catawba peace delegation that had come to Virginia.165 Spotswood, who 
had gone to meet the Catawba leaders, considered the attack a personal affront.
163 Colden, Continuation, 421-22.
164 Even other New Yorkers did not believe the story that Hunter tried to pass on the 
Iroquois. Colonel Caleb Heathcote wrote to Lord Townsend that the real reason for 
the Yamasee War was the illegal enslavement o f friendly Indian children and the theft 
o f land. Heathcote recommended that London order all the governors to make peace 
with local Indians (while they deal with the French) and “a line of garrisons . . . [be] 
erected on the frontiers o f all the governments, to answer to the line o f settlements the 
French have . . . from Mississippy to Canada,” (NYCD, 5:1716).
165 NYCD, 5: 483, 490;MPCP, 3: 22-24, 82-89.
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Perhaps more important, similar attacks by Tuscarora and Iroquois war parties against 
Catawbas continued for the next several decades. Colonial officials were left gasping 
in frustration as they watched Indians— all supposedly allies o f the English—warring 
upon one another. The result was rounds o f recriminations as officials from various 
colonies alternately blamed each other and various Indian groups.
Within these cycles of accusations, however, attention repeatedly returned to 
the role o f the Tuscaroras.166 In September 1718, Hunter met Iroquois sachems to 
discount recent murmurings. “Whoever it is that whispers these things in your ears is 
certainly not your friend,” he asserted. “You say that the Tuscarora Indians say that 
the Christians have raided them to get their land.” He countered with the English 
version of the Tuscarora War, that the Tuscaroras had originally been to blame for 
murdering innocents in their beds “at a time of a deep and quiet peace.” Playing up 
old animosities between the Iroquois and the Tuscaroras, Hunter recalled old Iroquois 
statements that the Tuscaroras were “a mean and unbelievable people who had no 
truth in them.” The Iroquois, he remembered, had promised to discipline or destroy 
them. But that had not happened— quite the opposite: “It seems that they have 
quickly found credit or favor among you, or you or they have miraculously changed 
since those days. . . ,”167
Hunter was right: the Iroquois had changed; Tuscaroras had found credit and 
favor among parts o f Iroquois society. But no one had expected this, at least not the
l66MPCP, 3:82-89.
167 All o f above quotations from Livingston, Indian Records, 226-27.
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Iroquois. As Tuscaroras had arrived, Iroquois speakers had tried to soothe Hunter. 
The Tuscaroras had nearly been destroyed, they had been dispersed, they were hardly 
a nation worthy of a name. The Tuscaroras had become like children and the Iroquois 
would be like fathers; the Iroquois would command and the Tuscaroras would obey.168 
The English might worry, but Iroquois speakers stood and assured anyone who would 
listen that all would live in peace. Most o f all, the Iroquois council assumed that 
Tuscarora refugees would diffuse quietly into Iroquois society like countless captives 
and adoptees from wars past. Tuscaroras were supposed to walk down the same 
cultural and ethnic trail as Hurons, Neutrals, Susquehannocks, and scores o f other 
refugees before them. Repeatedly during the Tuscarora War, whether they spoke to 
Blount, or Hancock, or refugees hiding in the Virginia hill country, Iroquois had issued 
the same invitation: join us.
Many came, and many did pick up Iroquois traits; nonetheless, their situation 
differed from that o f earlier adoptees in several respects. First, these were not the 
Beaver Wars from a half century before. Tuscarora defeat, as the Iroquois readily 
admitted, had come at the hands of the English and their South Carolina native allies— 
an early example of a new eighteenth-century pattern where immigrants to Iroquoia 
first met defeat at the hands of Europeans, not the Iroquois. Warriors might lurk 
about and give an edge to diplomats’ offers of sanctuary, but there was no longer any 
mistaking that the real threat came from Europeans, and that Iroquois needed migrants
168 NYCD, 5: 373-76; 387.
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to face this threat. Moreover, the Iroquois nations o f the eighteenth century no longer 
wielded the same demographic clout as a hundred or even fifty years before. The 
1,500 to 2,000 Tuscaroras streaming north would have been comparable to the 
population of the Oneidas or Mohawks.169 Rather than dispersing evenly, Tuscaroras 
tended to cluster together in their own communities near Oneida Lake or along the 
upper Susquehanna River.170 The existence of another Tuscarora population 
remaining in North Carolina outside the sphere o f Iroquois influence also contributed 
to the survival of a distinct Tuscarora identity.
Therefore, despite assurances to Hunter’s messengers that the Tuscaroras had 
no official standing among the Iroquois, all observers agreed that among smaller 
meetings at individual towns and around campfires, the Tuscaroras exerted substantial
169 Table 1 in Tooker, “League of the Iroquois,” 421. Quickly, however, the 
Tuscaroras’ population dipped precipitously, perhaps indicating increased mortality 
among the refugee population, or assimilation by some of its members into other 
tribes. This latter occurrence would have been especially true if males represented a 
high proportion o f the migrants, who then married into a matrilocal society.
170 Douglas Wesley Boyce, “Tuscarora Political Organization, Ethnic Identity, and 
Sociohistorical Demography, 1711-1825” (Ph.D. diss., Dept, of Anthropology, U. of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1973), 47-52.
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influence— much of this in ways that circumvented Iroquois leaders.171 According to 
historian William Fenton,
an internal schism, not unlike a structural fault, rent the body politic o f 
the Iroquois Confederacy during the first quarter of the century. The 
sachems, who came regularly to Albany to renew the Covenant Chain, 
admitted that they could not control the warriors. French agents easily 
appealed to the warlike genius o f the young men, for whom the 
warpath was the route to glory and the way to achieve status.172 
The Tuscaroras benefited from this structural split, often siding with Iroquois warriors.
The Tuscaroras injected an anti-English element into the region, with their 
communities gaining reputations as hot-spots best avoided by English missionaries
171 Hunter explained to his superiors: “Their Wars are begun and carried on in this 
manner, one of them who has got the design in his head makes a feast and invites his 
Canton to it and in the assembly he dances explaining in a way his intentions and 
reasons. Such as approve of it dance one after another and all that eat at his feast are 
looked upon as enlisted for that expedition . . . .” (Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 7, 1713 12 
March, Letter from Colonel Hunter to Lord [ ? ] BPRO, CO5/1085). Hunter failed to 
notice the role o f Iroquois matrons in this process, whose grief and anger often 
initiated warparties, and afterwards often the fate of captives when the warriors 
returned. Moreover, at the time that Hunter wrote this in 1713, he took comfort in 
the fact that the informal nature of raising warparties probably would prevent any 
single Iroquois uprising against the English. Later, however, as Tuscaroras and 
Iroquois warriors became troublesome, he bemoaned that the lack among Iroquois of 
the “laws and orders for the prevention o f abuses and the regulation o f the conduct of 
subjects towards each other and their neighbours” (Livingston, Indian Records, 226- 
27).
172 Fenton, Great Law, 384. Officials in New France were uncertain in their attitudes 
toward the incorporation of the Tuscaroras. On one hand, they welcomed the conflict 
Tuscaroras provoked against the English; on the other hand, they were wary of the 
potential increase in Iroquois strength.
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planning to put off martyrdom for another day.173 A missionary from the Society for 
the Propagation of the Gospel, William Andrews, who worked among the Mohawks at 
this time, reported:
The before mentioned Tuscarora Indians who formerly had warred with 
the People o f Carolina and Ever since hating all Christians, have been a 
great Occasion of our Indians becoming so bad as they are, they now 
take all occasions to find fault and quarrel wanting to revolt as they 
told the interpreter when he was to deliver the Governours Order to 
them, that the Covenant Chain between them and the Christians was 
grown very weak. It is a great misfortune to this province to have its 
security depending so much on the Indians.174 
“The other Indians were too easily persuaded to believe everything the 
Tuscararo Indians told them,” wrote one of Andrews’s contemporaries.175
173 David Humphreys, An Historical Account o f  the Incorporated Society fo r  the 
Propagation o f  the Gospel in Foreign Parts (London: Joseph Downing, 1730), 304- 
305, describes how “a farther Misfortune did quite set the Indians against the English. 
Some of the Tuscaroro Indians, who had fled from North Carolina after the War there 
with the English, came and settled in the Country of the Onontages, one o f the 
Iroquois Nations, bordering on the Mohocks. These People being enraged at the 
English, stirred up the Onontages against them, telling them they had been most 
barbarously used, and drove out o f their Country, and that the English watched only 
for an Opportunity to extirpate them too. The other Indians were too easily persuaded 
to believe everything the Tuscararo Indians told them; so that when any of these 
People came by the Mohocks Castle, and the Queen’s Fort, in their Way to Albany, to 
trade and buy themselves Necessaries; they used to mock at Mr. Andrews when he 
would offer to talk to them about Religion; and when he proffered to go to their 
Abode, they absolutely forbad him.”
174 SPG Letter Books, Ser. A, 12: 310-12.
175 Humphreys, Historical Account, 304-5.
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Tuscaroras stirred up nearby Onondagas with stories that “they had been most 
barbarously used, and drove out of their Country, and that the English watched 
only for an Opportunity to extirpate them too.”176 Thus enraged, Onondagas 
passing by Andrews’s mission on their way to trade at Albany would mock the 
missionary and forbid him from venturing in their direction.177 Soon members 
of Andrews’s own Mohawk congregation stopped coming by his chapel, or if 
they did come, stood at the door jeering or banging drums. His flock thus 
turned dangerously against him, the missionary left.
The contagion spread. Besides raids that incensed Spotswood,
Tuscarora ties to the south made them a steady source of rumors and 
disinformation, perhaps peaking in 1720 when two belts proposing peace sent 
by Virginia fell en route into Tuscarora hands who reversed their meaning, 
saying that they signified war.178
In Virginia, Governor Spotswood shared Hunter’s frustration at the Iroquois 
and Tuscaroras, but in a blistering 1720 letter he saved his greatest passion for the 
policies of New York. Led by Hunter, that colony had spent much of the previous 
decade attempting to use the Iroquois as agents o f a grand policy whereby British 
control centered in Albany would radiate far into the southern backcountry. But in
176 Humphreys, Historical Account, 304-5.
177 Humphreys, Historical Account, 304-5.
178 NYCD, 5: 660; MPCP, 3: 205- 6. For other rumors, NYCD, 5: 383; Livingston, 
Indian Records, 226-27; Wraxall, Abridgment, 97.
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reality, claimed Spotswood, New Yorkers did little more than coddle the Iroquois in a 
“submissive and soothing Stile.” His letter outlined a history of woes: how during the 
Tuscarora War Iroquois “were actually in these parts assisting the Tuscaruros, who 
had massacred in cold Blood some hundreds o f English;” how during the war they had 
robbed English trade caravans to supply the Tuscaroras; how “this very day” the 
Iroquois harbored the “chief murderers” o f the Tuscaroras “seated under their 
protection near Susquehanna River;” how they had joined forces against the Indians 
around Fort Christanna and continued to lay ambushes against Indians and whites. By 
this evidence, asked Spotswood, had any of New York’s recent policies been 
successful?
“Is their Confederacy with the Tuscourroroes, any ways agreeable to 
the five nations answer . . . [to] Lawrence Claessen in 1712 . . .  and to 
be taken for the assistance promised to reduce those Murderers? Or is 
the reason they gave for plundering our Traders a Testimony of their 
acting for the English? Can their . . . continual attacks upon . . . [the 
Catawbas] be look’d upon as a faithful observance o f their 
engagements to your Governor on the last of August 1715?”179 
In short, asserted Spotswood, officials like Hunter and the Albany Commissioners 
were foolish to imagine that they wielded any real influence. And then, when
119 MPCP, 3: 82-89. Matthew Lawson Rhoades, "Assarigoa's Line: Anglo-Iroquois 
Origins o f the Virginia Frontier, 1675- 1774" (Ph.D. diss., Dept, o f History, Syracuse 
University, 2000), 95-96, for a commentary on this exchange.
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Spotswood and other southern governments complained, New York officials acted as 
if Spotswood and his allies “chose to clamour upon those Occasions, only to put your 
province to trouble and expense” 180 This policy, warned Spotswood, “however much 
you may fancy it raises the Reputation o f your province, is far from strengthening it, or 
acting for the Honour of the British Nation in general.” Where Hunter viewed himself 
disinterestedly working for the preservation of the empire in America, Spotswood saw 
only narrow-minded self-interest and obsequious kowtowing to the Iroquois. Were 
such things to be tolerated?
No more. Rather than sending costly gifts and messengers, Virginia’s assembly 
would rather spend its money drilling militias. If war resulted between the Iroquois 
and Virginia, Spotswood predicted, New York would be the loser. “Once the blow is 
struck” did New York officials think that the crown would not force New York to side 
with Virginia, destroying their precious trade?181 The only solution, according to 
Spotswood, would be to refashion the whole web of diplomacy and the very 
geography of Indian interactions.
The Treaty of 1722
A tangle of discord had snarled relations across much of the backcountry, 
leaving the southern colonies, New York, the Iroquois, and Tuscaroras ensnared in
180 MPCP, 3: 82-89.
181 MPCP, 3:82-89.
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knots o f mutual mistrust and recrimination. At the worst o f times, each side feared 
bonds of alliance might be refashioned into the noose o f war. At other times, it was 
colonial leaders at each others’ throats. Cutting through the mess would require sharp 
new lines of authority and influence. It was in this context o f trying to instill order into 
the backcountry that the Tuscaroras eventually attained their status as the Sixth Nation 
of the Iroquois Confederacy in the wake of a treaty held at Albany in 1722.
The road to Albany began when Spotswood began lobbying for a new policy, 
or rather an old one that had languished nearly forgotten. In a 1684 conference,
Virginia’s then governor Francis Howard, baron of Effingham, had proposed a line 
separating Virginia from the Iroquois: “when you march to the southward, . . . keep 
to the foot of the mountanes, and come not nigh the heads o f our Rivers, there being 
no Beaver hunting there”182 Although the Iroquois had agreed to the boundary in 
principle, in practice this line along the upper piedmont proved too ephemeral to 
police. Moreover, Hunter’s efforts to employ the Iroquois in southern diplomacy had 
run counter to the spirit o f the agreement.
Now Spotswood attempted to resurrect the idea o f a boundary and expand it, 
pushing it outward to better protect Virginia’s tributary Indians and to give growing 
room to white settlers. This boundary would dictate that non-Virginian Indians would 
“not pass over Potowmeck [River] into Virginia to the Southward, nor shall go over
182 Francis Howard of Effingham, The Papers o f  Francis Howard, Baron Howard o f  
Effingham, 1643-1695, ed. Warren M. Billings (Richmond, Va.: Virginia State Library 
and Archives, 1989), 142-146; Rhoades, “Assarigoa’s Line,” 40.
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to the Eastward” o f the “high Ridge of Mountains extending along the back of 
Virginia.”183 Virginia’s government, for its part, would ensure that Indians under its 
influence would not pass the other direction. Spotswood did not make similar 
promises that Virginia settlers would cease to sprawl outward. In part, this omission 
reflected a refusal to abandon the sea-to-sea claims of Virginia’ s original charters. 
Most o f all, it reflected British concerns in the 1710s and early 1720s over disorderly, 
unsupervised contact between Indian groups (and the opportunities these might create 
for the French).184
An early ally of Spotswood in these proposals was Governor Sir William Keith 
of Pennsylvania. Keith’s government stood in a particularly awkward position with 
the Iroquois. Although the heartland of the Iroquois lay north o f Pennsylvania’s 
border, many of the Indians living in Pennsylvania, particularly in the Susquehanna 
Valley, claimed kinship and political ties with the Iroquois. During this period, 
Pennsylvania gradually came to a mutual accommodation with the Iroquois: the colony 
recognized and supported Iroquois authority by “right of conquest” over the 
Susquehanna Valley and the Indians who lived there. In return, the Iroquois acted as a 
broker in matters of land and authority with Pennsylvania’s government, allowing that 
government largely to exclude from decisions the actual Indian inhabitants of the 
Susquehanna Valley. Nonetheless, a downside of this relationship was that Iroquois
183 MPCP , 3: 114. The Potomac was referred to as the Great River Kahongoronton by 
the Iroquois.
184 Rhoades, “Assarigoa’s Line,” 95-96.
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war parties passing to Virginia and the Carolinas threatened to bring bloodshed to the 
region. Keith recognized that closing the southern border would bring the best of both 
worlds: Pennsylvania could continue trade and diplomatic relations with Iroquois 
from the north, but avoid importing war from the south.185
Moreover, fences— or good borders— made good neighbors. Spotswood and 
Keith agreed that one of the best ways that European “subjects o f the same Sovereign, 
however divided into distinct [colonial] Governments” could “still to be united in 
Affection to each other” would be through the division o f Indians into separate 
spheres of influence by ensuring boundaries whereby “neither o f them cross the 
Patowmeck River, [so] they cannot in their several courses come at one another.”186
But any such agreement would mean little without the consent o f New York 
and the Iroquois. Spotswood tried to press the plan upon a Tuscarora and four 
Iroquois diplomats in Virginia in October 1721. These Indians stubbornly replied that 
formal negotiation could only occur at either Onondaga or Albany, the Covenant 
Chain’s two customary council sites. Straining his body and his assembly’s willingness 
to pay for expensive diplomatic junkets, Spotswood journeyed to Albany in 1722
185 MPCP, 3 : 204-5.
186 MPCP, 3: 117-18; also see MPCP, 3: 209-12 where Governor Keith argued that “if 
our Indians . . . were brought voluntarily and distinctly by themselves to accept of 
and confirm the same Propositions as to the Boundaries . . .  it would in all probability 
prevent future Disturbance on the Frontiers of these Colonies, and tend to a General 
Peace amongst the Indians on this side of the Lakes.” However, for reasons which are 
unclear, the Pennsylvania council did not agree to this plan {MPCP, 3: 207). The 
governor sidestepped the obstacle by going personally to Conestoga and merely 
informing Indians there that the treaty had already been enacted {MPCP, 3: 209-12).
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where he met with diplomats from the Iroquois and Tuscaroras and the governors of 
New York and Pennsylvania.
All large conferences dealt with a host o f issues. The Albany treaty o f 1722 
was no exception. Broadly stated, Spotswood aimed to establish peace between his 
colony and the Iroquois after several years of near-warfare. As a first step, English 
governors and the Iroquois recited a history of their relations, renewing the Covenant 
Chain that had bound them together and provided that “accidents or mischeif ’ should 
be “forgot and forgiven” and not lead to further bloodshed.187 Spotswood pressured 
the Iroquois to include within the peace the “Toderechrones” (who included the 
Catawbas and smaller Siouan groups like the Saponis who lived around Fort 
Christanna). The Iroquois agreed to treat their former targets as if  they “have put their 
hands into the Covenant Chain”—-a hard task, the Iroquois claimed, since doing so 
meant overcoming within themselves “so inveterate an enmity, that we thought it 
impossible it could be extinguished, but by a total Exterpation o f them.”188
Declarations of goodwill spat with such loathing earned little trust. Spotswood 
instead relied on his border plan, which he outlined for his Iroquois audience.189 
Thereafter, crossing the Potomac or traversing the Blue Ridge would entail great risk, 
threatened Spotswood. Waiting on the other side would be trigger-happy militias 
instructed to shoot on sight. Already, bragged Spotswood, Virginia’s assembly had
187 NYCD, 5: 671.
188 NYCD, 5: 671-72.
l&9 NYCD, 5: 671.
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“given a very considerable sum of money for the buying of arms for the defense of 
those Frontier counties which lye most Exposed to the incursions o f the Indians.”190 
Survivors of this warm reception without proper passports would find themselves 
shackled in a slave ship bound for the Caribbean. The only exception would be for 
Iroquois warriors returning runaway slaves. Slave catchers were welcome to Col. 
George Mason’s house on the banks of the Potomac, where they could collect their 
reward o f a “good gun” and two blankets, and then hurry home.191
The stark simplicity of this plan should not obscure the complexity o f its 
consequences. Fully realized, it would have reworked the whole system of diplomacy, 
alliances, and warfare. Hunter had imagined a system of alliances running the length 
of the frontier with Albany at its head and the Iroquois as its spine; connective tissue 
grew from exchanges between the Iroquois and other Indian groups. If this awkward 
beast ever breathed at all, Spotswood planned to chop it up and kill it dead. His line 
on the map was about more than territorial claims and an eye towards land for future 
settlers. Spotswood envisioned a new diplomatic landscape where Indians from 
different colonies rarely met, where they no longer had “free Liberty to Pass and 
Repass” across the landscape in pursuit o f game, war, or even peaceful relations and 
trade with other Indians.192 Rather than relying on native networks, Spotswood
190 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 8; 1722 14 Aug - 1 Dec, Treaty with the Five Nations. 
National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., Diplomatic Branch, RG 
11, Ratified Indian Treaties, Treaty N o.l, p. 1.
191 NYCD, 5: 674.
192MPCP, 3: 215.
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would bar them almost entirely. Even if Iroquois came to Virginia with proper 
passports and carried the small golden horseshoes Spotswood gave them for such 
occasions, they would be subject to expulsion at the first sign o f meeting with 
Virginia’s tributaries.193
If  native diplomacy would happen at all, Spotswood planned for negotiations 
to be conducted vicariously. A network of colonial governors who would take up the 
role of passing around “their” Indians’ treaty belts, each officially stamped with their 
respective colonies’ seal of approval.194 During the negotiations in Albany in 1722, 
Spotswood had brought two sets of belts, one for the “Christians” o f Virginia, and 
another on behalf of the Indians who stayed behind in Virginia. Iroquois sachems 
complained, “we wish you had brought some of the Sachems of your Indians that they 
might have spoke to us face to face.”195 Such a meeting would have defeated 
Spotswood’s entire point.196
193 NYCD, 5: 674.
194 NYCD, 5: 637, 674;MPCP, 3: 117-19.
195 NYCD, 5:669-77.
196 Iroquois negotiators signaled their intent to exploit a loophole in this plan and allow 
face-to-face meetings between Indian groups to continue. Spotswood made it clear 
that “the Government o f Virginia will not demand satisfaction for whatever you do to 
any of their [Virginia’s] Indians whom you shall take” on the other side o f the 
border— practically an invitation for the Iroquois to do their worst. The Iroquois, 
however, declined. Instead they declared that Indians who crossed could signal 
peaceful intent by leaving stones in their campfire ashes, upon which the Iroquois 
would “treat them as friends and give them victuals” {NYCD, 5: 673-675).
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Negotiators, Indian and white, agreed to the plans. New York’s government, 
now represented by Gov. William Burnet who had succeeded Hunter, approved o f the 
proposals in hopes o f reviving relations with Virginia and ending southern wars that 
had been a major thorn in Iroquois-New York relations. Moreover, Burnet 
appreciated language that iterated a New York monopoly on Iroquois diplomacy.197 
“It appears to be a method agreed upon by your five Nations to receive no proposalls, 
nor have any manner of Treaty with any of the English Provinces, than through the 
Government o f New York, to which you belong,” noticed Spotswood approvingly.198 
This was not entirely true, but Burnett wished it was. Recently, officials from 
Massachusetts had attempted to establish an independent council fire at Boston or 
Deerfield. At Albany, with representatives o f Pennsylvania and Virginia present, 
Burnett “approved the method that had been taken by the other governours to consult 
this government before they would enter into treaty with their Indians and blamed the 
conduct o f New England which had taken other sort of measures and had attempted to 
treat with the five nations without the interpositions o f this government.”199 By 
dividing the backcountry, Spotswood, in the future, expected to rely on New York
197 NYCD, 5: 674; Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 8; Treaty with the Five Nations, 1722, 
National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. Diplomatic Branch, RG 11, 
Ratified Treaties, Treaty No. 1, pp. 7-8.
198 NYCD, 5: 674. During this period Pennsylvania also began treating privately with 
the Iroquois, a trend that would increase in subsequent years. But as o f 1722, 
Pennsylvania’s officials still preferred to negotiate major decisions in Albany and give 
primacy in Iroquois affairs to New York.
199 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 8; 1722 14 Aug - 1 Dec, Treaty with the Five Nations. 
National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., Diplomatic Branch, RG 
11, Ratified Indian Treaties, Treaty N o.l, p. 1.
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even more. Frustrated with the difficulty and expense of coming to Albany,
Spotswood expected to make this trip his last.200
Iroquois leaders approved of the proposals, perhaps in hopes o f reviving ailing 
relations with southern colonial leaders, perhaps to curb undisciplined warriors. 
Besides, Spotswood promised that refusal meant war.
Enacting proposals to divvy up the backcountry would require affirming lines 
of authority and affiliation among Indian groups, ultimately creating the context for the 
Tuscaroras’ emergence as the sixth nation. Spotswood presented ten guns and 
declared that he spoke on behalf of ten Virginia tribes: the Nottoways, Meherrins, 
Nansemonds, Pamunkeys, Chickahominies, and the Fort Christanna Indians comprised 
o f the Saponis, Occaneechees, Stenkenocks, Meipontskys, and Toteros. In turn, the 
Virginia governor asked the Iroquois sachems to “declare the names of all those 
Indians whom you comprehend in the present Treaty and for whose Performance the 
five Nations will answer.” Two days later, the Iroquois similarly “engaged” for ten
200 It was his last trip, but because Spotswood lost his position as governor shortly 
after the treaty. NYCD 5: 674-75. For Spotswood’s tussles with the House of 
Burgesses for money for Iroquois diplomacy, see Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 8, 1718 23 
Apr, Copy of Speech of Gov. Alexander Spotswood to the Virginia House of 
Burgesses, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia, Papers o f the General 
Assembly of the House o f Burgesses, Committee o f Propositions and Grievances,
1711-1730, Section Three, Mss 3v8b7; and Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 8, 1718 28 May, 
Copy o f message o f the House of Burgess to Gov. Alexander Spotswood of Virginia, 
about covenant with the Five Nations. Virginia Historical Society, Papers o f the 
General Assembly, House of Burgessses, 1711-1730, Mss 3v8bl8. The Assembly 
especially resented the Iroquois view that treaties needed to be periodically renewed 
with expensive gifts and councils, instead holding to the European model that treaties 
and laws held valid until specifically revoked. These differences perhaps reflected the 
differences between an oral, face-to-face culture versus one based on the written 
word.
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groups: the Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas, and Mohawks o f the Iroquois 
Confederacy, and “for the Tuskarores, Conestogoes, Chuanoes [Shawnees], 
Octaghquanawicroones [probably the mixed settlement o f Oquaga], and Ostanghaes 
[perhaps Otsiningo] which live upon Susquehanna River.”201
As Governor Keith o f Pennsylvania explained, these groups on the 
Susquehanna “actually pay Tribute now to the five Nations, and either from natural 
affections or Fear are ever under their Influence and Power.”202 Moreover, adding to 
the ties, among them often lived expatriate Iroquois— often called Mingos— “who 
speak the same language to this day.”203 To a certain extent, the absolute control by 
the Iroquois over these groups was a purposeful fiction whose fallacy became bloodily 
apparent when many moved to the Ohio and later sided against the Iroquois during the 
Seven Years’ War. Nonetheless, in 1722 these assertions carried a component of 
truth. Governor Keith of Pennsylvania afterwards explained the treaty to the 
Conestoga, Conoy, Delaware, and Shawnee Indians and flatly concluded, “You see 
therefore, my Friends and Brethren, that as the Five Nations have thought it necessary 
for preventing all further misunderstandings with Virginia to bind not only themselves
201 NYCD, 5: 675. Otsiningo was a community comprised of several nations o f Indians 
living on the upper Susquehanna River.
202 MPCP, 3: 204-5.
202 MPCP, 3:204-5.
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but have taken upon them to bind you, also must firmly to observe this treaty.”204 
Those Indians grumbled, but agreed.205
Events had already shown, however, that bids to assert similar authority over 
the Tuscaroras were inadequate. The conference itself proved no different. A 
Tuscarora named Sketowas was present, whom Spotswood despised as acting “the 
part o f an Incendiary rather than a messenger o f Peace” because he had hurled rumors 
that the Virginia governor had poisoned Iroquois sachems several years earlier. 
Spotswood countered with accusations o f his own—that the Tuscarora “may be justly 
suspected guilty o f destroying those of his Companions who would not joine in his 
Designs.” 206 Negotiators revisited the incident where Tuscaroras had reversed the 
meanings of belts from Virginia to signify war.207 At one point Iroquois speakers 
admitted that “diverse have endeavored to raise jealousies and evil Reports among us, 
and so perswade us to have a bad opinion of our Brethren the English,” but they swore 
they were immune to such efforts by the French and Tuscaroras.208 Facts proved 
otherwise. Reports circulated through the conference of three companies o f Iroquois
204 MPCP, 3: 209-12.
205 MPCP, 3:215.
206 EJCCV, 4: 8-9. Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 8; 1722 14 Aug - 1 Dec, Treaty with the Five 
Nations. National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., Diplomatic 
Branch, RG 11, Ratified Indian Treaties, Treaty No. 1, page 4.
201 NYCD, 5:660.
208 The French were also seeking to perpetuate conflict among Indians allied to the 
English and were included within this statement.
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warriors “gone out to fight against the Flatheads;” these warriors “made their abode 
among the Tuscaroras that live near Virginia and go backwards and forwards”209
No longer was it plausible to claim that the Tuscaroras had no influence, that 
they were hardly even a nation, having been defeated and dispersed. Dictates from 
above would fail. Success for the English in Albany hinged on the Tuscaroras joining 
the other Iroquois nations at the negotiating table. Therefore, although the Tuscarora 
migrants had not participated in any treaty since their flight north, in Albany they 
claimed—and were granted— a formal role. “Divers chiefs o f the Tuscaroras” 
negotiated “together with” representatives from other Iroquois nations during the main 
talks and also in side-conferences discussing land cessions in Pennsylvania.210
Further confirmation of the Tuscaroras’ changing status came at the treaty’s 
culmination. Spotswood sought to arrange an assent that was more broad-based than 
the Iroquois norm whereby designated speakers presented treaty belts. Too often, 
experience had shown that such diplomats could not speak for the whole. Therefore, 
Spotswood arranged for a ceremony that would include all the Indians present. This 
would include warriors often excluded from formal talks, and the Tuscaroras. An 
Iroquois speaker held aloft a coronet and the rest “gave six Shouts five for the five 
Nations and one for a castle of Tuscarores lately seated between Oneyde and
209 NYCD, 5:660.
210 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 8; 1722 Sept (II), A Treaty o f  Peace and Friendship made 
between the Governor o f  Pennsylvania and the Five Nations, at Albany (Printed in 
Philadelphia by A. Bradford, 1722), 8; MPCP,, 3: 199-202, 205-6. No speeches by the 
Tuscarora speakers were recorded, but it was typical of the Iroquois to express 
themselves through only one or two speakers at treaties.
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Onnondaga.”211 Then, the paperwork: alongside the names o f Mohawk, Oneida, 
Onondaga, and Seneca leaders, the treaty carried home by Spotswood showed the 
marks of three Tuscarora chiefs.212
Spotswood had gotten his treaty, but it proved of little value. Its main 
provisions for dividing the backcountry were soon ignored. Raids and counter-raids 
between Indians across the colonies quickly resumed, if they had ever paused at all. 
Nonetheless, the process had witnessed and codified another transformation. 
Afterwards, English and Indian diplomats began referring to the Iroquois as the Six 
Nations. Exactly what this status meant had yet to be answered.
211 NYCD, 5: 672. The importance of the geographic location of this Tuscarora 
community between Onondaga and Oneida to the Tuscaroras’ status should not be 
discounted. The main Iroquois diplomatic metaphor o f the Great Longhouse almost 
perfectly conflated political roles with physical location (Senecas kept the western 
door, Onondagas tended the fire, Mohawks guarded the eastern door, etc). It would 
have been difficult for the Iroquois to conceptualize a Tuscarora community between 
Onondaga and Oneida that was “outside” this Longhouse. Moreover, this location 
along the main east-west thoroughfare would have ensured that Tuscaroras were privy 
to internal affairs among the Iroquois. Letters by the missionary William Andrews 
suggest that this community may have existed at least as early as 1717 (SPG Letter 
Books, Ser. A, 12: 310-12).
212 Iroq. Doc. Hist., reel 8; 1722 29 Aug- 12 Sept; Account o f Treaty at Albany (copy 
made by an unidentified amanuensis, ca 1740) , Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, 
Va., Westover MS., pp. 369-380, MSS lB9966a. Perhaps the Cayugas are absent 
because of opposition to land deals along the Susquehanna included in the treaty 
{MPCP, 3: 182-83). The three Tuscaroras were Suwuitka, Adories, and Spotswood’s 
accuser, Sketowas.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SIXTH NATION
Shortly after the Albany Treaty o f 1722, the Iroquois regularly began to refer to 
themselves as the “Six Nations.” Returning from an errand to the “several castles” o f the 
Iroquois the following spring, Lawrence Claessen described the “Tusquarores being 
settled near Onoyde reputed now as a nation.”1 Around the same time, an Iroquois 
speaker told a crowd of Massachusetts officials that “last fall some of the Five Nations 
came into your Government” but “we are now come in the name o f the Six Nations.”2 
Besides making their mark among officials o f the various English colonies, within several 
years French officials noted among the Iroquois a “village” of the “Tuscarorens . . .  o f two 
hundred and fifty men near the Onontagues who brought them along.”3 Officials learned to 
wait for a sixth shout at conferences, and revised older maps, such as one of the “Country 
of the Five Nations” published in 1718, but amended in 1726 with a handwritten note in
1 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 11, 1723 27 May, Minutes of the N.Y Commissioners for Indian 
Affairs, Public Archives o f Canada, Ottowa, Federal Archives Division, Indian Records, 
RG 10, Vol. 1819, 16-17. Also see Wraxall, Abridgement, 144.
2 Iroq. Doc. Hist. Reel 11, 1723 23 May-June 4, Council Between Massachusetts and the 
Six Nations, Massachusetts Archives, Boston, Mass., Massachusetts Archives, vol. 29.
3 NYCD, 9: 1056-57. A large contingent o f Tuscaroras settled between the Onondagas 
and the Oneidas. Hence the French, who tended to view the Iroquois from west to east, 
described them living near the Onondagas, and the English, who diplomats traveled from 
the east, described them near the Oneidas.
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the margins that “the Tuscarora are now reckon’d a sixth nation and live between the 
Onondagas and the Oniedas.”4
What exactly did this new reckoning, as the sixth nation, mean? Distinguishing the 
Tuscaroras’ precise role and status alongside among the other five Iroquois nations 
remains difficult. Did the Tuscaroras function as true equals among the more established 
nations? One eighteenth-century expert on Iroquois affairs, Sir William Johnson, believed 
that after having been “admitted into the confederacy of the Five Nations,” the Tuscaroras 
“now enjoy all privileges with the rest.”5 On the other hand, Conrad Weiser, who had an 
equal grasp o f Iroquois workings, scoffed at Tuscaroras, “first compelled thereto by the 
English o f Carolina,” as having “no Title in Council, but is frequently called a Fool.”6 
Two experts close to Iroquois society, two widely divergent opinions, and perhaps neither 
entirely wrong. Such differences reflect the Tuscaroras’ unique and somewhat uncertain 
status: members o f the Iroquois and, yet, newcomers who had to bend and adapt to the 
others’ cultural and political norms.
Among the Iroquois themselves, no metaphor was as persistent or descriptive as 
the comparison of nations to a Great Longhouse stretching from east to west with the 
Mohawks and Senecas guarding their respective “doors” and the Onondagas tending the
4 For shouts see Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 13, 1746 Aug- Sept (II), Printed copy of a treaty 
between N.Y. Gov. Clinton and Six Nations; with manuscript note. BPRO, CO5/1061.
s Doc. Hist. N.Y., 1: 26-27,
6 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 12; 1744 22 June- July (IV), Treaty Held with the Indians o f the 
Six Nations at Lancaster, in Pennsylvania, in June 1744. Including account o f the first 
Confederacy of the Six Nations. Minutes o f  Treaty Between the Six Nations and Colony 
o f  Virginia 1744 at Lancaster, (Williamsburg, William Parks, N.D.), 26-27.
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central council fire. Nineteenth-century Onondaga documents refer to the Tuscaroras as 
an added “frame-pole to the great frame work” of the longhouse— an “inner one, . . . bent 
to form the frame.”7 The description is apt. They were members, integral ones even, and 
yet they had to be shaped to fit among the others, and lashed to them through ceremonies, 
practices, and habit. At the same time, for a frame pole to serve any use, it could not be 
bent so far as to be broken, or snapped—the Tuscaroras’ sense o f themselves as a people 
and a culture had to remain intact.
Members of the League and Confederacy
The basis of much Iroquois cultural and ritual behavior was the Great League of 
Peace. This was the institution founded as a series of alliances at an uncertain date, 
possibly between A.D. 1400 and A.D. 1600. Explained in a central Iroquois myth, the 
Deganawidah epic, the period was one of constant “mourning wars” and feuds between 
the peoples o f the Five Nations. These came to an end only after the supernatural being 
Deganawidah taught a series of ceremonies to a man named Hiawatha who had gone 
nearly insane with grief after the deaths o f his daughters. Deganawidah offered strings of 
wampum and symbolically dried Hiawatha’s tears, opened his ears, unstopped his throat, 
and ultimately cleared his mind. Then in a series of epic adventures, these two spread the
7 Douglas Wesley Boyce, "Tuscarora Political Organization, Ethnic Identity, and 
Sociohistorical Demography, 1711-1825" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University o f North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1973), 192; Horatio Emmons Hale, The Iroquois Book o f  Rites,
2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 152-3.
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ceremonies, known as the Good News of Peace and Power, among the warring peoples o f 
the Five Nations. They recruited approximately fifty headmen from towns into a Grand 
Council and organized the Great League of Peace. Thereafter, the main function o f the 
League was to alleviate the need for war between its members through the use of 
condolence rituals and ceremonial gifts.8
It has already been explained how the Great League, ironically, may have 
aggravated wars between its members and outsiders like the Tuscaroras. It also affected 
the role and status of Tuscaroras after they had come among the Iroquois. The structure 
and behavior of the Great League and its Grand Council relied heavily on the history of its 
founding. Foremost, its gifts and rituals reenacted the original exchange between 
Hiawatha and Deganawidah. Meetings began with long recitations o f the Deganawidah 
epic and a recollection o f the roles of its original fifty sachems, whose names were 
preserved on specially marked staffs. In 1743, Weiser witnessed such a roll-call: 
performed “in a singing way” by a speaker “walking up and down the house.” He spoke 
“in praise of their wise Fathers and of the happy union” repeating “all the names of those 
ancient chiefs who established it.” “They, no doubt,” said he, “are now Gods and dwell in 
heaven.” The crowd responded at each phrase with hearty “yo-hass.”9 The council’s 
membership remained limited to these fifty sachems, each of whom bore the name of his
8 The above account borrows heavily from Daniel K. Richter, "Ordeals o f the Longhouse: 
The Five Nations in Early American History," in Beyond the Covenant Chain: The 
Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800, Daniel K. Richter 
and James H. Merrell eds. (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1987), esp. 16-19.
9 John Bartram, Lewis Evans, and Conrad Weiser, A Journey from  Pennsylvania to 
Onondaga in 1743 (Barre, Mass.: Imprint Society, 1973), 121.
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predecessor. The connection to the past ran deeper still: in Iroquois minds, these sachems 
were near-reincarnations o f their predecessors, who inherited their names, traits, and 
virtues. The “most important League ritual occurred when one o f the fifty sachems died.” 
Members carried out condolence ceremonies, and symbolically “requickened” the 
deceased with a kinsman chosen by female elders.10
The nations themselves likewise occupied roles related to the circumstances from 
the epic. Mohawks, for example, were remembered as the “first promoter” o f the League 
and thus considered “the Eldest.” Oneidas in the Deganawidah epic were the next to join 
the Mohawks in the league “by putting themselves under their Protection;” thereafter, “he 
calls the Mohawks his father, and in return he is called a Son.” Mohawks employed him 
as “Ambassador to the other Nations.”11 The list continued with other nations carrying 
titles and roles based on their participation in the epic. Thus, members were not merely 
carrying out functions established long ago. In essence they were the same people 
carrying out the same ceremonies: past and present in a closed, never-ending cycle.
And Tuscaroras were out of the loop. It should be recalled that in Iroquois 
understanding, the formation of the League with all o f its attendant tales o f precedent-
10 Richter, “Ordeals o f the Longhouse,” 17..
11 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 12; 1744 22 June- July (IV), Treaty Held with the Indians o f the 
Six Nations at Lancaster, in Pennsylvania, in June 1744. Including account o f the first 
Confederacy of the Six Nations. Minutes o f  Treaty Between the Six Nations and Colony 
o f Virginia 1744 at Lancaster, (Williamsburg, William Parks, N.D., page 26-27. It should 
be noted that these roles are not always consistent from version to version. See, for 
example, Elias Johnson, Legends, Traditions, and Laws o f  the Iroquois, or Six Nations, 
and History o f  the Tuscarora Indians, reprint of 1881 ed. (New York: AMS Press, 1978), 
41-42.
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setting events took place after Deganawidah left the Tuscaroras’ ancestors in North 
Carolina. No tales o f the League’s founding included the Tuscaroras, no Tuscarora names 
appeared in the roll-call o f the founders; and within a conservative framework dependent 
upon ancient precedent, no new place within the Great Council could easily be made. 
Therefore, according to the Tuscarora Elias Johnson and several other nineteenth-century 
commentators, when the Tuscaroras were adopted they were “initiated without enlarging 
the framework of the confederacy and formation of the League”12 Tuscarora names were 
not added to the roll-call of League Chiefs. Tuscaroras were never given full membership 
in the council; in league matters they never received a guaranteed vote. Structurally, these 
distinctions within the Grand Council could ensure that they remained somewhat different, 
lacking the full prestige of the other five nations who often took pride in their roles. The 
missionary Zinzendorf, for example, spotted such attitudes among Onondagas glorying in 
their ancient “heroik deeds” like “old Romans” who looked down on nearly everybody 
else “as a miserable creature."13 Tuscaroras, who had made an “irregular entrance into the 
House,” may have been especially vulnerable— perhaps even “fools.”14
And yet, according to Elias Johnson and others, the Tuscaroras, enjoyed “a 
nominal equality . . . .  by the courtesy of the other five nations.”15 They were “not
12 Johnson, Legends, 69.
13 William M. Beauchamp, ed., Moravian Journals Relating to Central New York, 1745- 
66 (Syracuse, NY: Dehler Press for the Onondaga Historical Association, 1916), 3.
14 Boyce, "Tuscarora Political Organization," 189.
15 Johnson, Legends, 69.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
411
dependent, but were admitted to as “full an equality as could be granted them without 
enlarging the frame-work of the confederacy.” 16 In practice, this reflected the fact that 
although the Grand Council had fifty sachems distributed unevenly among the five nations, 
each nation only cast one vote. Moreover, the goal was consensus and goodwill, not 
narrow electoral victory. Although lacking league titles, the Tuscaroras could participate 
as spectators, and could make their voices “heard through the sachem o f some other 
tribe.”17 In this context o f seeking unity, the Tuscaroras could still wield influence even 
without a formal participatory role.
Moreover, the Grand Council was not the only, or perhaps even most important, 
entity for intercourse among the Iroquois nations. The Grand Council acted as a source of 
prestige and ceremonial precedent. However, its role centered on “peace functions;” it 
possessed few “state-like characteristics” in terms of decision-making, centripetal 
authority, or external diplomacy.18 Historian Daniel Richter has made a distinction 
between the older Great League of Peace as a cultural and ritual institution, and a more 
recent political and diplomatic entity, the Iroquois Confederacy. The Confederacy 
borrowed heavily in terms of ritual and form from the League, and at times membership in 
the two institutions overlapped, but they were different. As opposed to the earlier inter­
tribal crises confronted by the League, the Confederacy arose to confront the trade,
16 Johnson, Legends, 69.
17 Lewis Henry Morgan, League o f  the Ho-De-No-Sau-Nee or Iroquois, ed. Herbert M. 
Lloyd, reprint ed. (New York: Burt Franklin, 1966), 1: 93-94; Boyce, “Tuscarora Political 
Organization,” 189.
18 Richter, “Ordeals o f the Longhouse,” 17.
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warfare, and diseases brought by contact with Europeans beginning in the seventeenth 
century. Unlike the Grand Council o f the League composed of the fifty bearers of sacred 
sachem titles, the Confederacy relied on the cooperation o f an unfixed number of 
influential local headmen and skilled orators who had risen to authority in their home 
villages. It was these men who were most likely to try to exercise and coordinate 
authority within their communities; it was they who were most likely to treat with 
European diplomats, arguing in matters o f war, trade, alliances, and land. Increasingly 
into the eighteenth century, the Confederacy wielded a greater amount o f influence in 
decision-making among the Iroquois, and even took on some ceremonial functions o f the 
League.19
Whereas the conservative nature o f the League had restricted the roles available to 
the Tuscaroras, flexibility in the Confederacy allowed a fuller voice. Even while 
employing many League rituals and protocols, the Confederacy proved more adaptive and 
open to change. “Innovation,” according to Richter, “grew within a framework of 
traditional forms.”20 The same might be said of the Tuscaroras. Despite being barred from 
full participation within the League, Tuscaroras found a secure place in the Confederacy.
In the process they adopted many protocols originally employed in the League, but which 
had trickled down to the Confederacy.
In other words, even though the Confederacy arose as a separate entity from the 
League, the line between the two became almost immediately hazy. Therefore, it is
19 Richter, “Ordeals of the Longhouse,” 11-27.
20 Richter, “Ordeals of the Longhouse,” 26.
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impossible to analyze the Tuscaroras’ position within a static version o f an idealized 
League (or Confederacy). Instead, Tuscarora political leaders rose, similar to other 
Iroquois leaders around them, by internalizing the forms of the League, and by employing 
them in political discussions among themselves, other Indian groups, and with Europeans. 
One anthropologist, examining Tuscaroras in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even 
suggests that they became greater sticklers for proper ceremonial protocol than the other 
five nations, perhaps to compensate for an abiding self-consciousness as outsiders.21
An example o f this process can be seen in patterns o f Tuscarora leadership. 
Although Tuscaroras were denied positions in the League’s roll-call of sachems,
Tuscaroras joined the swell of local leaders rising to positions o f broader prominence in 
the Confederacy. Therefore, at councils and treaties, Tuscarora leaders appeared in the 
records. Some of their positions, according to Elias Johnson, initially followed old 
bloodlines inherited from the south.22 Moreover, those Tuscaroras who came north were 
able to preserve previous patterns of one or two village headmen who consulted with a 
council o f elders and respected men from the community— a contrast to the efforts of 
“King” Blount who monopolized unprecedented personal authority at the end of the 
Tuscaroras War.
21 David Landy, "Tuscarora Tribalism and National Identity," Ethnohistory 5, no. 3 
(1958): 255-59.
22 Johnson, Legends, 69-72. Describing groups near the Tuscaroras in North Carolina, 
Lawson wrote, “succession falls not to the King’s son, but to his sister’s son”— evidence 
o f a matrilineal system that corresponded to the Iroquois (Lawson, New Voyage, 204-05).
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In spite of such continuity, change did occur. Chiefs came to be “raised up” or 
installed using ceremonies adapted from other Iroquois nations.23 Old terminology (i.e. 
“teetha” for “king”) gave way to a new political vocabulary for words like “judge,” 
“Confederate Chief,” and “council” based on roots and stems borrowed from the speech 
of Iroquois neighbors.24 Like other Iroquois leaders who rose to prominence in the 
Confederacy, Tuscarora leaders performed ceremonial duties that echoed League 
etiquette. In some cases, Tuscaroras adopted the Iroquois practice of preserving leaders’ 
names as titles. The most prevalent such designation was that of Sakwarithra — “The 
Spear Dragger”—whose name appeared repeatedly in eighteenth-century records and 
which was held by several individuals in the nineteenth century. In a 1794 treaty, a man by 
that name was referred to as “head sachem by birth.”25 Another probable title was that of 
T ’hanhanagwanageas. One leader holding that name died in a 1754 fire; another 
Tuscarora of the same name died and received an elaborate funeral two decades later 26 
Other inherited names are harder to identify in the records, although Douglas Boyce has 
published a tentative list o f about twenty.27
23 Morgan, League, 1: 93-94; Johnson, Legends, 69-72.
24 Blair A. Rudes, Tuscarora-English/English-Tuscarora Dictionary (Toronto:
University o f Toronto Press, 1999), xvi-xvii.
25 Pickering, Papers, 153. The position was probably hereditary within a clan, not to the 
child o f  a single individual.
26 Doc. Hist. N.Y., 3: 1036; Journal, 1754/04/08, Hawley Papers; James Dean to Philip 
Schuyler, 1776/ 03/10 in Kirkland Letters, 64a. The first bearer o f the name also went by 
Jacob, and may have married into the Tuscaroras. Hawley wrote that his Indian name “is 
long, but o f no extraordinary meaning.”
27 Boyce, "Tuscarora Political Organization," 262-66.
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Led by such men, Tuscaroras took part in many ceremonies common among the 
Iroquois. They participated in condolence rites for the deaths o f leaders among other 
nations, offering beaded belts, blackened strouds, and soothing words. The death o f one 
of their own likewise provoked the “usual ceremony” from other nations and well- 
informed Europeans.28 In 1776, the diplomat James Dean reported that a “principle 
sachem” of the Tuscaroras “is lately dead” and that the Tuscaroras refused any 
negotiations “till his funeral observances are performed.”29 In another instance,
Tuscaroras and Oneidas chastised other Iroquois nations for neglecting a condolence 
ceremony for recently killed warriors— an omission, according to their speaker, “which we 
think wrong.”30
When such gifts and observances were not enough to end grief, Tuscaroras might 
receive captives “in order to replace some of their Friends deceased.”31 Taking up the 
Iroquois practice o f using adopted prisoners to fill spiritual and physical voids in grieving 
communities, Tuscaroras treated such captives, no longer “as prisoners, but with that 
kindness and tenderness and respect which they had for the deceased. If  one o f them 
makes [up] the loss o f a child or brother, he has title and privileges that appertain to the 
situation he stands in. In a word the deceased are now revived again.” The missionary 
Gideon Hawley watched the Tuscaroras give a “shout of approbation” as they received
28 Johnson, Papers, 12: 364, 946-47.
29 James Dean to Philip Schuyler, 1776/ 03/10 in Kirkland Letters, 64a.
30 Johnson, Papers, 9: 347- 352.
31 Johnson, Papers, 4: 367-72; 9: 357; Journal, 1756/02/18, Hawley Papers.
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one such prisoner to replace “Cayadanorong, a Tuscarora” who had recently died at the 
Battle o f Lake George.32 Captive-taking practices with similar roots had probably existed 
previously among the Tuscaroras in North Carolina, but were transformed by the slave 
trade. Transplanted and tended in Iroquois lands, they took new flower.
Clans were another area where Tuscarora behaviors fell into step with northeastern 
norms. Clan organization was so interwoven with the League that some Iroquois 
traditions attributed their creation to Deganawidah.33 Each o f the five nations had varying 
numbers of clans, usually named after animals and birds, which served as an important way 
for individuals to reckon their kinship. Taking pride in their heritage, “Indians, in their 
hours o f leisure, paint their different marks or badges on the doors o f their respective 
houses, that those who pass by may know to which . . . [clan] the inhabitants belong.”34 
At the League and village level, clans played a number of roles. Iroquois women gained a 
voice through clan matrons who controlled succession to League sachem titles. In an 
exogamous society where Iroquois married outside o f their own clan, clan lines set the 
boundaries o f prospective husbands and wives. In councils and ceremonies, clan groupings 
of “moieties” or “phratries” determined roles. One set of clans sat across the council fire 
from another, while a third might sit between, acting as “firekeepers” or “judges” who
32 Journal, 1756/02/18, Hawley Papers.
33 Tooker, "League of the Iroquois," 426.
34 John Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs o f  the Indian Nations (Philadelphia: 
Historical Society o f Pennsylvania, 1876), 254. “Clan” has been inserted in the above 
quotation in the place o f “tribe” in keeping with Heckewelder’s pattern of using the two 
interchangeably.
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moderated points o f discussion.35 Such descriptions date at least as far back as 1666 when 
a Jesuit missionary wrote that “when they assemble together for consultation, the first 
division ranges itself on one side of the fire in a cabin; and the other Division places itself 
on the other side” and continued into the twentieth century.36
Although no evidence suggests such complex clans among Tuscaroras in North 
Carolina, Iroquois patterns became the norm by the nineteenth century. Among those 
who came north, observers have since counted eight or more clans.37 For Tuscaroras, 
clans may have been especially important because of the ties they created between nations: 
a Bear clan member among the Tuscaroras, for example, could seek out and expect 
hospitality from fellow members of the Bear clan in each of the other five nations.38 If a 
member was hurt or killed, clan members— even from another nation—would be expected 
to provide aid or offer revenge. Beyond a place to rest, a meal to share, or even an ally in 
need, belief in a joint lineage from ancestors in an ancient mythological past could offer a 
sense o f common history and likeness.39
35 Tooker, "League o f the Iroquois," 426.
36 Doc. Hist. N.Y. , 1:4; William N. Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A 
Political History o f  the Iroquois Confederacy (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 
1998), 141-179.
37 William M. Beauchamp, A History o f  the New York Iroquois, Now Commonly Called 
the Six Nations, reprint ed. (Port Washington, N.Y.: Ira J. Friedman, 1968), 20-21.
38 Beauchamp, History o f  the New York Iroquois, 21; Jay Miller, “Kinship, Family 
Kindreds, and Community” in Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury, A Companion to 
American Indian History, (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2004), 140.
39 For the importance of clans in creating cross-national ties see Richard White, The 
Middle G round: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650- 
1815, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 16-20.
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Likewise, in the language they used to describe their relationship with other 
nations, the Tuscaroras adapted Iroquois usage, using a vocabulary that borrowed and 
expanded on clan patterns. Just as clans were divided into moieties for ceremonial 
purposes, the Six Nations imagined themselves as a family with an “elder” and a 
“younger” branch. Like clans, the two branches symbolically sat across from one another 
in councils between nations. During times o f loss and grief, members o f one branch 
collectively mourned together, receiving the ministrations o f the other branch who 
cooperated to assuage the grief. The elder branch included the Senecas, Onondagas, and 
Mohawks; the younger branch included the Oneidas and Cayugas. As the newest 
members, the Tuscaroras were a natural addition to this younger branch. Like other 
members o f the younger branch, they often referred to those in the elder branch as their 
“fathers” and in turn were called “sons.”40 Moreover, within the younger moiety, the 
Oniedas occupied a place as the “head” or “elder brother.”
These structural divisions help explain the confusing array o f kin terms associated 
with descriptions o f the Tuscaroras’ place among the Iroquois, such as statements that the 
Tuscaroras were “brother to the Onoyders and Cayuquos’s, and son to the others.”41 
Likewise, one gains a better understanding of Elias Johnson’s statement that the 
Tuscaroras
40 For an example o f the use of such divisions in a condolence in 1750 seeMPCP, 5: 476- 
78.
41 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 12; 1744 22 June- July (IV), Treaty Held with the Indians o f the 
Six Nations at Lancaster, in Pennsylvania, in June 1744. Including account o f the first 
Confederacy of the Six Nations. Minutes o f  Treaty Between the Six Nations and Colony 
o f  Virginia 1744 at Lancaster, (Williamsburg, William Parks, N.D.), page 4.
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made an application, through their brothers the Oneidas, to be admitted 
into the Iroquois and become the Sixth Nation . . . .  Then the Seneca 
adopted the Tuscarora as their children. Ever since that time to the 
present, if a Seneca addresses the Tuscaroras, he will invariably salute them 
as ‘my sons,’ in social or in council; and also the Tuscarora in turn will say 
‘my fathers.’42
Thus, being called “son” or “younger brother” and in turn addressing others as “father” or 
“older brother” did not necessarily signify derision pointed at a newly adopted outsider, 
but instead could represent integration within broader Iroquois patterns. The Cayugas, for 
instance, referred to the Senecas and Oneidas in similar kin terms as the Tuscaroras.
Iroquois metaphors, however, were notoriously slippery; rarely did any term have 
a single concrete meaning. Therefore, discussions o f Tuscaroras as children could slide 
rhetorically into implying power relationships based upon their recent arrival. Likewise, 
references to other nations as their fathers, or especially to the Oneidas as their “elder 
brothers,” could suggest dependency.43 At the Tuscaroras’ first arrival, it will be recalled, 
the Iroquois themselves had proclaimed authority over the adoptees as “our Children who 
shall obey our commands.”44 In a 1753 meeting with Oneida leaders, William Johnson
42 Johnson, Legends, 69.
43 In matrifocal Iroquois society, an elder brother could have influence comparable to the 
father. Even greater male authority could come from the mother’s brother. As suggested 
in William Johnson’s quotation below, such relations also entailed obligations. Under 
European influence, however, the Iroquois and other Indians increasingly adopted 
patriarchal language.
44 NYCD, 5: 387.
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referred to the “Tuscaroras who belong to you as children” and who were received on a 
“cradle” for the Oneidas to “feed and protect.”45 Two decades later Johnson urged a 
group o f Tuscaroras to obey “the Oneida chiefs who are the proper heads o f your 
settlement” and to remember early kindness shown upon their ancestors’ first arrival half a 
century earlier.46 Such language might even translate into faintly damning praise, as when 
Johnson lauded the “wholesome advice” given to the Oneidas by “your brother the 
Tuscarora, although younger.”47
Exactly how pervasive such views were, and what effect they had on relations 
between the Tuscaroras and other Iroquois nations is hard to determine, especially since 
descriptions came from patriarchal-minded Europeans. Johnson himself realized that the 
northeastern Indians had no “word which can express, or convey the Idea o f Subjection.” 
Instead in treaties and elsewhere, Indians might use native kin metaphors such as father or 
brother, only to have colonial translators “readily adopt & insert a Word very different in 
signification, and never intended by the Indians.” The results could be of “dangerous 
consequence.”48 Nonetheless, Johnson did not heed his own warnings, and instead may 
have attempted to use such language as a way to understand unfamiliar hierarchies and 
perhaps impose a few of his own. Trying to distinguish factions among the Iroquois, he 
wrote that the “Tuscaroras ( .  . are, as it were, under the Oneidas), [and] I suppose
45 Johnson, Papers, 9: 47-50, 113.
46 Johnson, Papers, 12: 1110.
47 Johnson, Papers, 9: 352-54.
48 Johnson, Papers, 11: 394- 396.
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followed their Example.” But only a few months later, he discovered a more cooperative 
mindset when the Oneidas refused to accept one of Johnson’s proposals, claiming they 
could not give a “determinate Answer till they had consulted with their Bretheren the 
Tuscaroras.”49 A broad analysis of the record suggests that Oneidas, in fact, often did 
take the lead, but not invariably. In many cases, the two cooperated apparently as equals; 
less frequently Tuscarora opinions proved a deciding influence.50 In a few instances, 
Oneidas and Tuscaroras broke with one another and took separate paths.51 Such 
interactions may have owed as much to local politics and the fact that Tuscaroras and 
Oneidas lived in close proximity, as to deep-seated structural authority based upon Oneida 
seniority.
Negotiations as the Sixth Nation
Despite any internal differences, the Iroquois were masters at shielding splits from 
the prying eyes of outsiders and putting forward a seemingly united front— one main 
reason why analysis of the relative position o f the Tuscaroras among the other five nations 
is so difficult. External cooperation helped make six individual nations into a collective
49 Johnson, Papers, 9: 852.
50 Johnson, Papers, 9: 332-34; In this encounter an Oneida described his people as 
“drunk” for not following the advice of the Tuscaroras earlier.
51 Johnson, Papers, 9: 414-16, 448-49; 9: 65-76, 839; 12: 797-99.
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“Six Nations” that wielded great diplomatic and military influence among colonists and 
other Indian groups. Any losses in prestige that Tuscaroras may have experienced as 
newcomers among the Iroquois were in large part compensated for by the diplomatic 
gains to be had as member o f the Six Nations. By casting their lot with the Iroquois, the 
Tuscaroras gained newfound political leverage in dealings with colonists, which is hard to 
imagine for refugees who had suffered massive military defeat and expulsion from their 
homelands.
After the Albany Treaty o f 1722, colonial diplomats viewed Tuscaroras primarily 
as part o f the Six Nations with whom they held councils and entered into treaties. In such 
external affairs, members o f the Iroquois Confederacy balanced individual autonomy with 
efforts to cooperate and coordinate their actions. Towards these ends, councilors from 
the different nations, including the Tuscaroras, frequently met at the central council fire at 
Onondaga; during treaties with Europeans they would confer and debate privately before 
emerging to answer colonial officials with a harmonized voice. Internal disagreements 
occurred— indeed, they were common—but inaction rather than contrary courses were the 
usual result. As one Iroquois politician explained, “one Nation often makes a Proposition 
and gives their consent to a thing in the name of all the rest, which if they afterwards 
consent and approve of, it is well, but if they disallow’d it, it was void.”52 A lack of true 
coercive authority hindered enforcement o f such a veto, but at very least, nations
52 NYCD, 5: 788.
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attempted to steer clear o f open conflict and bloodshed among themselves. Internal peace, 
their leaders recognized, could translate into external influence.53
Despite limitations, the Six Nations were the preeminent diplomatic force among 
Indians in colonial eastern North America.54 As members, Tuscaroras gained privileged 
access to numerous treaties and conferences, addressing a multitude o f issues. Many of 
these conferences were landmarks o f colonial Indian diplomacy. At the 1744 Treaty of 
Lancaster, officials from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia debated with Iroquois 
councilors over the fate of the Ohio Valley and the future o f wars between the Iroquois 
and several southern nations. At the Treaty o f Easton in 1758 during the Seven Years’ 
War, English officials and leaders from the Iroquois and other Indian nations negotiated a 
general peace across much of western Pennsylvania, New York, and the Ohio Valley. In 
1768, Iroquois diplomats signed a treaty at Fort Stanwix with British officials, creating a 
several-hundred mile frontier boundary to divide Europeans from Indians. At all of these 
conferences, and at numerous other meetings, Tuscaroras participated as the sixth nation
53 Johnson, Papers, 9, 668-69.
54 There are numerous works on Iroquois diplomacy. See, for example, Richter, Ordeal 
o f the Longhouse; Fenton, Great Law, Josae Antaonio Brandaao, Your Fyre Shall Burn 
No More: Iroquois Policy Toward New France and Its Native Allies to 1701 (Lincoln: U. 
of Nebraska Press, 1997); Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy 
on the Colonial Frontier, 1701-1754 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983); 
Francis Jennings, William N. Fenton, Mary A. Druke, and David R. Miller, The History 
and Culture o f  Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties o f  the Six 
Nations and Their League (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985); Jon William 
Parmenter, "At the Wood's Edge: Iroquois Foreign Relations, 1727- 1768" (Ph.D. diss., 
Dept, o f  History, University of Michigan, 1999); Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous 
Iroquois Empire : The Covenant Chain Confederation o f  Indian Tribes with English 
Colonies from  Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty o f  1744, (New York: Norton,
1984).
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of the Iroquois, sending representatives, negotiating in public or “in the bushes,” and 
affixing their signatures to official documents.55
The vastness o f this sea o f talks, treaties, and conferences extending from Virginia 
to Canada becomes even more evident when compared to the Tuscaroras’ situation before 
the Tuscarora War. Earlier, Tuscaroras had been big fish in a small pond whose diplomatic 
shores rarely extended outside of Virginia or the Carolinas. Those who remained in Indian 
Woods after the war had seen these waters recede even farther (even while their status 
slipped further down the local political food chain). Migrants, on the other hand, quickly 
became a fixture at the multitude of negotiations involving the Iroquois. If  anything, 
documents give the impression that these Tuscaroras became more active as the century 
progressed.56
One of the most important topics o f these treaties was land, which by mid-century 
an Iroquois speaker declared was the “chief cause o f all the late Wars.”57 During the 
eighteenth century, unprecedented numbers of European settlers flooded into the mid- 
Atlantic backcountry, making the ownership and control of territory, particularly rich
55 Participation at 1744 Lancaster Treaty: three Tuscarora signatures appear on Iroq. Doc. 
Hist., Reel 12, 1744 16 June- 7 July, Witham Marshe’s Journal o f the Treaty o f Lancaster 
between the Six Nations and Commissioners o f Maryland and Virginia, and the Governors 
o f Pennsylvania. Massachusetts Historical Society Collection. 1st Series 7: 171-201. 
Participation at 1758 Easton Treaty: MPCP, 8: 175-78. Participation at 1768 Stanwix 
Treaty: NYCD, 8: 113; Doc. Hist. N.Y., 1: 591.
56 For an overview of activity, see the entry under “Tuscarora” in the Iroq. Doc. Hist. 
Index, pp 691-92. This apparent increase in political activity may in part reflect an overall 
increase in records of Iroquois diplomacy after the elevation o f William Johnson to the 
position o f Northern Superintendent of Indian Affairs.
57 NYCD, 7: 726.
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bottomlands suitable for farming, vital. The Iroquois made the strategic sale and 
distribution of land a central means of securing their importance to colonial governments. 
One historian, tongue-in-cheek, has labeled them as America’s “first great real estate 
agency.”58 Rather than merely chasing profit and selling any chunk of land to the highest 
bidder, however, Iroquois diplomats strategically claimed and sold territory to shape 
settlement patterns by both European and Indian settlers along the edges o f Iroquoia, and 
to leverage advantageous deals in trade and war.59
Membership among the Iroquois gave a great leg up to Tuscarora migrants 
displaced from their own homelands in North Carolina. Whether negotiations centered on 
lands along the Susquehanna and Delaware rivers, the shores of the Great Lakes, or deep 
in the Ohio country, the Iroquois grounded ownership on assertions o f ancient occupation, 
military conquest, or pretensions o f authority over native inhabitants. Although nearly all 
o f these basis for ownership predated the Tuscaroras’ adoption, the Iroquois conferred 
such prerogatives to the Sixth Nation. For example, at the 1744 Treaty at Lancaster, the 
Iroquois responded to Maryland claims over the Susquehanna Valley,
[you] told us, you had been in Possession of the Province of Maryland 
above One Hundred Years; but what is One Hundred Years in Comparison 
of the Length of Time since our claim began? Since we came out o f this 
ground? For we must tell you, that long before One Hundred Years our
58 Calvin Martin, "The Covenant Chain o f Friendship, Inc.: America's First Great Real 
Estate Agency: Review of Francis Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire," Reviews in 
American History 13, no. 1 (1985): 14-20.
59 Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire.
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Ancestors came out of this very Ground, and their children have remained 
here ever since. You came out of the Ground in a Country that lies beyond 
the Seas, there you may have a just Claim, but here you must allow us to 
be your elder Brethren, and the Lands to belong to us long before you 
knew any thing of them.60 
At another point in the same negotiations, the Iroquois claimed ownership of the 
Susquehanna Valley and parts of Ohio by military conquest: “we conquered the Nations 
residing there, and that Land, if the Virginians ever get a good Right to it, must be by 
us.”61 At one point, Iroquois negotiators conceded that the English had “drove back the 
Tuscarorrowas,” voiding those Indians’ claims to parts of Virginia.62 On such a basis, one 
might expect the Tuscaroras to have had limited diplomatic clout. Nonetheless, 
Tuscaroras still took part in the negotiations alongside other Iroquois diplomats and 
affixed their name to the final treaty.63
60 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 12; 1744 22 June- 4 July, Printed Copy o f treaty Between the Six 
Nations and the Provinces o f Virginia and Maryland, at Lancaster. National Archives and 
Records Service, Washington, D.C., Indian Treaties, RG 11, page 11.
61 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 12; 1744 22 June- 4 July, Printed Copy o f treaty Between the Six 
Nations and the Provinces o f Virginia and Maryland, at Lancaster. National Archives and 
Records Service, Washington, D.C., Indian Treaties, RG 11, page 13.
62 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 12; 1744 22 June- 4 July, Printed Copy o f treaty Between the Six 
Nations and the Provinces of Virginia and Maryland, at Lancaster. National Archives and 
Records Service, Washington, D.C., Indian Treaties, RG 11, page 16.
63 Their names were Sidowax, Attiusgu, and Tuwaiadachquha. Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 12, 
1744 16 June- 7 July, Witham Marshe’s Journal of the Treaty of Lancaster between the 
Six Nations and Commissioners of Maryland and Virginia, and the Governors of 
Pennsylvania. Massachusetts Historical Society Collection. 1st Series 7: 171-201. Black, 
“Journal, 1744,” 414.
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This was no limited case. Despite their status as newcomers to the region, 
Tuscaroras joined in negotiations related to the claim and sale o f numerous lands in the 
mid-Atlantic and Northeast. In 1741, for example, Tuscaroras, alongside Onondagas, 
Cayugas, and Oneidas, took part in talks with the English and French regarding the 
possibility o f selling a plot near Niagara.64 Likewise, in 1754, a Tuscarora sachem named 
Suntrughwacho” affixed his name alongside those o f representatives from the other five 
Iroquois nations onto a treaty handing over a vast swath stretching westward from the 
banks o f the Susquehanna River.65 Four years later at Easton, Iroquois leaders claimed 
that the scope of the sale was larger than they had intended and had alienated Indians 
living in the Ohio Valley. Therefore, the western portion was returned to the Iroquois in 
another treaty, this time signed by leaders including “Nihaquontoquon, a sachem or chief 
of the Tuscarora nation.”66
Many of these territories were not even particularly near Tuscarora communities.67 
Indeed, the Six Nations, including the Tuscaroras, made a habit o f seizing a lead role in 
negotiations o f lands inhabited by the smaller tribes whom Iroquois and colonial officials
64 NYCD, 9: 1081.
65 Johnson, Papers, 10: 43-48.
66 Johnson, Papers, 10: 43-48.
67 In one odd case, a Tuscarora signature apparently appeared on a patent which was 
attempted to be used to defraud Mohawks of part o f the Kayadarosseras tract. The 
Mohawks inspected the paper and decided it was invalid based in part upon the fact that 
“one o f the subscribers was a Tuscarora” with improper authority over the tract. The fact 
that the paper was apparently signed in 1702, decades before the Tuscaroras’ adoption 
among the Iroquois, added to the illegality. Johnson, Papers, 12: 530-31.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
alike chose to view as subordinate to the Iroquois.68 In 1769, for example, a group of 
Indians from various tribes living along the Wabash River in the Ohio country complained 
that the Six Nations had given up “so much of the Country to the English without asking 
their consent and approbations and say the lands down the Ohio . . .  is as much theirs as 
the Six Nations.” Senecas and Cayugas (who had strong ties with these Indians to their 
west) agreed, admitting that the sale was against their “judgements;” nonetheless, they 
gave in to the will o f the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, and Tuscaroras.69 In other 
cases, the Tuscaroras’ position among the Iroquois allowed them to influence negotiations 
closer to home. In 1764, a group of Tuscaroras and Oneidas from communities near 
Oneida Lake approached Sir William Johnson in order to express their “hope that . . .[he] 
will protect our Possessions” by writing down their lands bounds in duplicate, one copy to 
be held by the Indians, and another to be preserved by colonial officials.70 More dramatic 
was the effect on the Treaty Line of Fort Stanwix. That line, meant to separate Indians 
and whites, ran up the length of the eastern branch of the Susquehanna towards that 
river’s headwaters, except at one point where it suddenly skirted east to bypass the 
Tuscarora and Oneida community of Oquaga. The detour apparently owed in part to 
politicking by the town’s Tuscarora and Oneida inhabitants.71 Rather than merely
68 See, for example, Doc. Hist. N.Y., 2: 750. MPCP, 5: 392-393.
69 Johnson, Papers, 7: 184-185.
70 Johnson, Papers, 11:29-31. Johnson ultimately rejected the entreaty, instead informing 
the petitioners that the recently enacted Proclamation of 1763 would guarantee their lands.
71 NYCD, 7: 729; Johnson, Papers, 12: 542, 628-29; Doc. Hist. N.Y., 1: 591. NYCD, 8: 
120-21, 125, 135-37 (includes treaty line and map).
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defending lands, members of the same community selectively sold other portions, ranging 
from large tracts o f over a 200,000 acres down to more personal sales, such as one to “a 
Woman at Schohare who wanted to buy a piece of land from them sufficient for a farm.”72
Another benefit derived by Tuscaroras as members o f the Six Nations was access 
to the gifts that were regularly distributed at conferences. English and French officials had 
quickly learned that gifts played numerous roles in Iroquois society and were an 
unavoidable cost o f conducting any serious business. Costly treaty belts, knives, fine 
clothes, and guns gave weight to a speaker’s words and indicated that he spoke for a 
whole community. Although initially both sides had exchanged presents as symbols of 
goodwill, increasingly in the eighteenth century, exchanges became a “one-way affair,” 
with Europeans viewing presents as payment, even bribes, for lands and alliance.73 As 
members of the Six Nations, Tuscaroras stood at the receiving end of this steady flow.
Tuscarora leaders received individual presents from European diplomats as signs 
o f respect and friendship; these in turn could bolster a recipient’s own standing among 
their people. One dapper Tuscarora leader returned from a conference sporting a “Silver 
Laced Hatt,” courtesy o f William Johnson who recorded its cost in his account book. 
Another entry recorded L5/16/4 for “a present” given to three Tuscaroras who came “on
72 Johnson, Papers, 12: 542.
73 Jennings, et. al., History and Culture o f  Iroquois Diplomacy, 94; White, Middle 
Ground, 112-119, 399-404; Nancy Shoemaker, "An Alliance between Men: Gender 
Metaphors in Eighteenth-Century American Indian Diplomacy East o f the Mississippi," 
Ethnohistory 46, no. 2 (1999): 239-63 discusses the effects of these patterns o f gift giving 
on gender conceptions.
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business.”74 During a 1732 meeting with the proprietor o f Pennsylvania, a Tuscarora 
leader received one of “six fine Jappaned and gilt guns . . .  to be delivered one to the Chief 
of Each of the Six Nations.”75 Six other Tuscarora leaders lined up for silver medals 
issued for military service against the French at M ontreal76 At times, Indians could be 
persistent in their expectations. Leaders from an Oneida and Tuscarora community 
(Oquaga) wrote to the “Governor . . . and great men” of Boston to remind them of a 
promise to give “several dollars to each of the heads” of their community, that had never 
arrived.77
Much to the frustration o f European hosts, rarely did only a few needy diplomats 
arrive. Instead, officials learned to expect a traveling road show, such as the one in 1736 
that arrived in Pennsylvania consisting of several Delaware chiefs, a Cayuga chief, 
“Teshansomen [,] a Tuscarore” leader and “several young Men, Women, and children, to 
the number of twenty-five in the whole, coming to town on a visit to this Government.”78 
This number was small compared to some later treaties to which Tuscaroras contributed 
sizable contingents. A delegate to the 1744 Lancaster Treaty recorded how “during our
74 Johnson, Papers, 3: 152; 12:734-35, 797-99, 863-69. The three Indians “on business” 
are referred to as from Ganughsawaghte, which was a community largely occupied and led 
by Tuscaroras, although there were also Oneidas there as well.
75 MPCP, 3: 450.
76 Johnson, Papers, 251-54.
77 Letter to Governor o f Boston from Isaac Takayenersere and Gwedethes 
Akwirondongwas, 1764/11/12, Charles Roberts' Autographs, Library o f Haverford 
College, Haverford, Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Marjory Hinman for calling my 
attention to this source.
™ MPCP, 4: 53-56.
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dinner, the deputies o f the Six Nations, with their followers and attendants to the number 
o f 252 arrived in town,” marching “in very good order;” these included their “wives, with 
some small children, [who] rode on horseback.” 79 A still larger meeting at Albany in 1745 
included 87 Tuscaroras, alongside 163 Mohawks, 75 Oneidas, 81 Onondagas, and 56 
Cayugas. (Senecas did not come because of a “distemper” that raged in their towns.)80
Such large contingents arrived with veritable shopping lists for Europeans to fill. 
The leader o f a Tuscarora delegation that camped outside Fort Johnson in 1756 told the 
Indian superintendent that “Our young men and women have brought down many things
79 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 12, 1744 16 June- 7 July, Witham Marshe’s Journal of the Treaty 
of Lancaster between the Six Nations and Commissioners of Maryland and Virginia, and 
the Governors o f Pennsylvania. Massachusetts Historical Society Collection. 1st Series 7: 
171-201.
80 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 12, 1745 Sept- Oct, Journal o f Isaac Norris o f his trip to Albany 
with an Account o f a treaty held there in October 1745. Journal o f  Isaac N orris . ., ed. 
And published with the Life of the Author by J. P. Norris, (Printed in Philadelphia by J.P. 
Norris, on the Hawthorne Press, 1867).
A 1742 meeting at Philadelphia hosted:
Onondagas-13 (1 chief Canassateego who is also speaker and 2 councilors)
Cayugas: 19 (2 chiefs)
Oneidas: 14 (2 chiefs)
Senecas: 3 (1 captain)
Tuscaroras:20 (3 chiefs, 1 captain)
Shawnees: 5 (1 chief)
“Canestogo Indians that speak the Onayiut’s language” 4(1  chief)
“Canoyias or Nanticokes o f Canestogo” 4 (0 chiefs)
Delawares of Shamokin: 6 (2 chiefs)
Delawares from the Forks : 4 (2 chiefs)
{Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 11; 1742 2-12 July, Treaty with the Six Nations at Philadelphia, 
(Philadelphia: B. Franklin, 1743).
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to have mended by the smith, and want some new to be made, viz Hows [hoes], axes, 
guns, kettles, etc., which we wish you would leave orders to have done.”81 In another 
instance, Tuscaroras went so far as to ask for a smith to return home with them to repair 
rusted axes and a ploughman with a team of horses to till their cornfields.82 Europeans 
also distributed pipes, tobacco, razors, combs, scissors, ribbons, and “trifles o f Cloathing” 
for the wives and children.83 Hogs and cattle would be roasted, kegs o f rum opened, and 
bread baked and distributed. Tuscarora women lined up alongside Onondagas and 
Oneidas in requesting rum to “fulfill some Dreams their People had and some for 
Christenings Weddings etc”84
In small quantities such goods might be no more than “trifles,” but, grumbled cash- 
strapped colonial officials, they added up to a costly flow of wealth from European hands 
into Tuscarora communities. Officials could easily spend a whole day or more dividing 
gifts to be shared among the Iroquois participants at treaties.85 Tuscaroras were 
sometimes so eager for part of the spoils that they angered members o f other Iroquois 
contingents. After the 1768 Treaty o f Fort Stanwix, Oneidas complained that the
81 NYCD, 7: 176. See Johnson, Papers, 10: 643-48 for another example o f Tuscaroras 
receiving gifts and repairs of tools since their axes were so rusted that they were “almost 
reduced to the necessity of burning down trees, (as our Forefathers used to do).” In this 
case, Johnson answered their request, but also distributed some criticism by blaming their 
poverty on their indolence.
82 Johnson, Papers, 12: 624-26.
83 Johnson, Papers, 9: 22-26.
84 Johnson, Papers. 9,638.
85 Iroq. Doc. Hist., Reel 13, 1746 Aug- Sept (II), Printed copy of a treaty between N.Y. 
Gov. Clinton and Six Nations; with manuscript note. BPRO, CO5/1061, page 16.
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Tuscaroras had departed with more than their fair share of the presents; they feared that 
Tuscaroras might also make off with an undue proportion of $10,000 promised for 
Iroquois lands by Pennsylvania in the treaty.86
For Tuscaroras in times of crisis, such gifts could turn into life-saving necessities; 
smart officials, in turn, expected to bank a return on their investment in gratitude and 
dependency. One ailing Tuscarora received money to “pay an Indian Doctor for Cureing 
him.”87 In early winter, 1758 William Johnson recorded that numerous Tuscarora and 
Oneida families came begging for food, “having nothing at home,” and in a “Starving 
Condition crops hav[in]g failed.” The superintendent issued them L48 credit to buy 
supplies at the nearby Palatine community of Stone Arabia, where some decided to spend 
the winter — living off European hospitality.88 As another Tuscarora chief said, two years 
earlier, “we are very poor and in want o f many necessaries for our Families which we hope 
you will be able to supply us with, as our only dependence at these times is on you.”89
Other gifts filled symbolic more than practical needs. Europeans learned to follow 
Iroquois protocol, understanding that presents could serve as a vital form o f reconciliation 
and allow clear minds to resume diplomacy. Thus, in 1756 Johnson carefully presented a
86 Johnson, Papers, 12: 670-71.
87 Johnson, Papers, 12: 758-63.
88 Johnson, Papers, 10: 77; 3: 152.
89 NYCD, 7: 150-51. In another instance, the commander of Fort Augustine fed a returning 
delegation of Delawares (and perhaps Tuscaroras) “3 barrells of flour that they might not 
dey, untill I knew of the Governour’s pleasure; they thank’d me, and said that they now 
saw that their Brothers, the English would have Compassion on them.” (PA Archives, 2: 
803.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
scalp and a bundle o f goods for each of three recently deceased Tuscaroras: one 
murdered, another a casualty o f the Battle o f Lake George, and another named Swegewy, 
a “Tuscarora who was drowned here a few days ago.”90 Often such gifts consisted of bead 
belts and darkened strouds.91 Few gifts carried such weight as prisoners. Within such a 
context, presenting a prisoner as a gift carried several meanings. Not only could such a 
presentation serve as a powerful stimulation to join in war, prisoners handed over for 
torture or adoption were particularly well-suited to cover the grave of grieving 
communities. When Guy Johnson acquired several prisoners, he planned to “give them 
amongst the Nations in the same manner which being always done is Expected by them 
and thought in the greatest light.” These he gave to the Tuscaroras, Oneidas, and 
Onondagas, “in order to replace some o f their Friends deceased.”92 Likewise, the Iroquois 
received a French prisoner at the conclusion of the Battle at Lake George, “with the 
greatest mark o f gratitude and satisfaction, every nation giving the shout o f approbation, 
and then carried off the Prisoners to their respective families.” One prisoner went to the 
family o f the recently deceased “Cayadanorong, a Tuscarora.” The next day, Iroquois 
representatives thanked the English for their “goodness in thus settling our minds which 
were so much discomposed” and reminding them of “that Harmony that has always
90 NYCD, 7: 177-78.
91 Presentations o f dark colored cloth apparently reflected a combination of the Iroquoian 
practice o f presenting mourning gifts and European practices o f wearing black during 
times o f grief.
92 Johnson, Papers, 4: 367-72.
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subsisted between our Forefathers and our Bretheren the English.”93 When live captives 
were not at hand, “2 french scalps” could do. These Johnson presented at a Tuscarora 
community which “one of their young men very briskly laid hold o f and sung the War 
Song with them in his hand round” inside the palisade.94
The end o f a conference did not necessarily halt gift-giving. Departing Indians, 
often numbering in the hundreds, sought and received quantities o f supplies to sustain 
them on their way home. Passing by Fort Augusta at the forks o f the Susquehanna on 
their return from a meeting with the governor o f Pennsylvania, Tuscaroras were “well 
pleased w ’t the usage” they received from Captain McKee: to each man he distributed 
plenty of food, four pounds of gunpowder, sixteen pounds o f lead, a quart o f rum, and “at 
their departure what Beaff and flour they might want for their Journey.”95 Europeans 
were not always so well pleased at having to give such supplies, but as a Tuscarora 
speaker reminded, what Europeans would not freely give, passing contingents would be 
forced to take, by killing cattle and stealing crops along the way.96 Colonial officials 
would be better advised to accept such expenditures as the cost o f diplomacy with the 
Tuscaroras and other members of the Six Nations.
Adapting to a New World
93 NYCD, 7:55.
94 NYCD, 7: 150-51.
95 PA Archives, 2: 789-90.
96 Johnson, Papers, 10: 643-48.
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For most Tuscaroras, treaties or grand councils were less important than the more 
local experiences o f integrating into new communities within and near Iroquoia. Surviving 
evidence suggests that Tuscaroras established several communities in Pennsylvania during 
their flight north. Tuscaroras left their name on a valley along the Juniata River, where a 
small Tuscarora community probably existed as late as 1762. In that year, Tuscaroras 
who had moved further north wrote a letter to the governor o f Pennsylvania asking the 
“state and behavior o f our brethren in Tuscarora Valley,” since they intended to “make 
them a visit.”97 Nineteenth-century oral histories recalled a community near present-day 
Tamaqua, Pennsylvania, where the migrants lived for about two years before moving on.98 
By 1722, “Charles, a Tuscarora Indian” was well versed enough with his new 
Pennsylvania surroundings to serve as a guide for traders along the Susquehanna River 
near Conestoga.99 Nonetheless, like the community at Tamaqua, most o f these 
communities in Pennsylvania seem to have been small and short-lived. While small 
numbers of Tuscaroras continued to travel and reside among the numerous Indian villages
97 Quoted in Abraham Guss, "Early Glimpses into the Pennsylvania Interior, the Ancient 
Juniata and the Tuscarora Indians, the Exploration o f the Interior by the Traders"," in 
History o f  Juniata and Other Counties o f  Pennsylvania (S.I.: s.n., 18—), 43. Gus also 
quotes a 1753 letter from Carlisle, Pennsylvania that refers to a “a large number of 
Delawares, Shawanese, and Tuscaroras [who] continue in this vicinity.”
98 “Tuscarora State Park” exists near the site today. Johnson, Legends, 68. Boyce, “As 
the Wind,” 156.
99 “The Examination o f Jonathan Swindel Servant to John Cartlidge, taken before Sr. Wm 
Keith in Council 22 March 1721/22” in Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, 1701-1742, 
American Philosophical Society in RSUS, Pennsylvania, Reel 2.
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of Pennsylvania’s Susquehanna Valley, most Tuscaroras ultimately settled further north, 
closer to the Iroquois.100
As in North Carolina, Tuscaroras in New York did not settle in one site; instead 
they joined towns and scattered hamlets loosely clumped in two main regions. The first, a 
cluster o f settlements south of Oneida Lake, was described in 1752 by a traveling 
Moravian diarist, John Martin Mack, engaged on a mission to Onondaga. Passing east 
from Oneida territory, his party reached “a Tuscarora Town” called Ganistagoa— literally 
“large village.” Aptly named, it contained “almost thirty houses, large and regularly built, 
with a wide street through the middle of town.” The “Tuscarora chief who lives here came 
to see us,” Mack recorded; the leader greeted them, explained that he had hoped to 
accompany them but could not, “being lame,” and discussed the prospects o f Christianity 
among his people.101
Setting out in the morning, Mack’s band “came to a few huts occupied by some 
Tuscaroras, and in the afternoon to a town of the same tribe” called Ganasaraga. Rather 
than following the example of several Seneca traveling companions who knew well 
enough to stop, Mack pushed on and “lodged in a cold and dark wood.” Lesson learned, 
whenever Mack or his Moravian companions passed again, they were sure to take
100 For examples of Tuscaroras traveling see Johnson, Papers, 6: 114-16; Gus, “Early 
Glimpses,” 43; Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 160-62.
101 Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 113, 150, 154. This town apparently was also 
sometimes referred to as S’ganates, also mentioned by Mack. It was probably about five 
miles outside of New Oneida (Samuel Kirkland, The Journals o f  Samuel K irkland: 18th 
Century Missionary to the Iroquois, Government Agent, Father o f  Hamilton College, ed. 
Walter Pilkington (Clinton, N.Y.: Hamilton College, 1980), 88.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
438
advantage of the “quashes and pumpkins” and “special fire” sure to be stoked for them at 
Ganasaraga by inhabitants who always “received us very kindly.”102 Although the town’s 
name— literally “several strings of beads with a string lying across”— may refer to some 
ceremonial use o f wampum, the image is also useful for visualizing the area, which in 
addition to the main town, consisted of scattered strings o f tiny settlements like 
Shawasreah, Tiachsochratota, Chutenenga, and Tiochrungwe crossed by the main east- 
west route upon which Mack traveled.103 A short walk the next morning brought them to 
their destination, the central Iroquois council fire at Onondaga.
Mack’s journey took him through the heart o f Tuscarora settlements in the Oneida 
Lake region. At varying times, Ganasaraga and Ganistagoa have been described 
collectively or individually as “Tuscarora” or “Tuscarora Castle.” (Ganistagoa seemed to 
have an especially strong claim to these titles).104 Nonetheless, it would be impossible to 
describe any of these communities as wholly Tuscarora. Located in the heart o f Iroquoia 
and directly on the Ambassador’s Road connecting them to the Onondagas and Oneidas, 
the fate o f these towns’ Tuscarora inhabitants was closely associated with that o f their
102 Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 120.
103 Beauchamp, Aboriginal Place Names, 111; Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 150; 
Kirkland, Journals, 61, 70, 72, 89, 184. A detailed map, c.a. 1794, showing “Tuscarora 
village called Chutenenga” and “Tuscarora Village called Kanasaraga” appears upon a 
hand-drawn map in Pickering, Papers, 174.
104 Samuel Kirkland, for example, referred in a letter to “Tuscarora (alias Kanadesco)” in a 
1791/12/06 letter to Henry Knox, in Kirkland Letters, 142b.
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neighbors, who constantly visited for trade or diplomacy or added their numbers 
permanently to the communities’ populations.105
Such was also the case for Tuscaroras living in the second main area o f settlement: 
the upper reaches o f the eastern branch of the Susquehanna River. The largest o f these 
communities was at Oquaga. Like many communities o f the upper Susquehanna, this 
town, whose name meant “hulled corn soup place,” was a mixing pot o f cultures: in this 
case Oneidas and Tuscaroras with a smattering o f Nanticokes, Delawares, Mahicans, 
Shawnees, and Mohawks appearing in the records in different years.106 These people 
shared food and tools, lifted voices together in prayer, cooperated in treaties, and 
intermarried. Even more than near Oneida Lake, Tuscaroras in this region lived in 
intimate proximity with neighbors from other cultures.
But behind this mixture, Oquaga was also a town of enclaves of peoples whose 
hulls did not easily come off A map drawn by Congregational missionary Gideon Hawley 
shows that the community would better be considered as a collective o f ethnic
105 Johnson, Papers, 9, 834 for reference to Onondaga Indians living at Ganasaraga.
106 Colin G. Calloway, “Oquaga: Dissension and Destruction on the Susquehanna,” in The 
American Revolution in Indian country : Crisis and Diversity in Native Americans 
Communities (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 108-128 
(p. 111 for “hulled corn soup place”). Also see Maijory B. Hinman, Onoquaga: Early 
Missionary Outpost, 1748-1777 (Onaquaga, NY: Old Onaquaga Historical Society,
1968); Marjory B. Hinman, Documentary History o f  Old Onaquaga, (Onaquaga: Old 
Onaquaga Historical Society, 1968); Marjory Barnum Hinman, Onaquaga: Huh o f  the 
Border Wars o f  the American Revolution in New York State (Privately Printed, 1975); 
Peter C. Mancall, Valley o f  Opportunity: Economic Culture Along the Upper 
Susquehanna, 1700-1800 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). Hawley records that 
the name of “Onohoquage” derives from the word “the rising mountain or annundulated 
mountain.” But the numerous pronunciations make multiple meanings possible. Letter to 
Belknap describing May to June, 1753, Hawley Papers.
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neighborhoods: two separate Tuscarora suburbs— one upstream and one downstream— 
bordered a core Oneida settlement. A Delaware group also appeared on the map.107 
Although often referred to as a single entity in records, with its clusters o f ethnic 
neighborhoods, numerous languages, and separate leaders, Oquaga was far from 
homogeneous. Moreover, not much farther off, other ethnically diverse Indian 
communities, some of which included Tuscaroras, such as Shawiangto, Ingaren,
Otsiningo, Unadilla, and Chugnut, added to the mixture. A short, steep portage led to the 
Delaware River and its communities.108 Hawley described his post at Oquaga “to be in the 
heart o f Indian country, there are many towns of Indians all round us at about a days 
journey.”109 Tuscaroras had made the upper Susquehanna their home, but they were not 
alone.
In the years following their flight from North Carolina, the majority o f Tuscaroras 
resettled in one of these two regions. South o f Oneida Lake and along the Susquehanna 
River, they succeeded in relocating as not only individuals but as members o f particular
107 Original in Hawley Papers. Reproduced in Boyce, “Tuscarora Political Organization,”
51 and Hinman, Hub o f  the Border Wars, 2. The Delawares appear to have been driven 
out during the Seven Years’ War. Hawley wrote, “This place consisted o f three villages 
o f Indians being in a triangle. The middle village was Onoydes and the other two 
Tuscarores, having different languages, but perfectly understanding my Interpreter who 
spoke the Cognowanga tongue. They were about 220 souls in all.” (Letter to Belknap 
describing May-June, 1753, in Hawley Papers. Quotation from below section describing 
June 4, 1753).
108 See, for example, “Captain William Gray’s Map of the Butler Expedition, 1778” 
reproduced in Hinman, Onaquaga, Hub o f  the Border Wars, inset pp. 54-55. Crevecoeur, 
Letters . . . and Sketches, 344-345.
109 1753/06/3, Hawley Papers.
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ethnic groups that retained their distinctiveness in culturally diverse settings.110 
Nonetheless, change did occur. Therefore, these communities’ stories do not merely 
narrate the re-establishment of Tuscarora culture from North Carolina, as if such a thing 
could be as simple as erasing a name from one part o f a map and rewriting it on another; 
they speak to the ways that Tuscaroras associated and integrated with other Indians to 
create new communities. Unfortunately, records from the most important period, between 
about 1714 and 1750 when the first generations o f Tuscarora migrants became acclimated, 
are almost wholly non-existent. Historians are confronted with the problem of watching 
Tuscaroras disappear into a tunnel carrying one familiar set o f cultural traits and beliefs 
from North Carolina, and then emerge later from the darkness out the other side— still 
recognizable, but different. Although much of the process is obscured, historians can look 
at the snapshots from before and after and try to evaluate what happened in between. As 
has frequently been the case for migrants, the Tuscaroras carefully straddled the line 
between acculturation among their new neighbors and the maintenance o f a separate 
identity that preserved their own language, leaders, manners, and customs.
Close association began at the Tuscaroras’ arrival. Later statements and the 
treatment o f subsequent refugee groups (including later waves o f Tuscaroras) suggest that
110 Helen Hornbeck Tanner, “The Glaize in 1792: A Composite Indian Community,” in 
Peter C. Mancall and James H. Merrell, eds., American Encounters: Natives and  
Newcomers from  European Contact to Indian Removal, 1500-1850 (New York:
Routledge, 2000), 404-425; Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio 
Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992);
Merrell, Indians’ New World, Colin G. Calloway, New Worlds For All: Indians,
Europeans, and the Remaking o f  Early America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), 134-151; White, Middle Ground, esp. pp 1-50.
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Oneidas and other Iroquois offered food, supplies, and access to cleared lands in the first 
crucial years. William Johnson’s 1753 declarations that the Oneidas had made it their duty 
to “feed and protect” the Tuscaroras as newborns were not merely political metaphors; 
they reflected the hard reality o f caring for newcomers “reduced to the utmost distress” 
and delivered into an unfamiliar, and possibly hostile world.111 When additional 
Tuscaroras arrived from North Carolina in mid-century, Johnson told Oneidas that he 
expected them to again “act your part by settling them in a proper place and afford them 
some assistance until they can help themselves.”112 In the short run, large numbers of 
hungry refugees might have created local hardships and perhaps even tension by eating 
into local food stores.113 Over the long run, such dependencies meant that whatever 
changes Tuscaroras underwent while learning to fend for themselves, their neighbors 
would be nearby asserting influence as allies, guides, and mentors.
The sites upon which the Oneidas “fixed” the Tuscaroras reflected several 
concerns that would affect their integration. Settlements south o f Oneida Lake had the 
advantages of being convenient to neighborly assistance, able to obstruct invading French 
armies, or, as Mack found, to act as a handy way station. Nearby territories “assigned” to
111 Johnson, Papers, 9: 47-50, 113; NYCD, 8: 43.
112 Johnson, Papers, 12: 312-313.
113 See Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, page 163-165 for mention of the hunger 
encountered by a group of Nanticokes arriving downriver from Oquaga at Otsiningo. 
Lawrence M. Hauptman, “Refugee Havens: The Iroquois Villages o f the Eighteenth 
Century” in Christopher Vesey and Robert N. Venables, eds., American Indian 
Environments: Ecological Issues in Native American History (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1980), 128-139, especially pages 134-135 for starvation among Indian 
refugee groups.
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Tuscaroras between Oneida Lake and the Susquehanna, and bounded by the Unadilla and 
Chenango Rivers, were thinly populated and could bear the increased population.114 
Oquaga’s appeal perhaps echoed in the admiration of Jonathan Edwards who hoped to 
establish a mission there: it was “as convenient perhaps as any place that can be found . . . 
a pleasant fruitful country, surrounded by many settlements o f Indians on every side, and 
where the way is open by an easy passage down the river . . . [Oquaga is on] the road by 
which several of the nations pass as they go to war with the southern nations.”115 
Strengthening the settlements there would also bolster the Iroquois expansion o f influence 
south into the Pennsylvania backcountry and beyond.116
While strategic, these settings also would have been almost wholly unfamiliar to 
the first generation o f Tuscarora migrants, necessitating many changes. The cultural 
impact o f weather patterns and topography upon a people who were farmers and hunters 
should not be discounted. The cold winters and mountainous terrain o f the Susquehanna 
Valley and Oneida Lake region were far different from the faintly rolling coastal plains of 
North Carolina. Around Oquaga, the swift, rocky Susquehanna and adjacent pockets of
114 Johnson, Legends, 69. Nonetheless, most Tuscaroras continued to live in the more 
densely settled northern and southern edges of these lands. In 1753 Hawley judged that 
the Indians around Oquaga did not use above one-fortieth of their land. Hawley Papers, 
1753/06/13.
115 Jonathan Edwards, Letters and. Personal Writings, George S. Claghorn, ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 584.
116 Mancall, Valley o f  Opportunity, 338.
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fertile floodplain hid beneath steep hills upon which crops were unlikely to grow.117 
Approaching his future mission site, Hawley described climbing the “ridge o f a mountain 
which gave us a view of other mountains as far as the eye could extend; at another time 
we were plunged into the depths of a gloomy valley.”118 At a glance, the land around 
Oneida Lake may have felt slightly more familiar. Ganasaraga’s less steep country was 
bordered on the north by a several-mile-wide “Great Marsh,” where two fast-moving 
streams suddenly slowed. Rather than draining into the salty estuaries o f the Pamlico or 
Albermarle Sound, however, these waters emptied into Oneida Lake, a lake far larger than 
any in North Carolina.119 Both settings entailed entirely different ecosystems with which 
the Tuscaroras would have to become acquainted.
Weather patterns also would have been unfamiliar. Tuscaroras had little 
experience living in a region where each winter could bring over a hundred inches of 
snow; where temperatures dropped so low that Madeira wine froze in its bottles; where 
rivers often froze from December to April, sometimes into solid blocks o f ice, other times 
into sheets that were deceptively— and dangerously—thin.120 In 1767, A Moravian diarist
117 For the geography of the upper Susquehanna River see Richard Smith, A Tour o f  Four 
Great Rivers, ed. Francis W. Halsey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906), 29-69; 
Mancall, Valley o f  Opportunity, Crevecoeur, Letters . . .  and Sketches, 353-380.
118 Hawley Papers, 1753/05/29.
119 L. M. Hammond, History o f  Madison County, State o f  New York (Syracuse: Truair, 
Smith, and Company, 1872), 645-648.
120 Mancall, Valley o f  Opportunity, 15; Hawley Papers, 1753/11/08; Dean R. Snow,
Charles T. Gehring, and William Starna, eds., In Mohawk Country: Early Narratives 
About a Native People (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 250-273.
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suspected that a group of Tuscaroras, newly arrived from North Carolina to the upper 
Susquehanna, especially suffered during a sudden blizzard because o f their unfamiliarity 
with the regions’ heavy, several-foot-deep snowfalls.121
Thrust into these unfamiliar environments, Tuscaroras could not long depend only 
upon the handouts and goodwill o f Oneidas and other Indians; they would have to learn 
local knowledge and skills, eventually lessening the cultural distance between them. At 
first, the unfamiliarity o f Tuscaroras to this environment would have accentuated cultural 
differences between Tuscaroras and nearby Indians. How many times did Tuscaroras 
bungle tying a snowshoe or stumble over the local pronunciation o f a creek? Did 
Tuscarora newcomers get lost in bewildering mazes o f trails, as did European travelers 
who journeyed without a guide? Over time, however, as Tuscaroras learned to adapt, and 
acquired local knowledge, the shared challenges o f living in these new environs helped 
draw Tuscaroras and their neighbors together.
Outward changes began as soon as Tuscaroras donned new clothes to ward off 
wintry blasts. Indians, according to historian Elizabeth Perkins, were “particularly
121 Frank H. Severance, "Our Tuscarora Neighbors," Publications o f  the Buffalo 
Historical Society 22 (1918): 326; J. N. B. Hewitt, "Tuscarora," in Handbook o f  
American Indians North o f  Mexico, ed. Frederick W. Hodge, Bulletin, U.S. Bureau o f  
American Ethnology, 30, Part 2 (Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institution, 1910), 847; 
Fioberger and Schmick, Diary, Friedenshiitten, 1/26/1767 in Moravian Mission Records 
Among the North American Indians from  the Archives o f  the Moravian Church, 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (microfilm, 40 reels) (New Haven, Conn.: Research Publications 
Inc., 1978) (hereafter Moravian Mission Records)', Carl John Fliegel, Index to the records 
o f  the Moravian Mission Among the Indians o f  North America (New Haven,: Research 
Publications, 1970), 3: 1052.
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sensitive to the transformative capacity of personal apparel.”122 They often forced a 
captive or newcomer to change clothing as a first step towards assimilation. In the case of 
the Tuscaroras, a gauntlet of cold and snow forced the issue. John Brickell, who was 
familiar with Tuscaroras in North Carolina, considered Indian fashions “as different as the 
Nations to whom they belong so that it is impossible to recount all the whimsical figures 
that they commonly make by their antic dresses.” He made a sharp distinction, however, 
between those in North Carolina, which “is a warm country and very mild in its winters,” 
and those of colder Pennsylvania and New York. “Our Indians’ habits,” he concluded, 
“differ very much from the dresses that are used by the savages that inhabit those cold 
countries.”123 In adapting heavier clothes it is uncertain whether Tuscaroras brought their 
own minute stylistic preferences— a shirt tucked a certain way, moccasins decorated 
particularly, a preference for certain color shades. They may have brought their own 
aesthetic from North Carolina, where Lawson noted that Indians incorporated elaborate 
patterns into clothing which were “extraordinary charming, containing several pretty
122 Elizabeth Perkins, “Distinctions and Partitions Amongst Us: Identity and Interaction in 
the Revolutionary Ohio Valley,” in Andrew R. L. Clayton and Fredrika J. Teute, eds., 
Contact Points: American Frontiers from  the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750- 
1830 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1998), 214-216; Timothy J. 
Shannon, “Dressing for Success On the Mohawk Frontier,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 53, No. 1, (1996), 13-42.
123 Brickell, Natural History, 315.
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figures.”124 By the nineteenth century, Tuscaroras in New York had acquired a wide 
reputation for elaborate, skilled beadwork, exceptional even among other Iroquois.125
Getting a bite to eat could also have profound cultural effects. Like one’s dress, 
how and what one choose to eat could serve as indicators o f social belonging or 
distance.126 Moreover, like other Indians, Tuscaroras occupied a majority o f their time in 
North Carolina hunting, gathering, and farming—behaviors that influenced settlement 
patterns and yearly cycles.127 Patterns changed, however, as Tuscaroras in their new 
homes picked up not only culinary tastes, but also many of the rituals and rhythms 
associated with these foods. Pumpkins, squash, corn, and beans were familiar enough to 
Tuscaroras from North Carolina, but where and when to plant would have to be relearned 
in a region of microclimates and approximately fifty fewer frost-free days. Either by word 
of mouth, or painful experience, Tuscaroras would have learned that the island 
downstream of Oquaga where they had some of their “planting fields” were “good
124 Lawson, New Voyage, 200.
125 Beverly Gordon, “Souvenirs of Niagara Falls: The Significance o f Indian Whimsies,” 
New York History , vol. 47, no. 4 (Oct., 1986), 391.
126 Perkins, “Distinctions and Partitions,” 228-229; Kevin Allen Gore, Mutton in the 
Melting Pot: Food as Symbols o f  Communication Reflecting, Transmitting, and Creating 
Ethnic Cultural Identity among Urban Navajos (University o f New Mexico, 1999); 
Barbara J. Mills, ed., Identity, Feasting, and the Archaeology o f  the Greater Southwest 
(Boulder, Colo.: University Press o f Colorado, 2004); Susan Applegate Krouse, 
"Traditional Iroquois Socials: Maintaining Identity in the City.," American Indian 
Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2001): 400-08.
127 Byrd, Tuscarora Subsistence Patterns.
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lowland” but “subject to be overflowed.”128 Seeds for corn, better adapted to the northern 
climate, would have to be acquired either as gifts or through trade.129 Eventually 
Tuscaroras joined their neighbors in planting verdant communities that excited the 
admiration of curious passersby, and the hunger o f attacking armies.130
Other foodstuffs would have been less familiar and required greater change. In 
North Carolina, peaches had been standard Tuscarora fare; these were dried and baked 
into cakes, “very pleasant and a little tartish,” according to John Lawson who considered 
them the Tuscaroras’ “only tame fruit.”131 But these gave way to a taste for apples 
already prevalent in Iroquoia. They soon acquired a habit o f planting apple orchards 
alongside their fields.132 A reworking of seasonal calendars occurred when Tuscaroras 
learned to anticipate the flowing of the maple sap in March. Then, with neighboring
128 Hawley, Map of Oquaga, in Hawley Papers; James Cockburn, “A Survey of a Tract of 
Land in the Township of Cheeningo, 1788” reprinted in part in Marjory Hinman and 
Bernard Osborne, The White Man Settles Old Onaquaga, (Old Onaquaga Historical 
Society, 1968), 8.
129Rudes, Tuscarora-English Dictionary, xvi-xix. Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 160- 
166.
130 J. Hector St. John de Crevcouer, who passed in 1775, admired “with pleasure a great 
deal o f industry in the cultivation of their little fields. Corn, beans, potatoes, pumpkins, 
squashes appeared extremely flourishing.” (Crevecoeur, Letters. . .andSketches, 345.) 
Three years later an attacking American force under Captain William Butler confiscated 
over 2000 bushels o f corn. (George Clinton, Public Papers o f  George Clinton, First 
Governor o f  New York, 1777-1795, 1801-1804, ed. Hugh Hastings, reprint o f 1899 ed.,
10 vols. (New York,: AMS Press, 1973), 4: 222-228.)
131 Lawson, New Voyage, 173, 182.
132 Cockburn, “Survey” p. 7 noted a “small orchard” and “an orchard o f several good 
bearing apple trees” upon tracts formerly occupied by the Tuscaroras. While passing the 
Tuscarora community upstream of Oquaga, Smith noted “Apple trees are seen by some of 
these huts.” (Smith, Tour, 64.)
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Oneidas they would remove together to sugar camps, an event that left Gideon Hawley in 
Oquaga preaching to a nearly empty church.133 Collecting syrup from northern sugar 
maples required ladles, cauldrons, and sap buckets, not to mention skills required to 
properly tap a tree and evaporate the sugar. Along with these, Tuscaroras may have 
picked up the “maple dance” or “Putting in Sugar” practiced among the Iroquois.134
Hunting and fishing could also contribute to building a sense of community.
Richard Smith, who toured the region in 1769, reported at the Tuscarora neighborhood 
downstream of Oquaga “a shad fishery common to the people of Ahquhaga also.” Every 
year the community gathered to “tye bushes together so as to reach over the River, sink 
them with stones and hawl them round by Canoes; all persons present including strangers, 
such is their laudable Hospitality have an equal Division of the Fish.”135 Dragging nets, 
steering canoes, shouting out instructions to one another— such moments required 
cooperation and teamwork, probably followed by a feast as they smoked and ate their 
catch. Unknown is whether during such occasions Tuscaroras also picked up bits o f lore
133 Journal, 1754/03/10, Hawley Papers.
134 W. M. Beauchamp, “Iroquois Notes,” The Journal o f  American Folklore, Vol. 4, No. 
12. (Jan. - Mar., 1891), 42; Joseph-Frangois Lafitau, Customs o f  the American Indians 
Compared with the Customs o f  Primitive Times, ed. and trans. William N. Fenton and 
Elizabeth I. Moore, 2 vols (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1974-77), 2: 153; H. W. 
Henshaw, “Indian Origins o f Maple Sugar,” American Anthropologist, Vol. 3, No. 4. 
(Oct., 1890), 341-352.
135 Smith, Tour, 68. For a discussion of usufruct rights shared by Indian communities at 
fishing sites, see William Cronon, Changes in the Land:Indians, Colonists, and the 
Ecology o f  New England, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 63-65.
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and local history from Oneidas who, on other occasions, told passing Europeans stories 
about how local drownings cursed former fishing holes.136
Tuscaroras and Iroquois already shared a common “hunters’ ethic” that assigned 
prestige and influence to skilled hunters. Nonetheless, each culture would have carried its 
own customary rules that dictated the pursuit, division, and consumption of gam e.137 
Passed on and adopted, such beliefs could bring cultures together; rejected, they signaled 
continuing cultural boundaries. Along the Susquehanna in 1743, the European traveler 
John Bartram listened as Indians taught him that guests deserved a double share o f food, 
that deer bones ought to be set aside and burned, and that tobacco smoke should be blown 
into a dead bear’s mouth. Fighting at salt licks was forbidden since it would prevent deer 
from returning.138 Tuscaroras, explained Nicolas Cusick, likewise learned and acquired 
hunting beliefs earlier prevalent among the Iroquois: stumbling across a dead deer was bad 
luck and might mean that a relation would die; hunters should purity themselves before 
setting out; and menstruating women should not touch venison. A deer that charged a 
hunter may signal that the hunter’s wife has been unfaithful.139 Despite intermixture,
136 Jeremy Belknap, "Journal of a Tour from Boston to Oneida, June 1796," Proceedings 
o f  the Massachusetts Historical Society 19 (1881-1882): 413.
137 Stephen Aron, “Pigs and Hunters: Rights in the Woods on the Trans-Appalachian 
Frontier,” in Andrew R. L. Clayton and Fredrika J. Teute, eds., Contact Points: American 
Frontiers from  the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, J 750-1830 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1998), 184-88.
138 Mancall, Valley, 44;
139 Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail, 34. The placement o f this passage within Cusick’s (at 
times confusing) narrative seems to suggest that these beliefs preceded the Tuscaroras’ 
flight to New York, but this is not entirely certain.
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persistent beliefs may have contributed to an occasional preference for Tuscaroras and 
Oneidas to hunt in separate parties. On one occasion, Hawley recorded that virtually all 
the Oneidas had departed Oquaga to hunt pigeons while Tuscaroras remained closer to 
town to hunt using fire.140
In a backcountry o f uncertain ethnicities, languages, dialects, and accents could 
serve as cultural boundaries, bridges, or both. John Heckewelder, an experienced 
Moravian missionary, wrote that “the first and most important thing for a traveler is a 
competent knowledge of the language of the people among whom he is. Without this 
knowledge it is impossible that he can acquire a correct notion o f their manners and 
customs and of the opinions which prevail among them.”141 Although much attention has 
been given to the importance of interpreters who could bestride linguistic chasms between 
Indians and colonists, Indians o f different tribes likewise had difficulty navigating a 
bewildering babbling sea o f native tongues.142 When a group of Nanticokes who
140 Hawley recorded that virtually all the Oneidas had departed Oquaga to hunt pigeons at 
the same time that Tuscaroras remained closer to town to hunt using fire. (Journal, 1754/ 
04/08 Hawley Papers).
141 Heckewelder, History, 318.
142James Merrell, Into the American Woods : Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier 
(New York: Norton, 1999); Daniel K. Richter, "Cultural Brokers and Intercultural 
Politics: New York-Iroquois Relations, 1664-1701," Journal o f  American History 75, no. 
1 (1988): 40-67; Frederick Fausz,., "Middlemen in Peace and War: Virginia's Earliest 
Indian Interpreters, 1608-1632," Virginia Magazine o f  History and Biography 95, no. 1
(1987): 41-64; Nancy L Hagedorn, "‘A Friend to Go between Them’: The Interpreter as 
Cultural Broker During Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740-70.," Ethnohistory 35, no. 1
(1988): 60-80;, Milton W. Hamilton, "Sir William Johnson: Interpreter o f the Iroquois.," 
Ethnohistory 10, no. 3 (1963): 270-86; Howard Lewin., "A Frontier Diplomat: Andrew 
Montour.," Pennsylvania History 33, no. 2 (1966): 153-86.
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eventually settled fifteen miles from Oquaga had an audience at Onondaga, they “could 
not make themselves understood, tho’ provided with an interpreter brought near 700 
miles” for the purpose. Therefore, they relied upon Conrad Weiser, himself a native 
German speaker, speaking to him in English which he then translated into Mohawk.143 
Inhabitants o f Oquaga found themselves in the same situation when, one night in 1754, a 
group of Delawares rushed in to tell o f a murder that had happened downstream, but 
stood stuttering and misunderstood until the next morning when an interpreter was 
found.144
In their relations with Oneidas, Tuscaroras were at an advantage since their 
languages were related, albeit distantly. Over time, this distance lessened. Looking about 
their new homes for the first time, Tuscarora migrants literally would have been at a loss 
for words, lacking vocabulary to describe their settings. Over time they incorporated 
words from the languages of their guides and hosts into their own speech— evidence o f 
the ways new environments and new neighbors worked jointly upon cultural patterns. 
Words for hemlocks, tamaracks, yellow birch, white birch, and black ash— all o f which 
were uncommon in eastern North Carolina—entered the Tuscarora language by way of 
Mohawk or Oneida terminology. When Tuscaroras learned to hunt northern moose or 
loon, they described their exploits with Oneida words. Tuscaroras chilled by slushy snow 
likewise borrowed an Oneida or Mohawk expression. Bending tongues around new 
words also let Tuscaroras wrap their minds around new ideas. The word for large lake—
143 Bartram, Journey from  Pennsylvania to Onondaga, 76, 115.
144 Journal, 1754/03/24, Hawley Papers.
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taken by Tuscaroras from the Oneida— shared roots with other words that linguistically 
paved the way for understanding Iroquoian notions o f government and a cosmology that 
viewed the world as perched on a swimming turtle’s back.145
Over time, most Tuscaroras moved beyond an expanded vocabulary to acquire a 
working fluency in Oneida. Tuscaroras near Ganasaraga and Ganistagoa probably also 
picked up Onondaga and perhaps Mohawk, while their cousins along the Susquehanna 
likely became acquainted with Delaware and Nanticoke. Samuel Kirkland, a Presbyterian 
missionary who worked among communities near Oneida Lake, reported that “Indians 
from seven different villages attend now upon my ministry— and these of three distinct 
dialects [Tuscarora, Oneida, and probably Mohawk]— but in general understand the 
Onoide Language.” 146 Nonetheless, Tuscaroras remained most comfortable with their 
native tongue, preferring it whenever possible. Therefore, Kirkland, added that he was 
“sometimes obliged to make use of an interpreter for the Tuscarorers.”147 Similarly, 
Hawley reported that Oquaga Indians were “perfectly understanding” o f his interpreter’s 
“Cognowanga tongue.”148 His interpreter, in this case, was Rebecca Ashley, who as a 
child had been captured from Deerfield, Massachusetts, in 1701 and spent much of her
145 For changing Tuscarora vocabulary, see, Rudes, Tuscarora-English Dictionary, xvi- 
xix.
146 Kirkland to Levi Hart, 1771/1/17, Kirkland Letters, 14a.
147 Kirkland to Levi Hart, 1771/1/17, Kirkland Letters, 14a.
148 Letter describing 1753/06/04, Hawley Papers. Hawley relied upon Rebecca Ashley, 
who as a child had been captured from Deerfield, Massachusetts in 1701, and spent much 
of her childhood at Kawnawake, a community of Catholic Mohawks in Canada. The 
Mohawk language is closely related to the Oneida tongue.
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childhood at Kahnawake, a community o f Catholic Mohawks in Canada. Nonetheless, on 
occasions where a majority of his listeners were Tuscaroras, he made use o f “one who 
understood English who was of that nation,” preaching “to them in their own language 
because they could understand it better.”149 On the other hand, when his regular 
interpreter, Ashley, fell ill, Hawley turned to the services o f “John Tuskero” to preach 
before mixed audiences.150
By incorporating Oneida words and learning the Oneida language, Tuscaroras 
moved closer to their neighbors, but did not erase barriers completely. Indian listeners 
kept ears tuned to the “purity or correctness with which a language is spoken” to 
determine a speaker’s background.151 Within the chatter o f mixed communities,
Tuscarora accents stood out. According to a nineteenth century visitor to the Oneida 
Lake region, the Iroquois tended to be linguistic snobs, who
valued themselves not a little on their pronunciation. The Oneidas are 
considered by them as speaking their language in a manner more graceful 
and mellifluous than the rest o f the tribes. All o f them use the guttural 
aspirate. The Tuscaroras terminate a great part o f their words with this 
aspirate, and are laughed at by the rest o f their countrymen for the 
harshness which this circumstance introduces into their pronunciation. The
149 Journal, 1754/04/07, Hawley Papers.
150 Journal, 1753/07/15, Hawley Papers.
151 Heckewelder, History, 327.
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Oneidas say that the pronunciation of a Tuscarora is like the noise o f the 
white man’s wagon running down a stony hill.152 
Likewise, a witness to a treaty conference felt that Tuscaroras, “speak a language leaving 
in my ear not the least similitude to the predominant dialect o f the Iroquois. They 
appeared to make an effort to speak— as if they had sticks in their mouth; but it is possible 
the speaker I heard might be a stammerer.”153
When John Tuskero stood and translated a sermon before a mixed Oquaga 
audience, the moment might have indicated how close Oneidas, Tuscaroras, and other 
neighbors had become; the same speech might also have allowed the audience to listen for 
signs o f the differences among them.
Nonetheless, words could not divide some who moved beyond cooperation to 
courtship and love. Strangers became husbands and wives, turning towns into truly mixed 
communities. Gideon Hawley recorded that one assistant, Jonah, was born an Oneida but 
“half-blooded,” with a French captive for a mother. Jonah’s wife was “a Tuscarora and 
full blooded.” Another o f Hawley’s Oneida assistants had similarly “married into the 
Tuscarora tribe.” Both proved invaluable with their contacts among both peoples.154
152 Timothy Dwight, Travels in New England and New York (London: H.S. Baynes,
1823), vol. 4, pg. 196; Boyce, “Tuscarora Political Organization,” 163.
153 “Description o f a Council, 1794,” Pickering, Papers, 259-263.
154 Address and Petition, January 29, 1794, Hawley Papers. This letter recounts events 
that took place in 1753. Similar comments are printed in another account contained in 
Doc. Hist. N.Y., 3:1031 - 46. The comment that this Oneida was “married into the 
Tuscarora tribe” reflects the Iroquois practice of tracing lineage through the female line.
It raises the potentially unsolvable question of determining how many “Tuscaroras” who 
appear in the documents were so by marriage or birth.
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Hawley described another Indian, a Delaware “who married a Tuscarora woman and has 
lived more than a year past not further than a mile and a half from my house,” and who 
maintained links among both the Delawares and Tuscaroras.155 Sakwarithra, a prominent 
Tuscarora chief from Ganasaraga, may have been married to an Onondaga woman, since 
William Johnson referred to him as having an Onondaga son.156 Likewise, the father of 
Tyagawehe, a Tuscarora chief who ventured to North Carolina to lead another migration, 
is referred to as an Oneida in some records.157 Ironically, even as such unions produced 
offspring, the ratio of individuals considered “Tuscarora” might have decreased. If  later 
migrations are a guide, a greater number o f the first newcomers were young men, a ratio 
that perhaps encouraged them to marry non-Tuscaroras— and descent, in these 
communities was traced through the mother.158
The stories that family members passed on likely influenced Tuscaroras’ 
perceptions of themselves as a distinct cultural group nonetheless living in diverse 
communities. Tuscaroras adapted many stories common among other northeastern 
Indians.159 Other tales, like the Tuscaroras themselves, made the migration from North 
Carolina and adapted aspects from their new setting into their telling. Tuscaroras told o f a
155 Journal, 1756/01/10, Hawley Papers.
156 Johnson, Papers, 12: 168.
157 Johnson, Papers, 9, 943-44; Johnson, Papers, 10: 801.
m NCCR, 7: 431.
159 Blair Arnold Rudes, and Dorothy Crouse, The Tuscarora Legacy o f  J. N. B. Hewitt: 
Materials fo r  the Study o f  the Tuscarora Language and Culture, 2 vols. (Ottawa,
Ontario: National Museums of Canada, 1988), 1: 17.
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monstrous mosquito that “appeared first among the Tuscaroras along the Neuse river” in 
North Carolina. Later it flew to “the fort at Onondaga, where it also destroyed many 
lives,” before it was finally killed and its spurting blood hatched smaller, present-day biting 
insects.160 Members o f other Iroquois nations subsequently picked up the tale.161
In the nineteenth century and perhaps earlier, Tuscaroras told stories o f more 
helpful creatures, the U-stru-u. These divine beings, resembling humans but covered with 
bird-like down, could prophesize warnings about enemies. A first pair, according to 
legend, had lived with the Tuscaroras in North Carolina; another set appeared once again 
in New York. For Tuscaroras, U-stru-u were related to the origins o f the huskenaw 
ceremony, an arduous set of puberty rituals characteristic among Indians in the Southeast, 
and preserved at least in memory among Tuscaroras who came north.162
160 Elias Johnson, Legends, 57-58; Rudes and Crouse, Tuscarora Legacy, 1:9 use internal 
and linguistic evidence to argue that this tale is not borrowed, but was part o f older 
traditional beliefs regarding the mosquito.
161 See, for example, a Seneca version of the story in William W. Canfield, The Legends o f  
the Iroquois told by “The Cornplanter, ” (New York: A. Wessels Company, 1902), 59-61. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine exactly when this story was transmitted.
162 “Tuscarora Customs and Beliefs— Tha-Ron-Hya-Wa-Kon,” BAE Box 445 transcribed 
in F. Roy Johnson Papers, BAE Extracts, NCSA, p. 98; F. Roy Johnson, The Tuscaroras: 
Mythology, Medicine, Culture, 2 vols. (Murfreesboro, N.C.,: Johnson Pub. Co., 1967), 2: 
59-62, 240-241. See Lawson, New Voyage, 241 for a description o f the practice among 
Indians who probably included the Tuscaroras. Such practices were recorded among the 
Tuscaroras in North Carolina as late as 1755 when they were reported to be 
“Sasquhanning” young men in preparation for war. (2 Pa Arch, 2: 537; Boyce, “Iroquoian 
Tribes,” 285. For a discussion of the practice among Powhatan Indians see Helen 
Rountree, The Powhatan Indians o f Virginia: Their Traditional Culture (Tulsa:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 80-87.
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Some of these tales wove together into a dark shroud of depression that wrapped 
the Tuscaroras’ view of themselves and their place in a world— distinguishing them from 
their neighbors. The stories of U-stru-u may have been related to another set o f tales, told 
both by Tuscaroras near the Virginia-North Carolina border in 1728 to William Byrd, and 
by Tuscaroras in New York in the nineteenth century.163 These stories told o f a prophet 
sent to instruct the Tuscaroras in North Carolina about powerful medicines and “to set a 
perfect example of integrity and kind behavior towards one another.”164 The U-stru-u and 
the prophets both also warned of the impending danger o f Europeans, who “will treat the 
Indians rudely and cruelly, and then would eat them.”165 But the Tuscaroras failed, 
rejecting the warning and the messenger. In one version, young ball-players abused him; 
in another “young rakes of the Conechta clan . . . tied him to a tree and shot him with 
arrows through the heart.”166 Furthermore, in the case o f the U-stru-u, the young men 
neglected to feed the creature so “He-holds-Sky appeared and said, you have failed to feed 
them, so I will take them away.”167
163 William Byrd, The Prose Works o f  William Byrd o f  Westover: Narratives o f  a Colonial 
Virginian, ed. Louis B. Wright (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press o f Harvard University 
Press, 1966), 303-4; The second version is related by Cusick in Beauchamp, Iroquois 
Trail, 31.
164 Byrd, Prose Works, 303.
165 Quotation from “Tuscarora Customs and Beliefs— Tha-Ron-Hya-Wa-Kon,” BAE Box 
445 in Johnson, BAE Extracts, 98.
166 Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail, 31; Byrd, Prose Works, 303.
167 "Tuscarora Customs and Beliefs-Tha-Ron-Hya-Wa-Kon," BAE Box 445 transcribed in 
F. Roy Johnson Papers, BAE Extracts, NCSA, p. 98.
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An implication o f such tales was that the Tuscaroras’ own failures made them 
partly responsible for their woes, forever leaving them cursed. Every man, woman, and 
child carried the effects o f an original sin that doomed them to be cast out from the 
gardens and fields of North Carolina to wander in a desert o f exile. The biblical overtones 
were not coincidental, since Christianity had influenced some of the tellers, and some of 
the listeners. The version told to William Byrd was the most explicit in describing the 
lingering effects upon the Tuscaroras:
their god took instant vengeance on all who had a hand in that monstrous 
act by lightning from Heaven, and has ever since visited their nation with a 
continued train of calamities; nor will he ever leave off punishing and 
wasting their people till he shall have blotted every living soul o f them out 
o f the world.168
Gideon Hawley recorded that the “war of the Tuskraro . . . seems to be as I am informed 
something discouraging to this people [,] they are afraid that it will be the occasion of 
much unhappiness to ‘em.”169 Their story was their own. But as Tuscaroras huddled 
together, at first mostly with Oneidas and other Iroquois, and then increasingly with 
Nanticokes, Tutelos, Delawares and others who had lost ancestral lands, theirs joined a
168 Byrd, Prose Works, 304. This version was told by Tuscaroras still living along the 
Virginia-North Carolina frontier in the 1720s and thus may have reflected attitudes arising 
from that group’s more dire situation. Nonetheless, other versions eventually were told in 
New York.
169 Quoted in Boyce, “Tuscarora Political Organization,” 167. I have been unable to find 
this quotation within the Hawley papers.
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chorus of laments that the Indians were confined to an “island,” sinking under a European 
tide.170
But if in fleeing north Tuscaroras had hoped to find safe haven from Europeans 
behind an Iroquois shield, they did not succeed— at least not for long. In the 1710s and 
1720s, the lands to which the Tuscaroras relocated were relatively remote from European 
contact. The upper Susquehanna remained a blank spot on maps, only lightly traveled. 
Diplomats, missionaries, and traders passed more often through the other area of 
Tuscarora settlement, south o f Oneida Lake, on their way to and from the Great Lakes 
and the powerful Onondagas and Senecas; few, however, remained for long. During the 
first half of the eighteenth century, the French and English engaged in a complex 
diplomatic dance with the Iroquois that left both courtiers jealously protesting any 
intrusion by the other. Even the Jesuits, once a common and powerful force for 
conversion in Iroquoia, largely disappeared, more content to work with the native 
congregations they had succeeded in luring to the St. Lawrence Valley in New France.
170 Hawley wrote that Indians at Oquaga “say now that the white people have [invaded or 
invroigled? ] them and they have[,] as they express it[,] only an Island left[—] by and by 
they wil[,]l they are afraid[,] be quite drove off from their lands.” (Journal, 1754/03/16, 
Hawley Papers). See Hauptman, “Refugee Havens” for the psychological trauma among 
Indian refugee groups. Twentieth-century ethnologists have similarly tried to quantify the 
effects of this collective mental injury upon the Tuscaroras (Anthony F. C. Wallace, The 
M odal Personality o f  the Tuscarora Indians as Revealed by the Rorschach Test, Bulletin, 
U.S. Bureau o f  American Ethnology, 150 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 
1951); David Landy, "Tuscarora Tribalism and National Identity," Ethnohistory 5, no. 3 
(1958), 250-84; Thomas H. Hay, “Personality and Probability: The Modal Personality of 
the Tuscarora Revisited” Ethos, 4, No. 4 (Winter, 1976) , 509-524. Unfortunately these 
twentieth-century studies do a poor job of directly relating contemporary attitudes to 
eighteenth-century events; later hardships may also have informed their attitudes.
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Nonetheless, as the century proceeded, traders and missionaries increasingly did 
make their presence felt. And they were not completely unwelcome. Despite anger and 
distrust towards Europeans, Tuscaroras never turned their backs completely on the 
material advantages o f European culture. Even during the height o f the Tuscarora War, 
Tuscaroras had claimed only that they wanted to end trade abuses, not trade itself. They 
were too entrenched in a lifestyle that depended on guns, metal knives, pots, hoes, and 
woolen cloth. The Iroquois likewise had experienced their own consumers’ revolution in 
the seventeenth century and felt much the same.171
Therefore, in addition to the diplomatic gifts Indians carried home from 
conferences and treaties, a steady stream of trade goods reached Tuscarora settlements.
By the early 1720s, traders had established a post at Oswego on the southeast shore of 
Lake Ontario. Traders could easily reach the site, largely by water, by traveling west from 
Albany, from the Mohawk River to Wood Creek via the “Oneida Carrying Place,” and 
from there along Oneida Lake to the Oswego River. On one hand, the post limited the 
number o f western Indians who would pass through the Oneida Lake region to sell their 
furs at Albany, curtailing any chance for the region’s Indians to play middleman.172 On the 
other hand, the route ensured nearby Tuscaroras and Oneidas access to passing traders. 
Soon, traders also turned to the upper Susquehanna in pursuit o f untapped markets.
171 James Axtell, “The First Consumer Revolution: The Seventeenth Century” in Natives 
and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins o f  America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001).
172 Richter, Ordeal o f  the Longhouse, 249-254;
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William Johnson cut his teeth as a young fur trader around Oquaga in 1739. In that year, 
he wrote to his uncle, requesting
the good mentioned in the Invoice, wh. Are mostly Indian truck, and fitt to 
trade wth. To a place called Oquago to the Southward from this on 
Suscahannah R iver. . . where I intend if yu. Think proper to make a tryall 
this fall wth. Abt. 200 punds worth o f Goods Wh. I am Credible informed 
by those that Came from thence that I can to advantage dispose of them to 
the Indians there better than at Oswego because there are to many traders 
go there.173
In addition, George Croghan, one o f William Johnson’s later deputies, earned much of his 
wealth trading with Oquaga Indians from his post at Otsego Lake at the head of the 
Susquehanna.174
Through such traders, and to a lesser extent the missionaries who sometimes 
accompanied them, a wide assortment of goods reached Tuscarora communities.. Jelles 
Fonda, a trader with extensive contacts in the Mohawk Valley in the 1760s, recorded in 
his ledger the debt of “Swangaroris a Tuscarora Indian” for two steel traps and a “French 
blanket.”175 Fonda’s records furthermore included invoices for dozens o f knives (some 
“yellow handled Indian knives” and others “fine inlaid brass handled”), casks o f varying
173 Johnson, Papers, 1: 6-7.
174 Jelles Fonda Collection, Indian Book, Col. Croghan’s Account, 1769-1772; Smith,
Tour, 36-37.
175 Jelles Fonda Collection, Indian Book, 23. Fonda likely traded with other Tuscaroras, 
but he did not always label the ethnicity of his clients.
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size shot, barrels of gunpowder, bundles o f “small wht beads” and “black wampum,” 
dozens of tea pots, and numerous strips o f calico and cotton check cloth.176
Although their main goal was to market the rewards o f Christian salvation, 
missionaries also carried their share o f earthly goods. Gideon Hawley had reached 
Oquaga in the company of a rum trader aptly named George Winedecker.177 Hawley 
condemned Winedecker’s rum and the violent drunkenness left in its wake, but soon went 
about dispensing other goods.178 Hawley’s expense account included entries for “roles of 
ribbons . . .  to give to the Indian youths,” vermilion paint, a “small quantity o f tea to [give 
to] Indian women,” a pair of shoes given to an Indian for bringing “a cow as far as 
Tuskarahroroh,” blankets for Indian paddlers, and surprisingly, several gallons of rum.179 
Samuel Kirkland, who always entertained visions o f carefully introducing the best aspects 
of European lifestyles, in addition to Christianity, offered an even more extensive set o f 
accounts for his mission “to the Onoides and Tuscarores” near Oneida Lake. His 
expenses included allocations for plows, axes, hoes, and scythes, along with clothing and 
provisions for the poorest of his congregation.180 With such opportunities, Indians 
acquired ever-expanding tastes. These ranged from a desire for trading posts, plowmen,
176 “Invoice” dated 1773/ 02/15, Fonda Papers 1773, Jelles Fonda Collection.
177Doc. Hist. N.Y., 3: 1043.
178 One of his first tasks was to help the leaders of Oquaga pen a letter to William Johnson, 
asking the superintendent to limit future visits by rum peddlers, including those by 
Johnson’s own boats (Account describing 1753/06/12, Hawley Papers).
179 Hawley, “Account o f Expenses, 1753” in Hawley Papers.
180 Account of Expenses, 1772/08/09, Kirkland Letters, 32d.
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and gunsmiths to the hunger expressed in the touching postscript o f a note from an Indian 
at “Tuscarora Castle:” the sender’s wife desired “the favour o f a little Chocolate if you 
please.”181
These changes altered the material terrain upon which Tuscaroras and their native 
neighbors met. Even before Tuscaroras relocated, Indians throughout eastern North 
America had already begun to depend upon European trade for a vast amount of their 
possessions. The resulting similarity in trade and material culture narrowed the gulf 
between the two cultures, partially easing previous distinctions. Indian purchasers did not 
necessarily lose their “Indian-ness” They maintained a reputation for demanding goods of 
particular specifications and for modifying these to suit individual and cultural tastes. 
Nonetheless, Indians’ European-made tools, pots, clothing, and weapons grew 
increasingly similar across regions and ethnic lines, creating what might be called a mass- 
market appeal. Eleazer Wheelock, master of an Indian school and Kirkland’s former 
mentor, struggled to find even a “small specimen” of a native artifact that was “without 
the least Mixture of any foreign Merchandise.” Instead, he discovered, as had 
missionaries before him, that the Iroquois were “in some measure like those in New 
England . . .  as to their Custums, their Dress, and their Impliments.” Observers of Indians 
across eastern North America might have said much the same.182 In the case o f colonists, 
historian T. H. Breen has argued, such a shared consumer culture allowed puritanical New
181 Doc. Hist. N.Y., 4: 312. The missionary Edward Johnson wrote the note to William 
Johnson on behalf of an Indian named Isaac, whose role among the Tuscaroras will be 
discussed later at length.
182 Quoted in Axtell, “The First Consumer Revolution,” 117.
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Englanders and Virginia cavaliers to overcome antagonistic cultural backgrounds to gain 
shared trust, cooperate, and fight a revolution together as “Americans.”183 Likewise, 
Tuscarora newcomers and their native neighbors found themselves adapting together to 
the same new world o f consumer choice.
European goods repeatedly appeared at the intersection o f Tuscarora and Iroquois 
lifestyles. When Tuscaroras set about digging the soil to plant new crops, they did so with 
numerous manufactured hoes, or with plows shared with nearby Oneidas.184 Tuscaroras 
raised some hogs in North Carolina; in New York they joined Iroquois and other Indians 
in learning to keep “Cows, Hogs, Fowls, and Horses” for sale to colonists.185 The absence 
of fences among Tuscaroras (and colonists) had aggravated tensions over roaming 
livestock with settlers in North Carolina. In New York, their communities included 
fences, even if they were “miserable” by European standards.186 Tuscaroras adopting new 
foods nonetheless cooked them in European-made “large brass kettles” and “iron pot[s]” 
that had been available for at least a generation in North Carolina.187 With the advent of 
metal ware that replaced homemade Cashie-ware pots, Tuscaroras did not carry their 
distinctive pottery style north; nor did they have much motivation to learn Iroquois pottery 
methods. Tuscaroras donning heavier winter clothes may have looked to Oneida fashions,
183 T.H. Breen, The Marketplace o f  the Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped 
American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
184 Smith, Tour, 67. Account o f Expenses, 1772/08/09, Kirkland Letters, 32d.
185 Account o f Expenses, 1772/08/09, Kirkland Letters, 32d.
186 Smith, Tour, 67.
187 Oneida and Tuscarora Losses.
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but cut them from European cloth. Although many European products had been available 
to both Tuscaroras and Iroquois before their merger, as the century proceeded, the rate o f 
changes they caused increased. The result was a material culture that to contemporaries 
and later archeologists blurred easy classification.
The architecture employed by Tuscaroras in the Northeast reflected this dual 
encounter with European and Iroquois influences. Against lengthy New York winters, 
Tuscaroras began to build homes modeled after the Iroquois longhouse. On a tour o f the 
Oneida Lake region in 1794, John Belknap, an Indian school benefactor, passed a 
Tuscarora village and “viewed a house which our interpreter . . . said was a complete 
specimen of Indian architecture.” It consisted o f two rows o f posts nailed into the ground 
supporting a roof o f withes and bark. Inside, bays of “raised platforms, on which they 
sleep” flanked several firepits. Each end had a “separate apartment; one o f which served 
as an entry, the other as a store-room.” Neither Belknap nor his interpreter commented 
on the irony that this example o f Iroquois architecture had likely been built by Tuscaroras 
whose use of the form went back less than eighty years. Moreover, even this “complete 
specimen” of Iroquois architecture contained European influences. A “pig’s trough” 
crowded the entryway; inside were a “few other things o f little worth,” which probably 
included European goods.188
By the late eighteenth century, such structures became a rarity as Tuscaroras 
joined their native neighbors in incorporating even greater numbers o f European features 
into their homes. An account o f losses from a mixed community at Oneida Castle during
188 Belknap, “Journal, 1796,” 411.
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the American Revolution listed several “bark houses” for the Tuscaroras—but also a 
“plank house” valued at twenty dollars, and a hybrid “Indian bark house-planked at the 
beds.”189 Such innovations may have been stirred by Kirkland’s construction in 1773 o f a 
church using European carpenters and sawyers assisted by Indian labor, and a rectory 
raised by Indians alone. “The whole town, both men and women, with several adjacent 
villages”—probably including Tuscarora communities—“assembled in the morning” for 
the task. “My people improve much in husbandry and are inspired with a noble ambition 
for comfortable dwelling houses—two already erected— one of them 35 by 18 feet— seven 
or eight more are upon hand,” Kirkland boasted. Offering more than motivation, Kirkland 
“furnished them with a number of carpenters tools” for which he hoped to be reimbursed 
by Boston backers.190
Similar architectural changes occurred along the Susquehanna Valley. In 1764, 
nearby Delawares and Shawnees occupied “3 large Towns o f 130 Good and well built 
houses of square timber chimney’s etc with . . . little out Settlements . . . along the River 
on both sides [and had] . . . Cows, Hogs, Horses.”191 At Oquaga in the Susquehanna 
Valley, missionaries built homes, soldiers constructed a short-lived fort, and religiously
189 Oneida and Tuscarora Losses.
190 Samuel Kirkland to John Thorton, 1773/06/05 in Kirkland Letters, 42b. To aid in the 
project, Kirkland also helped the Indians construct a sawmill. Kirkland to Ebenezer 
Pemberton from Kanonwarohare, 1771/ 03/25 in Kirkland Letters, 16a. He also had a 
“loghouse” built for use as a temporary school shelter (Samuel Kirkland to Ebenezer 
Pemberton, 1771/07/01, Kirkland Letters, 18a).
191 Johnson, Papers 11\ 159. A force from Oquaga destroyed these communities during 
Pontiac’s Uprising.
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minded Indians modified one of its blockhouses into a church.192 The result was a great 
deal o f architectural variability, with a trend towards European influences as the century 
proceeded.193 Smith, who visited Oquaga in 1769, described longhouses “composed of 
clumsy hewn Timbers and hewn Boards or Planks” filled with “a Row of Stalls or Births,” 
each o f which “contains an entire Family so that 6 or more Families sometimes reside 
together.” A bark roof pierced by several smoke holes covered these structures.194 
Several years later, Crevecoeur saw there “50 odd houses, some built after the ancient 
Indian manner, and the rest of good hew’d logs properly dove-tailed at each end.”195 In 
1778, Col. William Butler, at the head of an American army, wrote in admiration o f the 
community he had just destroyed: Oquaga was “the finest Indian Town I ever saw; on 
both sides the River; there was about 40 good houses, square logs, shingles and stone 
chimneys, good floors, glass windows, etc.”196 Migrants had come to live in homes whose 
influences were not entirely Tuscarora, Iroquois, or European.
Rather than allow their economic destinies to be determined entirely by European 
colonists, Tuscaroras, Oneidas, and other nearby Indians did their best to direct the flow
192 Letter from Onohquagae 1753/07/25, Hawley Papers. He built a house with a 
chimney. Dolores Elliot, “Otsiningo, An Example of An Eighteenth Century Settlement 
Pattern” in Robert E. Funk and Charles F. Hayes, eds., Current Perspectives in 
Northeastern Archeology, 17, no. 1 (Rochester and Albany: New York State Archeology 
Association, 1977), 93-105, esp., pp. 96-97. Smith, Tour, 65.
193 Elliot, “Otsiningo,” 96-97.
194 Smith, Tour, 65.
195 Crevecoeur, Letters . . . and Sketches, 345.
196 Clinton, Papers, 4, 222-228.
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of trade for their own benefit. When, during the Seven Years War, traders were hesitant 
to venture down the Susquehanna, a delegation of Oquaga Indians, (including a Tuscarora 
leader named Rudt) approached William Johnson to complain that “it is too tedious and 
hard for most o f our People to come such a great way [to Cherry Valley] with our Skins 
wherefore we entreat you to send Traders to Aughquaga with such Goods as suit us.” In 
turn they promised to “all take care that such Traders shant be touched or hurted.”197 
Beyond satisfying their own needs, savvy Oquaga leaders recognized that with much of 
the backcountry in turmoil and off limits to traders, such a store would attract the business 
o f “Indians from all parts within 100 miles of us.”198 Similarly, in 1767, Sacquarrisa from 
Ganasaraga convinced Johnson against the wishes o f his superiors to send a trader to 
purchase ginseng collected by Tuscaroras.199
But if at times these communities were eager for traders, they were not so 
desperate that any trader would do. Rum traders, in particular, caused complaints among 
town leaders, who lamented that “when we heard o f Canoes coming down the River, 
which at first sight much comforted our Hearts; but when we came to look into it we Saw
197 Johnson, Papers, 9, 804- 808.
198 Johnson, Papers, 9, 391- 92, 568-69. Inhabitants at Ingaren, a small Tuscarora 
settlement of “five or six houses but a good deal scattered” about fifteen miles downriver 
o f Oquaga, had a tannery—probably to cure hides coming upriver from other Indian 
groups— and would have benefited from such a store. (Frederick Cook and George S. 
Conover, eds., Journals o f  the Military Expedition o f  Major Gen. John Sullivan Against 
the Six Nations, (Auburn, N.Y.: Knapp, Peck & Thompson, 1887), 24. Oquagans likely 
also hoped that Indians drawn by such a store would add to the defensive strength o f the 
community during these perilous times.
199 Johnson, Papers, 12: 168.
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nothing but a heap of Caggs and Barrels filled with Rum, which at once made us 
tremble.”200 Frequently, such requests bore the mark of missionaries, such as the letter 
Hawley helped pen on behalf o f Oquaga leaders immediately upon his arrival, and shortly 
after nearly being shot in the head by a drunken Indian.201 In it, Oneida and Tuscarora 
headmen begged Johnson to intervene with the “great men” at Albany, Schenectady, and 
Schoharry, that “we would have them send us no more rum.”202 Oquaga leaders, 
moreover, went so far as to blame William Johnson directly, since “yr battoe is often here 
at our place and brings us rum that has undone us.”203
Rather than being confined to European traders, the sale o f rum increasingly fell 
into the hands o f Indian middlemen, as had been the case among Tuscaroras in North 
Carolina. Passing through Ganasaraga on his return from a diplomatic mission to 
Onondaga, the interpreter Conrad Weiser bought several quarts o f rum from the 
inhabitants.204 “There has been no white man at [Oquaga] who has disposed of any 
strong liquors . . .  for more than a year and a half,” bemoaned Hawley in 1756; instead 
“they bring it themselves in small kegs from Schoharry.”205 The establishment of Indians
200 Johnson, Papers, 7: 348
201 Letter from Onohoquaga, ca 1753/07/15, Hawley Papers; Doc. Hist. N.Y., 2: 627- 28;
3: 1044.
202 Description o f Journey, ca 1753/06/12, Hawley Papers; for discussions o f the rum 
trade see Peter C. Mancall, Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
203 Description o f Journey, ca 1753/06/12, Hawley Papers.
204 MPCP, 5: 478.
205 Journal, 1756/12/09, Hawley Papers.
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as traders, however, did little to alleviate the potential for abuses, leaving Oquaga leaders 
to complain that “when we had White Traders, Goods Seemed to be Something 
reasonable and right; but Indians devour us, they extort from us every thing we get with 
great pain and labour in the Woods, for little or nothing.”206 Ending the trade had its own 
costs, however: Tuscaroras (and Cayugas) complained that the French and other Indians 
“laugh at us because there is no Rum allowed to be sold at our Castles.”207 While helping 
to establish a hybrid culture among Tuscaroras, Oneidas, and their other Indians 
neighbors, trade also had the possibility o f creating new divisions.
To a certain extent, trade’s effects can be quantified using an inventory written to 
reimburse wartime losses suffered at Oneida Castle, which was destroyed by Tory 
Iroquois in July 1780. The document is not a perfect catalog, since it focused on 
livestock, homes, and trade goods valued by Europeans. The list did not reflect the claims 
from smaller, predominantly Tuscarora communities nearby, nor address the losses of 
Tuscaroras who had relocated to new settlements in western New York in the intervening 
fourteen years. Therefore, only eight Tuscaroras appear alongside about one hundred 
Oneidas.208 Nonetheless, the claims offer a valuable glimpse into one eighteenth-century 
mixed community. Like their neighbors, Tuscarora homes at Oneida Castle contained an
206 Johnson, Papers, 7: 348. Sakwarithra, a leader at Ganasaraga, was also opposed to 
drinking (Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 92).
207 NYCD, 7: 242.
208 See Anthony Wonderley, "An Oneida Community in 1780: Study of an Inventory of 
Iroquois Property Losses During the Revolutionary War," Northeast Anthropology, no.
56 (1998): 19-41 for observations based on this document.
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assortment of European cooking-ware including large brass kettles, pewter basins, frying 
pans, kettles, and fireplace trammels. Tools included several varieties o f axes, hoes, iron 
wedges, and handsaws. Steel traps indicated that at least one Tuscarora had probably 
purchased his goods with furs. Other Tuscaroras cared for livestock, including horses, 
milk cows, and a young heifer— at least some of which were probably housed in a “log 
stable” that had been destroyed. The median value o f their possessions, twenty dollars, 
put the typical worth o f Tuscaroras only somewhat below that o f their Oneida neighbors, 
whose possessions had a median value of thirty dollars.209 Their mean property value 
would have been far below that o f the average white freeholder in the Middle Colonies, 
and even less than a third of that of Indians at the Mohawk upper castle.210
All the Tuscarora claimants had possessions comparable to the most typical 
Oneidas; no Tuscarora claim exceeded fifty dollars. Striking, however, is the absence of 
any Tuscaroras comparable to certain wealthy Oneidas: Hon-ye-ry, who owned a veritable 
herd o f cattle, a new wagon, and a “framed house, made by white people;” Lodwick
209 These figures must be used with great caution, especially owing to the small sample 
size o f the Tuscaroras. I chose to calculate median as opposed to mean (used by 
Wonderley) as a better estimate o f “typical” worth (median could be skewed by a few rich 
individuals). Median calculated for 99 Oneida property loss claimants and 7 Tuscarora 
property loss claimants (i.e. claims for meritorious service, etc. were excluded.) Numbers 
were calculated using the document’s third column which reflected adjustments by 
Pickering and conversion to New York dollars at a rate o f 2.5 per pound sterling. Mean 
for Oneidas was about $75 (converted to dollars at the above rate from the figure in 
pounds in Wonderley, “Oneida Community,” 26) and nearly $28 for Tuscaroras. Oneida 
and Tuscarora Losses.
210 Wonderley calculates the mean Oneida claim for property worth at about 30 pounds, 
compared to 180 pounds for male free-holders in the middle colonies, 108 pounds at the 
upper castle and 180 pounds at the lower castle of the Mohawks. (Wonderly, “An Oneida 
Community,” 26.)
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Gaghsaweda, who owned a “pleasure sleigh,” or several other Oneidas with extensive 
claims.211 Such Oneidas had acquired possessions that raised their property values above 
those o f most Oneidas and all of the listed Tuscaroras. Kirkland, who lived in the 
community before its destruction, may have unwittingly verified differences in material 
culture when he referred to “these rough unhewn barbarous Tuscarorers” and “these 
rough, savage Tuscarorers.”212
Within these communities of Tuscaroras, Oneidas, and other Indians spread across 
separate regions o f Iroquoia, ties of loyalty tugged in multiple, sometimes competing 
directions. Tuscaroras functioned as a “nation” within a league-based structure that 
operated at treaties and councils.213 Moreover, an incident that affected one Tuscarora 
might resonate particularly strongly with other Tuscaroras across Iroquoia. In 1756, after 
a Tuscarora named Jerry unwisely boasted to members o f the 44th regiment in Schenectady 
that he had killed one o f their comrades at Braddock’s defeat on the Monongahela River, 
the soldiers executed him, hoisting his head onto a spike on the ramparts. In response, 
Tuscaroras throughout Iroquoia exploded into grief and rage. A group at Johnson Hall 
“foamed, and Gnashed their teeth” and considered marching against the troops.214 Months
211 Oneida and Tuscarora Losses.
212 Kirkland to John Thorton, 1771/02/06, Kirkland Letters, 15a; Kirkland to Levi Hart, 
1771/01/17, Kirkland Letters, 14a. Since such wealth tended to gravitate towards 
individuals perceived to have influence within their communities and among the Iroquois, 
these differences may reflect a lower status.
213 For example, representatives from both the Oneida Lake and Susquehanna regions 
appeared together at the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty (NYCD, 8: 113).
214 Johnson, Papers, 9, 495- 497, 499-500, 502; Journal, 1756/08/05, Hawley Papers.
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later, the “Murder o f Jerry,” reported Johnson, “sticks in the stomachs o f the Tuscaroras” 
and threatened to tip the nation towards the French— a serious threat during the Seven 
Years’ War.215 Only well-chosen gifts and expensive concessions by William Johnson, 
who “left no measures unessayed to settle this unhappy Affair,” prevented the incident 
from broadening into violence against the English.216
Although at such times and at treaties and councils Tuscaroras often acted 
collectively, at other times local considerations intervened, causing Tuscarora communities 
to take separate courses.217 At the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, William Johnson 
had lobbied hard to convince far-flung Tuscaroras and Oneidas to resettle together in a 
single, compact, and easily defendable settlement. Tuscaroras who lived near Oneida 
Lake eventually convinced Oneidas near them to agree to the scheme.218 Oneidas at 
Oquaga also initially agreed. Tuscaroras at Oquaga, however, refused to cooperate with 
their northern brethren, perhaps feeling, as they did a decade later when the plan was 
revived, that “incensed foolish people” would destroy “our settlement cattle, grain, etc. So 
that when the troubles were over, we should return naked and destitute o f every
215 Johnson, Papers, 9, 824-827.
216 In addition to “scalps, belts o f wampum goods etc,” Johnson ordered workers “with all 
possible dispatch” to visit Ganasaraga to built fortifications for which the Tuscaroras had 
long petitioned. (NYCD, 7: 185-6; Johnson, Papers, 9, 496- 497)
217 Boyce, “Tuscarora Political Organization,” 64-73 draws upon some of the same 
examples to likewise makes an argument for “differential involvement” within Iroquois 
political affairs based upon geography. A key source for arguments regarding local 
politics in Iroquois history is William N. Fenton, "Locality as a Basic Factor in the 
Development of Iroquois Social Structure," in Symposium on Local Diversity in Iroquois 
Culture, ed. William N. Fenton (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1951), 35-54.
218 Johnson, Papers, 9: 332- 334.
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comfort.”219 Tuscaroras knew what it was like to lose everything and become refugees—  
they did not want to repeat the experience.
Several factors contributed to the tendency for communities near Oneida Lake and 
the Susquehanna to follow separate courses. O f the two regions, Oneida Lake was far 
more integrated into the politics o f the Six Nations. The location o f these Tuscarora 
communities along the Ambassador’s Road between the eastern Iroquois nations and 
Onondaga ensured that Tuscaroras were well-connected to councils and discussions 
between the other five nations. Tuscaroras could either talk to diplomatic delegations 
who stopped for food or rest, or easily attend councils themselves.220 Kanadesco was 
about a day’s journey from Johnson Hall; Ganasaraga was even closer to Onondaga. As 
John Martin Mack had prepared to depart towards Onondaga from the Oneidas, four 
Oneida chiefs told him what more experienced diplomats already knew “that on our way 
we must pass through several towns, among the first [most prominent?] two Tuscarora 
towns, where we should tell the chiefs that the Oneidas knew of our going to Onondaga.
At the last town a chief would go with us and hear our proposals.”221
William Johnson followed this pattern when, en route to Onondaga to investigate a 
possible Seneca conspiracy in 1761, he paused for an “interview” with Sakwarithra, the 
Ganasaraga chief.222 In another instance, rather than traveling on to Onondaga, William
219 Journal, 1754/03/16, Hawley Papers; Johnson, Papers, 9: 371.
220 In 1768, a large passing delegation o f Onondaga Indians consumed the Ganasaraga 
chiefs only cow. (Johnson, Papers, 12: 670-71.)
221 Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 113.
222 Johnson, Papers, 3: 440. Guy Johnson did similar: Johnson, Papers, 10: 587.
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Johnson held a conference on the banks o f a stream outside Ganasaraga.223 In meetings
with Europeans and councilors from other Iroquois nations, inhabitants o f these towns
were most often the face of the Tuscarora nation.
The geographic setting of communities on the upper Susquehanna, on the other
hand, worked against such frequent participation. Travel to Onondaga, Oneida, or
■ #
Johnson Hall entailed a several-day journey that during winter months went from 
uncomfortable to dangerous.224 The distance and difficulty often left Indians from that 
area feeling isolated from affairs o f the Six Nations. In 1746, a delegation from Oquaga 
complained:
We live at Oghquago, the news that is sent from your Excellcy [Governor 
Clinton of New York] through the Six nations is not brought truly to us, 
nor the news that the Governour o f Canada Sends to the Said Nations, we 
have not been taken notice o f nor acquainted that your Excellcy was to 
treat with the Six Nations till the Interview was near over . . . .  We have 
Received different news from the Six Nations at times . . . .225 
Whereas at times these Indians could complain o f their isolation, at other times their 
setting allowed them to pursue their own political course. “They are a Flourishing and 
encreasing People,” wrote William Johnson, “as many of our Friend Indians amongst the 
Six Nations who are disgusted with the ruling Politics of their People leave their Castles
223 Johnson, Papers, 12, 368- 372.
224 See in particular Journal 1756/01/04-1756/01/10, Hawley Papers.
225 Quoted in Boyce, Tuscarora Political Organization,” 66.
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and go and settle at Oghguqgo.”226 Some Europeans went so far as to consider the 
community at Oquaga as “though they were a very despicable company, a kind of 
renegades, scarcely to be reckoned as o f the Six Nations, being out o f the country o f those 
nations”— although Jonathan Edwards considered this a misunderstanding o f those 
Indians’ status.227 Instead, by voting with their feet, such Indians may have reduced daily 
confrontations, preventing a formal break with the Six Nations.228
Proximity, however, offered no guarantee o f harmony since divisions also occurred 
within local communities, even though cooperation was always the ideal. Typically, at 
councils with Europeans, mixed communities operated as a single entity even as their 
delegations contained leaders from different nations. In 1757, for example, Thomas, 
Nicholas, Rut, Peter, Joseph, Peepy -all “chiefs o f Oquaga”— appeared at Johnson Hall to 
speak on behalf of the “Aughquagas and our Bretheren of the 6 nations extending as far as 
Chucknut.”229 Rut and Thomas— a Tuscarora and Oneida, respectively—worked together 
as a pair on another occasion to bring the Pennsylvania governor, “by the hand,” to a 
council at Lancaster.230 In a letter to William Johnson, the inhabitants o f Oquaga
226 Johnson, Papers, 9: 824- 27. This politically independent attitude may even have 
partially ameliorated anger after the killing of Jerry.
227 Edwards, Letters and Personal Writings, 582; William Johnson asked them to convince 
the other Six Nations to favor the English on his behalf, but they declined stating that they 
lacked the necessary influence (Johnson, Papers, 9: 714- 716).
228 Parmenter, "At the Wood's Edge.”
229 Johnson, Papers, 9: 804-808.
230 Johnson, Papers, 9:737-38.
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described themselves as “both nations together under one head.”231 Hawley, concurring, 
described the community as several towns “united as far as I can say to a man in the same 
things, certainly their principal men are.”232 At other times, however, even at Oquaga, 
Tuscaroras and Oneidas formed distinct groups who met with William Johnson separately, 
even as they ultimately agreed on similar points.233 At Oneida Lake, inhabitants usually 
sent distinct Tuscarora and Oneida delegations, but these tended to operate in such close 
conjunction that Europeans like William Johnson typically paired them in the same breath.
Nonetheless, such apparent local harmony could and did break down. At their 
most inconsequential, divisions might be little more than a communication failure that left 
two Tuscarora leaders from Oneida Lake arriving to a conference a day later than their 
Oneida counterparts 234 Divisions emerged in another case when, after being scolded by 
English officials for repeatedly crying wolf in apprehension o f an invading French army, 
the Oneidas, wrote Johnson’s envoy, “gave me to understand that they believed they were 
imposed upon by the Tuscaroras.”235 At Oneida Lake, the worst splits occurred not along 
ethnic lines but over questions of alliance. Attempting to determine whether these 
communities would favor the French or the English, William Johnson observed in 1758 
that the Tuscarora and Oneidas there were “very much divided amongst themselves and
231 Account, ca 1753/06/12, Hawley Papers.
232 Account, ca 1753/06/13, Hawley Papers.
233 Johnson, Papers, 11: 181-82.
234 Johnson, Papers, 10: 65-76.
235 Johnson, Papers, 9: 406- 07. The invasion did, in fact, occur.
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that there intestine Broils took all their Attention.”236 The fact that “the greater part are 
neutral” prevented greater divisions from occurring.237
At Oquaga, the sharp divide between the unity they espoused, and the division they 
sometimes practiced sent Hawley into a confused spiral of doubt. Hawley’s mission 
unfortunately coincided with the early years o f the Seven Years’ War. As was the case in 
Oneida Lake, the inhabitants around Oquaga were uncertain what course to take in the 
conflict. On one hand, William Johnson expected his long history of trade and diplomatic 
relations to ensure the community’s loyalty to the British.238 If  that would not hold them, 
perhaps a fort, two small blockhouses, and a small garrison o f soldiers would.239 On the 
other hand, Oquaga’s location ensured that its inhabitants had close relations with 
Shawnees, Delawares, and other Indians downstream who were disaffected with English 
and Iroquois claims of authority. These Indians intermingled with the inhabitants of 
Oquaga, trying to cajole them to join with them, and if they refused, threatening them 
(causing some of the inhabitants to request the fort out o f fear) 240 One Delaware Indian, 
who was married to a Tuscarora at Oquaga, arrived with five English scalps and tried to 
“stir up the Tuscaroras against the English” telling them “they must remember” the 
Tuscarora War and that this time they would be “able to drive the English all into the
236 Johnson, Papers, 9: 903- 906.
237 Johnson, Papers, 9: 903- 906.
238 Johnson, Papers, 9: 903- 906.
239Journal, 1756/02/05, Hawley Papers. Johnson built a fort with two small blockhouses 
at Oquaga in 1756 (Johnson, Papers, 9:568-69; 644).
240 Letter to William Johnson [?], 1755/11/25, Hawley Papers.
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Sea.”241 Earlier, Hawley reported “not one Tuskuhrora” and “but few Onoydas” at his 
sermons because they were “prodigiously alarmed” by reports o f attacking settlers.242 But 
they were not all innocent victims—he also remembered seeing English plunder among his 
congregants, including a gentleman’s watch which was offered to him.243 This he rejected 
in horror, but it seemed the clock was ticking. Should he stay or should he go? In the 
depths o f winter in 1756, fearing for his life, Hawley finally decided to flee.
That decision had been hard enough and the wintry flight had almost cost his life, 
but the real confusion came nearly a year later. Hawley had received a letter from some of 
Oquaga’s inhabitants purporting to invite him back, but its contents puzzled him. He 
finally had the opportunity to unravel the letter when he encountered the person who 
penned it for the Indians—Benjamin Ashley, husband of his former interpreter, and who 
had remained in Oquaga. Hawley, asked about the letter’s origin and recorded the ensuing 
dialogue:
Ashley. Three or four of the head-men got together and tho’t best to send 
for you to return to them. It was about the time when the Delawares were 
gone to General Johnson’s to make peace. They advised you to leave them 
in the spring because o f the Delawares, you know, and now they tho’t that, 
as that matters was going to be settled again, you might come back to 
them.
241 Journal, 1756/02/10, Hawley Papers.
242 Journal, 1755/11/02, Hawley Papers.
243 Letter apparently written about 1806/01/16, Hawley Papers.
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But something in this answer did not satisfy Hawley; the letter’s framework ran contrary
to his conviction that Oquaga invariably operated by unanimous consensus:
Hawley: But was there but three or four only who joined in that message—
I remember that there were Shexrich, Jonah, and Isaac named at the 
bottom of the paper, but supposed that they all conversed in the message— 
you know that it is a very unusual thing for two or three to transact any 
publick affair how small soever its consequence, except they are chosen 
and impowered by the rest after a council upon the affair, from which they 
received their instructions. If two or three act for the rest without a 
delegation (you know what I mean) from the whole it is o f no force.
Indians are as exact about such things as any people I know or have read 
of. And were Shemmick Jonah and Isaac the only persons who sent me 
that message which you wrote me?
Ashley: I don’t know of any others.
Hawley: Strange! That two or three should desire advise and urge my 
return—they after deliberating in a full meeting upon the affair advised me 
to leave them in the spring; and now if any of them tho’t it advisable for 
me to return, a Council ought to have been held, and the opinions o f the 
rest consulted upon an affair o f so much imporatance and it is not 
agreeable to indians customs to act otherwise you should have objected 
against sending such a message to me or at least told them, that it was best 
for them all to meet and take the affair into publick consideration first, and
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see whether they would not all concur in sending to me. And seeing you 
did write you’ld have done well to have explained it to me. . . . Did they 
any of them send n o w , desiring and advising my return?
Ashley: Yes 
Hawley. Who?
Ashley. Shemmick and Jonah 
Hawley: Nobody else?
Ashley: No.244
The answer to the puzzle was simple; it just ran counter to everything that Hawley 
thought he understood: the inhabitants at Oquaga were divided. Only a few Indians truly 
wanted him back. Some feared that the region was still unsafe for an Englishman; others 
disliked the notion of a white preacher among them once more. One prominent leader, 
Adam, had moved his family into Hawley’s home and did not relish giving it back.
Puzzled and disappointed, Hawley wrote a letter to the town and then departed. He soon 
after took up a new post preaching to the Mashpee Indians on Cape Cod.
244 Journal, 1756/12/10, Hawley Papers.
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CHAPTER NINE 
ROADS BETWEEN:
SHAPING TUSCARORA IDENTITIES AND THE BACKCOUNTRY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
At a time when English colonies on the coast were overcoming their initial 
isolation from one another, the native backcountry was tied together by groups of 
Indians constantly visiting each other on worn valley paths hidden behind Appalachian 
ridge lines— routes later shared and eventually taken over by European migrants.1 For 
displaced Indian groups, these communications helped ensure the survival o f a broad 
sense o f community. But rather than continually fostering harmony and goodwill, such 
interactions could also provoke tension and unease that ultimately refashioned their 
sense o f identity.
Such was the case for the Tuscaroras in the eighteenth century: defeated by 
colonists, enemy Indians, and their own internal divisions during the Tuscarora War,
1 Colin G. Calloway, New Worlds fo r  All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking o f  
Early America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 135-37; For a 
discussion on the gradual establishments o f links between colonies, see Jack P.
Greene, Pursuits o f  Happiness: The Social Development o f  Early Modern British 
Colonies and the Formation o f American Culture (Chapel Hill: North Carolina 
University Press, 1988). The “Great Wagon Road” from Pennsylvania through 
Virginia into the Carolinas followed much the same route (T. H Breen, "The Great 
Wagon Road," Southern Cultures 3 [Spring, 1997]: 22-57).
483
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
484
they were, according to one observer, “scattered as the wind scatters smoke.”2 A 
large segment continued to live in North Carolina where they squeezed into “Indian 
Woods,” a small reservation in present-day Bertie County.3 Nearly two thousand 
others had fled to New York and Pennsylvania’s upper Susquehanna Valley where 
they planted new roots and were adopted as the Sixth Nation o f the Iroquois. As has 
often been the case for refugees, the Tuscaroras carefully straddled the line between 
acculturation among their new neighbors— Iroquois and white— and the maintenance 
o f a separate identity that preserved their own language, leaders, and customs.
But despite dispersal, they remained a nation, partially owing to the persistence 
of contacts between Tuscaroras in North Carolina and Iroquoia that demonstrated and 
in turn strengthened their common bonds. Such travels made possible the survival o f a 
broad sense of Tuscarora identity. And yet these same contacts were unable fully to 
bridge the alienation and splits that arose out of the groups’ different experiences.
Indeed, they showed just how large the gaps had grown. Meetings let Tuscaroras 
marvel as much at their differences as appreciate their commonality. Visitors greeted 
with smiles might more joyfully be sent packing. Once hopeful reunions that soured 
showed that while Tuscaroras remained a family, sometimes it was a dysfunctional one
2 Quotation by Bishop August Spangenburg appears in Douglas W. Boyce, ‘“ As the 
Wind Scatters the Smoke’: The Tuscaroras in the Eighteenth Century,” in Beyond the 
Convenant Chain: The Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600- 
1800, ed. Daniel Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1987), 151.
3 The name “Indian Woods” did not enter into common usage until the nineteenth 
century, but I use it here as a convenient label.
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where old conflicts resurfaced and new tensions emerged. Nonetheless, Tuscaroras 
clearly valued such contacts and “would no longer be put o ff’ from visiting, according 
to one official who tried to intervene.4
These exchanges between bands o f Tuscaroras in Iroquoia and those remaining 
in North Carolina flowed in two distinct streams. One, south from New York and 
Pennsylvania, consisted o f war parties o f young men who traveled along the so-called 
“Warrior’s Path” to strike traditional Catawba enemies in the Carolinas. These parties 
often paused at the reservation of the southern Tuscaroras in North Carolina to 
recoup, re-supply, and rekindle old relations. But the arrival o f such parties, who often 
stirred trouble with white and Indian neighbors and challenged the authority o f local 
tribal leaders, could test the limits of traditional hospitality.5 That these Tuscaroras 
from New York usually arrived accompanied by warriors from the other Iroquois 
nations enforced tendencies among some North Carolina Tuscaroras to see the visitors 
as cultural “outsiders.”
The second major stream consisted of bands of Tuscarora migrants who, 
sporadically over the course of nearly a century, traveled north from the Carolinas to 
rejoin their kin who had already settled among the Iroquois in New York and 
Pennsylvania. Among these was a group o f 166 Tuscaroras who left North Carolina in
4 William Johnson, The Papers o f  Sir William Johnson, 14 vols. (Albany: University of 
the State o f New York, 1921-65), 4: 849.
5 For tensions between colonial officials and these war parties, see especially Matthew 
Lawson Rhoades, “Assarigoa's Line: Anglo-Iroquois Origins o f the Virginia Frontier,
1675- 1774” (Ph.D. diss., Dept, of History, Syracuse University, 2000).
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1766, some of whom begged shelter that stormy winter at Friedenshutten. Rather than 
simple flight, these Tuscaroras who chose to leave North Carolina just over fifty years 
after the first wave of refugees were lured by the entreaties o f their northern kin who 
had sent a delegation the previous year. The departing Tuscaroras’ experiences reveal 
that the concept o f “chain migration”— typically applied to European migrations to 
describe the “pull” that initial immigrants exerted upon succeeding generations to 
follow— equally applied to Native Americans in the colonial era. By coming north, 
they escaped the confines o f their reservation and gained greater control over their 
lives. Their arrival helped their northern cousins sustain their population, preserve 
their language, and retain a distinct ethnic identity. But as refugees in an unfamiliar 
land, the newcomers also found themselves particularly vulnerable to manipulation and 
entanglement in new types o f dependencies.
Although not as dramatic as their initial expulsion from North Carolina in 
1713, with their burning forts at their back and slavers on their heels, links that 
developed were equally important in shaping the Tuscaroras’ experience in the 
eighteenth century. Interactions with other Indians, negotiations with surrounding 
settlers and colonial officials, their sense o f identity locally and as members o f a 
broader Tuscarora nation all reflected the persistence of contacts. Conversely, these 
contacts depended in part upon tapping into other networks among other Indians, 
settlers, and officials. Far from being of concern only to Tuscaroras and incidental to 
other lives on the frontier, connections between scattered groups were one o f the 
backcountry’s central features. For the Iroquois, connections fostered by adoptees
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from scattered nations shaped policy, both in the ways that the confederacy conducted 
wars abroad, and conceived defense at home. By adding their numbers to the Indian 
migrants who settled the upper Susquehanna valley, Tuscaroras contributed to a 
survival strategy of the Iroquois as important as that confederacy’s famous neutrality 
between Britain and France.6 As colonial officials tried to direct and order migrant 
flows through treaties, passports, and selective aid, they exercised and strengthened 
the bureaucratic apparatus of an expanding empire even while gaining a better 
understanding of its weaknesses.
Gangs of New York
“ . . .and now the Northern Indians and Tuscoruros begin again their customary
incursions.”
—Alexander Spotswood, Governor o f Virginia, 17187
6 For Iroquois neutrality, see Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois 
Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier, 1701-1754 (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1983), 85-128; Daniel K. Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” 
WMQ 3rd Ser., no. 40 (1983): 528-59; Jon William Parmenter, “At the Wood's Edge: 
Iroquois Foreign Relations, 1727- 1768” (Ph.D. diss., Dept, o f History, U. of 
Michigan, 1999); William N. Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political 
History o f  the Iroquois Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 
363-516.
7 Karen Ordahl Kupperman, ed., Calendar o f  State Papers, Colonial-North America 
and the West Indies, 1574-1739 [on CD-ROM], Windows version 1.0 ed. (London: 
Routledge: Public Record Office, 2000) (hereafter CSP), Item 699, vol.30 (1717- 
1718), pp.355-357.
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“There are also two French Indians . . . that went out a fighting two years ago 
towards Virginia by way of Cayouga, and have their abode among the Tuskarores that 
live near Virginia and go backwards and forwards.”
--Iroquois Speaker in Albany, 17228
Despite the near-frantic efforts o f colonial governors that culminated in the 
Albany Treaty of 1722, Tuscaroras who fled north to Iroquoia frequently joined 
Iroquois raids south along the Warrior’s Path throughout the first half o f the 
eighteenth century. Ranging hundreds of miles from Iroquois country, war parties 
struck against Catawbas and various tribes o f the Carolina and Virginia piedmont.
These southern wars were an important part of the Iroquois “mourning-war complex,” 
in which members o f the Confederacy responded to natural and violent deaths by 
redirecting anger, grief, and suspicion at outside nations in the form of raids aimed at 
acquiring scalps, or better yet, captives who could be distributed for torture or 
adoption. For these nations of the Longhouse, warfare abroad helped ensure peace 
within.9
By joining the raiding parties, Tuscarora warriors were participating in a 
political and cultural ritual that helped solidify their place within the Iroquois
8 NYCD, 5: 660.
9 James H. Merrell, ‘“ Their Very Bones Shall Fight’: The Catawba-Iroquois Wars,” in 
Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North 
America, 1600-1800, ed. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse, N.Y.:
Syracuse University Press, 1987), 117-118. See also Richter, “War and Culture,”
528-59.
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Confederacy. It was no coincidence that Tuscaroras first gained recognition as the 
sixth nation during diplomacy regarding these raids. Multiethnic raiding parties gave 
young Tuscarora men a chance to cooperate, form friendships, and show off their 
martial skills with Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas, Mohawks, and Shawnees— to list 
the nationalities o f just one 1717 raid.10 For Tuscaroras, whose nation had been 
adopted as metaphorical infants lashed to the cradleboard of the confederacy, such 
excursions offered an especially valuable opportunity to prove their manly vigor and to 
improve their personal and national stature by striking against longstanding Iroquois 
enemies.11
Nonetheless, Tuscaroras also undoubtedly brought their own particular 
understanding of raids that allowed them to nurse national grudges and settle old 
scores against Indians who had cooperated with South Carolina slave traders against
10 Observers, especially in Virginia and the Carolinas, usually lumped the participants 
vaguely as “Senecas” or “northern Indians.” This multiethnic band was described by 
Virginia sources, as a “Seneca” war party (Rhoades, “Assarigoa’s Line,” 91). See 
Severance, “Our Tuscarora Neighbors,” 322, for descriptions o f a 1726 raid that 
included “Mohawks, Senecas, and Canada Indians” in cooperation with Tuscaroras.
11 The first time that the Tuscaroras appear in documents as the “sixth nation” occurs 
within the context o f a 1722 treaty to discuss such incursions into Virginia. That 
meeting ended with “six shouts—five for the Five Nations and one for a castle of 
Tuscaroras, lately seated between Oneyda and the Onnondage” (NYCD, 5: 672). 
Demonstrating the importance of warfare in attaining political and masculine stature in 
Iroquois symbolic discourse, an Iroquois complained to the English: “Look at the 
French, they are Men, they are fortifying everywhere— but we are ashamed to say it, 
you are all like Woman bare and Open without any Fortifications” {Doc. Hist. N.Y.,2: 
581).
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them during in the Tuscarora War.12 Besides offering an opportunity to strike back at 
a traditional enemy, for Tuscaroras who had escaped north, embarking on the 
Warrior’s Path meant a chance to return to their North Carolina homeland and kin.
But the trip stretched across several seasons and a variety o f terrain. Rather 
than roving a hungry wilderness where clothes and moccasins wore thin, where 
shelters had to be hastily erected against sudden storms, and only meager supplies o f 
parched corn or a hunter’s lucky shot warded off hunger, they preferred to depend 
upon the hospitality o f communities along the way.13 Setting off in late fall or early 
winter, the same time that Iroquois men might otherwise embark on the winter hunt, 
mixed bands o f warriors ranging from over a dozen to over a hundred men paddled 
down or trudged along the banks of the Susquehanna River, pausing at Conestoga,
12 Richter, “War and Culture,” 303; Merrell, “There Very Bones,” 118. Governor 
Hunter o f New York blamed increased southern raids upon the influence o f the 
Tuscarora refugees who “have quickly found credit or favor among you” (Leder, 
Livingston Indian Records, 226- 28). Likewise, Gov. William Keith o f Pennsylvania 
noticed that the Iroquois used to go to war “towards the South West against Indians 
settled upon or near the lower Branches o f Mississippi, but o f late They seem to have 
relinquished that Path . . . [and now] their Course and Projects o f War is now 
generally bent against the Indians who are in Amity with Virginia and Carolina” Keith 
blamed the French, but it is likely that the Tuscaroras also played a role in this shift
(MPCP , 3: 99). For participation of the Catawbas in the Tuscarora War, see Joseph 
Barnwell, “The Second Tuscarora Expedition,” South Carolina Historical and  
Genealogical Magazine 10 (Jan., 1909): 43-44; Paschal, “Tuscarora Indians,” 95-100.
13 For shelters, see Byrd, Prose Works, 393; for thefts o f clothes, see Henry R. 
Mcllwaine, ed., Executive Journals o f  the Council o f  Colonial Virginia, 6 vols. 
(Richmond, Va.: Virginia State Library, 1925), 4: 139 (hereafter EJCCV) and William 
L. Saunders, ed., Colonial Records o f  North Carolina, 30 vols. (New York: AMS 
Press, 1968-1978), 11:10-13 (hereafter NCCR).
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Shamokin, and numerous smaller riverside villages.14 These multiethnic communities 
with their rapidly changing populations o f Delawares, Shawnees, Iroquois, and 
numerous smaller tribes were all loosely— sometimes grudgingly— associated with the 
Iroquois Confederacy.15 Besides filling bellies, visiting war parties at the towns 
deepened diplomatic ties and added weight to often-flimsy claims o f Iroquois 
sovereignty over the region.16 Sometimes they sought similar hospitality at the 
doorways o f the rough new cabins o f German, English, and Scotch settlers— a bid that 
brought violence and racial tension as often a warm bed and hot meal.17
14 Byrd estimated one party to contain one hundred warriors (Byrd, Prose Works,
393). Governor Johnson of South Carolina considered parties o f thirty to forty to be 
typical (CSP, Item 490, vol. 39 [1732], pp. 275-79.) For Susquehanna communities, 
see Peter C. Mancall, Valley o f  Opportunity: Economic Culture along the Upper 
Susquehanna, 1700-1800 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 27-70; James L. 
Merrell, “Shamokin, 'the Very Seat o f the Prince of Darkness': Unsettling the Early 
American Frontier,” in Contact Points: American Frontiers from  the Mohawk Valley 
to the Mississippi, 1750-1830, ed. Andrew R. L. Clayton and Fredrika J. Teute 
(Chapel Hill: U. o f North Carolina Press, 1998), 16-59.
15 For a brief summary of Iroquios relations with the “Pennsylvania Indians,” see 
Francis Jennings, “'Pennsylvania Indians' and the Iroquois,” in Beyond the Covenant 
Chain: The Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800, ed. 
Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 
1987), 75-91.
16 Aquila, Iroquois Restoration, 229; Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois 
Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation o f  Indian Tribes with English colonies 
from  its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty o f  1744 (New York: Norton, 1984).
17 For relations between settlers and Iroquois in the Susquehanna valley, see David L. 
Preston, “The Texture o f Contact: Europeans and Indian Settler Communities on the 
Iroquoian Borderlands, 1720-1780” (Ph.D. diss., Dept, o f History, College o f William 
and Mary, 2002), 87- 167; James Hart Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators 
on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: Norton, 1999).
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Leaving behind the Susquehanna Valley at its great eastward bend near its 
juncture with the Juniata River, passing narrow Pennsylvania and Maryland valleys, 
and ferrying the Potomac River near a stream still known as “Tuscarora Creek,” a 
warrior could expect to reach the rolling Virginia piedmont sometime between 
March— “when the Turky Cocks gobled”— and May.18 Turning east, with the 
Appalachians ,at his back, and following the Roanoke River into the North Carolina 
coastal plain brought the warrior to his final and most important way station— and if 
he happened to be a Tuscarora, to his former homeland.19
Between about 1717 and the early 1740s, numerous war parties stopped at 
“Indian Woods,” the North Carolina reservation of the southern band of Tuscaroras. 
Despite encroachment by white settlers and adoption o f European trade goods, many 
practices at Indian Woods remained little changed at mid-century. Visiting warriors 
slept in airy houses different from their substantial longhouses in the north, witnessed
18 See Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 69, for an Indian map of the route between 
the upper Susquehanna and the Juniata and estimated travel times. The journey to this 
point varied from approximately a week to ten days o f continuous travel. Tuscarora 
Creek meets the Potomac near Leesburg, Virginia. Travelers may have also crossed 
near Frederick, Maryland where there are two Tuscarora Creeks (Rhoades, 
"Assarigoa's Line," 31) or further west near Cherry Run (Wallace, Indian Paths, 168). 
For quotation about the turkeys in May, see Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 70.
For examples o f war parties arriving during this season see Leder, Livingston Indian 
Records, 135\EJCCV, 4: 368-70.
19 In 1727, Nathaniel Harrison warned the Catawbas of “a great body of Sinnica 
Indians [that] were dayly expected down Roanoke River in Perriagues to the 
Tuskaroras.” (BPRO/CO 5/1321, ff.l, 2, 2v., 4v.-9v in Va. Colonial Records Project, 
reel M-241) The region where the Roanoke River meets the Appalachian mountains 
has several “Catawba Creeks”—evidence o f the dueling war parties that passed this 
way.
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local styles o f face painting and hairdressing, and could try to keep up with dances, 
“keeping exact time” and carefully employing their arms “into a thousand menacing 
postures.”20 At meals, did northern Tuscaroras and the other Iroquois warriors follow 
their hosts’ taboo against mixing turkey and venison in the same pot? -probably, 
although sources do not say.21 Around meals, cousins—real and fictive— shared news 
and passed political instructions, sustaining a communication network effective enough 
to enable Tuscaroras from Indian Woods to tell one New York official that “although 
we have lived at a considerable Distance from you . . .  yet your Name, and Words 
reached us, as though you was but close by.”22 Eligible bachelors struck up more 
personal relationships.23 The appearance o f the surname “Seneca” among individuals 
at Indian Woods hints that at least some of the visitors remained and married, 
strengthening blood-ties to Iroquoia.24
20 Shannon Lee Dawdy, “The Secret History of the Meherrin” (Master's thesis, Dept, 
o f Anthropology, College of William and Mary, 1994), 104-5; Byrd, Prose Works, 
218. The quotation actually describes dances at a Nottoway Village in 1728, but 
probably holds true for their Tuscarora neighbors.
21 Byrd, Prose Works, 390.
22 Johnson, Papers, 12: 273-74.
23 Byrd’s visit to the Nottoways indicates that the practice of offering “trade girls,” to 
visitors — noted by John Lawson among the Tuscaroras earlier in the century— 
survived into the 1730s in a truncated form. Although Iroquois men esteemed 
abstinence during war, these restrictions likely loosened during lengthy stays among 
friendly hosts. Byrd, Prose Works, 218-19; John Lawson, A New Voyage to Carolina 
(Chapel Hill: U. o f North Carolina Press, 1967), 190, 194-95.
24 NCCR, 25: 507-9. Such marriages may have been a useful tool o f expanding the 
reproducing population o f the reservation.
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Most Tuscaroras at Indian Woods had less romantic reasons to welcome the 
parties. Upon arrival, the war parties found a limited yet eager body o f recruits among 
the young men of the reservation hungry to retaliate against Catawba raiders that 
frequently harassed Indian Woods.25 “Last fall some [Catawba] Indians came to the 
head o f new river and killed Capt. Jack and wounded one more o f their people,” 
explained William Blunt, the reservation’s “intended King” in 1731. His people’s 
response was typical: “a party o f Seneca’s coming to their Town to go against the 
Catabo’s they went out with them.”26 At the expectation of another Catawba attack, 
“Alliance and Amity” with the Iroquois, who promised, supposedly “to assist them 
with a Thousand men part o f which are already come into this province,” bolstered 
confidence at Indian Woods. Among colonists, rumors of such alliances increased the 
southern Tuscaroras’ military and political importance beyond their small numbers, 
and put North Carolina officials into a panic.27
Ties established through northern cousins to Iroquois warriors able to “bring 
on a war with the English in General,” made North Carolina Tuscaroras— despite
25 For examples o f the harassment of the Tuscarora reservation by Catawbas, see 
NCCR, 4:1311-14; 11: 11-12. Immediately after the Tuscarora War, the North 
Carolina Tuscaroras had been allowed to remain along the Pamlico and Neuse Rivers. 
In 1717 they petitioned to move slightly north, to Indian Woods along the Roanoke 
River, partially to escape potential Catawba attacks (NCCR, 2: 288-89). For southern 
Tuscaroras fighting alongside Iroquois, see NCCR, 2: 305; 3: 202; 11: 10-16.
26 NCCR, 11: 11.
27 Boyce, “As the Wind,” 162; NCCR, 3: 202. A thousand men is probably an 
exaggeration. It is impossible to determine if this number was inflated by the Iroquois, 
or by Tuscaroras at Indian Woods seeking to increase their clout with North Carolina 
officials.
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defeat in the Tuscarora War—enough of “a matter o f consequence” that North 
Carolina’s governor took the extraordinary step of appointing members to his 
executive council based solely upon experience in Indian affairs.28 This prop to 
Tuscarora confidence extended to affect daily relations with settlers who ringed Indian 
Woods. During a trip from Pennsylvania to North Carolina to scout for future 
Moravian mission sites, Bishop August Gottlieb Spangenburg noted that usually the 
Indians were “treated with great contempt” by settlers who took their land, poached 
their livestock, and blocked them from using ferries.29 But anticipation o f a war party’s 
arrival turned the balance of power. Here was a chance for young Tuscarora men to 
tap into the “feeling of animosity” that lasted decades after the war; here was a chance 
to throw off the cloak of helplessness and defeat, puff up with pride, and swagger with 
an “insolence” that shocked Spangenberg.30 In Pennsylvania “the Indians are not 
feared at all unless they are drunk,” he wondered. But “here [in North Carolina] they 
conduct themselves in such a way that the whites are afraid o f them. If they enter a 
house and the man is not at home they become insolent and the poor woman must do 
as they command. Sometimes they come in such large Companies that even the man is 
sorely put to it if compelled to deal with them.” This bullying he linked to the recent 
discovery nearby o f “traces of Seneca Indians.”31
28 NCCR, 3: 153, 205.
29NCCR, 5: 1.
30 NCCR, 4: 1313-14.
31 NCCR, 4: 1313-14.
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Besides augmenting each other’s military strength, war parties gave second and 
third generations o f northern Tuscaroras a chance to become reacquainted with the 
topography of a homeland they would otherwise know only through stories passed on 
by their forebears. One suspects that northern and southern Tuscaroras traveling in the 
Carolinas who passed cairns memorializing ancient battles or tragedies would have 
paused to add a stone or sweep aside a twig and remember the site’s story— actions 
echoing those o f Tuscarora travelers a century before.32 Expeditions also enabled the 
joint creation of new sites upon the mental landscape, whether o f victories, such as at 
the “craggy cliffs” of the Huwara River “made famous” as the site o f a gorily 
successful ambush upon a Catawba war party, or defeats, as at a cave that Tuscarora 
guides showed to a band of surveyors where nine Toteros fended off a “great host of 
northern Indians and at last obliged them to retire.”33
Although their limited population did not allow southern Tuscaroras to offer 
great numbers of recruits, their well-earned reputation for knowing “the most secret 
and shortest avenues in the very heart o f the country” gave raiding parties an added
32 For Tuscaroras pausing at old monuments in 1650, see Edward Bland, “The 
Discovery o f  New Brittaine, 1650,” in The First Explorations o f  the Trans-Allegheny 
Region by the Virginians 1650-1674, ed. Clarence Walworth Alvord and Lee Bidgood 
(Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark and Co., 1912), 105-130.
33 NCCR, 19: 848; Byrd, Prose Works, 387.
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edge.34 In 1752 southern Tuscaroras sent a threat to the Catawbas that “they could 
come and go there in 20 days . . .  the way to Catawba Town could soon be found.”35 
Two years later when a Catawba woman who had escaped from the Iroquois reported 
grimly that the Iroquois “knew where the Catawbas fetched their Water and Wood and 
they would utterly destroy them,” she was probably accurately summing up Tuscarora 
expertise and intent.36 Knowing when to strike could be as valuable as knowing 
where. Only hours after a Catawba peace delegation surrendered their guns during 
parlays with Virginia officials, a joint war party descended upon the defenseless camp. 
Distraught officials afterwards attributed the onslaught’s murderous precision to 
intelligence gleaned from local traders by southern Tuscaroras.37
Inter-national Relations and Contested Constructions o f the Backcountrv
That attack and numerous others like it, enabled by bonds between southern 
and northern Tuscaroras that helped channel Iroquois warriors, reshaped the political,
34 NCCR, 4: 472. The region between Indian Woods and the Catawbas had once been 
inhabited by the Tuscaroras. It was still used as a hunting ground for much of the 
eighteenth century. War parties accompanied by Tuscaroras would sometimes journey 
to the head of the Wacamaw River and then go downstream (NCCR, 11:11). They 
also sometimes traveled further east along the coastal plain through the swamps of the 
Peedee River (Virginia Gazette, January 7, 1737, page 3 column 2).
35 NCCR 4: 1311-14.
36 Quotation in Merrell, “Their Very Bones,” 130.
37 EJCCV, 3: 442-4; NYCD, 5: 490-91.
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military, and cultural character of the Virginia and North Carolina backcountry.
Particularly hardhit was Virginia’s system of ordering its frontiers by relying on 
“tributary” Indians resettled on strategically placed reservations to alert and defend 
against intruders, capture escaped slaves, and serve as a way for governors and their 
council to direct and limit settlement. At the outbreak of the Tuscarora War in 1711, 
Virginia governor Alexander Spotswood had “seized that critical time” to attempt to 
strengthen the tributary system and enlarge it by including the Tuscaroras living near 
his borders.38
But despite the colonists’ victory over the Tuscaroras in 1713, instead of being 
strengthened, the tributary policy that tied local Indians to Virginia’s government 
descended into a several-decade chaotic blood bath. The war had backfired. What 
went wrong? Tuscaroras who remained in the region, balking at Spotswood’s 
onerous demands, reneged on promises to relocate to Virginia, and instead chose to 
remain as tributaries just miles over the border in North Carolina. That colony, 
perpetually disorderly, locked in boundary disputes with Virginia, devastated by the 
recent war and fearful o f its return, was unable to enforce strict discipline upon settlers 
or Indians.39 Completing the second half o f the ruinous equation, Tuscaroras, who
38 Byrd, Prose Works, 220.
39 In 1719 Virginia officials requested that the North Carolina governor send the 
“Chief man of the Tuscaroros” to Williamsburg to discuss problems caused by his 
hosting the war parties from the North. North Carolina’s governor replied that he 
would try, “but could not promise of their Complying therewith” (EJCCV, 3: 517).
Again, in 1727 Virginia’s governor complained that it appeared that the North 
Carolina governor “has very little authority over them [the North Carolina 
Tuscaroras]” {EJCCV, 4: 132-33).
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had fled to the Iroquois in the panicked final days o f the war, returned south, now as 
comrades-in-arms of the Iroquois— despite near-frantic efforts o f colonial governors 
that culminated in the Albany Treaty o f 1722.
Spotswood had had good reason to worry. The Tuscarora-Iroquois 
combination wreaked havoc upon the best-laid plans o f Virginia officials by re-shaping 
cultural alliances in the region. Until this time, the tributary Indians had almost 
invariably been prey to Iroquois forays: the possibility of sheltering from an Iroquois 
storm in the lee of gun-toting Virginians had been one o f the few draws of being a 
tributary.40 But the Tuscaroras, who had strong cultural ties with several o f these 
tribes—particularly the Nottoways and Meherrins—bridged old gaps and negotiated a 
newfound amity between the former hunters and hunted.41 Virginia officials were 
essentially accurate when they grumbled in 1732 that “the Nottoway Indians frequently 
entertain at their Town parties o f the Tuskarooro’s inhabiting in No Carolina and
40 For example, Iroquois warriors attacked the Nottoways in 1704, killing several and 
capturing their headman (Rhoades, “Assarigoa’s Line,” 69).
41 EJCCV, 3: 517. Dawdy, “Secret,” 96. For cultural ties see Douglas W. Boyce, 
“Iroquoian Tribes o f the Virginia-North Carolina Coastal Plain,” in Bruce G. Trigger, 
ed., Handbook o f  North American Indians vol. 15 Northeast (Washington, D .C.: 
Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 282-289; Lewis B. Binford, “An Ethnohistory o f the 
Nottoway, Meherrin, and Weanock Indians o f Southeastern Virginia,” Ethnohistory 
14, no. 3-4 (Summer-Fall, 1967): 104-218.
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under Colour thereof do receive among them divers o f the Six Nations under the 
Government. . .  o f New York . . . ,”42
But the Iroquois and Tuscaroras had not slogged eight hundred miles only to 
make friends. The young warriors demanded scalps and captives for prestige and to 
soothe the grieving women of death-stricken families awaiting them in their villages.
Often the parties did not bother to march the extra twenty days from Indian Woods 
into well-defended Catawba territory and sought easier proxy targets closer at hand.
Only “a small daies march” from Indian Woods, some of the Virginia tributaries were 
friendly with the Catawbas—particularly the Saponis, Tutelos, and remnants o f the 
Occaneechees who shared a loose cultural affiliation with the Catawbas as 
“Siouans.”43 Besides, Iroquois beliefs did not brook neutrality lightly: Tuscaroras had 
already learned firsthand that any tribe not in the shadow of the League’s Tree of 
Peace could be its enemy. To all this the Tuscaroras added their own long-standing 
hostilities against the Saponis.44 Conversely, Catawba retaliatory raids rarely reached 
all the way back to Iroquoia; a several-hundred miles abattis o f intervening towns 
made such an undertaking nearly suicidal.45 Instead they lashed out against groups in
42 EJCCV, 4: 291. The source actually states that the “Tuskarooro’s inhabiting in No 
Carolina and under Colour thereof do receive among them divers o f  the Six Nations 
under the Government o f  North Carolina and under Colour thereof do receive 
amongst them divers of the six Nations under the Goverment o f New York . . . ” but I 
suspect that the italicized portion is an error [my italics].
43 CSP, Item 243, vol.29 (1716-17) pp. 142-144.
44 CSP, Item 137, Vol.24 (Addendum 1708-1709), pp. 95-98; BPRO/ CO 5/1216,
No.9 and C05/1362, pp.318-325.
45 MPCP, 3: 96, 100.
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North Carolina and Virginia, obeying the maxim that the friend of mine enemy is mine 
enemy. In 1727 the Catawba “King of the Sugers” explained to a Virginia agent that 
his people had come “to assist the Saponis to take revenge on the Tuskaroroes who 
had killed many of them last winter.” But instead they attacked the Meherrins, after 
hearing from two settlers that “the Meherrins and Tusks were all one and were always 
together.”46
To avoid being ground to dust between Catawbas colliding with Iroquois and 
their Tuscarora allies, the smaller tributaries were forced to choose sides and 
participate. The grim result was an ever-repeating arabesque of revenge curling into 
further revenge— all mocking Virginia’s efforts at order. In 1719 Virginia’s Council 
extracted from tribal leaders a list of eight Nottoways and twelve Meherrins who “did 
joyn the Senequas and Tuscoraros and attack the Saponies” outside Fort Christanna.47 
Again, several years later, the Nottoways admitted that “in conjunction with some 
French Indians [Iroquois] and Tuscaroroes” they had chased several Indian enemies to 
a settler’s home. When the fleeing Indians ducked inside, the pursuers opened fire, 
killing the inhabitants.48 The pattern continued into the 1730s and 1740s. Even former 
student-hostages, proteges of the tributary education program at the College of 
William and Mary and supposedly schooled in the arts of civility, joined in the uncivil 
behavior. As he lay dying, the son of the Totero king accused “Hickory, a Nottoway
46 BPRO/CO 5/1321, ft. 1, 2, 2v , 4v-9v (in Va. Col. Rec. Proj., reel: m-241).
47 EJCCV, 3: 520.
48 EJCCV, 4: 125-26.
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Indian with whom he was acquainted at the College” o f braining him with a 
tomahawk— amid the crime’s confusing circumstances Virginia’s Council thought they 
sniffed the taint o f Tuscarora and Iroquois influence.49
In addition to constant appeals directed toward the Iroquois and New York, 
Virginia also strove for a solution closer to home. Tuscarora interference left Virginia 
in the awkward position of trying to corral troublesome tributaries without further 
alienating them. To stem the tide of violence and return the tributary system to a firm 
footing, Virginia’s councilors, governors, and agents tried everything— arrests, 
tongue-lashings, curfews, unannounced inspections, requiring travel passes— and 
failed.50 The real blame, officials felt, could be traced back to the interloping of 
“divers foreign Indians” who fought out their own conflicts in Virginia’s backyard.
After a 1732 outbreak of skirmishes between the Nottoways and Saponis, officials 
declared that the “Nottoway Indians are for the future to forbear entertaining at their 
Towns or giving encouragement to their coming into this Colony any of the said 
foreign Indians on pain of being made accountable for any Mischief or Injury the sd 
Tuscaroras or other foreign Indians shall do either to his Majesties Subjects or to the 
Saponies . . . ”51
49 EJCCV, 4: xvii, 186.
50 EJCCV, 4: 121.
51 EJCCV, 4:291.
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The Saponies for their part were similarly enjoined to keep out “any o f the 
Cattabaw Indians [or] their Confederates.”52 The threats failed; three years later 
Virginia was once again calling up the militia to scare off or arrest “the Tuskoror and 
other Northern Indians” at Nottoway town.53
Although already weakened by years o f white encroachments, it was the 
withering strain o f living in a dangerous battle-zone perpetuated by the southern 
Tuscaroras’ proximity that ultimately disintegrated Virginia’s tributary Indians.54 So, 
too, collapsed the frontier system that depended upon them. In 1728, “for fear of the 
Catabas,” the Meherrins “deserted their ancient town” to move closer to the dubious 
safety o f English settlements.55 The Nottoways, faring little better, cowered behind 
their town’s ten-foot palisade.56 Saponis, casting about in desperation, disappeared as 
separate entities from Virginia’s archeological record, fleeing first to the Catawbas in
52 EJCCV, 4:291.
53 EJCCV, 4: 365.
54 Lewis Roberts Binford, Cultural Diversity among Aboriginal Cultures o f  Coastal 
Virginia and North Carolina (New York: Garland, 1991), 194; Merrell emphasizes 
the formative, collective response that Iroquois raids provoked among the piedmont 
peoples (Merrell, Indians' New World, 113).
55 Byrd, Prose Works, 213. The presence in the Tuscaroras’ New York nineteenth- 
century reservation of a “non-Tuscarora element” whose name, Cowinchawkon, is 
“essentially identical” to name of the Meherrin town in Virginia indicates that some 
Meherrin probably migrated to Iroquoia in the eighteenth century. Their “rapid 
assimilation” indicates that the “Meherrin were quite similar in language and culture to 
the Tuscarora” (Blair A. Rudes, “Cowinchahawkon: The Meherrin in the Nineteenth 
Century,” AIgonquian andIroquoian Linguistics 6, no. 3 (1981): 32-34). For an 
examination of the persistence o f the Meherrin in the region, see Dawdy, "Secret 
History."
56 Byrd, Prose Works, 217.
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1730, three years later considering joining the Tuscaroras, finally throwing in their lot 
with the Iroquois around 1740 and resettling along the Susquehanna River.57 To a 
House o f Burgesses always eager to limit spending, dubious o f supporting even allied 
Indians, and suspicious o f the whiff of monopoly that came with the governor and 
council’s strict regulations, the benefits the tributaries offered did not seem worth the 
effort required to support them against encroaching settlers, protect them from 
outsiders, and prevent them from attacking each other.58 Instead, Virginia accelerated 
its dependence upon yeoman, white, Protestant, “foreign” settlers o f Scotch-Irish and 
German descent to settle and protect its western frontiers, encouraging them to push 
westward to create a new, all-white, western buffer that eventually led to claims as far 
west as Ohio.59 Such yeomen were likely to discourage, not attract and shelter, 
visiting war parties. Ironically, over the long run, this change would merely shift 
friction with Iroquois war parties away from tributaries and onto European settlers.
57 Simpkins, Abor, 325; CSP, Item 348 I, vol. 37 (1730), pp.212-20.; NCCR, 3: 89; 
EJCCV, 4: 303; Merrell, Indians'New World, 116.
58 Spotswood, Official Letters, II: 282. Moreover, after the settlement o f the long­
standing boundary dispute with North Carolina, several o f these tribes were found to 
be outside of Virginia’s jurisdiction.
59 Warren R. Hoftstra, “'The Extextion of His Majesties Dominions': The Virginia 
Backcountry and the Reconfiguration of Imperial Frontiers,” Journal o f  American 
History 84, no. 4 (March 1998): 1281-1312.
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Shape Shifters and Blurred Reflections:
Intra-“National” Tuscarora Relations
Virginia blamed its troubles on the welcome that raiding parties received from 
the North Carolina Tuscaroras; however, not everyone at Indian Woods embraced the 
arrivals. Reunions that demonstrated and strengthened ties between separated bands 
could also revive old conflicts and allow new ones to emerge— calling into question 
exactly what it meant to be a “Tuscarora.” The sudden appearance of a troop of 
armed young men, hungry from the trail, put a strain on the small, impoverished 
reservation and tested the limits of traditional hospitality. “I can not understand that 
Blount [the head of the Tuscaroras at Indian Woods through the 1730s] is so desirous 
of so many of the . . . [raiding groups] coming among them and spending up their 
provision,” wondered one North Carolina official; perhaps,“[he] can not help it, and is 
obliged to keep in with them.”60 Part o f the obligation was cultural. Several decades 
earlier, the North Carolina surveyor and explorer, John Lawson, described the strong 
cultural impulse among Tuscaroras to feed and entertain visitors.61 To do otherwise 
was tantamount to an expression of hostility— a hard lesson learned by white settlers 
who rebuffed this Iroquoian belief that “friends eat out of the same bowl.”62 Perhaps
60 NCCR  2: 305. Oddly, the official does not connect the presence of these bands with 
the Tuscaroras’ wars against the Catawbas despite the fact that in the same document 
he records that King Blount was requesting an increase in bounties against that tribe.
61 Lawson, New Voyage, 243-45.
62 Rhoades, "Assarigoa's Line," 32-33.
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many North Carolina Tuscaroras would have secretly sympathized with a Saponi 
leader who complained to the Indian agent, Nathaniel Harrison, that he had no choice 
but to host the Catawbas, that “they did not desire their company but were afraid to 
tell them so, because it would make them angry and they were too powerful to pretend 
to quarrel with.”63 Repercussions reverberated throughout Iroquoia because, at towns 
along their return home, war parties recounted “the most minute details . . . telling 
where they had been treated kindly or badly by Indians or Europeans.”64
By cooperating, though, southern Tuscaroras faced other quarrels when the 
war parties left. “They side with the Six Nations against the Catawbas, but suffer from 
this relationship very much,” concluded an observer weighing the consequences.65 
Revenge, and South Carolina’s reward for “bringing Tuscarora Indians dead or alive,” 
inspired Catawbas to go “out in quest o f them,” sometimes picking off stragglers on 
the trail, other times striking Indian Woods directly.66 The result was a split 
personality: the North Carolina Tuscaroras exuded bravado in the war parties’ 
presence, in their absence, crippling terror. Nervous Tuscaroras watched for clues of 
the Catawbas who haunted them: tell-tale tracks, mysteriously slaughtered cattle and
63 BPRO/CO 5/1321, ff.l,2,2v.,4v.-9v. (in Va. Col. Rec. Proj., reel: m-241). 
Pennsylvania Indians along the warriors’ route faced a similar dilemma (MPCP, 3: 
100).
64 Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 171.
65 NCCR, 4: 1313.
66 Virginia Gazette, Sept.22, 1736, page 3 column 1.
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hogs, the shadows spotted by “some of their children going for wood.” 67 When 
William Byrd hired a pair of panicky Tuscaroras as hunters and guides, they were 
scared to near uselessness, “so fearful of falling into the hands o f the Catawbas that 
they durst not lose sight o f us all day” and so killed nothing— leaving the party to a 
meager dinner o f cold bread and cheese.68
Besides angering Catawbas and other Indian allies o f the English, the North 
Carolina Tuscaroras’ cousins stirred up unwanted conflict with nearby whites— killing 
cattle, harassing slaves, stealing horses, threatening settlers, and in one case taking 
shirts off clothes lines69—leaving governments to “look on their Nation as 
Accessory.”70 In the atmosphere of suspicion, North Carolina sent spies “on another 
pretense” to Indian Woods to discover any “evil designs against the government.”71 
When murders were committed in South Carolina, the Tuscaroras earned blame based
67 NCCR, 11: 11-12.
68 Byrd, Prose Works, 390.
69 For thefts, see NCCR IP. 11-15. For examples of northern war parties causing 
tensions, see William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar o f  Virginia State Papers and Other 
Manuscripts, 1652-1781, 11 vols. (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1875-1893) vol. 
1: 210-11 (hereafter referred to as CVSP)\ NCCR 2\ 305; Johnson, Papers 4\ 260; 12: 
123, 137-38; Severance, “Our Tuscarora Neighbors,” 321. A North Carolina official 
complained of visiting Iroquois’ “rudeness” towards settlers at Wekocanaan (a north- 
south path that crossed the Roanoke River not far from Indian Woods) theorizing, “it 
is either natural for them to be so, or else they have a mind to drive away the people 
from their settlements there it lying in their way to Blount’s town [Indian Woods]” 
(NCCR, 2: 305).
70 EJCCV, 3:446.
71 NCCR, 2: 304-5.
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upon the slender evidence that the perpetrators “bent their way northward.”72 Against 
similar accusations in Virginia in 1727, Blount stood fast by his alibi that the murders 
were “committed by the Tuscaruroes now living under the protection o f the five 
nations; and that he was sure if those were tax’d with it they would not deny it.”73 His 
envoys even volunteered to remain hostage in Williamsburg until their innocence could 
be proven.74
On the other hand, the Tuscaroras o f North Carolina were hardly blameless. 
Whenever they could, they passed off guilt, using northern Indians as scapegoats.75 In 
doing so they blurred the line between unity with and distinction from the northern 
warriors. When encountering settlers during one raid in 1730, North Carolina 
Tuscaroras masqueraded as Iroquois who could not speak English until spotted by a 
trader who recognized them.76 Later, when accused on the same raid by a South 
Carolina official o f stealing slaves and killing livestock, several southern Tuscaroras 
answered that “they knew nothing of i t . . .  as to what was done now the Senecas who 
did it must pay for it.” Finally, confronted with proof, they admitted being present— 
but only as bystanders.77 The official interviewing them was flabbergasted. Earlier
72 Virginia Gazette, Jan. 7, 1737, page 3 column 2.
73 EJCCV, 4: 132-33.
u  EJCCV, 4: 139.
75 Boyce, “As the Wind,” 163; NCCR, 3:153.
76 NCCR, 11: 12. During a raid in South Carolina in 1726 there occurred a similar
incident, in which two Tuscaroras among a party of twelve Indians, “called themselves 
Sinnekas” (NYCD, 5: 793).
11 NCCR, 11: 11-15.
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“[you claimed] the Seneca’s and Tuskerorer’s were all one yet now you make a 
difference and lay all the blame upon the Senecas’s though you yourselves own that 
you come down into our settlements,” he sputtered, “No, I am not come so far to hear 
and believe lies.” 78
The inhabitants of Indian Woods were not above using deception. But closer 
examination reveals a more complex truth that the Tuscaroras could not quite explain 
and the official could not quite understand. While the Tuscaroras o f North Carolina 
and New York often cooperated in general, in specific behaviors they could be at 
cross-purposes. The North Carolina Tuscaroras freely admitted to joining the war 
party to retaliate for recent murders. They admitted shooting into a Catawba fort at 
night. For much of the expedition they probably enjoyed the camaraderie and the 
sense that “they were all one” with their Iroquois and northern Tuscarora fellows. But 
these southern Tuscaroras were also keenly conscious that they lived surrounded by 
white settlements and would not, in the end, return to homes nearly a thousand miles 
distant. Therefore they sought a situation that would “let them that were Indians alone 
to make war against Indians w ithout. . . [whites] meddling in it” and acted 
accordingly.79 Present when northern members of the party had stolen a slave, the 
North Carolina Tuscaroras claimed to have “tould them it was not good for them to 
do so and that they must not meddle with Slaves.”80 They had similarly protested
1SNCCR, 11: 11-15.
19 EJCCV, 11:14.
80 EJCCV, 11: 10. See NCCR, 2: 536, 570 for another example o f North Carolina 
Tuscaroras blaming Northern Indians for taking slaves.
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when, “before the white people’s face,” the party “in a very rude way” stole shirts that 
were in the wash, and again when the party had killed cattle and shot a horse.
These tensions lurking within the war parties may have been sharpened by 
deeper misgivings between the North Carolina Tuscaroras and the Iroquois. Within 
living memory, the Tuscaroras had been victims of Iroquois raids that only stopped in 
1710 when a delegation journeyed to Conestoga to beg for mercy.81 The Tuscaroras 
who journeyed to Iroquoia after the Tuscarora War and were adopted as the 
confederacy’s “sixth nation” forgave past trespasses. Reconciliation for the Tuscaroras 
who remained in North Carolina was more rocky: implicitly, they had rejected the 
Iroquois. After the Tuscarora W ar’s conclusion, several Tuscaroras hiding in 
Virginia’s hills told Spotswood that Iroquois messengers came to demand that they 
“submit themselves to the Senecas” and “made them large offers o f Assistance to 
revenge themselves on the English, upon condition of incorporating with them.”82
81MPCP, 2: 510-13. Before 1710 some Tuscaroras may have been striving for a 
peace. According to Lawson “If you go to persuade them [the Iroquois] to live 
peaceably with the Tuskeruros, and let them be one People, and in case those Indians 
desire it, and will submit to them, they will answer you, that they cannot live without 
War, which they have ever been used to; and that if Peace be made with the Indians 
they now war withal, they must find out some others to wage War against. . . .” 
(Lawson, New Voyage, 207.) For mention of negotiations between the Iroquois and 
the Tuscaroras see also "Minutes, 31 July 1710,” mss., Penn Papers, Indian Affairs,
1:34 available in William Sumner Jenkins, ed., Records o f  the States o f  the United 
States o f  America [Microform Collection] (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress 
Photoduplication Service, 1949-1951): Pa.M .la Reel 1, Supplement 1687- 1756 (m- 
13919).
82 Boyce, “As the Wind Scatters the Smoke,” 161; Spotswood, Letters, 2: 42.
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After rejecting the offer, fears lingered for several years that the Iroquois would 
attack, years that overlapped with the war parties’ first visits.83
Suspicions and fears were probably smoothed by the frequent presence of 
Northern Tuscaroras amid the visitors. But the two groups o f Tuscaroras had their 
own history of cultural and political differences.84 As leader o f Indian Woods, King 
Blount and his successors struggled to lead their people in an accommodationist policy 
towards colonial governments that would retain a measure o f autonomy and avoid a 
return to war. In the later days o f the Tuscarora War, Blount’s accommodationist 
faction had even skirmished with the most bellicose part of the Tuscaroras—the same 
group who formed the core of the initial migrants to New York.85 Even while some 
Tuscaroras departed northward, Blount had used the post-war reconstruction to 
secure his own authority among those who remained.
83 See, for example, the fourth provision o f the 1713 Treaty o f Peace between the 
Virginia and the Tuscaroras (CSP, Item 603 I, vol.27 [1712-1714], pp.306-310) and 
rumors o f an impending attack in 1723 (EJJCV, 4:33).
84 Based upon linguistic evidence, Blair Rudes suggest that Tuscaroras who initially 
migrated to Iroquoia were probably from around the Contentnea basin, had a slightly 
different linguistic base, and probably associated more often with southern Pamlico 
tribes as opposed to the Upper Tuscaroras who often associated with the Nottoways 
and Meherrins and formed the bulk of Blount’s faction that remained in Indian 
Woods— a conclusion largely corroborated by documentary evidence (Blair Rudes, 
personal communication, October 4, 2003, Rensselaerville, New York).
85 In 1712, Blount delivered Chief Hancock, a leader of the Tuscarora uprising, to 
North Carolina officials who promptly executed the prisoner (NCCR, 1: 883, 891, 
896.)
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Now these migrants’ return on the W arrior’s Path provoked a power struggle 
within the reservation that often played out along age lines.86 In 1723 Blount informed 
the North Carolina government “that he has certain Intelligence o f several o f the 
Northern Indians that design to make him a Visit this fall with an Intent to seduce the 
young men of his nation from him in order to Comit mischief on him and on the white 
people.”87 Several years later, despite Blount’s apparent opposition, several o f his 
men joined with a group of northern Tuscaroras in a night attack against a Saponi 
hunting party’s camp on the Roanoke River.88 Afterwards English settlers spotted 
among the war party some of their familiar Tuscarora neighbors toting their trophies 
of “divers scalps that they were carrying home to their town.”89 An Indian slave at 
Indian Woods testified that they brought back more: an unfortunate Saponi whom the 
townspeople joined in torturing. Frequently referred to by maps and colonial records 
as “Blount’s Town,” at such times the town was not his to control. Again, several 
years later, Blount complained that recent crimes had been committed by “Northern 
Indians that had Revolted from him, and now lived as Pirates and Robbers;” even at 
that moment there was one such “Indian in his town, named York, who was formerly
86 There may also have been a splits along lines that corresponded to villages that 
existed before 1713 since at the end of the Tuscarora war, several villages had forced 
to combine into one under Blount’s sole leadership, losing their former village councils 
and chiefs (Boyce, “As the Wind Scatters the Smoke,” 160-61).
87 NCCR, 2: 496.
n  EJCCV, 4:126.
89EJCCV, 4: 132-33.
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of the Tuskarooroe Nation.”90 Arrival in the company of other Iroquois may have 
increased the sense that the returning Tuscaroras were meddling outsiders.
Blount’s protests may have had ulterior motives: complaints that “some o f his 
people are disorderly and throwing off their obedience” could actually strengthen his 
grip upon the reins o f the town as the sole conduit to colonial authorities. At his 
request, officials issued proclamations “commanding all the Tuscaroras to render the 
said Blount Obedience otherwise they will be looked upon as Enemies to the 
Governement.”91
But the persistence and ire in Blount’s language raises questions about the 
Tuscaroras’ views of each other and their own identities that have no easy answers—  
in matters o f ethnic and social boundaries, which are o f course fluid, relational, and 
situational, there never are.92 As members o f the war parties coming south, the 
northern Tuscaroras probably felt that they were returning to a collectively 
remembered homeland where (through their contacts, language patterns, and collective 
memory) they would be insiders more than their compatriots among the other Iroquois
90 CVSP, 1:210-11.
91 NCCR, 2: 570-73; this took place in the context o f a dispute about incursions by 
northern Indians and the a slave who was possibly held in the town. Blount even 
negotiated for the construction of a fort in his town to be built by North Carolina.
This structure would have served to ward off both northern Indians and attacking 
Catawbas, and reinforced Blount’s authority. The colony agreed, but no records show 
that it was ever actually constructed (NCCR, 2: 496).
92 Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika Teute, eds., Through a Glass Darkly: 
Reflections on Personal Identity in Early America (Chapel Hill: University o f North 
Carolina Press, 1997), esp. 1-12.
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nations. Such contacts helped facilitate a broader sense of what it meant to be a 
“Tuscarora”— one that encompassed members o f two groups living and adapting in 
widely divergent geographical, environmental, and political circumstances, but 
nonetheless who cooperated politically and militarily and shared an “aura o f decent.”93 
At the same time, because of the northern Tuscaroras, the inhabitants o f Indian Woods 
gained new connections and were able to place themselves as members o f a broader 
community that included their former Iroquois enemies. Cooperation on the warpath 
between northern Tuscaroras, southern Tuscaroras, and other Iroquois encouraged 
and necessitated trust during “high risk situations” that built upon and added to a sense 
of sameness and common identity.94
But, anthropologists have noted, this commonality is a fragile thing:
“differences, even minor ones like the absence of situationally defined clothing, raise 
suspicions about basic character that are not easily allayed.”95 In the case o f the 
Tuscaroras, differences ran deeper. Blount’s blistering language gets at these 
misgivings: that these “revolted” and “former” Tuscaroras who had moved away, that 
had thrown in their lot with the Iroquois were somehow inherently untrustworthy.
These were not prodigal sons to be welcomed joyfully back into the family, but 
scoundrels abusing weakened blood ties. Or, were his railings merely those of an
93 Brackette F. Williams, “A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across 
Ethnic Terrain,” Annual Review o f  Anthropology 18 (1989): 415.
94 Williams, "Class Act," 407.
95 Williams, "Class Act," 407.
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angry old man trying to create and delineate a boundary among his people that did not 
exist? The northern Tuscaroras’ repeated visits to the reservation and the real 
likelihood that they could “seduce” young warriors there all reveal continued 
identification as a single nation, albeit one under contestation. Even as contacts 
continued, they bred new rifts.
Around 1740, the frequency of contacts via the Warrior’s Path and the 
complaints they provoked decreased. Blount’s death shortly before 1739 silenced the 
most vocal critic at Indian Woods.96 At nearly the same time, the long-running efforts 
o f Virginia’s governors to prevent the “constant excursions o f the said five nations . . . 
and their correspondence and frequent marches to and from the Tuscaroras” through 
diplomatic maneuvers aimed at extending a buffer o f land and white settlers past the 
Shenandoah Valley began to pay off, coming to fruition at the Treaty o f Lancaster in 
1744.97 At that conference, an Iroquois spokesperson announced that “there lives a 
Nation of Indians on the other side of your Country, the Tuscaroraes, who are our 
Friends, and with whom we hold Correspondence; but the Road between us and them 
has been stopped for some time on Account o f the Misbehavior o f some o f our 
Warriors.”98 The treaty had “open’d a New Road for our Warriors [west o f the Blue
96 NCCR, 4: 345.
97 Quotation in EJCCV, 3: 451. For an account o f Virginia’s diplomatic efforts to shift 
the routes of Iroquois war parties (which unfortunately underestimates the role of 
tributary Indians and the Tuscaroras in Virginia’s conception of the frontier), see 
Rhoades, “Assarigoa’s Line,” particularly pp. 123-169.
9*MPCP, 4: 734.
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Ridge] and they shall keep to that; but as that would be inconvenient for Messengers 
going to the Tuscaroraes we desire they may go the old Road.”99 The speech ended 
with a desire to increase the number of messengers between the two groups, but 
without the incentive o f using Indian Woods as a military staging ground, war parties 
no longer beat a path to the southern Tuscaroras. By 1752 the Tuscaroras o f Indian 
Woods found themselves off the Warrior’s Path. On an “old road” grown faint with 
disuse, they hurled threats to the Catawbas that they could not enforce, ignorant that 
the Six Nations and Catawbas had recently negotiated a separate peace.100
Migration North: Push and Pull 
“The Tuscaroras . . .  are very desirous to bring away their People from the 
Southward [and] would no longer be put o ff’
—William Johnson, 1765101
99 MPCP, 4: 734. Ironically, even as Virginia officials were trying to compel the 
Iroquois to cede land over to them to create a buffer zone, the Iroquois in part based 
their claim to this territory in the western portion of what became Virginia, upon their 
“conquest” and later adoption of the Saponis and Tutelos that came as a consequence 
o f their raids based out of Indian Woods (Rhoades, “Assarigoa’s Line,” 157- 8; 
Jennings, History and Culture, 181.)
100 NCCR, 4: 1313. Warriors from the northern and southern Tuscaroras would later, 
however, cooperate together alongside British troops during the Seven Years War 
(Johnson, Papers, 12: 270- 76).
101 Johnson, Papers, 4: 849.
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With the redirection of war parties west, contacts between the bands of 
Tuscarora did not end, but they did decrease in frequency and change in nature. 
Sporadically over the course o f the eighteenth century, bands o f Tuscarora migrants 
traveled north from the Carolinas to rejoin their kin who had settled among the 
Iroquois in New York and Pennsylvania. Most such groups, especially smaller ones, 
slipped through the records and perhaps consisted of little more than a few hardy souls 
who joined a war party returning to Iroquoia. An exception is a group of 166 
migrants who left North Carolina in 1766 and rejoined their kin around the town of 
Oquaga in the upper Susquehanna Valley. These Tuscarora migrants joined a broader 
current o f Nanticokes, Tutelos, Conoys and other groups that departed Maryland, 
Virginia, and the Carolinas. By one count, members o f fifteen tribes relocated to 
Iroquoia in the eighteenth century.102 They filled a space left by an outflow of other 
groups, particularly Delawares and Shawnees, who felt impinged upon by Iroquois 
claims of dominion and settlers’ claims of land and sought to maintain autonomy by 
retreating to Ohio country.
In examinations of Indian migrations, like that of the Tuscaroras who left 
North Carolina in 1766, it is tempting to focus on the “push” factors—the wars, 
disruption, and encroachment—that made homelands untenable. The opposite side of 
the equation also deserves attention.103 This secondary migration in mid-century—five
102Hauptman, "Refugee Havens," 129.
103 For attention to this issue see, Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The 
Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: U. of Nebraska Press,
1992), 1-46, esp., 29.
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decades after military defeat expelled the first generation o f migrants— reflected the 
“pull” o f circumstances and social factors in New York. Able to ponder their decision 
in advance, the members of this 1766 group were not “refugees” in the same sense as 
their forebears in 1713 had been. Those first desperate survivors o f the Tuscarora 
War had narrowly escaped slaughter and enslavement when an army o f South 
Carolinians and enemy Indians captured and burned their stronghold Fort 
Neoheroka.104 Instead, the carefully planned departure o f the 1766 group better fit 
what other historians have termed a “community model o f migration.” Such 
movements “combined a basic satisfaction with a way of life and a deep dissatisfaction 
with present opportunities for living that life. It was fueled by the belief that people 
can improve their own condition by seeking new opportunities elsewhere. People 
involved in this kind of migration organized their trip around existing kinship and 
community ties.”105
This “chain migration” displayed the strength of ties between the separated 
groups decades after their original separation. Tuscaroras chose to leave North 
Carolina lured by the entreaties o f their kin, the promises o f assistance from officials, 
and the prospect of new opportunities in Iroquoia. By coming north, they escaped the 
confines of their reservation and gained greater control over their lives. Their arrival 
strengthened existing Tuscarora communities. But as refugees in an unfamiliar land,
104 Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians," 107; Barnwell, "Second Tuscarora Expedition."
105 Richard White, “The Transformation of Western Society: Migration,” in "It's Your 
Misfortune and None o f  M y Own" A History o f  the American West (Norman: U. of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991), 192.
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the newcomers also found themselves particularly vulnerable to manipulation and 
entanglement in new types of dependencies. Reliance upon sponsorship by colonial 
officials and uncertain status as newcomers left them vulnerable— susceptible to the 
machinations o f imperial officials, and exposed to Indians and missionaries embroiled 
in sectarian squabbles. The newcomers traded old problems for new. To fully 
understand the experiences of such immigrants requires a broadened focus that also 
examines the ways that others sought to use them for their own agendas.
Blount had led a neutral course during the Tuscarora War, and despite 
sporadic participation with northern war parties, his people generally continued to 
seek survival through accommodation. But the reservation offered little protection. 
Squatters settled on their land, felled their timber, and drove stock onto their fields 
even as the southern Tuscaroras’ usefulness as tributaries, able to patrol the frontier 
against runaway slaves and enemy Indians, declined.106 In an increasingly plantation- 
based society where alliances were perceived in terms of black and white, neighbors 
repeatedly accused them of harboring and conspiring with runaway slaves.107
106 NCCR, 5: 785; Boyce, “As the Wind,” 162; Paschal, "Tuscarora Indians," 137. For 
discussion of a case in which a settler “violently assaulted and beaten and broke the 
arm o f an Indian belonging to the Tuscarora Nation” see March 13, 1722 Court Order 
in Indians: Treaties, Petitions, Agreements, and Court Cases (1698-1736), Colonial 
Court Records, Box 192, NCSA..
107 Paschal, “Tuscarora Indians,” 131. Also NCCR, 2: 534, 536, 570, 674; 3: 218. 
Boyce, “Tuscarora Political Organization,” 76. For mention of suspicions that 
Tuscaroras would unite with slaves during a conspiracy in 1804 see Jeffrey J. Crow, 
“Slave Rebelliousness and Social Conflict in North Carolina, 1775-1802,” WMQ, 3rd 
ser. 37, no. 1 (Jan. 1980): 98.
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Departure— or its threat— offered some reprieve. In February 1740, North 
Carolina’s governor reported that “I found our Indians last summer highly 
discontented and even threatening to leave the province.”108 The threat hit home. The 
timing may have signaled a rapprochement with the Tuscaroras’ northern kin owing to 
Blount’s recent death. More importantly it also happened to coincide with the 
outbreak of the War of Jenkin’s Ear, which escalated fears o f French- and Spanish- 
inspired Indian attacks. “I cannot forbear desiring you to consider what mischievous 
consequences might happen,” warned the governor to the assembly, if the Tuscaroras, 
with their knowledge of the local countryside, should be allowed to fall under hostile 
influence.109 Better to keep potential enemies close. Therefore, the threat to abandon 
the colony brought Tuscaroras temporary concessions: leave “to hunt on all People’s 
lands,” provided they were “behaving themselves orderly” and did not burn too close 
to homes nor poach livestock, recommendations to traders “in the Strongest Terms” 
to be “Just and Reasonable,” an order for surveyors to record the boundaries o f Indian 
Woods and hand over a copy of their findings to its Tuscarora inhabitants.110 But all 
that was good did not last. The Indian population continued to plummet, dropping to 
approximately three hundred by mid-century.111 In 1757 Tuscaroras complained that
108 NCCR, 4: 472.
109 NCCR, 4: 472.
110 NCCR, 4: 492, 507, 539, 592.
111 NCCR  , 22: 311-13. By 1766, their numbers had dropped even further to between 
220 and 230 individuals (NCCR, 7: 218-20). For the dim state o f the reservation in 
mid-century, see NCCR, 4: 1311-14; Johnson, Papers, 12: 273.
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another surge of squatters laughed off the carefully preserved, yellowing title as “good 
for nothing.” These tensions may have contributed that year to accusations against a 
Tuscarora for murder.112
If  there were many broad, long-term factors pushing Tuscaroras to consider 
leaving Indian Woods, the timing of one group’s decision in 1766 owed to the arrival 
of a delegation of nine Tuscaroras from New York in that year. By mid-century, 
Tuscaroras living along the upper Susquehanna had several reasons to welcome, and 
indeed to seek out, immigrants. Among a people who kept their own language, 
sachems, and villages even as they integrated into multiethnic neighborhoods around 
Oquaga, an infusion of new blood would have been welcome. While the overall 
population o f the Iroquois Confederacy saw a small resurgence during the eighteenth 
century, reaching about seven thousand by 1760, the Tuscaroras themselves were 
losing numbers.113 Hawley reported that in 1756 a few of the “first settlers” to come 
from North Carolina around 1714 were still alive in Oquaga, but these were mostly 
women and “the oldest Indians I ever saw in those parts.”114
112 NCCR, 5: 785-86. For the murder see records o f the Supreme Court o f Oyer and 
Terminer, October 13, 1757 in Indians: Treaties, Petitions, Agreements, and Court 
Cases (1698-1736), Colonial Court Records, Box 192, NCSA. Other small Indian 
groups in eastern North Carolina were similarly facing land pressures at this time. See 
Joh[n] Carr to Gov. Arthur Dobbs, Aug. 10 1756, Arthur Dobbs Papers, NCSA.
113 For Iroquois population, see Preston, “Texture o f Contact,” 15. Boyce, 
“Tuscarora Political Organization,” 54 cites William Johnson claiming that the 
Tuscaroras had a total population of about 1,000 in 1770. NYCD, 4: 427, 1093.
114 Hawley to Cooper, December 25, 1770, Hawley Papers.
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Turmoil during the Seven Years’ War and “Pontiac’s War” added pressures 
upon Oquagans to seek greater strength in numbers at mid-century. Located on 
Iroquoia’s periphery, its inhabitants, who generally sided with the British, felt exposed 
and constantly feared reprisals from neighboring Delawares, Nanticokes, and 
Shawnees. In 1756 some inhabitants had successfully petitioned for reinforcements 
and the construction of a small fort but resented the “common soldiers” who came 
with it because the women could not “go out to get wood without being ravished by 
them.” But without assistance, they were left with “nothing to fight with but sticks, 
stones, and fists.”115 Nearby, the founders o f Ganeghwaghtai, a small town of 
Oneidas and Tuscaroras newly created in 1763 mid-way between Oquaga and Oneida 
Lake, also sought settlers.116 In 1764 one o f the town’s Tuscarora sachems petitioned
115 In this instance the petitioner’s solution was to request Christian soldiers: “such 
men as fear God and hate Iniquity.” As shall be shown, however, one o f the authors, 
Isaac Takayenersere, became involved in the attempt to bring in Tuscarora migrants as 
a similar religious endeavor at around the same time. Isaac Takayenersere and 
Gwedethes Akwirondongwas to ‘Governor of Boston’, November 12, 1764, Charles 
Roberts' Autographs, Library o f Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania. I would 
like to thank Marjory Hinman for calling my attention to and providing a copy of this 
letter. Also see NYCD, 7: 50-53. In the same year, inhabitants of Oquaga asked for a 
trading house to be built that would “draw Indians from all parts” and “encrease our 
numbers.” William Johnson assented, but wanted to wait until after tensions in the 
region subsided, thereby side-stepping its purpose {NYCD, 7: 73-74).
116 Johnson, Papers, 10: 643-48. The need arose for this town out o f fears that the 
geographical remoteness of the upper Susquehanna communities from the rest of the 
Iroquois Confederacy and their numerous ties to other belligerent communities in 
Pennsylvania would make them susceptible to influence by hostile tribes. The Oneidas 
“appointed” Taawaghsachquo, a sachem of the W olf clan to “assist. . .  in the 
management o f . . . affairs” but in practice two Tuscaroras, Gaghswangarora and his 
son Tyagawehe appear as the spokespeople for the community. Johnson, Papers, 10: 
643-48, 801; 11: 80-85, 160.
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for a fort “for their protection as they lye much exposed;” the superintendent’s denial 
only bluntly restated the problem: “there are but a few Families there.”117
The scheme to draw additional Tuscaroras north appears to have been bom 
primarily out o f these New York events, rather than being conceived in North 
Carolina. Only four months after Ganeghwaghtai’s creation in 1763, two of the town’s 
Tuscarora sachems approached Sir William Johnson, the Northern Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, and “earnestly requested . . .[his] assistance in getting and bringing all 
their People from the Southward.” 118
Northbound: 1766-67
The original exodus of Tuscaroras to New York after 1713 had been a fait 
accompli, achieved before poorly informed and ill-coordinated colonial governments 
could muster more than half-hearted sputtering in response; the circumstances 
surrounding the migration to occur in 1766 would be far different, reflecting a 
backcountry under greater imperial supervision.119 Gaghswangarora and his son 
Tyagawehe, the Tuscarora sachems who approached Johnson in 1763, promised in
117 Johnson, Papers, 11: 160, 185-6.
118 Johnson, Papers, 10: 801.
119See for example E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Journal o f  the Legislative Council o f  the 
Colony o f  New York (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1861), 356; Berthold Fernow, 
ed., Calendar o f  Council Minutes (New York), 1668-1783 (Harrision, N.Y.: Harbor 
Hill, 1987), 248.
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return for assistance in moving their kin north to abide “by such road as I should judge 
best,” recorded Johnson.120 Fearing that a migration would fan the flames during a 
time “now troublesome and dangerous, owing to the Rash, and unnatural proceedings 
of the Senecas & others” involved in Pontiac’s uprising, Johnson stalled two years, but 
eventually acceded and set into motion the wheels o f the expanding British imperial 
government.121 He issued passports, hired interpreters, and wrote letters to governors, 
fort commanders, magistrates, and his southern counterpart, John Stuart. If, as 
Johnson muttered, Tyagawehe and his father “would no longer be put off,” at least the 
governments would stay informed.122 Armed with bundles o f documents and 
accompanied by an interpreter and eight companions, Tyagawehe set out in early 
September 1765.123
Events continued in this official vein after the envoys’ arrival in North Carolina 
the following spring.124 Tyagawehe fell ill with the mumps after the long journey and 
recovered his health in the home of Gov. William Tryon, whom he charmed with his 
polished manners. “I found him not only humanized but civilized,” wrote Tryon to 
Johnson, describing the meals at which the sachem and the governor worked over the 
legal steps and bureaucratic maneuvers necessary to facilitate the migration.125 This
120 Johnson, Papers, 10: 801.
121 Johnson, Papers, 10: 801.
122 Johnson, Papers, 4: 849.
123 Johnson, Papers, 4: 849.
124 Parkman, Papers, 27: 417-18; NYCD, 7: 880-83.
125 NCCR, 7: 218-20.
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time, unlike when Tuscaroras threatened to depart in 1740, no officials raised 
objections. The French were gone, expelled from the continent by the Treaty o f Paris 
at the end of the Seven Years’ War, leaving the Tuscaroras irrelevant as either enemy 
or ally; influential planters crowded to purchase the land; officials eyed the increase in 
quit-rents.126 That autumn the colonial legislature assembled and passed laws legalizing 
the sale of eighteen hundred acres o f Indian Woods (approximately half o f the total 
land).127 The transaction earned departing Tuscaroras L I,200 to buy a supply train of 
wagons, horses, and provisions for the journey.128
Obscured behind these public transactions were private debates and 
deliberations that occurred within Indian Woods as some Tuscaroras decided to stay 
and others to leave. The deliberations’ outcomes would ultimately depend in part 
upon the strength of the ties between the Northern Tuscaroras and the Tuscaroras of 
Indian Woods. Europeans who faced similar questions about whether to migrate, 
perhaps even contemplating the same region of Pennsylvania and New York, relied 
upon nationally distributed pamphlets and broadsides besides personal letters and
126 NCCR, 6: 989, 1232-4, 1284, 1287, 1294; 7: 248, 300, 304-7, 339, 354, 358, 368- 
69, 371, 373, 420, 431; 25:507-9.
127 J. Bryan Grimes, Statement of the State’s Position on the Claims of the Tuscarora 
Indians to Reversionary Rights in Bertie County, Treasurer’s and Comptroller’s 
Papers, Indian Affairs, Box 17, North Carolina State Archives.
128 Technically, the land was leased for a rent of 150 years with an annual payment of 
one peppercorn on the Feast o f St. Michael. NCCR, 7: 248-49; 25: 507-9.
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conversations with their relations.129 The Tuscaroras had no such printed material; but 
while Tyagawehe negotiated with Tryon, his eight companions remained in Indian 
Woods sharing information about Iroquoia.130 Word on “transportation routes” and 
the destination could do much to “counteract the frictional effects o f distance,” easing 
the choice to leave.131 The links involved in such “chain migrations” could enable 
movement over huge areas to particular destinations that would otherwise be too 
difficult to reach and too unknown to be attractive.132 But such decisions necessitated, 
among other things, trust—trust in the words o f the eight envoys and reliance in their 
word that their kin would be able to grant them a better situation upon the migrants’ 
arrival in New York. Not everyone reached the same conclusion.
Local issues also played into the equation. Political discontent with chiefs, 
who, backed by North Carolina’s government, single-handedly attempted to sell off 
tribal lands may have influenced some dissidents to depart.133 Age and gender were 
also factors: a greater percentage o f young men, wrangling against diminished 
opportunities to hunt, plant, or trade in Indian Woods and better able to make the
129 White, "Migration," 190. Virginia De John Anderson, New England's Generation: 
the Great Migration and the Formation o f  Society and culture in the Seventeenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 37; Marianne Wokek, 
“Harnessing the Lure o f the 'Best Poor Man's Country',” in "To Make America":
European Emigration in the Early Modern Period, eds. Ida Altman and James Horn 
(Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1991), 204-43.
130 NCCR, 7: 218-20.
131 Anthony, "Migration," 902.
132 Anthony, "Migration," 903.
133 Boyce, "As the Wind," 163.
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arduous journey, chose to depart.134 Ultimately, 166 decided to head north, leaving 
behind 104 of their townspeople.135
Such choices, though, could not have been easy, especially since the 
ramifications of each person’s decision reverberated among their townspeople, 
affecting the dynamics o f the households and the community o f those who remained 
behind.136 The sale o f much of their land and the departure o f many of their most 
vigorous members left those who stayed, predominantly the very old and very young, 
struggling to fend off encroachments, particularly in light o f the government’s belief 
that what land they still held constituted “a large proportion for their numbers.”137 
“We are mostly old men, unable to hunt, our young men having gone to the 
Northward with the Northern Chief, Tragaweha” complained a delegation from those 
who remained.138 The migration left those who remained dependent on the charity of 
North Carolina’s government, even while it contributed to a local version o f the 
widespread “myth of the disappearing Indian”—that the Tuscaroras o f Indian Woods 
would inevitably die off or depart.139 If in succeeding years the remaining Tuscaroras 
o f Indian Woods lacked land and therefore “neglected Hunting [and] Planting,” or
134 NCCR, 7:361.
135 For the number remaining see NCCR, 7: 431.
136 Thompson, Mobility and Migration, 9.
137 NCCR, 7: 431; Paschal, “Tuscarora Indians,” 139.
138 NCCR, 7: 361.
139NCCR, 24: 171-73.
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turned to alcohol for solace, it was partially the emigrants’ fault.140 Though difficult 
for most, for some who remained the migration opened new doors. Whitmell 
Tuffdick’s name appeared among lists o f “chief men” for the first time immediately 
afterwards.141 In the next decades, his name came to appear at the head o f most deeds 
and petitions, often alongside others bearing the same surname.142
The 166 Tuscaroras who chose to depart also faced a difficult road, despite 
considerable preparation. From a hazy distance, the long train o f carts and livestock 
winding north along the valleys of Virginia and Pennsylvania may have resembled 
those of the predominantly German and Scotch-Irish settlers who also sought new 
homes on the edge of this “best poor man’s country.” They may even have employed 
the vaguely boat-shaped, covered “Conestoga Wagons,” predecessor to the “prairie 
schooners” of the Great Plains and already driven by German settlers in the 
Susquehanna Valley. But similar appearances did little to endear incoming Tuscaroras
140 Quotation from Johnson, Papers, 12: 273. NCCR, 24: 171-73.
141 NCCR, 7: 361.
142 Thirty-six men signed their name to the act confirming the lease o f lands in Indian 
Woods. A comparison to the petition for aid after the migrant’s departure (which 
contains 11 names) gives a rough picture o f individuals who stayed and departed. 
Interestingly, using this method, no individuals with the surname TufFdick departed, 
perhaps suggesting a familial component to attitudes towards departure (NCCR 7:
361; 25: 507-9). The only name I have been able to tentatively trace to New York is 
that o f Thomas Howit—“Hewitt” becomes a predominate name on the Tuscarora 
reservation in New York in the nineteenth century. For examples o f later appearances 
of Whitmell Tuffdick’s name see leases by the Tuscaroras dated 9/7/1777, 2/11/1782, 
and 7/20/1787 in Miscellaneous Papers, 1697-1823, North Carolina State Archives, 
Raleigh, North Carolina, pp. 47, 51, 54. The name indicates the close relationship 
with Thomas Whitemeal, a wealthy “trader among them, [who] understands their 
language and speaks it quite fluently” (NCCR, 4:1313).
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and the prospect o f Indian settlement to European frontiersmen in the wake of a 
decade of border warfare. When Tyagawehe and his companions had first come south, 
they were “ill used” in York County, Pennsylvania: only Johnson’s hired escort 
narrowly prevented “several attempts made to murder them.”143 An equally menacing 
reception met the caravan headed north. Outside Paxton, earlier site o f the infamous 
Paxton massacres by vigilantes angry at a Pennsylvania’s conciliatory Indian policy, 
settlers attacked the group and robbed them of supplies and their horses. The 
Tuscaroras brandished “ample passes from the Governments” but few guns.144
Though not all were friendly, inhabitants along the route, both European and 
Indian, were vital to the expedition’s survival. Pre-existing networks ensured that the 
migrants would not be thrown upon their own resources with only each other to 
survive. The Tuscarora migrants departed in mid-August, probably waiting only long 
enough to harvest their corn. This timing meant that they would embark well-stocked, 
be able to re-supply from the larders o f other communities along the way, and reach 
their new homes in time for spring planting. But the timing also meant taking a 
gamble against the harsh Pennsylvania winter on the trail. Despite precautions, records 
consistently refer to the migrants as hungry and wretched. Apparently the migrants 
split into two groups (with smaller parties keeping communications between): hunger 
and fierce winter weather forced one band to shelter with Moravian missionaries and 
their Indian charges at Friedenshutten (present day Bradford County), another
143 Johnson, Papers, 12: 231-32.
144 NYCD, 7: 966; Johnson, Papers, 12: 231-32, 240-43.
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wintered further south, begging for ammunition, tools, and forty bushels o f Indian corn 
from royal officials at Fort Augusta.145
These European establishments overlaid pre-existing networks o f Indian 
communities that were long essential to travelers as way stations.146 Now these native 
communities did their best to shuttle the Tuscarora migrants up the Susquehanna.
John Jacob Schmick, a Moravian diarist, recorded:
On the 18th [November, 1766] two chiefs, Newollike and Achkolunty, 
came down with others from Schechschequanik in 5 canoes. They 
brought a message from the Six Nations for our Indian Brethren to this 
effect: the Six Nations have received news by a Tuscarora messenger 
that a number o f their people are on their way, but they do not know 
how they are to make out and provide for themselves. The Six 
Nations, therefore, request the Indians everywhere along the 
Susquehanna to receive these poor Indians, and send canoes from place 
to place for them, and provide them with corn so that they may get
145Earlier, in 1757 a group of Tuscaroras of indeterminate size, perhaps living in the 
Tuscarora Valley region of Pennsylvania also received “provisions enough and five 
gallons o f rum” from Colonel James Burd, stationed at Fort Augusta at Shamokin, 
when they informed him that “they intended setting up the river.” (Guss, “Early View, 
43). Johnson, Papers, 12: 240-43; 5: 538; J. N. B. Hewitt, “Tuscarora,” in Handbook 
o f American Indians North o f  Mexico, ed. Frederick W. Hodge, Bulletin, U.S. Bureau 
of American Ethnology, 30, Part 2 (Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institution, 1910), 
847; Frank H. Severance, “Our Tuscarora Neighbors,” 326; Johnson, Papers, 5: 538. 
Much o f this information can be found in Fliegel, Moravian Missions Index, 3: 1052.
146 Fort Augusta, for example, was built in the winter of 1755-56 upon the site of 
Shamokin. Merrell, "Shamokin."
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along all right. Our Indians, accordingly, as soon as they hear o f their 
arrival at Lechawachneck [present-day Pittston] will send 10 canoes for 
them . . .  141
The final leg o f the Tuscaroras’ journey may have resembled a convoy of 
Nanticoke migrants who had settled downstream from Oquaga fourteen years earlier. 
“As far as the eye could reach you could see one canoe behind the other along the 
Susquehanna,” recorded David Zeisberger and Henry Frey, two Moravians whose 
canoe brought up the rear of the twenty-six boat fleet. Along the way some of the 
Nanticokes drove cattle along the shores, others shot pigeons, others cut sheets of 
bark to build shelters for the evening. Upon arrival, the Nanticokes quickly 
overcrowded the few existing homes. So they built huts and to the astonishment of 
the missionaries, “in an hour’s time a whole city had arisen”— though these would 
have been a far cry from the assortment o f sturdy longhouses and cabins that marked 
more permanent settlements. Soon, a delegation of Tuscarora and Oneidas arrived 
from Oquaga and a council was convened to greet the Nanticokes. They “walked 
around in a circle, shook hands with every one, and solemnly welcomed them saying: 
Brothers we are glad to see you here.” The Tuscaroras in the delegation presented the 
Nanticokes two strings of wampum, one to welcome them, another to tell them what 
“land lay open to them.” Then they presented several sacks o f seed corn to the
147 Quotation in Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania, 111-12.
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newcomers— a gift o f real value to an uprooted people, and one symbolic o f 
permanence. Within two days, the entire community was busy planting corn.148
Perhaps under similar circumstances the Tuscarora travelers finally reached 
Oquaga in early spring of 1767, after nearly an eight-month journey. Tyagawehe, who 
had organized the expedition, probably hoped to steer them even further to reinforce 
his rough new settlement at Ganeghwaghtai. But sheer exhaustion, the lure of 
plentiful “very good . . . open country on the river,” and well-established Tuscarora 
communities already at Oquaga conspired to keep them from moving on.149 Home as 
last, their journey was complete.
Newcomers
Newcomers in 1767 had to experience and learn many of the same 
lessons as their predecessors generations earlier. This time, however, they 
could draw on the advice and assistance o f Tuscaroras who had already made 
the trek. Tuscaroras already long settled throughout the region continued to 
provide assistance with supplies to the newcomers for at least a year and a 
half.150 In the autumn of 1768, Tuscaroras seeking extra provisions for their
148 “Diary of David Zeisberger and Henry Frey” in Beauchamp, Moravian Journals,
160-66.
149 Letter to Revd. [Ivery? or Jefry?] from Onohquaga, June 13, 1753, Hawley Papers; 
Johnson, Papers, 12: 623-24. In 1769 some Tuscaroras considered returning back 
down the Susquehanna River to settle near Friedenshutten (Fliegel, Moravian 
Missions Index, 3: 1052).
150 Johnson, Papers, 12: 670-71.
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cousins even made off with a majority o f the gifts distributed at the Treaty o f 
Fort Stanwix—a maneuver that raised the ire o f other Iroquois nations.151
After the hardships of the journey, most o f the recently arrived Tuscaroras 
embraced their new surroundings. In lavishing praise on this long-awaited promised 
land, however, they sometimes disparaged their former homeland and those who 
stayed behind. Here, among the Iroquois, they would “live much happier than we did 
there [in Indian Woods],” declared one Tuscarora representative.152 Another newly 
arrived Tuscarora cast aspersions upon his former fellows where “they live but 
wretchedly being Surrounded by white People, and up to their Lips in Rum, so that 
they cou’d not turn their heads anyway but it ran into their mouths. This made them 
stupid, so that they neglected Hunting, Planting, etc.—We are since our arrival. . . last 
Fall, become wiser and see our former folly.” 153
The speaker’s overt blame is upon surrounding whites, but the subtle shift in 
the language from “they” to “we” hints at deeper splits: “we” who chose to flee are 
“wiser” for it, “they” who remain still wallow in rum and their own “stupid” “folly.”
151 Johnson, Papers, 12: 670-71.
152 Johnson, Papers, 12: 360-61.
153 Johnson, Papers, 12: 273. This interpretation is made more complex by the fact 
that the speaker for the newly arrived Tuscaroras may have actually been a Northern 
Tuscarora, Aucus (alias Kanigut) one of Tyagawehe’s eight companions. It appears 
that Aucus is a follower o f Isaac— privately he tells o f Johnson about tension with 
some of his brethren as he tries to personally give up alcohol and remain loyal to 
Johnson. This speech, then, might be a mini-triumph for Isaac, in that it follows 
Isaac’s complaints about immorality of the newcomers and elicits an injunction from 
Johnson to follow the leaders in Oquaga who show “readiness to instruct you in the 
principles o f morality.”
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The Tuscarora Trail acted as a safety valve, offering those most discontented with 
lifestyle on the reservation a chance to escape by migrating north.154 But by 
concentrating malcontents in the north, this flow probably acted to increase splits 
between the regions. Some Tuscaroras thought that to save their culture, they had to 
move it.
Iroquois and Tuscaroras already established in the region, however, did not 
always welcome their new neighbors back. Migrant groups flooding into Iroquoia in 
the eighteenth century discovered that the process by which they became fully 
accepted was not rapid. For example, the Nanticokes who were linguistically unrelated 
to the Iroquois and preserved the habit of carrying the disinterred rotting corpses of 
their ancestors on their migrations, acquired a reputation for poison and witchcraft. 
Among Indians, as well as colonists, such accusations often signified an up-welling of 
barely restrained distrust and ostracism— a demonization of outsiders.155 The 
Tuscaroras, who shared ancient, distantly remembered historical connections with the 
Iroquois, did better than many groups, but they too encountered prejudice. A 
Moravian noted in 1750 that “it is plain to be seen that although the Tuscaroras are
154 Boyce, “As the Wind,” 163.
155 Cusick notes that “it is supposed that the Skaunratohatihawk, or Nanticokes in the 
south first founded the witchcraft” (in Beauchamp, Iroquois Trail, 29; see p. 78 for 
corpse transport). This may also show the ways that newcomers had strange things to 
teach o f their own: new magic, or different medicinal plants. Alfred A. Cave, “The 
Failure o f the Shawnee Prophet's Witch-Hunt,” Ethnohistory 42, no. 3 (Summer,
1995): 445-75, esp. 450. Wallace, Death and Rebirth. For comments on the adoption 
of the Nanticokes, see Diary of David Zeisberger in Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 
30.
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counted as belonging to the Five Nations, yet they are not as highly esteemed as the 
other nations and bear a bad character among them.”156 The incorporation o f greater 
numbers o f newcomers might garner added esteem for the Tuscaroras’ strength, but 
culturally clumsy outsiders could do little for the perception o f their character. This 
process may have contributed to the lingering sense, generations after the initial 
adoption of the Tuscaroras in 1713, that all the Tuscaroras were newcomers. As late 
as 1771— six decades after the Tuscaroras’ initial migration— the Indian 
superintendent, William Johnson, who was as attuned to Iroquois culture as any 
European, wrote in a letter describing the different Iroquois cultures: “The Tuscaroras,
I omit as they are a southern people not long introduced . . . ,”157
Tuscarora newcomers would have noticed differences between themselves and 
their predecessors owing to the latter’s longer history of interaction with the Iroquois.
The influx of Tuscaroras from the south helped preserve the Tuscarora language in 
Iroquoia, but over time northerners incorporated Iroquois terms and pronunciations.
By 1802, southerners found that their brethren “spoke a dialect considerably 
different] from theirs.”158 Divergences extended into the broader realm of symbolic 
discourse. In their dealings with whites and each other, Tuscaroras—like the other five 
nations— employed a litany of condolence rituals, symbolic adoptions, and exchanged 
treaty belts. Generations o f Tuscaroras growing up among the Iroquois internalized
156 “Diary of David Zeisberger” in Beauchamp, Moravian Journals,30.
157Doc. Hist. N .Y.,4: 430-7.
158 Quotation in Boyce, “Tuscarora Political Organization,” 149.
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these complex political rituals and its metaphorical language from an early age.139 But 
for Tuscaroras newly arrived from the south, this etiquette would have to be learned. 
When Tyagawehe had negotiated the Tuscaroras’ departure with Governor Tryon in 
North Carolina, he presented several belts of wampum and bestowed upon Tryon an 
Indian name— procedures absent from the governor’s dealings with Tuscaroras in his 
own colony, but typical in the north.160
The Tuscaroras who came north in 1766 had escaped the confines o f their 
reservation and gained greater control over their lives. Nonetheless, as strangers in a 
new land, they found themselves vulnerable to manipulation and entanglement in new 
types o f dependencies.161 In 1767 “a number o f Tuscaroras who lately came from 
Carolina” approached William Johnson, pleading “we are very poor having brought 
nothing from whence we came” and begged for hatchets, hoes, powder, and lead.
They assured Johnson of their “sincerity and attachment,” and called him “father.”162 
Their patriarchal choice o f kinship terms, a deviation from the normal practice o f using 
the more equal “brother,” might have signaled a newcomer’s unfamiliarity with the
159 Johnson, Papers, 10: 221, 801. NYCD, 7: 55.
160 Johnson, Papers, 13: 390-91. Unfamiliarity with the intricacies o f these rituals may 
partially explain why Tuscaroras who were frequently present at treaty conferences 
often only acted as silent participants.
161 Anthony, "Migration," 904.
162 Johnson, Papers, 12: 360.
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precise etiquette o f the covenant chain, or a weaker position owing to their recent 
arrival and impoverished state.163
Despite initial annoyance at the costs and effort o f assisting “a few people of 
little importance,” Johnson soon recognized that he held in his hands a tool to extend 
his authority and to reshape imperial frontiers.164 Charity had its price. “I rejoice with 
you at the increase o f your Confederacy by the considerable Number o f Tuscaroras 
who joined you lately,” declared Johnson at a conference in 1767. He elaborated his 
role in issuing “passports and some assistance on their arrival, such as provision, arms, 
and some implements o f husbandry.” In return for having “done so much for the 
strengthening of your confederacy,” he expected adherence to his plan “recommending 
to You the Assembling All your scattered friends together:” namely, bringing in the 
remnants o f other tribes according to the model just established by the Tuscaroras. 
Towards this end he gave letters and passports to the Nanticokes, Conoys, and 
Delawares to approach their respective colonial governments and to sell their
163 Francis Jennings et al., The History and Culture o f  Iroquois Diplomacy: an 
Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties o f  the Six Nations and their League (Syracuse, 
New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 119-20. Over the next several years 
Johnson would record giving cash and food for the “Tuscaroras lately arrived from 
Carolina . . .  in a starving condition.” (Johnson, Papers, 12: 670-71, 734-35.) Several 
scholars have suggested that the Tuscaroras suffered a loss o f status, and even 
permanent psychological trauma from their removal. David Landy, “Tuscarora 
Tribalism and National Identity,” Ethnohistory 5, no. 3 (summer, 1958): 250-284; 
Anthony F. C. Wallace, The M odal Personality o f  the Tuscarora Indians as Revealed 
by the Rorschach Test, Bulletin, U.S. Bureau o f  American Ethnology, 150 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1951); Hauptman, “Refugee Havens,” 
128-39. Rather than making such broad, century-spanning generalizations, I seek to 
show how loss of status manifested itself in particular eighteenth-century interactions.
164 Johnson, Papers, 5: 77.
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remaining eastern lands to fund their removal to the Six Nations, “as the Tuscaroras 
did who left North Carolina.”165
Concentrating the Indian nations together would breath life into Johnson’s 
long-running efforts— spelled out in the Proclamation of 1763 and at Fort Stanwix— 
to create a general boundary between Indian and colonists. East of the line, voluntary 
removal would eliminate potential trouble-spots o f remnant Indians peacefully and 
cheaply. Barring robberies such as occurred at Paxton, the Indians would even 
conveniently pay their own way. Then, resettling dependent groups just west o f the 
line within the Six Nations would help curb unregulated expansion by white settlers 
eager to flood into lightly inhabited areas and ease friction with more hostile westward 
peoples.166 Nanticokes, Montauks, and Canoys heeded his advice. Eventually, 
however, the strategy backfired by increasing tensions on the frontier. During the 
American Revolution, New York’s frontiers would explode in racial violence.
Johnson was not alone in welcoming Tuscarora newcomers as potential pawns 
in broader power plays. The Tuscaroras coming north in 1766 found themselves 
among kin who took a different stances towards Christianity and were not averse to 
manipulating the new arrivals toward their own religious ends. Moravians had 
recorded that the Tuscaroras who passed their missions in the winter o f 1766 
absolutely “refuse to hear religion.”167 The initial group of migrants to flee after the
165 Johnson, Papers, 5: 544-45; 12: 240-43, 312-13.
166 The treaty line “came up to the Tuscarora village” upstream of Oquaga (NYCD, 8: 
549-55).
167 Severance, “Our Tuscarora Neighbors,” 326.
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TuscaroraW ar had been similarly reticent. In 1716, when one missionary in New 
York “offer[ed] to talk to them about Religion,” they mocked him; “when he proffered 
to go to their Abode, they absolutely forbad him ” 168 But by mid-century, the 
persistence o f a steady stream of missionaries paid off, earning several Tuscarora 
communities in New York—including Oquaga— a reputation for evangelical fervor.
The resulting differences in faith could add a sour note to reunions.
Moreover, confusing the situation, Oquaga itself was bitterly divided into 
religious factions.169 The arrival of Tuscarora immigrants in 1767 in part resulted from 
and exacerbated these disputes. On one side of the contest was a series o f New Light 
Congregational and Presbyterian missionaries who targeted their evangelical efforts 
upon Oquaga for three decades in the mid-eighteenth century.170 Their chief opponent 
was an Oneida known occasionally as “old Isaac” or “Isaac o f Oquago.” To his 
enemies, who found him “vain and conceited” and “very much puffed up with pride, ”
168 David Humphreys, An Historical Account o f  the Incorporated Society fo r  the 
Propagation o f  the Gospel in Foreign Parts (London: Joseph Downing, 1730), 304-5.
169 Calloway, "Oquaga," 108-128. Boyce, “Tuscarora Political Organization” (p. 72) 
notes that “Christianity had unified some Tucarora and Oneida, but it had also created 
new bases for fragmentation.”
170 These included: Gideon Hawley, who made inroads before fleeing mid-winter 
snowstorm in the turbulence of the Seven Years’ War, Eli Forbes who scratched a 
journal in tiny letters in margins of an almanac one summer and dreamed of 
establishing a bigger school (Johnson, Papers, 10: 515-18), Aaron Crosby who wrote 
confidentially of success to his superiors and at night wept privately at his failures, and 
most famously, Samual Kirkland, former protegee of Wheelock credited with steering 
the bulk o f the Tuscaroras and Oneidas to the American cause during the American 
Revolution, and later attempting to found an academy of native scholars.
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he was Isaac “the Pharisee.” He preferred “Isaac, the minister.” 171 His beliefs 
included a mixture o f native practices— in addition to dancing and shooting guns at 
healing ceremonies, some of his followers were accused of being “carried by the spirit 
out o f themselves into Beasts.” These combined with a stern Christianity that held 
childhood baptism and strict adherence to the Ten Commandments as sufficient to earn 
salvation from a redeeming Christ.172
In towns like Oquaga, comprised of disparate peoples and cultures, traditional 
hierarchies o f sachems, League politicians, and councilors often took a secondary role 
to the leadership o f influential religious figures who could approve or condemn every 
facet o f life. During the Seven Years’ War, when missionaries fled Oquaga, Isaac had 
taken over preaching to the congregation there and first tasted power.173 For the next 
twenty years, after the missionaries’ return, it was a status he sought to regain.
Religious fervor may even have influenced the formation o f Tyagawehe’s plan 
to retrieve Tuscarora migrants from North Carolina in 1766. When Tyagawehe had 
established the town of Ganeghwaghtai in 1763, Isaac had briefly joined him there,
171 Isaac is most well-known as the father-in-law of Joseph Brant. His role in 
converting Brant, who had been schooled by Wheelock, to Anglican leanings, deserves 
further study. This is briefly hinted in Isabel Thompson Kelsay, Joseph Brant, 1743- 
1807, Man o f  Two Worlds, (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1984), but I 
feel that Kelsay greatly misportrays Isaac’s character.
172 Samuel Kirkland, Letters, Archives o f Hamilton College, New York, 39e, 47c 
(hereafter, Kirkland, Letters). Johnson, Papers, 11: 42. Kirkland felt that Isaac 
reflected the Catholic influence of French Jesuits, but Isaac claimed to favor the 
English in the Seven Year’s War out of religious loyalty.
173 See in particular, Hawley, Journal December 10, 1756, Hawley Papers.
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proclaiming, “as there is a division amongst themselves” in Oquaga, “it would be 
proper for them that follow” his brand of Christianity “to live by themselves” in the 
new town.174 Tyagawehe’s father, a fellow sachem o f the town, promised to guide 
“our people religiously.”175 Perhaps the two men also corroborated in the plan to 
escort the Tuscaroras, with Isaac hoping to snatch them up as new followers.
Subsequent events bear out this theory. By the time the Tuscarora immigrants 
reached Oquaga in 1767, Isaac had returned and immediately sought to establish 
religious authority over the newcomers.176 He rushed to Johnson before the 
Tuscaroras could make their own formal appearance and bewailed that with the arrival 
o f “our Brethren of Tuscarora from Carolina,” he had at first “rejoiced in the hopes I 
had of encreasing the number o f hearers o f the word of god, but how great was my 
Concern on finding them averse to it, well knowing they can never be true, and firm 
friends to us, or the English whilst they remain in the present state.” Johnson, an 
Anglican who often favored Isaac as a counter to Presbyterian influence, enjoined the 
Tuscaroras, and all of Oquaga, to follow Isaac’s message.177
174 Doc. Hist. N.Y., 4: 312. Tyagawehe’s father, a fellow sachem o f the town, had 
promised to guide “our people religiously.” (Johnson, Papers, 11: 80-85.)
175 Johnson, Papers, 11: 80-85.
176 Perhaps Isaac’s presence helps explain why the Tuscaroras did not proceed to 
Ganeghwaghtai.
177 Johnson, Papers, 12: 270-76. Johnson, who engaged in land speculation, also 
suspected that the missionaries were secretly competing for ownership o f lands along 
the Susquehanna River {Doc. Hist. N.Y., 397-98).
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Despite this preemptive strike, Isaac did not win an immediate victory over the 
hearts and minds o f the Tuscaroras. Instead, for the next decade, Isaac and various 
Presbyterian missionaries engaged in a protracted war, one aspect o f which was 
continued jostling for the support o f the Tuscarora newcomers. In one instance, the 
missionary Aaron Crosby accused Isaac o f “using all his cunning to separate” the 
Tuscaroras “and persuade them” to journey to Schoharie where they could receive an 
Anglican baptism. To counter, Crosby put aside his usual practice o f enforcing upon 
converts a lengthy probation and determined that “it appeared expedient to baptize 
them, for the promotion of religion, and also to keep them together” with the rest o f 
his congregation.178
Another battle centered around reading, writing, and language. Isaac drew 
much of his authority and prestige from his ability to read and preach from a Mohawk- 
language version o f the Book of Common Prayer.179 The Tuscaroras applied to 
William Johnson to have one printed in their own language and to send pens and paper 
so they could learn to read it. Johnson recognized the end run buried within this 
apparently innocuous request. He replied that the current books were “sufficient. . . 
for your purpose at present” and pressed them to be more obedient.180
Just before the revolutionary war, these disputes reached a climax when “the 
old man Isaac” sought to expel Crosby from Oquaga. In defense, the beleaguered
178 Kirkland, Letters, 47c.
179 NYCD, 8: 549-555; Kirkland, Letters, 53b.
180 Johnson, Papers, 12: 1110.
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missionary protested to Guy Johnson (William Johnson’s nephew, son-in-law, and 
administrative successor) that most of the settlement “had entered into fixed 
resolutions in his favour, and particularly mentioned the Tuscaroras.” Johnson shot 
back that he “presumed the Tuscaroras, who were a people lately received from 
principles o f humanity by the rest, would not dictate to them in matters of 
Religion”18 '-another example of the hold that Johnson and Isaac attempted to exert 
upon the Tuscarora newcomers.
The Tuscaroras who came north in 1766 achieved better material 
circumstances and more autonomy than did their brethren who remained in North 
Carolina. But owing to the disputes in which they found themselves enmeshed, they 
never enjoyed complete harmony in Oquaga. Nor did they call the area home for long. 
Less than ten years after their arrival, in 1775, a majority o f the Oneidas, frustrated by 
religious controversy, concluded that “we have no hope of making peace among our 
selves while we live together” and departed to Oneida Lake at Aaron Crosby’s and 
Samuel Kirkland’s urging. Most of the Tuscaroras, apparently including the 
newcomers, followed their lead.182 Those few who remained were driven out during 
the American Revolution by the rampaging armies of the Sullivan-Clinton campaign.
But if the Tuscaroras who came north to the upper Susquehanna in 1766 
remained only briefly and their numbers were small, their significance to the region 
was still considerable. The experience faced by the Tuscaroras show that the
181 NYCD, 8: 549-555.
182 Kirkland, Letters, 54a.
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immigrants were not merely incidental to life along the upper Susquehanna, but were 
one o f its central features. They had to be taken into account whether one sought to 
shape broad imperial policy or local religious squabbles. Not merely broad “forces” but 
the actions o f particular individuals, most notably Tyagawehe but also William 
Johnson and Isaac, shaped the departure and arrival o f the Tuscaroras from Indian 
Woods. Similar decisions were being faced by other groups debating whether to come 
to the region. By acting as a blueprint for others to come, they helped set the stage for 
further immigrations that gave a distinct cast to the region. By acting as a catalyst in 
disputes, they added to the polarizing divisions there. The appearance of newcomers 
was one of the region’s shaping forces; the repercussions were felt by all o f its 
inhabitants.
*  *  *  *
For much of the eighteenth century, travels north and south helped ensure the 
survival o f a coherent Tuscarora identity, even while provoking an undercurrent o f 
tension and unease when members of the two groups reunited. By the end o f the 
century, however, war parties along the Warrior’s Path became increasingly rare, and 
gradually ended altogether.183 Colonial governments had long opposed the raids for 
the disruptions they caused among settlers and sought to end them, or barring that, 
reroute them farther west, away from settlements. Even before the last raids, Indian
183 Merrell claims the southern raids ended because “For the Iroquois there were too 
many settlers in the way, too few Catabas left—less than five hundred—to make the 
journey worthwhile, and, after 1775, too many problems closer to home to worry 
about” (Merrell, “Their Very Bones,” 132).
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Woods, impoverished, surrounded by European settlers, and able to offer few recruits, 
fell from the Warrior’s Path.184 The last great migration along the Tuscarora Trail 
occurred in 1804 when almost the entire population o f Indian W oods journeyed north. 
The resulting increase in population and the money from selling the remainder o f the 
land in Indian Woods were vital to the survival o f the Tuscaroras in New York, who 
faced invasive Indian policies from the young state and national governments. Those 
few who remained in North Carolina, cut off from their people in the north, and their 
reservation sold, disappeared from the consciousness o f a southern society that 
recognized only two races, black and white.185 Only recently, have people claiming to 
be their descendents still living in North Carolina, attempted to regain recognition as 
the southern band o f Tuscaroras.
184 It is impossible to determine when the last party stopped at Indian Woods, but a 
small number may have passed by as late as the late 1760s or early 1770s.
185 Rountree, “Indians of Virginia”; For reference to contemporary suspicions that 
Tuscaroras were colluding with slaves, see Crow, "Slave Rebelliousness," 98.
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CONCLUSION
The trails traveled by the Tuscaroras were long and varied. In some ways the 
Tuscaroras were unusual; in others they typified the experience of Indians during the 
period roughly between 1700 and the outbreak o f the American Revolution, when they 
were forced to navigate a new political and demographic landscape. The days were 
passing when locally powerful Indian groups confronted individual colonial 
governments that were as lonely and remote from one another as from the halls of 
power in London. No longer isolated outposts uneasily clinging to the eastern littoral. 
European colonies grew increasingly interconnected into a nearly unbroken line of 
settlement. Previous efforts to link the colonies, such as Edmund Andros’s attempt to 
create the Dominion of New England, had stumbled, but the handwriting was on the 
wall. For Indians, such changes meant profound shifts in the way they interacted with 
settlers and their governments.
Tuscaroras had inhabited one of the last regions along the eastern seaboard to 
experience these changes. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, their homes, in 
what would become North Carolina, occupied a final shrinking gap between areas of 
consolidated colonial control. In 1709 John Lawson described a world where 
numerous Indian communities existed uneasily alongside growing numbers o f settlers 
and traders. Tuscaroras and their native neighbors welcomed the new technologies
546
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and trade goods offered by Lawson’s ilk. If  the arrival o f such newcomers brought 
uncomfortable new dependencies, Tuscaroras could take some comfort in the fact that 
at least briefly, nearly all the colonists—like Lawson, himself—relied on Tuscarora 
guidance and goodwill. The governments o f North Carolina or Virginia could grumble 
at their relative lack of authority and scheme to make changes, but in the end they 
could accomplish little.
Only a few years later Lawson was dead and the world he described was 
gone—-indeed, by killing the surveyor and author, the Tuscaroras had signaled the start 
o f the war that permanently altered their place in colonial America. In some ways, the 
Tuscarora War (and to a certain extent, the closely-related Yamassee War) was the 
last o f the localized conflicts that characterized the previous century, especially the 
Powhatan uprisings o f 1622 and 1644. Like those conflicts, the Tuscarora War 
represented an attempt by members of locally powerful Indians to reassert influence in 
the face of growing numbers o f newcomers.
But if the causes felt familiar, the way that the war was fought and its 
aftermath had a distinctively different feel, one more characteristic of the broader 
Indian wars of the eighteenth century. Begun locally, the war quickly took on a trans- 
regional cast. Owing to their location between South Carolina and Virginia, and 
because of their ties farther north to the Iroquois, Tuscaroras found themselves facing 
not just whatever makeshift militias could be mustered among settlers along the 
Albemarle and Pamlico sounds, but also confronting leaders o f several colonies armed 
with different blueprints for cultural and political control o f the frontiers. The war
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profoundly altered the contours o f the region for Indians and colonists alike. Even 
those Tuscaroras who had tried to remain neutral or cooperated with colonists felt the 
effects of the war. Therefore, although the military outcome of the Tuscarora War 
was decided by the destruction o f Neoheroka in 1713, establishing a clear cultural and 
political conclusion would take much longer and be far less certain.
The 1710s and early 1720s found the Tuscaroras standing at a crossroads 
between several colonial worlds, struggling to decide which path to take. All were 
dangerous. Some led to submission as colonial tributaries, others to a precarious 
existence on the edge of the deerskin- and slave-trade economy. Still others led to 
long-distance relocation and possible assimilation among other Indian groups. To a 
greater or lesser extent, most Indians of eastern North America in the eighteenth 
century found themselves confronted by similar decisions as old worlds crumbled and 
new colonial spheres o f influence and control rose in their place. Like other Indians 
who found themselves disrupted and defeated, Tuscaroras confronted tough choices, 
but choices did remain.
Some Tuscaroras set out in pursuit o f captured kin in South Carolina, 
temporarily establishing a community on the periphery of that society’s slave- and 
deerskin-trading economy. Others briefly wandered the hill country of the North 
Carolina and Virginia borderlands, hungry refugees on the edge of a territoiy they had 
once dominated. Virginia’s government, led by Alexander Spotswood, struggled to 
insert these Tuscaroras into a network of tributary Indians that patrolled and protected 
the colony, but he failed. The complex cultural and political identities o f these Indian
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groups defied manipulation. Moreover, even in defeat the Tuscaroras maintained a 
degree o f autonomy that would continue to frustrate officials for much o f the rest of 
the century.
Many Tuscaroras gravitated to Indian Woods, a community in North Carolina 
under the leadership of “King” Tom Blount, one of a new breed o f leaders whose path 
to power became increasingly common among Indians on the periphery o f the British 
colonies. During the war years, Blount had attempted to carve out new authority for 
himself by becoming first spokesperson and then the sole leader o f the Tuscaroras in 
the eyes o f colonial officials. By positioning himself as a fulcrum between competing 
interests, Blount wielded influence locally among Indians and Europeans alike. Never 
colonists’ pawn, Blount played a dangerous game, balancing against one another the 
threat o f renewed Indian hostilities on one hand, and deadly colonial retribution on the 
other. In the 1720s, Blount’s maneuvers took on a new dimension, as he again 
positioned himself, this time to play off Europeans against troops of Tuscaroras and 
Iroquois Indians who began to arrive from the north. Even a master like Blount, 
however, could not sustain this act indefinitely. Over time, Blount, and— after his 
death— his successors at Indian Woods struggled against decline into irrelevance. 
Carefully selling or renting off parcels o f land to colonists, employing themselves as 
slave-catchers and guides, and volunteering for colonial wars could slow the slide, but 
not stop it.
Greater numbers of Tuscaroras, afraid of colonial retribution and wary of 
Blount’s authority, abandoned old homes altogether and made their way north to areas
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near Oneida Lake and along the Susquehanna River. There they found shelter among 
the Iroquois Confederacy and eventually were adopted as that league’s sixth nation. 
Increasingly, over the eighteenth century, they found themselves living side-by-side 
with other groups o f Indians who made similar choices to relocate in the shadow of 
the Iroquois. Indeed, the Tuscaroras’ successes partially served as a model for groups 
such as the Tutelos, Conoys, and Nanticokes who followed the trail to Iroquoia.1 
Moreover, across eastern North America, in places such as the Ohio Valley, the 
Susquehanna Valley, around the Great Lakes, and in the interior Southeast, Indians 
devastated by disease, war, and encroachment similarly relocated and formed new 
attachments with one another to better confront colonial threats. In Indian country, 
alliances and mergers, often spanning great cultural and geographic distance, became 
the new norm.
To a large degree, these maneuvers were successful for the Tuscaroras. No 
other group of migrants attained such status and recognition among the Iroquois. As 
the “Sixth Nation,” Tuscaroras who moved north achieved a degree o f influence in 
treaties and trade that was quickly eroding among their kin to the south. Rather than 
slipping into obscurity, Tuscaroras achieved renewed prominence in colonial records, 
albeit as part of the Six Nations. Moreover, Tuscaroras achieved close community ties 
with neighboring Indians, especially the Oneidas with whom they often settled, hunted, 
fished, farmed, and prayed.
1 Jay Hansford C. Vest, "An Odyssey among the Iroquois: A History o f Tutelo 
Relations in New York," American Indian Quarterly 29, no. 1 and 2 (Winter and 
Spring 2005): 124-55.
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Nonetheless, such realignments came at a cost. By the mid-eighteenth century, 
Tuscaroras in the north rarely appeared in colonial records acting as an independent 
entity. Some colonial observers thought they detected a hint o f derision towards these 
newcomers in Iroquois society. Moreover, even though Tuscaroras maintained a 
distinct cultural identity among the Iroquois, as they picked up new speech patterns, 
manners of dress, styles of housing, and political habits, they seemed ever more 
foreign to kin who had remained in Indian Woods. Across eastern North America, 
Indians struggled to adopt and adapt to new political and cultural environments. For 
better or worse, old cultural habits died hard, leaving persistent fault lines in new 
Indian coalitions. Indian country simultaneously became more heterogeneous, as 
bands o f refugees and migrants took up residence in each others’ communities, and 
more homogeneous, as cultural patterns and lifestyles diffused across old group 
boundaries.
Thus, even as Tuscarora migrants found their way in Iroquoia, they never 
forgot their homelands or their kin who remained there. Richard White once described 
Indian communities shattering like broken glass, but in reality the breaks were never so 
complete.2 Old ties still remained. The result was an Indian country laced with trails 
connecting divided Indian populations. Despite great distances, Tuscaroras never truly 
lost contact with one another. Tuscaroras journeying south from Iroquoia as part of 
multi-cultural war parties to strike at traditional enemies visited Indian Woods;
2 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great 
Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1-2.
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Tuscaroras from North Carolina traversed the same networks as they visited or 
immigrated to Iroquoia.
Throughout these changes, the Tuscaroras’ fate, like that other Indians, was 
inexorably tied to the actions o f colonial governments. Therefore, the story o f the 
Tuscaroras is also the story of officials like Thomas Pollock, Robert Hunter,
Alexander Spotswood, and William Johnson. At every step, officials attempted to 
assert authority. Governments in South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and New York attempted to create tributaries, regulate new alliances, 
limit movements, and control patterns o f settlement. Colonial governments viewed 
disruptions among the Indians as an opportunity to experiment with new forms of 
authority along colonial frontiers. But if the fate o f colonial governments and Indians 
like the Tuscaroras went hand in hand, it was often unclear who led the way. Colonial 
officials liked to imagine a day when they would wield control over orderly frontiers.
But that day never seemed to come. Instead, officials looked aghast as every failed 
plan to direct Indians’ lives gave way to further chaos, sparking wars, spurring refugee 
movements, and upsetting alliances. It often seemed that the harder colonial officials 
squeezed, the more control slipped from of their hands. Despite these failures, 
officials did make their presence felt. Tuscaroras traveling in the 1760s carrying 
passports, accompanied by escorts, and stopping at military posts, presented an image 
far different than their original unsupervised flight half a century earlier.
The Tuscaroras had traveled many trails by the 1770s, but their journeys were 
not yet at an end. Although it seemed that they might find respite among the Iroquois,
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their sojourn was short-lived. That decade saw the Tuscaroras again suffering 
disunion and dislocation. The effects o f the Revolutionary W ar fought between the 
colonies and Britain soon made their way to Indian country. Once again, Tuscaroras 
faced invading Anglo-American armies, this time as forces led by the American 
generals John Sullivan and James Clinton marched through the heart o f Tuscarora 
communities along the Susquehanna River and near Oneida Lake. Once again, 
Tuscaroras faced disunion as the Iroquois confederacy itself, torn by competing ties of 
political and religious loyalty, split to side either with the Americans or the British. 
Most Tuscaroras, following the lead of Oneida neighbors and feeling the influence of 
missionaries like Samuel Kirkland, sided with the Americans, but such divisions were 
by no means entirely clear-cut. Former allies found themselves on opposing sides, and 
occasionally attacking one another.3
3 For Iroquois and Tuscarora experiences during the American Revolution, the best 
source remains Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1972). See also Colin G. Calloway, "Oquaga: 
Dissension and Destruction on the Susquehanna," in The American Revolution in 
Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native Americans Communities (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 108-28; Frederick Cook, and George S. Conover, 
eds., Journals o f  the Military Expedition o f  Major General Sullivan against the Six 
Nations o f  Indians in 1779 (Auburn: Knapp, Peck, and Thomson, 1887); John C. 
Guzzardo, "The Superintendent and the Ministers: The Battle for Oneida Allegiances, 
1761-75," New York History 57, no. 3 (July 1976): 254-83; Marjory Barnum Hinman, 
Onaquaga: Hub o f  the Border Wars o f  the American Revolution in New York State 
(Onaquaga, N.Y.: Hinman, 1975); David Levinson, "An Explanation for the Oneida- 
Colonist Alliance in the American Revolution," Ethnohistory 23, no. 3 (Summer 
1976): 265- 89; Peter C. Mancall "The Revolutionary War and the Indians o f The 
Upper Susquehanna Valley," American Indian Culture and Resource Journal 12, no.
1 (1988): 39-58; Karim M. Tiro, "A 'Civil' War? Rethinking Iroquois Participation in 
the American Revolution," Explorations in Early American Culture 4 (2000): MS- 
65; Anthony Wonderley, "1777: The Revolutionary War Comes to Oneida Country," 
Mohawk Valley History 1, no. 1 (2004): 15-48.
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By the war’s end, most Tuscaroras were again uprooted, some gravitating to a 
new reservation near Niagara Falls, others establishing themselves in other Iroquois 
communities.4 New boundaries, now the border between Canada and the United 
States, added to divisions.5 In Indian Woods, Tuscaroras had likewise faced hardship, 
selling off further lands, cultivating relationships with influential neighbors, and 
carefully avoiding conflict. Still, old ties remained. In 1804, after a visit by 
Tuscaroras from New York, a majority o f those Tuscaroras who remained in North 
Carolina sold their remaining lands and traveled north to rejoin their distant relatives, 
once more following old trails o f kinship.6
4 For a brief description of Tuscaroras in the post-Revolutionary period, see David 
Landy, "Tuscarora Among the Iroquois," m H N A Ivo\. 15 Northeast, (Washington, 
D.C.: Smithsonian, 1978), 518-24. See also, Douglas Wesley Boyce, "Tuscarora 
Political Organization, Ethnic Identity, and Sociohistorical Demography, 1711-1825" 
(Ph.D. diss., Dept, o f Anthropology, U. o f North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1973), 85- 
147.
5 For the effects o f these new borders see Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians, 
Settlers and the Northern Borderland o f  the American Revolution (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2006). For the place o f the Iroquois in New York state see Jack Campisi, 
"National Policy, State's Rights, and Indian Sovereignty: The Case of the New York 
Iroquois," in Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroquoian 
Studies, ed. Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi and Marianne Mithun (Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 1984), 95-108.
6 Landy, “Tuscarora Among the Iroquois,” 518-24. For subsequent efforts by Indians 
remaining in North Carolina to gain official recognition as Tuscaroras, see Gerald M. 
Sider, Living Indian Histories: Lumbee and Tuscarora People in North Carolina 
(Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 2003).
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